Lifetime Punishments for Mentally Ill Juvenile Rampage School Shooters: No Hope for the Future?

Abstract

This study examines the roles of age and mental health in the processing of 10 adolescent rampage school shooters who had shown signs of mental instability prior to their rampage, but were tried and convicted as adults and sentenced to life or almost life in prison. Findings from court transcripts show that expert witnesses for the defense provided evidence of mental illness in all cases; however, the court determined that the diagnoses failed to meet the insanity standard or did not qualify as a significant mitigating circumstance. The reality of the boys’ actual guilt, the low competency standard, and the transfer of jurisdiction from Juvenile Court to criminal court all worked against their defense. Although in recent years the Supreme Court has ruled that because of the lesser development of children, life sentences for juveniles constitute cruel and unusual punishment, appeals on behalf of these boys have been routinely denied. Cross-national comparisons reveal the rarity of school shootings outside the United States and suggest that juvenile justice processing in many countries is far less punitive than that in the United States.

Keywords

lifetime punishments mentally ill juvenile school shooters

“In a civilized society, we cannot lock up our mentally ill, neurologically impaired fifteen-year-old offenders and throw away the key without a hope for the future.”

—Mark Sabitt (1999), attorney for Kip Kinkel, at sentence hearing

Introduction

Just 15 years old when he committed a school shooting in 1998, Kip Kinkel was processed as an adult and sentenced to over 111 years in prison—a de facto life sentence. Indeed, he had committed egregious crimes, shooting to death both of his parents in the family home before going to school the next morning and shooting 24 of his classmates and teachers, killing two of them. Kip had begun suffering from dangerous and damning auditory hallucinations several years before his rampage. He noted that the first voice he heard issued a command: “You need to kill everyone, everyone in the world”; it also confirmed his self-loathing, as in, “You are a stupid piece of shit. You aren’t worth anything” (Kinkel, n.d., in Langman, 2009, p. 88). His thoughts about the source of the voices exemplified the paranoid component of his mental illness—perhaps the government had placed a computer chip in his brain, or the devil had targeted him. Moreover, his preshooting journal entries revealed his awareness of his psychiatric problems: for example, “I don’t know who I am . . . . My head just doesn’t work right . . . . I need help” (Langman, 2009, p. 90). Or, “God damn these VOICES inside my head. I want to die. I want to be gone. But I have to kill people. I don’t know why” (Langman, 2009, p. 91).

Although aware of the very low success rate of the not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense (employed nationally in less than 1% of felony cases and successful in only about one quarter of those cases, Lilienfeld & Arkowtiz, 2011), Kip’s defense team initially considered such a plea. Eventually, upon the advice of his team, Kip entered a guilty (G) plea in exchange for the state’s agreement to recommend that the mandatory sentences of 25 years for each of the murders be served concurrently. Then, in a move that came as a surprise, the sentencing judge, while accepting the state’s recommendation for concurrence on the murder charges, ruled that the sentences for the attempted murders would run consecutively, resulting in a total of 220 years. Although the prosecution now favored this maximum, the judge reduced it to 111.67 years, saying that he saw “little point in sentencing much beyond the normal lifetime” (Mattison, 1999). In pleading guilty, Kip was required to sign a petition that read in part, “By entry of pleas of guilty to these charges, I expressly and knowingly waive the defense of mental disease or defect, extreme emotional disturbance, or diminished capacity” (Mortimore, 1999, quoting Kinkel’s Plea Petition, p. 4). This waiver worked against him as appeal after appeal filed on his behalf was denied.

Kip is one of a number of mentally ill juvenile school shooters in the United States who were tried and convicted in criminal (adult) court and sentenced to life or almost life in prison. The American criminal justice system has been equivocal at best regarding both the role of mental illness in gauging criminal responsibility and the place of rehabilitation in its more punishment-oriented prison model. However, the American juvenile justice system, originating in 1899 with the establishment of Juvenile Court in Cook County, Illinois, was based on the belief that juvenile offenders are children, and as such, are best served by a system that provides them with rehabilitative treatment. Children, the new Court reasoned, are still developing emotionally and cognitively and thus are less capable of guilty intent (mens rea). Moreover, as they are not yet fully formed, they are more receptive to behavioral and attitudinal change. In accordance with these beliefs, the juvenile justice system was structured to include a cooperative component, one in which various professionals and family members considered options for meeting the individual needs of each child offender (under age 18 in most jurisdictions). What, then, are we to make of this incongruity? Why is it that children, and especially mentally ill children, are being given “no-hope-for-the-future” sentences, to be served out in adult prisons?

To address these questions, I drew from my broader study of adolescent rampage school shooters in the United States (Farr, 2018), a sub-sample of 10, all of whom suffered from symptoms of mental illness prior to and at the time of their rampage and, with the exception of one 18-year-old, were under the age of 18 at the time of their crime. All had been tried and convicted in adult court, followed by a life or almost life sentence. This sub-sample study examines the ways in which these young offenders’ mental illness and juvenile status came into play as their cases moved through the court system. A brief comparative look at school shooters and juvenile justice processing in other countries follows the presentation of the findings from this U.S. study.

Relevant U.S. Court Rulings: Mental Illness and Juvenile Status

Other than in a few U.S. jurisdictions where guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) or its equivalent is a plea option, NGRI is the only plea option available to mentally ill defendants. According to the 1843 M’Naghton rule, on which most jurisdictions rely, legal insanity requires the defense to prove that “at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong” (Queen v. Naghten, 1843). And, in Clark v. Arizona (2006), the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) upheld a part of Arizona’s insanity law stating that mental health issues were only admissible as they applied directly to the issue of insanity. In addition, the imagined benefits of conviction through a GBMI plea have often not been forthcoming. There is some evidence that defendants so convicted tend to serve longer prison sentences than those who plead guilty and often lack access to adequate treatment while serving their sentences (Grachek, 2006; Melville & Naimark, 2002).

However, in recent years, SCOTUS has provided some hope for defendants given extreme sentences for crimes committed when they were juveniles. To begin, the SCOTUS ruling in Roper v. Simmons (2005) set up a categorical ban on the capital execution of juveniles, arguing in part that unlike adults, children are still developing neurologically and socially, and thus their capacity for meeting the mens rea requirement is diminished. Then, in Graham v. Florida (2010), SCOTUS went further, finding that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violated the eighth amendment, in part by ignoring the evidence set forth in Roper establishing juveniles’ lesser culpability and greater capacity for rehabilitation; the Court concluded that such juveniles must be given a “meaningful opportunity” for release. Almost 2 years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012), SCOTUS ruled that the eighth amendment violation also applied to juvenile homicide offenders and that for both homicide and nonhomicide juvenile offenders, age should be given sentencing priority in that adolescence is characterized by “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, an inability to address consequences” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012 at 2465). Shortly thereafter, in State v. Riley (2015) the Court ruled that because the juvenile appellant’s 100-year sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, his case must meet the requirements set forth in Miller. Finally, in January of 2016, SCOTUS further expanded parole opportunities for imprisoned youth, affirming in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) the retroactivity of the previous rulings regarding juveniles’ special status.

Method

As referred to in the title of Katherine Newman and her coauthors’ seminal 2004 book, Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings, the term “rampage” (commonly defined as “a period of violent and uncontrollable behavior,” or “violent or excited behavior that is reckless, uncontrolled, or destructive”) is used in this and other studies to characterize school shootings in which the shooter shot or shot at multiple, typically random, victims. The criteria for inclusion in my sample of rampage school shootings were the following:

the attacked school was a high, middle, or elementary school;

the shooter was a current or former student at the school and under 21 years of age;

the shooting took place in the school, on the school grounds, or at a school event;

the shooter shot at two or more people, at least one of whom was a student, or shot

at or into a group or gathering of school-affiliated people that included students;

at least one of the persons shot or shot at was not a specifically targeted victim.

For the sample in my larger study, I examined multiple lists of school shooters whose shootings took place between 1995 and 2015 (see, for example, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & U.S. Departments of Education & Justice, 2001; Langman, 2008-2018; National Research Council & Institute of Medicine, 2003; National School Safety & Security Services, 2010; Statistic Brain Research Institute, 2015; “List of Attacks Related to Secondary Schools,” 2015). Through this search, I identified 31 shooters/29 shootings who met the above standards. All of the shooters were male.

Data on the shooters’ postarrest pathways through the juvenile and criminal justice systems came from court transcripts and media reports on trials and hearings for each case. Examined in this data set were (a) defense characterizations of the defendant’s psychiatric status and other mitigating factors, (b) prosecutorial characterizations of the defendant’s psychiatric status and other aggravating factors, (c) judicial input and rulings, and (d) appeal issues. Data on the shooters’ prerampage histories came from the above sources and from my broader study. Sources not cited in the body of the article are listed, by case, in the Appendix.

Results

Table 1 lists the 10 shooters and provides psychiatric, demographic, victim, plea, and sentence data on them and their cases. As shown, their ages at the time of their crime ranged from 14 to 18, with a median of 15.5. The number of shooting victims in each case ranged from three to 26, with a median of five; shooting fatalities ranged from one to four, with a median of 2.5.

Table 1.

Pre-rampage Psychiatric Issues of Extreme-sentenced Shooters, by Age at Crime, Victims (shot/killed), Year & Location of Crime, Plea, & Sentence.

Shooters	Delusions	Depression	Psych Meds	Suicidality	Anger	Plea, Sentence
Loukaitis, B., 14	X–a	X	X	b	X	NGRI
4/3, 1996						LWOP+205 yrs
Moses Lake, WA						new:189 yrs
Rouse, J., 17	X–	X		X	X	NG
3/2, 1995						LWOP+50yrs
Lynville, TN						new: LWOP+42yrs
Lane, T.J., 17	c	X		X		G (from NGRI)
6/3, 2012						LWOP+35 yrs
Chardon, OH
Castillo, A., 18	X+	X	X	X		NGRI
2/1, 2006						LWOP
Hillsborough, NC
Kinkel, K., 15	X+	X	X	X	X	G (from NGRI)
26/4, 1998						111.67 yrs
Springfield, OR
Woodham, L., 16	X–	X		X	X	NGRI
10/3, 1997						LWP+140 yrs, x3
Pearl, MI						parole poss age 65
Ramsey, E., 16		X		X	X	NG
4/2, 1997						210 yrs
Bethel, AK						parole poss age 85
						new: 99 yrs, x2
Carneal, M., 14	X+	X	X		X	GBMI
8/3, 1997						LWP
Paducah, KY						parole poss age 40
Willliams, A., 15		X		X	X	G
15/2, 2001						50 yrs to LWP
Santee, CA						parole poss age 65
Wurst, A., 14	X+	X		X	X	G
4/1, 1998						30–60 yrs
Edinboro, PA						parole poss age 45

Some evidence, lesser frequency and/or intensity; + : clear evidence, frequent & intense.

No direct evidence of suicidality, but his mother had threatened to kill herself on Valentine’s day in front of his father and his father’s girlfriend, and told Barry he was to join her in a double suicide; he committed his rampage shooting just days before Valentine’s day.

Lane initially claimed he suffered from hallucinations, but later said he had lied. Langman (2016) now believes that Lane likely suffers from psychopathy.

As further indicated, prior to their rampage, all of the shooters suffered from depression. All but one of the 10 had persistent anger and anger control problems, and all but one had attempted suicide or experienced ongoing suicidal ideation. The majority had talked or written about their hallucinatory or delusional experiences. That is, their histories showed considerable psychological instability during their teens, and more often than not, in even earlier years. Only three, however, were known to have been taking prescription psychotropic medications either prior to or at the time of their rampage (Castillo, Kinkel: antidepressant; Kinkel, Loukaitis: Ritalin; Langman, 2013).

Not surprisingly, five of the boys initially pled NGRI, and another pled GBMI. Five of the 10 received an actual or de facto LWOP sentence, four an actual or de facto life with possibility of parole (LWP) sentence, and one a sentence of 30 to 60 years. For the five whose sentences included the possibility, but only the possibility, of parole, the first eligibility hearing will not take place until they reach the ages of 85, 65, 65, 45, and 40, respectively.

Psychiatric Testimony and Prosecutor Characterizations

As illustrated in Table 2, psychiatric experts for the defense found evidence of severe mental illness in each of the 10 young defendants. Six shooters were diagnosed by one or more of these experts as suffering from psychosis-level disorders (most commonly schizophrenia or a personality disorder). Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, experts for the state also found evidence of mental illness in four of the boys. Alvaro Castillo, for example, was described by experts for the state as psychotic, but not insane. His defense attorneys argued (unsuccessfully) both at trial and in subsequent hearings that Alvaro believed that his crime was done at God’s bidding and was not morally wrong, thus meeting the definition of legal insanity. In their argument, Alvaro’s defense team referred to State v. Brandon (1862) in which SCOTUS had ruled that the insanity defense applies to “a criminal act committed under the belief that it was commanded by God.” In addition, when asked by his mother postshooting if he wanted to go to confession (the family was Catholic), Alvaro first said, “Oh, yes, mom. No problem,” but followed this reply with, “. . . but what do I have to confess about? I didn’t do anything bad. I did the right thing” (State v. Castillo, 2011). In mid-April, some 4 months before his rampage, Alvaro had prepared to commit suicide in his home: dressed in a military uniform and with shotgun in hand, he was interrupted by his father, who was able to wrest the gun from his son. Determined by a magistrate to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment, Alvaro was admitted to a psychiatric hospital with a diagnosis of “psychotic disorder, major, recurrent, and severe depressive disorder” (State v. Castillo, 2011). However, having convinced the staff that he was no longer suicidal, he was released a week later, with a prescription for an antidepressant and a warning to stay away from guns. About 5 days after his release, he purchased a rifle and in July, a shotgun (Lieberman, 2008). Alvaro did pursue ongoing treatment through outpatient therapy. Throughout July and August, a social worker treating him expressed her concern about her client’s paranoid and delusional thinking and tried desperately to get him further, in-depth psychiatric treatment (Blythe, 2009). However, she was unable to find a facility that could or would take him. On August 30, Alvaro carried out his rampage shooting.

Table 2.

Selected Defense and State Testimonies and Characterizations, by Defendant.

LOUKAITIS Defense: Mixed bipolar disorder to psychotic degree; depression with unrelenting anger and mood swings; delusional. State: Ruled out full-blown psychosis; mentally ill, but too young for diagnosis; detached, depressed; “one of the strangest kids I’ve ever met”; “. . . very angry, hateful person”; “cold-blooded killer.”ROUSE Defense: Severe mental illness; paranoid schizophrenia—delusions, auditory hallucinations; depression. State: No mental illness that would render him incapable of “controlling or understanding his actions.”LANE Defense: Defendant recanted symptoms consistent with schizophrenia, is pleading guilty. State: “What we’re dealing with is a disgusting human being . . . “The only explanation I can offer the court is he is an evil person.”CASTILLO Defense: Psychotic, schizophrenic, paranoid, delusions, hallucinations (specific diagnoses varied); command hallucinations from God; did not know his acts were morally wrong. State: Psychotic but not insane; “He wants to be known as a mass murderer and school shooter . . .”KINKEL Defense: Floridly psychotic; paranoid schizophrenic; delusions with paranoid character, persistent command hallucinations; psychotic connection to affective illness (becomes sicker when depressed). State: “. . . ranks with some of the most notorious criminals in our history, names like Ted Bundy, Timothy McVeigh, Jeffrey Dahmer, John Wayne Gacy . . .” “All we know . . . is that there’s something really wrong with [him].” “From a very early age, Kip Kinkel was a very nasty, violent, easy-to-frustrate and easy-to-anger boy. This was his essence long before any so-called mental illness set in.”WOODHAM Defense: Serious depressive disorder; hallucinations; severe borderline personality disorder and distorted reality; narcissistic traits, including lack of empathy and hypersensitivity to insults; insane. State: narcissistic traits; not insane; “mean” and “hateful”; “He’s bloodthirsty . . .” “Murder was on this boy’s mind.”RAMSEYDefense: depressed from young age; attempted suicide; struggled to control explosive temper; intent to commit suicide.State:“There are some people in this world that are no good. Nobody really knows where they come from or why.”CARNEAL Defense: depression and schizotypal personality disorder; on appeal: reevaluation: paranoid schizophrenic, insane, mental condition undiscoverable at trial as he had been afraid to reveal his full delusional system; terrified of monsters. State: elevated degree of mental disturbance; had referred to persistent irrational fears and ideas, but had not reported symptoms of serious mental illness, such as hallucinations or delusional beliefs.

WILLIAMS Defense: major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, without psychotic features; cannabis dependence and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder otherwise not specific. State: wanted to impress his new friends. “He wanted to become the bully of the crowd of bullies.”WURST Defense: seriously psychotic, illness could emerge as schizophrenia; major mental illness with psychotic thinking and delusions of persecution and grandeur; suicidal thoughts since age 10; unable to deal with minor incidents in his daily life; reluctant to discuss full delusional system; terrified of monsters. State: no delusional disorder, no manifest symptoms of major psychiatric illness; history of emotional upset characterized by depressed moods associated with aggressive and suicidal ideation; what he talked about with defense psychiatrist not fixed beliefs or convictions, but just ideas he was thinking about; wanted notoriety; not an athlete.

Note. Phrases and quotations from court transcripts (see Appendix).

One state expert testified that while he found him to be mentally ill, Barry Loukaitis was too young to be diagnosed with a psychosis-level disorder (Miller, 1996). Relatedly, state experts found Michael Carneal to have an “elevated degree of mental disturbance,” with “persistent irrational fears and ideas,” but no severe mental disorder; furthermore, they determined, at the time of the crime, Michael “had the capacity to understand the wrongness of his acts and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law” (Carneal v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2006). And, while he argued that Andrew Wurst did not have a major psychiatric disorder, an expert for the state testified that Andrew did suffer from a history of emotional disturbance, “characterized by depressed moods associated with aggressive and suicidal ideation” (quoted in DeJong, Epstein, & Hart, 2003, p. 79). Interestingly, the state presented no psychiatric expert testimony to rebut the testimony of defense experts that Kip Kinkel was deeply psychotic.

As also noted in Table 2, prosecutors were highly likely to characterize the young defendants as evil, hateful, and murderous; in perhaps the most glaring allegation, a state’s attorney compared 15-year-old Kip Kinkel to serial killers such as Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer (Mortimore, 1999). In other cases, prosecutors emphasized the defendant’s narcissistic traits and desire for notoriety.

In addition to evidence presented to them by prosecutors and defense attorneys, judges and juries may also be influenced by a defendant’s courtroom behavior. Inappropriate self-presentations can serve as verifications of a prosecutor’s argument that the defendant is remorseless, volatile or dangerous. In this regard, T. J. Lane’s performance at his sentencing hearing stands out. Having already admitted to lying about his mental illness symptoms, T. J. had told his attorneys not to make any statement on his behalf at this hearing. Then, against his attorneys’ advice, he made his own statement. As he entered the hearing chamber and sat down, he first removed his outer shirt to reveal a t-shirt on which he had written the word “killer.” Then, facing his victims’ families, he said: “This hand that pulled the trigger, that killed your sons, now masturbates to the memory. Fuck all of you” (Sheeran, 2013, p. 1). During his trial, Luke Woodham appeared volatile, at one point shouting at the prosecutor who was questioning him, “You make me sick. You’ve never walked in my shoes. Yet you stand to judge me (“Teen in Mississippi,” 1998, p. 1). Both boys were given long-beyond-life sentences.

Legal Arguments Working Against the Defense

Actual guilt, that is, the perpetration of the rampage shooting, was not in question in any of the cases. The shootings were public and witnessed by numerous students, teachers, and school staff; the gun used in the shootings was for the most part found in the hands of or next to the perpetrator. Nevertheless, the state does determine the specific charges to be filed against the alleged offender and has the power to use those charges as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations. In three cases, such plea bargains were offered by the state. However, in addition to the unexpected turn in Kip Kinkel’s bargain, the state rescinded its offer to James Rouse (shortly before his trial date) in exchange for his agreement not to plead NGRI. The state also dropped a number of lesser charges against Andy Williams in exchange for his guilty plea. Yet all three boys were sentenced to life in prison.

For juvenile offenders, the chance of success with an NGRI plea is further hampered by the relative absence of prerampage formal psychiatric diagnoses. Based also on the belief that children’s personalities are not fully developed, the American Psychiatric Association contends that children (under age 18) should not be diagnosed with a number of psychosis-level illnesses, most prominently schizophrenia and personality disorders. As such, even the boys in this study who received treatment for psychological problems prerampage were unlikely to have been diagnosed with a serious psychiatric disorder. In addition, a number of these boys appeared to suffer from a disorder with paranoid qualities; as several defense experts pointed out during trial and in subsequent appeals, those who suffer from paranoia are often wary of revealing their full delusional system for fear of the ways in which such an admission might be used against them (see Harding, Mehta, & Newman, 2003).

Two of the most important decisions in the processing of juveniles come at the beginning, while the alleged offender is still under the jurisdiction of Juvenile Court: the first is the hearing to determine whether the alleged offender is competent to stand trial, that is, whether he or she has a rational understanding of the court proceedings and can rationally assist in his or her defense; the second is the transfer hearing to determine whether or not Juvenile Court will hand jurisdiction of a particular case over to criminal court, where the juvenile will be tried, sentenced, and (if incarceration is part of the sentence) eventually imprisoned. In the cases of the 10 boys in my sample, seriousness of the offense was clearly the focal variable in the transfer decision, far outweighing mental health or age status. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions now have mandatory transfer laws for murder and other serious crimes against the person. Moreover, there is evidence that in the vast majority of transfer decisions, Juvenile Court follows the recommendation of the prosecution (Snyder, Sickmund, & Poe-Yamagata, 2000). As is common in general, the state had argued for transfer in each of the nine relevant cases in this study.

Transfer to criminal court is a setback for the juvenile defendant. Unlike in the juvenile system, where a young offender’s best interests are at least considered, and sentences can be tailored to fit his needs, in the highly-adversarial adult system, winning the case is the state’s only real goal. In addition, Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over delinquents typically ends at or around 21 years of age. Thus, prosecutors can and do argue (often successfully) that even if the juvenile can be rehabilitated, this short jurisdictional time is inadequate. Most of the boys in my sample did spend their first few incarceration years in a juvenile detention facility (until they reached majority age) or in a wing of prison that housed younger inmates; however, soon they were serving time amid the general prison population, where they were among the youngest inmates. Age is one of several hierarchies of power that flourish in the adult inmate subculture; the youngest inmates are notoriously victimized in myriad ways by more-hardened, older ones.

Appeals: Major Issues

All of the shooters appealed their conviction or sentence. The most frequent appeal issues concerned either the appellant’s mental health and/or age status. Many of the boys argued that, due to their mental health and/or age status, they were unable to understand the nature of the criminal process and therefore were not competent to stand trial at the outset; the error, they claimed, lay either with their counsel’s (flawed) defense or the Court’s (inappropriate) ruling(s). A similar appeal (also often citing mental illness or age) addressed the appellant’s inability to understand the full meaning of entering a plea and the ineffectiveness of counsel in explaining different plea options, plea bargains, and the waiving of rights that accompany a guilty plea.

Other common issues focused on the transfer decision. Where applicable, the defense challenged mandatory state transfer laws. Also challenged were transfer decisions based, in the defense’s view, on the Court’s unsubstantiated claims about the appellant’s lack of amenability to rehabilitation and his continuing danger to the public. The failure of the Court to consider the appellant’s individual characteristics (including age, mental health status, lack of prior criminal record, and history of family abuse) was another issue commonly addressed by the defense.

Particularly prominent were challenges to the appellant’s sentence as simply excessive (given his young age and other individual characteristics) or in violation of the eighth amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Appeals filed after the 2012 Miller and subsequent rulings highlighted the eighth amendment violation and theoretically strengthened the constitutional argument against sentencing offenders who were children (under age 18) at the time of their crime to life in prison.

However, in almost all cases, the shooters’ appeals have been denied. In the three “successful” cases, the outcome provided no actual benefit to the defendant. After arguing that Miller, along with a companion Washington state law, invalidated his life sentence, Barry Loukaitis was granted a resentencing hearing, only to have his sentence reduced from LWOP + 205 years to 189 years, the resentence requested by the state. As written in the state’s brief, “The sentence recommended is a de facto life sentence.” “That term is appropriate because it reflects the deliberate mass shooting that the defendant planned and executed” (Byrd, 2017, p. 2). Moreover, as in several other cases, the judge who was to resentence Barry Loukaitis stated that input from the victims’ families would be given a great deal of consideration in his decision. Barry, stating in advance that he would defer to his victims’ families’ wishes, did not contest his new sentence and waived his right to any future appeals (Byrd, 2017). James Rouse won his claim of sentence excessiveness on attempted murder charges, and as a result had his sentence reduced from LWOP +50 years to LWOP +42 years. Similarly, Evan Ramsey had his conviction on one charge of attempted murder overturned, and he also was resentenced—from the original 210 to 198 years.

Michael Carneal was granted the right to a new competency hearing, but that ruling was overturned by the Kentucky Supreme Court. And, regarding Luke Woodham’s 2015 appeal of his sentence on the basis of Miller and subsequent SCOTUS rulings, the Court had yet to take any action 3 years later. Aware that the Mississippi legislature had not established a system for handling resentencing, one of Luke’s defense attorneys lamented, “I don’t think you’re ever going to get the Legislature to act on this . . . The people who get found guilty of committing these crimes, even when they’re juveniles . . . are not exactly a popular cause” (Pettus, 2017, p. 4).

Particularly concerted have been the prosecutorial and judicial efforts to make sure that Kip Kinkel spends the rest of his life in prison. As the prosecutor stated at Kip’s sentencing hearing: “Kip Kinkel must die in prison. He must never be allowed to walk free.” Evidence supporting Kip’s mental illness claim was particularly credible. In addition to expert testimony, Kip gave numerous descriptions of his elaborate delusional system and persistent command hallucinations. Moreover, as mentioned, the state presented no expert psychiatric testimony to counter the defense testimony. Also as noted, Kip eventually changed his plea from NGRI to G on the basis of a plea bargain that went awry. On appeal, Kip challenged his sentence based on Miller, but his appeal was denied because his sentence was not technically LWOP. Then, based on subsequent SCOTUS rulings: that de facto LWOP sentences were the equivalent of actual ones and that the new rulings applied retroactively, Kip again appealed. This time, in 2016, the Court ruled that he had already challenged his sentence based on the eighth amendment violation and that he could not relitigate the same argument (Graves, 2016). Frustrated, the defense stated that they intended to petition the Court for review in that the most recent SCOTUS rulings actually provided new content for a challenge, but as of the beginning of 2018, no further action had been taken.

School Shooters and Juvenile Justice: Selected Cross-Country Comparisons

School shootings in countries other than the United States are quite rare. Indeed, one study (Grabow & Rose, 2018) identified 288 school shootings (including those related to gang violence or emanating from a personal fight) in the United States between 2009 and 2018. Mexico, with eight such shootings over the same period, was second to the United States. Canada and France had two, and Germany had one. In addition to their rarity, only a handful of adolescent school shootings in other countries have received international attention; among them are shootings in Winnenden, Gemany (2009), where 17-year-old Tim Kretschmer killed 12; Tuusula, Finland (2007), where 18-year-old Pekka-Eric Auvinen killed seven and wounded 10; and Erfut, Germany (2002), where 19-year-old Robert Steinhaaeuser killed 16 and wounded 10. All three of these shooters, at the upper end of adolescence, committed suicide at the end of their rampage. However, in what appears to be a developing trend in several countries, the father of Tim Kretschmer was subsequently tried and found guilty of involuntary homicide, bodily harm caused by negligence, and negligent abandonment of a weapon, under the argument that he had not safely stored his gun and that he should have known that his son was capable of such violence (“Winnenden Ruling,” 2011).

One of the few non-U.S. cases of a younger boy committing and surviving a rampage school shooting was that of 14-year-old Todd Cameron Smith, who shot and killed one student and wounded another at his high school in Taber, Alberta, Canada, in 1999. This was the first fatal school shooting in Canada in over two decades. Prosecutors’ request to transfer Todd for criminal processing in adult court was denied, and he eventually pled guilty. Although prosecutors asked for the maximum sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole in 5 years, Todd was sentenced to 3 years in prison (McIlroy, 1999).

The dearth of research on the court processing of adolescent rampage school shooters in countries other than the United States seems clearly related to the scarcity of cases and the high likelihood of a shooter’s suicide following his attack on his school. However, some of the literature on the processing of juvenile offenders in countries other than the United States is relevant and informative. It should be noted that cross-country comparisons of justice systems are problematic, due in great part to missing or unreliable data and to cultural differences in justice-related terminology and recording processes. In addition, much of the comparative research on the processing of juvenile offenders comes from European countries, and, with the notable exceptions of England and Wales, European countries tend to have juvenile systems that are far less punitive than that in the United States.

One critical measure of difference has to do with the definition of a child for criminal justice purposes. The minimum age of criminal responsibility, known as the MACR, varies cross-nationally (see Child Rights International Network [CRIN], n.d.-a; The Howard League for Penal Reform, 2016; Muncie, 2008); in some countries, for example, Burundi, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Laos, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, the MACR is 15; in even more countries, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Croatia, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Korea, Libya, Romania, Spain, the MACR is 14. Much lower are the MACRs of 10 in England, Canada, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Scotland, and Wales. And, in the United States? Overall, 35 states have no MACR, and the remaining states have MACRs between six and 10.

In addition, laws allowing the transfer of alleged juvenile offenders to criminal court to be processed as adults are broader in the United States than in many other countries. All U.S. states have some provision for transfer; moreover, 15 states have statutes mandating transfer for certain offenses. Juvenile transfer laws in the United States vary by state: 17 states and the District of Columbia have no specified minimum transfer age; in the remaining 33 states, minimum transfer ages range from 14 to 10 (Griffin, Adams, Adams, & Firestine, 2011).

The availability and use of transfers in other countries varies. In the Netherlands, France, and Germany, for example, there are no provisions for the transfer of juveniles (under age 18) for processing in adult court; in Belgium, transfer is allowed, but only for youth 16 or older. In England and Wales, transfer procedures are similar to those in the United States (Van Dijk & Nuytiens, 2004). Where juvenile transfers are allowed, they tend to be less frequently applied and have higher minimum ages than in the United States (Dunkel, 2014).

Interim youth or young adult categories established in some countries provide protections for young offenders that extend beyond the teen years. In Germany, youths between the ages 18 and 21 are eligible for processing under juvenile court jurisdiction if it is determined that the “moral and psychological development of the offender is ongoing” or if the crime is a typically juvenile one (Subramanian & Shames, 2013). Finland applies the categorical model to sentencing: youth aged 15 to 17 can only be given a sentence one quarter of that which would be given to an adult for a similar crime (and with a 10 year maximum); for 18- to 20-year-old offenders the maximum is two thirds that of a comparable adult sentence, and if a first offense, the percentage is between one-third and half.

Like school shootings and juvenile crime rates in general, juvenile custodial rates are considerably higher in the United States than those in most other countries (following a pattern, England and Wales are exceptions, Hazel, 2008). Lower rates are due in part to concerted efforts to incarcerate fewer young people. Setting maximum sentences for juveniles is one strategy for achieving this goal. Maximum sentences in some countries, even for crimes that could result in a life sentence for adults, are vastly lower than the life with possibility of parole maximum for juveniles in the United States. For example, maximum sentences for offenders under the age of 18 range from 3 to 8 years in diverse countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, and Switzerland. Ten-year maximums are mandated in, among other countries, Austria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Germany, and Indonesia (see CRIN, n.d.-b, for a full list of maximum juvenile sentences by country). Yet, while life sentences for juveniles in the above and other countries are banned, according to CRIN, 67 countries still allow them.

Some countries’ treatment of juvenile offenders appear to adhere more closely than that in the United States to doing that which is “in the best interests of the child,” prioritizing rehabilitation (through educational and protection services, vocational training, diversion, and other community programs) over punishment. Nonetheless, the literature on the rehabilitation-punishment divide is itself divided. While many of the scholars cited above emphasize the rehabilitative focus of juvenile justice outside the United States, others (see Dunkel, 2014; Muncie, 2008) warn against, as Muncie puts it, a “punitive turn” in juvenile justice in both the United States and Western Europe.

Outside the United States, the official stance on the processing of juvenile offenders with mental health problems typically favors psychiatric treatment in lieu of incarceration. However, as Penner and his colleagues (2011) point out, this goal often falls short due to vagueness in policy statements, a lack of accountability, or insufficient resources. For example, legislation in New South Wales in Australia requires juvenile justice facilities to provide services that promote the “physical, psychological, and emotional well-being” of its detainees, but gives no further direction. Relatedly, the 2002 Youth Criminal Justice Act in Canada places an emphasis on treating underlying problems that might be related to a youth’s criminal behaviors, and specifically permits juvenile judges to order an intensive rehabilitative order for juveniles suffering from “a mental illness or disorder, a psychological disorder or an emotional disturbance,” but only if the youth has committed a serious violent crime and services are available (quoted in Penner, Roesch, & Viljoen, 2011, p. 221). Moreover, data suggest that such orders are infrequent (Doob & Sprott, 2005).

A mental health screening program introduced in Britain in 2003 requires that all youth involved in the justice system be administered a structured form to assess their mental health status and need for treatment. And, in the Netherlands, youth who have committed serious offenses are administered a test for identifying psychopathological disorders, followed by a written assessment of the findings and suggested treatment. This particular tool has since been used in Scandinavian countries and in Germany (Bailey & Tarbuck, 2006).

Concluding Comments

With each new adolescent rampage school shooting in the United States comes increasing public outrage over “somebody’s” failure to recognize and provide treatment for these youth before they carried out their shooting. However, while decrying the lack of treatment for the preshooter, the public is often equally vociferous in its demand for harsh punishment for the postshooter, regardless of his age or his mental health status at the time of the crime. The justice system in the United States provides for such punishment in its encouragement of the transfer to adult court of juveniles who have committed serious felonies; once transferred and convicted, the defendant can be sentenced to life in prison with possibility of parole. In contrast, in many other countries, transfer to adult court is much less common, and maximum sentences for juveniles are far lower. In addition, while there is some concern about a return to more punitive systems, the focus in many countries tends to still favor rehabilitation without lengthy incarceration.

In the United States, the rehabilitation-punishment divide is particularly salient in the cases of juvenile school shooters with significant psychiatric disorders. Once the accused meets the simplistic competency criteria, the juvenile and adult systems come together to provide a potential conduit from treatment to punishment through the transfer process. After transfer, the question of competency extends to the defendant’s ability to understand plea options as well as the effects of entering a particular plea; thus, the defense frequently raises competency issues in appeals for young defendants, especially for those whom they have determined to be severely impaired.

The state’s case in these U.S. shootings was advantaged from the beginning in that actual guilt had already been established, and the crimes were high-order felonies. Although at the time of their rampage, the 10 shooters in my sample were young and likely to have been suffering from mental illness, these and other personal characteristics were given little or no weight as they moved through the system. Multiple appeals in their cases have been routinely denied, and the few that have been granted provided no real gain for the appellant. It appears at this time that these boys, now young men, will spend all or most of their lives in prison. In sentencing Alvaro Castillo, one of the most convincingly and seriously psychotic of the 10 shooters, to LWOP for the murder of his abusive father and the wounding of one student at the school, the judge gave voice to the tragic situation of the young convicted felon standing in front of him: “It’s frustrating to hear how help—I think it was available but everything didn’t fit together to get you the help you needed” (Karas, 2009, p. 1).

Footnotes

Appendix

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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