Exploring Asia: Understanding the Historic Roots of Regional Contemporary Challenges

Reviewing these four books altogether is not an easy task. They all refer to Asia, approaching the region from four different perspectives. Taken together, they can guide the reader through an interesting and innovative trip into this dynamic area as well as help Asian scholars to forecast the evolution of regional balance of power and strategic equilibrium in the near future.

Becoming Asia offers a very good background to the way in which the region has been built. Borrowing Prince Metternich’s characterisation of Italy before its unification, Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich state that at the end of World War II Asia was not much more than a geographical expression. While before the war most of the region had been colonised or dominated by foreign powers, during the war Japan managed to embrace most of East Asia. After the war many changes happened in Asia, and Becoming Asia represents a successful attempt to provide a systemic perspective on these complex developments, focusing on both outlook and actions of all single states and on the interactions of states and other forces within a regional and global context. The goal of the authors is ‘to provide an interpretative account of how Asia became a region of increasingly consequential nation-states, leading to a shift in the global center of gravity toward the region and prompting some observers to descry the advent of “the Asian century”’. ¹ At the same time, going beyond this extraordinary revolution the authors aim at describing the reasons why a few key issues have remained on top of the international agenda, such as Taiwan, the division of Korea and the threat of nuclear proliferation, the Kashmir issue, and the nuclearised Indian–Pakistani conflict.

The authors basically link the most important watershed that took place in Asia during the last few decades to two important historical events: World War II and the Cold War. It is argued that World War II, after weakening the European colonial powers and their capacity to maintain their empires in Asia, helped to inflame and mobilise local nationalistic spirits and convinced indigenous elites to strengthen independence movements. A challenging task for a region where the dissolution of pre-war empires created brand-new nation-states that for the previous four centuries had been subordinated to foreign powers. While during the Cold War Asia had been included in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to convince all countries to align with one of them, in the post-Cold War decades a growing economic interdependence following the consolidation of regional governments made local countries more powerful and regional relations stronger. It is argued that even if Asia is still lagging far behind Europe in developing regional bodies, it had progressed far from being a mere geographical expression: it had become Asia, a region with a sense of identity, growing self-confidence and a record of dynamic economic growth that prompted many to dub the new century the ‘Asian Century’. ² The authors are right in recognising that considering its starting point, Asia made a huge and rapid improvement. Great recessions clearly testify to this change. While in the late 1990s Asia had to look to Europe and the United States to be rescued, in 2008 the world asked Asia to ‘act as the locomotive to pull global economy back from the brink of a depression’. ³

Among the strengths of the book there is certainly the choice of using original documents to examine the mindsets and policy choices of the various protagonists in order to assess their goals, ideas and perspectives, to evaluate the effects of their decisions, and to consider whether they could be anticipated or not. This choice is particularly effective to avoid neglecting the importance played by the worries, priorities and interests leaders had at the time in which they had to take the decisions that shaped Asia. Among its weaknesses is probably the central role attributed to the United States in influencing regional development. Although it is a matter of fact that the United States played an important role in the area, it is contended whether Washington can be still considered a primary actor in it.

The authors are correct when they state that a very important question remains open in the region. Which is whether, and, if yes, when, Asia’s accrual of economic strength would translate into geopolitical power and, as a consequence, produce a fundamental shift in the regional and global balance of power. They are probably too pessimistic when affirming that there are too many obstacles hampering Asia’s ascent to a dominant role, such as ideological differences, economic rivalry, persisting nationalist conflicts and territorial issues. And they seem excessive when arguing that these long-term conflicts will inevitably keep the United States in Asia as its regional stabiliser. However, their arguments on these topics help to draw the background of the Asian security debate in which all other books can offer new insights. Indeed, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia and South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Security Predicament investigate three challenges ‘the new’ Asia is facing today: the lack of water and the consequent necessity of securing stable supply routes; the new challenges the ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention are facing in the Southeast Asia context; and the contemporary examples of regional insecurities in South Asia.

The water issue approached by Brahma Chellaney’s book is particularly hot as it is a matter of fact that ‘Asia faces a daunting water crisis that threatens its economic and political rise and environmental sustainability’, and that ‘water has emerged as a source of increasing competition and underlying discord between many Asian states striving for greater economic growth’. ⁴ Chellaney’s book shows that if the battles of yesterday were fought over land and those of today over energy, the ones of tomorrow might be fought over water. According to the author, the problems linked to the forthcoming water crisis will not only impact regional economic growth, but also have the potential to exacerbate long-time territorial disputes, and impose further hardships on the poor. Although Asia is crossed by many rivers and lakes, its huge population added to rising income levels and to an exploding economic and agricultural demand (70 percent of the world’s total irrigation originates in Asia) for water have made it the most water-scarce continent on a per capita basis. Its freshwater levels per capita are one-third those of Europe’s, and slightly less than Africa’s. Considering that many Asian water sources cross national boundaries, the rise of international tensions is inevitable.

Water: Asia’s New Battleground is definitely a pioneering study of Asia’s water politics and the relationships between freshwater, peace and security. Analysing the broad picture of ‘water-connected’ national interests, Chellaney not only highlights the security implications of resource-linked territorial disputes, but he also proposes real strategies to avoid conflict and bravely recommends a more equitable share of Asia’s water resources. Introducing his perspective on contemporary territorial disputes in Asia, Chellaney persuasively argues that the problems of sovereignty in Tibet and Kashmir, but also all along the Asian ‘hot’ borders, have not been solved only because regional governments are aware that the most precious loss connected to these disputes is not land but water.

Among the many strengths of this book there is certainly its capacity to treat a brand new problem in a smart way able to embrace its interdisciplinary nature ranging among geopolitics, environmental studies and geology. The author reminds on more than one occasion that Asia’s water crisis also deepens environmental risk in a part of the world which is already vulnerable because of its melting glaciers and densely populated coastal areas. Moreover, he stresses that Asia’s water ills can also be attributed to the large-scale impoundment of water by dams, barrages and other storage-creating structures. Proving his deep knowledge of the region, Chellaney is also able to link today’s water threats to a long regional history of connectivity in terms of water-sharing. He is right in claiming that ‘water wars’ have already been waged across the region via non-military means, fostering mistrust and hampering efforts towards greater cooperation. Accordingly, to forestall water conflict, he recommends three strategies: ‘The first is to build Asian norms and rules that cover trans boundary water resources. The second is to develop inclusive basin organizations encompassing transnational rivers, lakes, and aquifers in order to manage the water competition. And the third is to develop integrated planning to promote sustainable practices, conservation, water quality, and an augmentation of water supplies through non-traditional sources.’ ⁵ Finally, he suggests regional government to promote transparency in dispute settlements and to raise water efficiency and productivity at central and provincial governmental levels. Some scholars have considered as a weakness the fact that the book does not suggest what India could propose to mitigate the potential water conflict with China, what negotiating positions it could put on the table and what countermeasures it could take to protect its interests. However, even though the author is Indian, this book never pretends to be an assessment of New Delhi’s strategy on water issues.

Lee Jones’s ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia is another challenging book. Drawing on the fields of political economy and historical sociology, Jones dispels the overwhelming consensus among scholars that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) never interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and pioneers a new approach to the understanding of regional politics in Southeast Asia.

‘“Asean countries” consistent adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two Asean countries since the founding of Asean.… Let us maintain it in the twenty-first century.’ ⁶ This is a sentence pronounced by Singaporean Foreign Minister Shunmugam Jayakumar in 1997 and it expresses the main principle ASEAN is famous for: non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. However, Jones argues that while the principle of absolute non-interference is enshrined quite unambiguously in the protocol of ASEAN, the reality is more complex and subtle than it appears. Although it is true that ASEAN countries are famed for clinging to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and resisting the shift to ‘post-Westphalian’ sovereignty, the author claims that historical records show that they have also been involved in subversion, invasion, annexation, proxy warfare, peacekeeping, state-building and humanitarian interventions. Initiatives that do not exactly refer to the ‘non-interference’ ideal.

Starting from this contradiction, Jones bravely investigates what sovereignty really means in Southeast Asia today. Jones proves his argument with three case studies focusing on recent history in Burma, Cambodia and East Timor. Affirming that the way in which their crises have been handled, that is, using a selective application of sovereignty norms, helps in identifying the power struggles within Southeast Asian societies. According to Jones, not only can Southeast Asia not be considered the last bastion of absolute state sovereignty in the world, but scholars should admit that this idea is just an official rhetoric that cannot be proved by the facts. Indeed, while it is a popular to downplay exceptions to the norm, their scope and significance should not be minimised. Jones claims that until now nobody has really put together this evidence of exceptions or violations of sovereignty and looked for patterns in that evidence, assuming that this kind of evidence has been disregarded for three reasons. First, it is often uncomfortable and sensitive, especially in the context of the Cold War, when containment of a neighbour’s actions were key to reducing the state’s vulnerability to a domino effect, and this containment could be achieved by supporting separatist movements in neighbouring states or invading or annexing them. The second is that it reflects elite discourse. Jones explains that ASEAN elites often say they do not interfere in each other’s affairs, when in reality they do that in a loose and strategic way. The third is that non-intervention is a useful catch-all term for all of ASEAN’s shortcomings. For example, if ASEAN cannot address human rights, it can blame consensus or non-intervention for that. Asian scholars should be aware of this, as such an approach can prevent them from looking at the underlying causes for the weaknesses of regional governments.

Jones’s main argument exemplifies at the same time the strength and the weakness of his book: the strength because he introduces a brand new theory of interpreting Southeast Asian politics and regional integration; the weakness because three case studies, although solid and consistent, are not enough to demonstrate that the one he identifies as the general trend is the one that has always been dominant in Asia. Jones claims that ASEAN states have always intervened in the domestic affairs of other states while maintaining their strong rhetorical commitment to absolute sovereignty. However, he concludes by stating that, despite all, ‘abandoning non-interference in Southeast Asia, rather than solving problems, might well exacerbate and multiply them’. ⁷

The validity of this perspective is further proved by T.V. Paul in his book, South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Security Predicament, which argues that one of the reasons behind South Asia’s weakness and insecurity is linked to its proverbial incapacity to adopt an ASEAN-style non-intervention approach. Paul claims that South Asia, a region composed of eight states of different sizes and capabilities, is characterised by high levels of insecurity in interstate intrastate and human dimensions. It is explained that South Asian countries have not yet been able to settle most of their internal and external conflicts, and that some of them have become the epicentres of both traditional and non-traditional security problems. Moreover, Paul highlights that the region has not yet developed adequate institutional mechanisms and normative frameworks for solving its security challenges collectively and non-violently. As a consequence, ‘even when some conflicts are resolved, others emerge in their place, often leading to the continuation of the cycle of violence in other parts of the region’. ⁸

Starting from this precondition, Paul investigates the reasons behind South Asia’s chronic insecurity. After reviewing the main literature on this subject and highlighting that some of these reasons are linked to the existence of irreconcilable national identities, lack of political development, weak economies, unsettled territorial disputes and lack of regional institutions, the book argues that these factors explain insecurity only at interstate level, and that ‘a compelling explanation that can cover substantial ground for the perpetual multidimensional insecurity of South Asia’ ⁹ is still missing. Accordingly, the aim of the book becomes one of scrutinising the relationship between internal, interstate and human security dimensions in the region.

Paul grounds his multidimensional insecurity explanation on two factors – the presence of weak states and weak cooperative interstate norms – considering both as intervening variables in causing regional insecurity. This approach is particularly useful for scholars interested in comparing Southeast Asian with South Asian stability. Indeed, it helps to explain how effective a regional group like ASEAN can be, despite all its limitations, in a region with an extremely high insecurity rate. Paul proves that no matter how weak they are, norms of cooperative behaviour or standards of behaviour can provide a compensatory mechanism for preventing violent conflicts even among weak states. This is something that is not happening in South Asia because states in the region are not interested in committing to non-intervention norms. On the contrary, they are said to exhibit characteristics of revisionism at varying degrees, and are portrayed as not often willing to live following the imperative of the territorial status quo.

The main strength of this book lies in presenting a serious thinking on capacity- building and institution-based norm-building in South Asia. Further, the book successfully recommends the necessary changes South Asia should implement to emerge as a peaceful region. In particular, to transform the regional ‘vicious circle’ of conflict to a ‘virtuous circle’ of cooperative relationship. ¹⁰ To imagine how to build a pluralistic security community, Paul introduces a new system based on three pillars: institutions, democracies and economic interdependence. These three pillars are considered as mutually reinforcing and supporting. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Paul’s decision to dedicate a chapter to the challenges posed by each Asian country is particularly useful for readers that are not familiar with the region. This book in undoubtedly a welcome addition to the emerging literature on weak and failing states that has become a major field of inquiry in the international relations discipline around the world, and it is also helpful in reminding that despite important advances, South Asia remains plagued by insecurity, from the state to the human level. Some scholars also argue that Paul’s work is a useful contribution to regional as well as to broader literature, drawing lessons that can apply to weak states elsewhere in the world.

Although at first sight the only thing these four books seem to have in common is their Asian focus, it has already been argued that, altogether, they succeed in offering their readers some elements to forecast the evolution of the regional balance of power and strategic equilibrium in the near future. Chellaney’s and Jones’s books make clear that Asia, today, needs to face challenges going beyond traditional security and embracing natural resources provisions as well as non-traditional security challenges. Generally speaking, all authors agree that Asian contemporary priorities can help the region to build a solid and reliable balance of power that is better than the resolution of their traditional and historic divergences. Indeed, although they all recognise the limits of ASEAN consensus-based ‘weak’ integration, they also admit that this is a crucial ‘first step’ integration approach without which – as the case of South Asia demonstrates – not even a limited trust-building process could ever have been started. Accordingly, while hoping that this model will soon be upgraded to address new security challenges, such as the one of water provision, which could easily evolve into a dangerous regional destabilising factor, they also argue that without this consensus-based integration, the regional security background could have been even more precarious.

In conclusion, taken together, with the exception of Lyman Miller and Wich’s Becoming Asia which is easily accessible to readers who are not too familiar with Asian topics, these four books are useful tools for scholars interested in approaching Asian traditional challenges from a new perspective. Further, it is a matter of fact that with the help of Becoming Asia, non-Asian specialists can learn how to approach the other three texts to further deepen their knowledge about the region.