Abstract
In this book, editor and contributing author, Martine Herzog-Evans, together with renowned experts, offers a systematic analysis of how early release is organized in different European countries and in the United States. Conscious that the system is embedded in a specific jurisdiction and is a product of a specific path, she draws the thesis that a thorough comparison of early release systems should allow us to assess the ideal early release system, whether automatic (mandatory) or discretionary, and whether the decision to release an offender from prison should be taken by an executive body or a court.
No quantitative study answers both questions. They are so rare that the editor chose to reprint a study of Amy Solomon et al., which identified a modest positive effect of discretionary release to supervision for some categories of offenders only.
Reading the contributions of the authors providing a qualitative approach, the first lesson is that the closer one looks, the foggier the picture becomes: Automatic release is not as mandatory as its name suggests, and discretionary systems are often restricted by rules and procedures, coming close to quasi-mandatory themselves.
Kevin Reitz confirms this insight by stating “Sentencing structure is not destiny” (p. 100). It is necessary to comprehend the system in all its aspects and, as suggested by various authors, answer such questions as how is readiness for release considered by the decision makers, which kind of information is taken into account, is agency considered, and what follows exactly after early release?
Of course the functionality of early release should not be forgotten. What, exactly, is its purpose: resettlement and less reoffending? While some jurisdictions value rehabilitation as its purpose in their constitution, other jurisdictions are silent on the issue. There is nevertheless a second purpose associated with early release: the regulation of the prison population. Whereas it is legitimate to address prison overcrowding by releasing offenders early, the critical question is whether this back door strategy is consistent with the criminal justice system as a whole.
Lack of a clear purpose and consistency, when reorganizing criminal justice systems, is argued by some of the authors. In England and Wales, Belgium and France, a growing lack of proportionality and a shift toward more executive decision making are observed. In England, a gain in flexibility is countered by a loss of transparency. In France and Belgium, the zigzagging reform process led to a bifurcated system producing inequality.
Germany and Denmark were able to improve their early release practices, the expertise of the decision makers, as well as the collaboration with relevant actors in transition management. And although the United States is described by its legacy of tough on crime policy, the authors cite important innovations, such as therapeutic jurisprudence and the implementation of problem-solving courts.
So, what are the answers to the questions posed by Herzog-Evans? Which system wins the prize? Should early release be automatic or discretionary, and should a court or an executive body decide on it? There is no clear answer, but there is a clear idea about the embeddedness of the decision-making body and the elements that constitute professional decision makers.
A few authors in the book insist on the independence of courts, not eclipsing the fact that they very much depend on information from the actors in the field. In the perspective of who works, they also bring in the value of expertise (further training) and ethical attitudes (core values). A common denominator regarding the organizational development of the courts, as well as of parole boards, is specialization. In France and in Germany, specialized courts deciding early releases have maintained independence while improving practice and procedures. In the United States, the openness of the courts to adapt to the growing complexity of the forensic field was made possible by therapeutic jurisprudence and the creation of problem-solving courts (e.g., drug, reentry, and community courts).
The ideal model seems therefore to be a balanced one: An early release system allowing the vast majority of offenders a conditional release. The decision in itself should not be automatic, but a discretionary one, embedded in a structured process. Preparation for release should start the first day the offender spends in prison, and the process leading to freedom should be as seamless as possible, thereby avoiding disruptive moments. Early release should also be organized as a rite de passage involving the active participation of the offender and the society.
The paths enabling the change of release systems thus vary significantly. In some jurisdictions, institutions seem to have a strong stability. In others, they might be closed down in response to public outcry over a particular event. Some countries, such as France, England and Wales, innovate from top down, implementing reforms speedily and universally. In the United States, innovation seems to be driven from bottom up, with ownership and enthusiasm provoking a wildfire while not reaching all corners of the system.
Offering us insights into different paths to the improvement of sentencing practices, the book overtly invites us to think globally but act locally in the search for feasible solutions for each jurisdiction.