The Gates of Jerusalem: European revisionism and the populist radical Right

Abstract

In late 2010, the ‘European Freedom Alliance’, a group of four European politicians from populist radical right parties: Heinz-Christian Strache, Chairman of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ); Filip Dewinter, a senior leader in Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB); René Stadtkewitz, founder of Germany’s Die Freiheit; and Kent Ekeroth, the International Secretary for the Sweden Democrats (SD), travelled to Israel and the West Bank. Their trip culminated in the signing of the ‘Jerusalem Declaration’, a document conveying their staunch support for Israel and its right to defend itself against ‘Islamic aggression’. The author analyses key interviews and the Declaration to demonstrate how the event is indicative of a reformed and realigned populist radical Right. Open anti-Semitism, he argues, has been replaced by calls to prevent Islam’s supposed contamination of the nation’s cultural heritage and new positions are being adopted on post-national cooperation and European identity. Also, wider transformations in Western European politics have resulted in the populist radical Right increasingly framing the electorate’s insecurities as evidence of the cultural erosion of the nation state. Through comparing the experiences of Israelis with those of non-Muslims living in Europe, the Alliance argues for the need to toughen Europe’s defence against a common enemy.

Keywords

anti-Semitism European Freedom Alliance European identity Filip Dewinter Heinz-Christian Strache integration Islam Israel Jerusalem Declaration Palestine populist radical Right

While under normal circumstances a group of European politicians travelling to Israel and the West Bank would be rather unremarkable, the European Freedom Alliance in 2010 was no ordinary delegation. It was made up of representatives from four European populist radical right parties:¹ Heinz-Christian Strache, Chairman of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ); Filip Dewinter, a senior leader in Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB); René Stadtkewitz, founder of Germany’s Die Freiheit; and Kent Ekeroth, the International Secretary for the Sweden Democrats (SD). For most onlookers, it is nothing short of extraordinary to hear politicians on the populist radical Right, some of whom belong to parties with well-documented anti-Semitic roots, align themselves with Israel. Yet the trip follows a long list of declarations of support from like-minded politicians for a state that divides public opinion like no other. Ever since Gianfranco Fini, leader of the Italian ‘post-fascists’ and deputy prime minister, visited Israel in 2003 to mark his solidarity with the country as part of a wider process of modernisation and reorientation,² politicians on the realigned Right have been falling over one another to lavish praise on Israel as ‘a beacon of light’³ and an ‘outpost of democracy’.⁴ Indeed, as Fekete points out, for those incessantly obsessed with the threat of ‘Islamofacism’, defending Israel is now virtually of doctrinaire importance.⁵ But ignoring the less-than-subtle revisionism contained in such sentiments, this newfound love of Israel offers a revealing insight into a reformed and realigned populist radical right and the changing nature of conflict in Western European politics.

The European Freedom Alliance

The ‘European Freedom Alliance’,⁶ the banner under which the delegation travelled to Israel and the West Bank and the name of the Swiss-based thinktank that helped organise the trip, represents a converging of like-minded populist radical right parties with increasingly anti-Muslim positions.⁷ Following the 2005 departure of the party’s charismatic leader Jörg Haider, the FPÖ, under Heinz-Christian Strache’s leadership, has moved away from ‘traditional’ FPÖ topics such as revisionism and anti-Semitism and has begun to place a larger emphasis on Islam-related issues.⁸ This mirrors developments within Vlaams Belang, the party that succeeded the disbanded Vlaams Blok, which was convicted of breaching the Belgian law against racism in 2004. VB has softened its xenophobic stance and demands for forced repatriation, instead calling for the ‘repatriation of those who reject, deny or combat our culture and certain European values’;⁹ a coded form of anti-Muslim prejudice reflecting the party’s focus towards Muslims and Muslim immigrants. René Stadtkewitz, a former member of the Berlin state parliament for the Christian Democratic Party, founded Die Freiheit¹⁰ in October 2010 after his former party distanced itself from his outspoken criticism of Islam and support for Geert Wilders. During the party’s foundation, Stadtkewitz stressed ‘the need to stop Blaming Sarrazin’ for supposedly highlighting the problem of Muslim immigration.¹¹ And while the SD’s historical lineage lies in racism and neo-Nazism, the party has similarly attempted to transform itself since then.¹² The party no longer adheres to ‘classic’ biological racism and instead argues that a safe and harmonious society ‘depends on a high degree of ethnic and cultural likeness among the population’.¹³ This new cultural racism fits well to the party’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and Jimmie Åkesson, the party’s current leader, wrote in 2009, ‘I see this [Islam and Muslims in Sweden] as our biggest foreign threat since World War II, and I promise to do everything in my power to reverse the trend’.¹⁴

Trip to Israel and the West Bank

During the trip the politicians were received in the Israeli Knesset, where they met with Israeli parliamentarians, including Member of Knesset (MK) Rabbi Nissim Zeev from the Shas Party, ex-Deputy Minister MK Ayoob Kara from the Likud Party and also Eliezer Cohen, the ex-MK and ex-Air Force Officer who initiated the visit.¹⁵ While in Israel itself, the delegation visited Yad Vashem, Jerusalem’s much-revered Holocaust Memorial, the city of Ashkelon, which lies on the northern border of the Gaza Strip, and the city of Sderot and its Qassam Museum, which displays the Qassam rockets that have been fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip. Guided through the West Bank by Gershon Mesika, previously head of the Shomron Regional Settlement Council, the Alliance visited the Israeli settlement Ariel and, according to one report, ‘drove through Palestinian villages in a bulletproof bus to meet Jewish settlers in the desolate West Bank outpost of Har Bracha’.¹⁶ To conclude their trip, the four politicians published the ‘Jerusalem Declaration’, a statement of the groups’ ‘absolute’ recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in the face of ‘Islamic terrorism’. Whilst on their trip, the politicians also gave extended interviews¹⁷ to the Islam-critical and self-declared pro-Israeli¹⁸ German online platform Politically Incorrect. Needless to say, the trip was not without its controversies.¹⁹

Analysis of the trip

A close analysis²⁰ of the Politically Incorrect interviews with Strache, Dewinter, Stadtkewitz and Ekeroth as well as the Jerusalem Declaration, reveals fascinating insights into the delegation’s shared values and political objectives. What follows is a summary of how the Alliance – in both individuals’ interviews and the Declaration itself – describes and frames European identity, the threats facing Europe, how to protect Europe, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

On European identity

In his interview, Strache describes a Europe that is set apart by its ‘Germanic, Hellenistic culture’,²¹ which has been born out of ‘the enlightenment, [and] out of a Judeo-Christian consciousness (Wertebewusstsein)’. Islam, however, seemingly has little relation to Europe’s history and identity. Dewinter defines Islam as essentially opposed to European values, commenting that ‘I know that some naive politicians think in Europe that they can organise a sort of “enlightened Islam”, a European Islam. I will tell you, the only thing that will happen is not that we will have a European Islam but that is that [sic] Europe will be Islamised’. Also incompatible with Europe, according to Strache, is ‘the oppression of women [and] the oppression of people of a different religion’, practices that do not belong ‘in Europe, in an enlightened society’. By implicitly attributing these non-European practices to Islam, Strache defines Europe as liberal (through its acceptance of other religions and its non-oppression of women) and Islam, by default, as illiberal.

The Jerusalem Declaration states, ‘[t]he basis of our political activities is our steadfast recognition … of western civilisation’s set of values, which are based on the spiritual heritage of the Greek-Roman antiquity, on Judeo-Christian cultural values, on Humanism and on the enlightenment’. Portraying European identity in this manner couples the values celebrated by the four politicians with a strong historical lineage, defining Europe’s identity through its past and accounting less importance to the present. Strache adds a disclaimer to this portrayal of European history, declaring that ‘we have regrettably experienced various totalitarian aberrations in Europe, but we’ve left them behind us’ and that the Holocaust was ‘a tragedy, which is completely unimaginable for today’s generation’.

On threats facing Europe

Dewinter argues that the mere presence of Muslims in Europe is in itself a danger: ‘If Turkey becomes a member of the European Union that will mean once again eighty million Muslims, who will join the European Union, that means that Europe will come to about one hundred and twenty, one hundred and thirty million Muslims. Then it’s over and out for Europe.’ Put otherwise, for Europe to survive, the Muslim population needs to be kept to a minimum. Strache characterises this particular aspect of the ‘Muslim demographic threat’ in a similar fashion, stating that:

[T]he established parties don’t invest in a family policy (Familienpolitik) for European peoples, instead they get immigrants from the Middle East, from Islamic countries and bring them to Europe and we are [now] threatened to become a minority and thus I say, now we are faced with the situation, either the downfall of Europe or the salvation of Europe and I am fighting for the salvation of Europe (die Rettung Europas).

Hence the proposition is that any large increase in the number of Muslims living in Europe is per se dangerous. In both instances, Dewinter and Strache position themselves as individuals determined to ‘save’ Europe, framing their reaction as the position any ‘sensible’ person would take. It is implied that their ‘irresponsible’ opposites at home are unwittingly – or perhaps even knowingly – endangering Europe’s future. Dewinter later elaborates on the supposed consequences of an increased Muslim presence in European cities:

I think within eh eh 2 years, next local elections in 2012, we will be confronted with the first Muslim mayors in those districts, in different cities in our country. And we already see that whole neighbourhoods became Muslim neighbourhoods … The last Flemish people leaving those districts and that’s what the Muslims want, they want to create islands for themselves in our big cities, that’s their strategy and when they are … when they have a majority over there, then they are in power they install the Sharia and eh well these are sort of little Muslim republics into our own cities, and well I think this is only the beginning, because they eh will not stop, for them it’s not only too important to have small Muslims islands, where they have a majority, where they are in power in our cities, they want to be in power in the city as a whole. They want to be in power in our country as a whole. They want to be in power in Europe as a whole, that’s their main aim, they want to conquer, they want to conquer Europe for Islam, for the prophet Muhammad, for Allah.

Here the ‘Muslim threat’ relates to a seemingly innate trait within Muslims to always want more. Unless stopped, ‘they’ will allegedly continue to ‘conquer’. Not just Muslim immigrants, but ‘Islam’ itself is perceived by Dewinter to be a danger: ‘No Islam is not moderate! And there are no two or three or five different types of Islam, Islam is Islam and that’s it. And we have to understand that the Koran is the Koran eh and Islam is Islam.’ Islam thus becomes essentialised and non-changing. Elsewhere in the interview, Dewinter claims that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology and that it is not Islamic fundamentalists or certain followers of Islam who pose a threat; it is the (one and only) Islam that is aggressively threatening Europe:

[I]t’s more dangerous than National Socialism, why? Because National Socialism, Fascism, also Communism, these were political ideologies. Islam is a political ideology and also a religion so it makes it even danger … more dangerous than the totalitarian ideologies we knew in eh Europe in eh the thirties and forties.

Later in the interview, the comparison of Islam to Nazism is expanded upon: ‘[I]f you wanted to know what Hitler wanted to do with the Jews you only had to read Mein Kampf … Well if you want to know what Muslims uh no Islam is going to do eh well read the Koran, it’s all in the Koran, so read the Koran.’ A vivid and dangerous image of Islam is depicted, which rather than resembling totalitarian ideologies of the past actually outweighs them. This equation of fundamentalist Islam with totalitarianism is also to be found in the Jerusalem Declaration:

After the totalitarian systems of the twentieth Century were overcome, humanity is now faced with a new worldwide totalitarian threat: the fundamentalist Islam. We consider ourselves as part of the worldwide battle of defenders of democracy and human rights in the face of all totalitarian systems and their accomplices. As such we stand at the forefront of the battle for the Western-democratic community of values.

Besides Muslim immigrants and Islam, Islamic institutions are assigned distinctly threatening attributes. According to Strache, Europe has witnessed the growth of Muslim parallel and ‘counter-societies’ [Gegen-Gesellschaften], which, as alien to European society, are spreading non-European values. Likewise Mosques represent the ‘political abuse of a religion’ because they are places, ‘where religion, politics, societal and legal systems are connected with one another’.

The threat posed by ‘Muslims’ contrasts with the framing of ‘Jews’, whose behaviour or religious traditions are not explicitly criticised. Rather, it is the threats facing Jews that characterise Jewish existence in Europe. Consider the following comment from Strache:

[T]here are mass demonstrations in Vienna with 10,000, up to 10,000 Turks, who hold placards – which have also been photographically documented – with ‘Hitler wake up’ on them and monstrous anti-Semitic developments, and we are the only party in Austria, which strongly criticises and also fights this.

Such imagery suggests that Austrian Jews have much to fear in a city where thousands of Turkish anti-Semites are calling for Hitler’s return. Interestingly the FPÖ is framed as being firmly on the side of Austria’s Jewish population, unlike its political rivals. Also Dewinter suggests that the supposed totalitarian nature of Islam threatens the safety of ‘the Jewish people’:

Interviewer: ‘We have seen the cruelty that happened in the Nazi time against the Jews. There are some people who say Islam is a similar danger, not for … not only for all unbelievers, especially for the Jewish people. What do you think about that?’

Dewinter: ‘Well I think they are right, people who say that, I’m saying it also, I think that eh Islam is the green fascism, eh it’s also a totalitarian ideology.’

On protecting Europe

The reiterated ‘West versus Islam’ bloc character of the supposed clash results in calls for post-national lines of defence. Dewinter argues:

I want to stress this that we should unify, we should work together, we can’t stop Islamisation on our own. Only when we work together with all those Islam critical parties, with all those patriotic right-wing conservative parties in Europe, we have a chance to win. Look, the Muslims, even when they are divided in Sunnis, in Shiites and eh they are divided in all sorts of eh groups and so on and so on, if it really matters, they work together, they are first of all Muslim; the moderates and the radicals, the Sunnis and Shiites, the whatever, they work together. We should do the same, we should stand together for our common struggle against [sic] Islamisation of Europe.

Ekeroth makes similar remarks: ‘[I]t’s important not only Sweden or Belgium or whatever deals with the problem of Islamisation but we need to have a Europe that’s free of Islam/Islamisation, so I think it’s important to work together and it’s a um a good place to start.’ In this manner, Islamisation is presented as both a domestic and European danger; hence it is not only domestic opposition that is called for, but Europe-wide resistance. A dividing line appears between Islamisation and ‘Europe’, with Dewinter describing the ‘Muslim opposition’ as a superficially divided but in reality largely united bloc, requiring a counterweight of similar make-up. Opposition to Islam and mass immigration, in Ekeroth’s view, also helps to unite political parties of differing persuasions:

We have differences of course in our policies but what we’re talking about is the commonalities we have and also again regarding mass immigration, Islamisation and in those views we have pretty much the same views, eh what’s important for us is obviously democracy and its humanism, the western values, which we all share, so I think we have a lot in common there and a lot to work with.

Inspiration for such a pan-European movement, according to Strache, is also to be found in the founder of Zionism:

Theodor Herzl … who was a ‘German-conscious’ (Deutsch-bewusster) eh citizen with Jewish roots, actually founded Zionism out of this German national, free and liberal movement and one should also indeed … realise, there are many many similarities in the historical development and I say, perhaps we need … again a Theodor Herzl for the development of European, for the development of European Fatherlands, which are federally structured, where the diversity of the European peoples and the diversity of the cultures and the identities remains preserved.

Leaving aside the rather questionable assertion that Herzl’s inspiration was born out of the freedom offered to him by a free and liberal German movement, parallels seem to be drawn between a Zionist movement which sought a safe haven for Jews and a possible solution to safeguard Europe’s future. It is worth noting that Strache claims that, ‘Theodor Herzl lived in Austria, was a member of a student fraternity (Waffenstudent) like me, we are, I mean, I am often vilified’. He thus portrays himself as a Herzl-like figure fighting for the survival of Europe.

On top of these general calls for Europe-wide resistance, the European Freedom Alliance details how this resistance ought to be implemented. There are calls from Strache to deal with ‘Islamism’ in a decidedly tough manner: ‘Tolerance of the intolerant, that cannot be allowed. And if in Islamism one is fully intolerant of those of another religion and of Christians and of Jews, well then one can’t be tolerant of the intolerant.’ Dewinter comments that diplomacy is of little use:

I think it was Winston Churchill, who once said, ‘those who keep on feeding the crocodile the only thing that will happen [sic] that [they] will be eaten the last’ but they will be eaten, so don’t feed the crocodile, kill the crocodile … Islam is a predator and a predator goes for the weakest victim, and we are weak, we Europeans we are weak because we don’t … we no longer believe in ourself [sic], we don’t … we no longer believe in our own … believe in our culture, in our civilisation, in our own moral values, and that’s what makes us very weak, that makes us a victim, a weak victim for the predator that is Islam.

Described as a ‘predator’, Islam is depicted not only as a primitive and savage religion, but the term suggests that any attempts to ‘fend it off’ would require some force. In contrast, contemporary European society is negatively portrayed as a weak victim, insinuating that it needs to be strengthened. Also Stadtkewitz comments that those, ‘who believe, that one can establish peace through looking away, through evasiveness, they are mistaken’. Hence the interviewees are at odds with ‘those’ naive individuals who apparently do not fully apprehend the danger posed by fundamentalist Islam. Besides abstract calls for a tougher approach, there are demands for concrete steps to be taken. Dewinter, for instance, calls Muslim voting rights into question:

In my country [the] progressive socialist and green parties … will do everything to please the Muslim community in our countries, and that’s very very dangerous, it’s not as they say over here in Israel ‘land for peace’, it’s eh Muslim rights for votes and well that’s not the way eh we should do it, not at all.

It is inferred that the ‘Socialist and Green Parties’, which seek the votes of Muslims, accommodate demands that are presumably dangerous for Belgium. Using the metaphor of ‘Land for peace’, invokes an additional element of danger in ‘Muslim votes’. Earlier in the interview Dewinter remarks:

I know that eh the policy of the Israelian [sic] state was ‘land for peace’ but they gived [sic] the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip land, autonomy, their own state and what did the Israelians [sic] get back? Peace, not really, because until today, almost every day there are mortar attacks coming out of the Gaza [sic].

On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Much can be discerned from the following excerpts from Strache’s interview:

It was great [to be here] in Israel … We visited the West Bank in order to speak with the settlers living there and also to personally witness some of the difficulties facing the settlers … we [had] a very very open and warm dialogue here in Israel and eh have finally also through observing the local problems also, I believe, developed a stronger and better understanding of the problems there.

[I]t was also certainly interesting for once to hear the Settler’s side [of the argument] … We have discovered that the 300,000 Jewish settlers are not eh living over there in eh some kind of hmm well temporary-like buildings, um they are actually long terms projects with permanent homing and eh also settlements, which have been sustainably built, [and] have also contributed something to the region.

In his description, the Israeli settlers as well as ‘the local problems’ are identified as going unnoticed by ‘others’ (one can presume the mainstream parties and media). The settlers are depicted as responsible individuals who have positively contributed to the region. Ekeroth similarly describes a situation in which the reality of life in Israel is little known or misunderstood:

Well it’s hard to get an impression how hard it is to live in Sderot just being there for an hour or so, eh but of course to have rockets fired at you, no other country in the world would tolerate it, but Israel is expected to from the international community which I think is wrong. I think it’s in their right and I think it’s their obligation to defend themselves against attacks from the Arabs.

The ‘international community’ and leftwing parties are characterised through their opposition to Israel and their lack of understanding of life in the country, whilst supposedly also denying Israel the right to defend itself. Indeed Dewinter claims, ‘[the Israelis] know who are their allies and who are their enemies. We are their allies; the left-wing parties in Europe are their enemies’.

Rather than taking sides, support of Israel is framed as the logical outcome of a deep understanding of the conflict. An act of reasonableness, against which, claims Stadtkewitz, no right-minded person could object: ‘[I] can only say, if each of us is prepared … to clearly position themselves, to stay on the side of Israel, then I can hardly fathom, what one can have against that.’ Similarly the Jerusalem Declaration claims that, ‘Israel as the only genuine democracy in the Middle East is an important counterpart in this troubled region’, while Strache comments that any ‘reasonable person’ can understand Israel’s actions:

10,000 rockets have been fired at Israeli territory in the last years and if as father or mother one must daily fear to lose their child, that … well these are circumstances, which nobody in Europe or in the world can imagine, and every reasonable person, who is confronted with such problems, ultimately [wants] it to end.

This sentiment is echoed in the Jerusalem Declaration’s support for ‘Israel’s right of self-defence against all aggression, especially against Islamic terror’.

The politicians interviewed, to varying degrees, all position Israel and themselves on the same side of the same struggle. Consider Dewinter’s summary of the trip to Israel:

[T]his was a unique eh opportunity to come to Israel and to show our solidarity and to express also our solidarity towards the Jewish people eh in our common struggle against Islamisation. Look, the Israelians [sic] … they are an outpost of this struggle, this struggle, this clash of civilisations, eh and we in Europe, we’re fighting the same battle: the battle against radical Islam against Islamisation.

Strache invokes the same thesis, claiming that Israel ‘represents a frontline in this conflict, if you like, in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, which is actually taking place’.²² In addition, Ekeroth alleges, ‘Israel is in the same struggle as we are and they are in the forefront of it eh so I’d say we are very much in the same struggle’. The apparent similarity of the threat facing both Europe and Israel, according to Stadtkewitz, even has the potential to unite those Europeans who otherwise have their differences:

[E]ach party of course has its own ideas, its goals, also has differences, [that’s] quite clear, in other areas of policy for sure much more um, but we are united in this respect, in this point and I believe that [as] the result of the collective experience of … the danger posed by Islam that one inevitably comes to the conclusion that Israel, as a country, which is on the frontline of this confrontation, um is a partner for us and that Israel’s freedom is also our own freedom.

It is a similarity that prompts calls for similar tactics of defence. Stadtkewitz states that, ‘we also need to keep it [Islamic terrorism] at bay and the same also goes for Israel: do not yield one millimetre to this Islamic terror, not one millimetre to the Jihad, not one millimetre to the ideology of Islam’.

Still, the problems facing Israel and Europe are portrayed as containing some distinguishable elements. Dewinter describes the diverging situations as such: ‘Over here [in Israel] you have the military Jihad, you have the Jihad of the violence, in Europe we also had some terror attacks, but have the cultural Jihad, we have the demographical Jihad, we have the immigration Jihad.’ Ekeroth in a similar fashion claims that, ‘Israel suffe… is suffering from the onslaught of Islam in a very concrete sense with rockets and so on and so forth, we have it in a more of a … subtle way in Europe’.

Whilst Europe and Israel are considered to be remarkably similar, the lives of Palestinians are of little interest to the European Freedom Alliance. Indeed, rather than refer to Palestinians as such, a variety of other terms are employed in the texts. Strache, for instance, does not once refer to Palestine or Palestinians in his interview. Instead he refers to the ‘Arab world’, conjuring up an image of a large uniform group of ‘Arabs’. Also Ekeroth, who was interviewed in the Israeli settlement Ariel, a settlement some 16km east of the Green Line²³ and thus situated inside the West Bank, comments without irony: ‘it’s always interesting to see how close they [the settlements] are to the Arab villages’. The Palestinians become Arabs who live in ‘villages’, denoting a degree of simplicity to their lives while simultaneously reducing their presence in size. There is no mention made of the fact that the proximity of the ‘Arab villages’ owes much to the fact that the West Bank is recognised by most parts of the international community as Palestinian territory. Ekeroth elaborates on this point further, stating, ‘I actually read up on the legal status of Judea, Samaria, and also Gaza, and eh and from my point of view, from what I’ve learned, it’s a [sic] legal settlements and eh it’s not a Palestinian territory in the first place eh since there’s never been a Palestinian people or a state.’²⁴ Note the use of the words ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’; biblical terms to refer to the West Bank, used by, among others, the Israeli authorities. Dewinter refers to ‘the so-called West Bank, the so-called occupied territories, they [the Israelis] call it Judea, Samaria’. And Stadtkewitz highlights the ‘exclusive’ historical connection between the West Bank and the Israelis who live there: ‘well, eh it is the wrong wording if one says the Jews calls it Samaria and Judea. It is Samaria and Judea and it is for my, in my opinion clearly the land of the Jewish people’. Hence the Alliance characterises the West Bank as a non-Palestinian entity with little or no connection to the non-Jews who live there. Seen in this light, Palestinian ownership of the West Bank makes little sense. Or in Dewinter’s words, ‘[a] solution will not be found eh in taking away the land of the Jews by taking away Samaria and Judea from the Jews’.

In response to the question, ‘would it perhaps be the best solution, a large Israeli state with full rights for the Muslim-Arabic population?’, Stadtkewitz answers, ‘I believe that would actually be the best solution, it is naturally difficult for us to understand, we would presume that everyone [would] rather live in a free democratic society than allow themselves to be dominated by an ideology.’ In his portrayal, some Palestinians irrationally favour domination over democracy; if they did not, then they surely could have no problem with Israel controlling all of the West Bank. Put otherwise, Israeli control of the West Bank is the only rational and sensible option.

As opposed to the ‘unqualified recognition of the right to existence’ offered to Israel, Palestine is neither referred to nor is its existence mentioned in the Jerusalem Declaration. The individual politicians, however, take a more nuanced stance. Stadtkewitz considers ‘the creation of a state for the Palestinians … absurd, because … that means the end of Israel in the long run’. While Dewinter does acknowledge that ‘Palestinians have the right to self determination’, he qualifies this statement by claiming that, ‘at this moment, I think that this right of self-determination is abused by eh organisations like Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad, and maybe even the PLO, for um their fundamentalistic … Islamic eh agenda eh and that’s a pity’.

From nationalist anti-Jewish hatred to European philo-Semitism

When one considers recent transformations that have taken place within populist radical right parties in Western Europe, the results of the analysis are not wholly surprising. Far-right nationalists and social conservatives have indeed long treated Europe’s Jews with contempt and hatred. But following the horrors of the Holocaust, there is a perception that anti-Semitism has lost much of its ‘credibility’ in post-war Western Europe. As Mudde points out: ‘Despite different interpretations of the war period between and within countries, there exists a strong consensus that the Holocaust was the epitome of evil and that anti-Semitism is unacceptable.’²⁵ This is not to claim that anti-Semitism has disappeared²⁶ or to dismiss the very real racism facing Jews in Western Europe. Rather, as Bunzl argues, the message of ‘all political parties with any degree of influence, is based neither on anti-Semitism or on anti-Zionism, but on their conjoined repudiation’.²⁷ In fact, as Williams in her analysis of the populist radical Right in Western Europe writes, ‘Jews have become a highly desired constituent for some far right parties seeking to expand their legitimacy and also to expand their base of electoral support.’²⁸ Similarly others observe ‘an increasing number of acknowledgments by some extreme-right parties of the Jewish contribution to European culture’,²⁹ whereby references to Europe’s ‘Judeo-Christian heritage’ are crude manifestations of a cultural realignment in which Jews are increasingly constructed as allies in the struggle over Europe’s future.³⁰

While it is certainly of some comfort that hatred of Jews is no longer in vogue, Betz sadly reminds us that ‘the disavowal of anti-Semitism is intricately linked to the Western European populist right’s broader anti-Islamic ideological turn, which targets Western Europe’s Muslim migrant community as the main enemy, eclipsing any other (including the Jews)’.³¹ In the process, Islam is erased from European history along with centuries of anti-Jewish persecution. Prejudice against and exclusion of Muslims, however, is based not on biological superiority, but on the need to protect against cultural contamination at the hand of backward and alien cultures.³² It is a narrative often reflected in government policies and media campaigns,³³ resulting in an ever-wider audience becoming receptive to the populist radical Right’s strong cultural opposition to Islam.³⁴

It is also noteworthy that criticism of an ineffective and bureaucratic Brussels does not necessarily reduce its support for a strong set of European nation states.³⁵ Western Europe has become a battleground for European rightwing nationalists, a contested space in which like-minded populist radical Right parties are increasingly joining forces.³⁶ Likewise debates surrounding Turkey’s possible accession to the EU are characterised in much the same way, with Ankara’s exclusion demanded on the basis of its supposed non-European and Islamic character.³⁷As Bunzl notes, ‘Islamophobes are not particularly worried whether Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes. Rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interest of national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe.’³⁸

Cultural conflict and the populist radical Right

Whilst Western European populist radical Right parties have developed a cultural identity less at odds with contemporary norms and ideals, wider transformations in the political sphere have led to other strategic changes. Kriesi et al. and Bornschier argue that a detailed reading of Western European political systems reveals a weakening of traditional class and religious divisions.³⁹ As a result of the processes of globalisation, these conflicts have transformed into disputes over global market integration on the one hand and contrasting conceptions of cultural identity on the other. The traditional pro-state position has become more protectionist while the pro-market position now favours the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets. Contrasting visions of community and national identity have come to underscore the cultural line of conflict, whereby universalistic conceptions of community and individual autonomy are pitted against calls to preserve traditional communities supposedly threatened by a multicultural society. The socio-economic conflict culminates in calls for protection against global economic competition, while the cultural conflict results in demands for protection from cultural competition, i.e. from ‘foreign’ cultures that are supposedly challenging citizens’ life styles, their everyday practices and their fundamental position in society.

The problem is that mainstream parties, formed in terms of earlier conflicts, no longer speak to large segments of the electorate, particularly those who seek further economic and cultural protection. Added to this is the difficulty of convincingly integrating these two modified lines of conflict, as well as the prevailing neoliberal consensus that overshadows alternative economic ideas. As a result, the electorate’s insecurities are increasingly translated into issues of ‘culture’, a situation which provides the populist radical Right with fertile ground to reap new successes. Carving out an uncompromising stance on cultural issues, the lowest common denominator for the mobilisation of its potential voters, the populist radical Right has exploited an electoral niche by ‘playing to its strengths’. The Left, though open to economic protectionism, adopts a culturally open stance that is detrimental to its success in highly charged debates on cultural issues. A situation ensues in which the electorate is increasingly voting on the basis of cultural values, even if matters of economics still continue to hold a great deal of influence over their political convictions. Or as Magnus Marsdal, in his analysis of the Norwegian Progress Party summarises:

The political demobilizing of class conflicts does not take place because most voters have come to emphasize value issues more than class, which they have not, but rather because, under the neo-liberal élite consensus on class issues, confrontation on moral and cultural issues (‘values’) has become the only available means of party-political and ideological demarcation.⁴⁰

Hence questions of culture, values and identity are vital for the future success of the populist radical Right.

Conclusion

With a large consensus in Western Europe repudiating Nazism, biological racism and anti-Semitism, reference to Europe’s Jewish heritage during the Alliance’s visit to Israel and the West Bank helps disassociate it from extremist rightwing factions. Yet, the interviewees go one step further. Rather than simply disassociate themselves from past totalitarian digressions, they frame Islam as the new totalitarian threat facing Europe and insinuate that it is not Nazis that Europe’s Jews have to fear, but Muslims. Positioning Muslims as Europe’s (new) anti-Semites results in a novel ‘othering’ of Islam. As a supposedly totalitarian and anti-Semitic religion, it is the antithesis of the European Freedom Alliance’s non-totalitarian and Judeo-Christian Europe.

With regard to the ‘threats’ facing Europe and its ‘peoples’, the Alliance utilises the fears of concerned citizens in a rapidly changing world. By referring to mosques as hotbeds of extremism, comparing the Qur’an to Mein Kampf, and alluding to the supposed existential threat that Muslim immigration poses to Europe, the delegation reinforces the perception that citizens’ lifestyles are indeed at risk, enhancing the parties’ position as ‘the only ones’ standing up for endangered local communities. Staking out an explicit cultural and religious identity, and linking it inextricably with Europe’s lineage, is undoubtedly helpful in furthering the politician’s credentials as bearers of tradition. The consensus among the interviewees regarding pan-European co-operation accentuates the seriousness of this apparent danger.

In terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while the dangers facing Israelis are allegedly ignored and dismissed by the mainstream parties, it is the European Freedom Alliance that is willing to defend and relate to those otherwise disregarded. Portraying themselves as the defenders of the undefended, the politicians are then sending out a clear message to others who may similarly feel unfairly treated by ‘those in power’. The existence of a Palestinian polity is either not recognised or dismissed as a hoax and Palestinian demands for self-determination are viewed as little more than a means to an end, namely the destruction of Israel. Depicted as having no historical connection to the lands where they live, Palestinians are expected to either assimilate to life in Israel, or find somewhere else to go. Offering ‘them’ concessions would supposedly only help other ‘Arabs’ to use Palestinian territory to attack Israel. The delegation’s repudiation of Palestinian existence mirrors the same patterns of exclusion with regard to Europe: ‘their’ traditions belong elsewhere; ‘they’ must assimilate or leave; ‘they’ harbour plans to conquer ‘us’. Indeed, the politicians go to great lengths to emphasise the similarities between Israel and Europe. First, both supposedly share the same cultural fabric, history and values. Second, the dangers facing Europe and Israel are highly similar, if not the same. That is to say, Israel is a European state and what applies to Israel de facto applies to Europe (and vice versa).

This is of some significance. By implicitly equating the anxieties of Israelis with those of the electorate in their home countries, the European Freedom Alliance is thus attempting to redefine the character of the political conflict in their home countries. By transporting the contours of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict onto the situation in Europe, the actions proposed by the Israeli government could, thus, be justifiably applied by European governments. As Sutcliffe observes:

Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beitenu party … advocates from within government policies what few European far-Right groupings dare openly avow for their own societies. However, the appeal of the notion of the expulsion of Arabs undoubtedly surpasses its expression, and the unchallenged circulation of such ideas in one country facilitates their freer ventilation elsewhere.⁴¹

By reiterating Israel’s legitimate and reasonable exercise of force, the politicians validate their own fierce proposals (no votes for Muslim rights; expulsion for those who do not wish to assimilate) for solving a supposedly indistinguishable problem in Europe. In a sense, to paraphrase Fekete, they are removing Muslims from their immediate environment and linking them to a homogenous and repressive global Islam.⁴²

While this analysis is admittedly centred on the trip itself, it sheds some further light on the wider phenomenon of Western European populist radical right parties increasing support for Israel. Through contextualising and interpreting the trip to Israel and the West Bank in line with wider developments in Western European politics, I have attempted to detail the manner in which the European Freedom Alliance utilised the simmering animosities underlining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to further its own agenda. Taken more broadly, it suggests that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is serving as a vehicle with which the populist radical right can illustrate not only their disavowal of anti-Semitism and the contours of their new enemy, but can also mobilise support for their uncompromising conception of Europe and more protectionist policies against Muslim communities, now deemed ‘Europe’s Palestinians’.

Footnotes

Omran Shroufi is an MA Political Science graduate from the Freie Universität Berlin, where he specialised in anti-racism, European identity and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

References

The term ‘populist radical Right’ is borrowed from Mudde’s research. While it may not be perfect, I think the term embodies the three central tenets of populist parties on the Right, i.e. they are distinctly populist, are radically opposed to state-sponsored pluralism and adhere to a rightist conception of the nation state. At the same time, it is important to recognise that these parties differ from fascist and neo-Nazi groupings in that they reflect a large consensus within Western European society which supports democracy and is opposed to biological racism. Others using the term ‘radical Right’ or ‘new Right’ are largely analysing the same phenomenon. See Mudde

, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Sutcliffe

, ‘The unfinished history of philosemitism’, Jewish Quarterly (Vol. 58, no. 1, 2011), p. 68. As Sutcliffe also mentions, Fini declared in 2008 that ‘the burning of the Israeli flag by left-wing protesters in Turin was “much more serious” than the murder of a young Italian by skinhead gangs on the same day’, ibid.

Speech by Geert Wilders, Tel Aviv (5 December 2010), available at: http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1731-speech-geert-wilders-tel-aviv-december-5-2010#sthash.JaNvGD4p.dpuf.

In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Filip Dewinter claimed in 2005 that ‘Israel is a sort of outpost for our Western society, an outpost of democracy, of freedom of speech, of protecting common values within a hostile environment’; see Schwartz

, ‘Between Haider and a hard place’, Haaretz (28 August 2005), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/between-haider-and-a-hard-place-1.168287.

Fekete

, ‘The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre’, Race & Class (Vol. 53, no. 3, 2012).

Not to be confused with the European Alliance for Freedom, see below.

The trip to Israel is just one instance of cross-national alliances between the parties in recent years. In 2005, the FPÖ’s thinktank, Die Freiheitliche Akademie, organised an international conference with the FPÖ, the Front National and the VB in attendance. Also ‘Cities against Islamization’ brought together the FPÖ, VB, and the German movement ‘pro-Köln’. The FPÖ, VB and the SD previously worked together alongside other like-minded parties such as Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid in the pan-European ‘European Alliance for Freedom’, an officially recognised grouping in the European Parliament (EP) from 2011 until 2014. Out-manoeuvred by UKIP’s Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, the group failed to secure the support of members from seven member states following the 2014 EP elections and is no longer officially represented.

For instance, a 2008 policy position paper argued that the occidental Christian culture must be defended against Islam. Similarly a 2009 European election slogan called for the ‘Occident in hands of Christians’, as cited by Rosenberger

Leila

H-A.

, ‘Anti-Islamic mobilization of the extreme eight in Austria’, in Mammone

Godin

Jenkins

, eds, Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p. 153.

As cited by Erk

, ‘From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: the Belgian far-right renames itself’, West European Politics (Vol. 28, no. 3, 2005), p. 495.

10.

The current chairperson of Die Freiheit is Michael Stürzenberger, who incidentally also interviewed the European Freedom Alliance on behalf of Politically Incorrect. Indeed he makes very little attempt to hide his political views in many of the questions he puts to the interviewees. For instance, in his interview with Dewinter he asks: ‘Tell us a bit more about the situation in Belgium. We hear in Brussels the most em popular name of newborn babies is Muhammad. Ehm how is the state of Islamisation in Belgium nowadays?’

11.

As cited by Schellenberg

, ‘Developments within the Radical Right in Germany: discourses, attitudes and actors’, in Wodak

Khosravinik

Brigitte

, eds, Right Wing Populism in Europe: politics and discourse (London, Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 154. Thilo Sarrazin is the controversial ex-board member of the German Federal Bank who claimed Muslims in Germany were both integrationsunwillig (unwilling to integrate) as well as integrationsunfähig (unable to integrate).

12.

Jansson

Mikael

, then leader of the SD, wrote an article in 2000 titled, ‘Our loathing of Nazism’, see Oja

Mral

, ‘The Sweden Democrats came in from the cold: how the debate about allowing the SD into media arenas shifted between 2002 and 2010’, in Wodak et al., ibid., p. 280.

13.

As cited by Widfeldt

, ‘Party change as a necessity – the case of the Sweden Democrats’, Representation (Vol. 44, no. 3, 2008), p. 272.

14.

As cited by Mulinari

Neergaard

, ‘We are Sweden Democrats because we care for others: exploring racisms in the Swedish extreme right’, European Journal of Women’s Studies (Vol. 21, no. 1, 2014), p. 48.

15.

Primor

, ‘The unholy alliance between Israel’s Right and Europe’s anti-Semites’, Haaretz (12 December 2010), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-unholy-alliance-between-israel-s-right-and-europe-s-anti-semites-1.330132.

16.

Theil

, ‘Far-Right politicians find common cause in Israel’, Newsweek (27 February 2011), available at: http://www.newsweek.com/far-right-politicians-find-common-cause-israel-68583.

17.

For the four interviews with Politically Incorrect, see Israeli Reise - Interview René Stadtkewitz, Jerusalem (8 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch-CLIMThHQM; Israeli Reise - Interview Filip Dewinter, Jerusalem (8 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcqgXFLpPSY; Israeli Reise - Interview Heinz-Christian Strache, Jerusalem (7 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkhq60h-Xz0; Israeli Reise - Interview Kent Ekeroth, Settlement of Ariel (6 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksDmYmvgE3E. The Jerusalem Declaration is available (in German) at: http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20101207_OTS0199/fpoe-strache-jerusalemer-erklaerung.

18.

The platform’s motto is: ‘News Against the Mainstream – Pro-American – Pro-Israeli – Against the Islamisation of Europe – for Constitution and Human Rights.’

19.

According to Der Spiegel, during the visit to Yad Vashem, Strache chose to wear ‘a cap that identified him as a lifelong member of the right-wing student fraternity Vandalia’, a student fraternity long associated with Pan-German nationalism and anti-Semitism; see Mayr

, ‘Right-Wing Populists on the Rise: Austria’s Freedom Party goes from strength to strength’, Spiegel Online (14 July 2011), available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/right-wing-populists-on-the-rise-austria-s-freedom-party-goes-from-strength-to-strength-a-774255.html; See also Thiel, op. cit.

20.

Adapting Reisigl and Wodak’s approach to discourse analysis, the Discourse Historical Approach, which was developed specifically to investigate anti-Semitism in Austria to show how individuals establish and reaffirm racist images and concepts, I analysed the nomination, predication and framing strategies employed by the European Freedom Alliance in their interviews and in the Jerusalem Declaration itself. Note that Reisigl and Wodak also analyse two additional strategies: argumentation and intensification/mitigation. See Reisigland

Wodak

, Discourse and Discrimination: rhetorics of racism and anti-Semitism (London, Routledge, 2001).

21.

This and all following translations from German to English are mine – the interviews with Strache and Stadtkewitz took place in German.

22.

Strache, however, in contrast to the other participants on the trip, takes extra measures to stress his party’s apparent neutrality, evident in his amendment to the Jerusalem Declaration: ‘[I]t is important to stress the Austrian neutrality and the political tradition since Bruno Kreisky … and we feel bound to this neutral position.’

23.

B’Tselem, Ariel Settlement Fact Sheet (2012), available at: http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20100830_facts_on_the_settlement_of_ariel.

24.

It is unclear what Ekeroth is referring to; since 2005 there are in fact no Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. Such a statement calls into question his earlier assertion that ‘I actually read up on the legal status’ of Gaza.

25.

Mudde, op. cit., p. 80.

26.

For instance, a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey in 2008 showed that 20 per cent of respondents in France, 25 per cent in Germany and 46 per cent in Spain still harboured prejudice against Jews, cited by Williams, op. cit., p. 125. Similarly the situation in Eastern Europe differs somewhat, where populist radical right parties in, for instance, Hungary or Poland, are much more openly anti-Semitic.

27.

Bunzl

, Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago, Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007), p. 29. See also Ansari

Hafez

, ‘Islamophobia: an introduction’, in Ansari

Hafez

, eds, From the Far Right to the Mainstream: Islamophobia in party politics and the media (Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2012), p. 23.

28.

Williams op. cit., p. 128.

29.

Zúquete

, ‘The European Extreme-Right and Islam: new directions?’, Journal of Political Ideologies (Vol. 13, no. 3, 2008), p. 329.

30.

This is also true of populist radical Right parties in highly secularised societies, with parties like the Danish People’s Party combining secular liberal values with traditional ‘Judeo-Christian’ ones, see Betz

H-G.

Meret

, ‘Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe’, Patterns of Prejudice (Vol. 43, no. 3–4, 2009), p. 333. For an excellent account of the populist radical Right’s newfound love of Judeo-Christian culture, see Bunzl, op. cit.; see also Zúquete , op. cit., p. 330.

31.

Betz

H-G.

, ‘Mosques, minaret, burqas and other essential threats: the populist right’s campaign against Islam in Western Europe’, in Wodak et al., op. cit., p. 79.

32.

See Fekete

, ‘Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the right’, Race & Class (Vol. 48, no. 2, 2006), pp. 7–12.

33.

For a rigorous overview of how government policies and media campaigns in a post 9/11 world have been quick to interpret any unrest within predominately Muslim communities as a sign of cultural difference, see Fekete

, A Suitable Enemy: racism, migration and Islamophobia in Europe (London, Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 43–73.

34.

A 2012 poll in Britain showed that 37 per cent of respondents would likely vote for a political party were it to halt Muslim immigration and reduce the presence of Islam in society; cited in Townsend

, ‘Voters more likely to back an anti-Muslim party than reject it – poll’, The Observer (16 September 2012), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/16/voters-support-anti-immigrant-party.

35.

As suggested in slogans like the Front National’s ‘No to Maastricht – yes to a Europe of Fatherlands’, cited in Mudde op. cit., p. 165; similarly, in a 2008 speech, Strache said: ‘We say: Patriots of all the countries of Europe, unite! Because only together will we solve our problems’, cited in ‘EU Far-Right Groups to Form Party’, BBC News (25 January 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7210036.stm.

36.

See Mudde op. cit., pp. 174–7.

37.

Such sentiments are not limited to the populist radical Right and also appear in the comment pages of European broadsheet newspapers.

38.

Bunzl, op. cit., p. 13.

39.

I borrow heavily here from the work of Kriesi et al. and Bornschier and their analyses of contemporary Western European politics. They suggest that political actors now operate within a space more differentiated than the classical ‘left versus right’ division of politics. What is particularly interesting is the link they draw between the salience of cultural conflict and the success of the populist radical Right. See Bornschier

, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: the new cultural conflict in Western Europe (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2010); Kriesi

Grande

Lachat

Dolezal

Bornschier

Frey

, eds, West European Politics in the Age of Globalisation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kriesi

Grande

Dolezal

Helbling

Höglinger

Hutter

Wüest

, eds, Political Conflict in Western Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).

40.

Marsdal

M. E.

, ‘Loud values, muffled interests: third way social democracy and right-wing populism’, in Wodak et al., op. cit.

41.

Adam Sutcliffe , ‘Power and the politics of prejudice’, in Bunzl

Matti

, ed., Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago, Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007).

42.

Fekete (2009), op. cit., p. 125.