Acculturation and Capital Punishment: The Effect of Mexico Versus United States Cultural Orientations on Public Support for the Death Penalty

Abstract

Few studies have explored how the intersection of vastly different cultures, like those of the United States and Mexico, influences death penalty support. The present study uses the Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans-II to examine whether individuals who are more closely aligned with U.S. culture are more likely to support the death penalty than individuals more closely aligned with Mexican culture. Findings support this conclusion. Findings also reveal that the significance of predictors for death penalty support varies between Mexican- and U.S.-oriented subsamples. Thus, this study reaffirms the importance for researchers to consider cultural context when examining public attitudes toward the death penalty, especially when using samples from a single, multicultural country such as the United States.

Keywords

death penalty capital punishment acculturation Mexico public opinion

Introduction

Research on public attitudes toward the death penalty has largely focused on samples from the United States (Stack, 2004). Nevertheless, scholars have studied predictors of death penalty support in countries such as Australia (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muftic, Maljevic, Mandic, & Buljubasic, 2015), China (Cao & Cullen, 2001; Jiang, Hu, & Lambert, 2018), India (Lambert, Pasupuleti, Jiang, Jaishankar, & Bhimarasetty, 2008), Japan (Jiang, Pilot, & Saito, 2010; Sato, 2017), Mexico (Brown, Benedict, & Buckler, 2010; Updegrove & Orrick, 2018), Singapore (Chan, Tan, Lee, & Mathi, 2018), South Korea (Choi, Jiang, & Lambert, 2017), and the Netherlands (Hessing, de Keijser, & Elffers, 2003), among others. A related body of work has compared and contrasted predictors of death penalty support between international and U.S. samples (Elechi, Lambert, & Ventura, 2006; Jiang, Lambert, & Wang, 2007; Lambert et al., 2016). This research is important because it examines how predictors of death penalty support vary across two or more distinct cultures. One avenue of research that has yet to be explored, however, is the potential for cultural variations within a country, and how these variations may influence death penalty support.

Mexican culture manifests a strong presence in the United States, especially in the southwest, and differs from the dominant U.S. culture in many ways (Velasco & McMillian, 2015). One important cultural difference between Mexico and the United States is the former’s rich tradition of rejecting capital punishment. This tradition dates back to 1929, when the Mexican government eliminated the death penalty in Mexico City (Olivero, 2013). Following this, 11 of Mexico’s 31 states abolished the death penalty during the 1930’s (Meade, 2010). From the 1940’s through the mid-1960’s, 13 additional states abolished the practice. By 1975, the death penalty had been completely abolished in all 31 states and federal territories (Hood & Hoyle, 2015). In 2005, Mexico’s congress amended the constitution to prohibit military administrations of the death penalty (Meade, 2010).

Mexico has not executed a civilian since 1937 (Attanasio, 2015), and last carried out a military execution in 1961 (Gibbs, 2009). In contrast, the United States has executed 11 Mexican nationals since 1976 (Warren, 2016). An additional 55 Mexican nationals currently sit on death row in the United States (Warren, 2018). Several U.S. states have added insult to injury by refusing to inform Mexican nationals of their right to consulate access, as guaranteed by the Vienna Convention ( Mexico v. United States of America, 2004 ). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Medellin v. Texas (2008) , however, that states are not bound by international treaties such as the Vienna Convention. In 2000, the Mexican government established the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program (Kuykendall, Amezcua-Rodriguez, & Warren, 2008). This program funds lawyers and mitigation specialists on U.S. capital cases to ensure that Mexican nationals receive the best defense possible (Chammah, 2016). Mexican culture also enjoys a strong Catholic influence, as demonstrated by a 2014 poll that found 81% of Mexicans self-identified as Catholic (Lipka, 2016). In August 2018, Pope Francis unequivocally denounced the death penalty as immoral under any circumstance, making abolition the official doctrine of the Catholic church (Povoledo & Goodstein, 2018; Steiker & Steiker, 2018). Prior to this, the Catholic church had expressed the view that capital punishment was rarely appropriate.

All of these matter because immigrants who move to a new country bring their culture with them (Wals, 2011). Over time (and successive generations), many immigrants take on aspects of their new country’s culture. This phenomenon is known as acculturation. Acculturation refers to changes in individuals’ worldviews, traditions, values, and preferences that occur as a result of two cultures interacting with each other (Haugen & Kunst, 2017). Although scholars generally use the term “acculturation” to describe immigrants adapting to their host country’s culture, the concept itself is broader. Specifically, acculturation is a “two-way process” that consists of bidirectional shifts in individuals’ cultural orientations (Haugen & Kunst, 2017, p. 67; Pedraza, 2014; Teske & Nelson, 1974). In other words, Mexican-born individuals who come into frequent contact with the dominant U.S. culture may begin to take on aspects of this culture, but U.S.-born individuals exposed to Mexican culture may also begin to take on aspects of Mexican culture. Because Mexico has a cultural history of opposing capital punishment, individuals who are more closely aligned with Mexican culture may be less likely to support the death penalty than individuals more closely aligned with U.S. culture. The present study uses the 30-item Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans-II (ARSMA-II; Cuellar, Arnold, & Maldonado, 1995) to test this hypothesis.

Literature Review

Research on public attitudes toward the criminal justice system has traditionally been limited to false Black–White dichotomies that exclude Latinxs,¹ Asians, Native Americans, and other racial and ethnic groups (Baik, 2012; Rodgers, 2012). Furthermore, when Latinx opinions are considered, the topic is frequently associated with immigration (Branton, 2007). This historic oversight is unfortunate given that Latinxs are paying increased attention to criminal justice matters (Lantigua-Williams, 2016). Scholars have only recently begun to study Latinx public opinion with any sense of urgency (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera, 2013). This push is largely driven by the growing prominence Latinxs have gained at the state and national levels through immigration-driven population increases.

Latinxs are the third fastest growing population in the United States (Colby & Ortman, 2015). Between 2014 and 2060, the U.S. Latinx population is projected to increase from 55.4 million to 119 million. The percentage of the U.S. population accounted for by Latinxs is projected to grow from 17.4% to 28.6% (Colby & Ortman, 2015). In Texas, where this study was conducted, this change is even more pronounced. In 2014, 10.4 million Latinxs were recorded living in Texas, 87% of which reported Mexican heritage (Pew Research Center, 2015). By 2020, the number of Latinxs in Texas is projected to outnumber the non-Latinx white population residing there (Potter & Hoque, 2014). Latinxs are projected to account for 51% of those living in Texas by 2042, and reach a record high of 21.5 million by 2050 (Potter & Hoque, 2014).

As the Latinx population continues to grow in the United States (and Texas), it is imperative for scholars to consider the role culture may play in shaping public opinion. In places like Texas, where 87% of Latinxs are Mexican American (Pew Research Center, 2015), individuals who are more closely aligned with Mexican culture may express greater support for public policies consistent with Mexican values. This is likely true regardless of whether or not an individual possesses Mexican heritage, since Mexican culture is prevalent throughout much of Texas, especially near the border (Dear, 2013; Ganster, 2016; Martinez, 1994). Such individuals may be socialized into Mexican culture despite being born in the United States and lacking Mexican heritage.

Acculturation and Public Opinion

Efforts to understand U.S. public opinion must consider the unique intersection of cultures that occurs when individuals immigrate to the United States (Wals, 2011). Immigrants bring experiences, traditions, and perspectives from their country of origin with them to the United States (Wals, 2011). After arriving, however, immigrants may find that their old country’s culture clashes with values held by their new neighbors, who have been socialized within the dominant U.S. culture. The process of navigating differences between the old and new cultures profoundly shapes immigrants’ lives (Garcia, Sanchez, & Peralta, 2009). This struggle is experienced anew as successive generations wrestle with how closely they should align themselves with the dominant U.S. culture.

To the extent that individuals embrace U.S. culture and distance themselves from their cultural roots, they can be said to be acculturated (Garcia et al., 2009). Bandes-Becerra (2008, p. 19) defined acculturation as “borrowing traits from another culture,” while Pedraza (2014, p. 901) referred to acculturation as “a process of brokered exchanges between Latinxs and the dominant Anglo society.” Most Latinxs strike a balance between adopting U.S. culture and preserving their heritage (Espino & Leal, 2007). Acculturation does not just apply to immigrants, however; it is equally applicable to U.S.-born individuals. This is because acculturation is a “two-way process” where individuals from both cultures take on aspects of the other culture (Haugen & Kunst, 2017, p. 67; Pedraza, 2014; Teske & Nelson, 1974). Thus, while Mexican-born individuals who come into frequent contact with U.S. culture may take on aspects of this culture, U.S.-born individuals exposed to Mexican culture may also take on aspects of Mexican culture. This observation has important implications for how cultural orientations may influence public opinion.

Scholars have suggested that Latinx public opinion may vary according to how closely aligned they are with U.S. culture versus their country of origin’s culture (Michelson, 2001). Kahan (2006), for example, argued that individuals view public policies through a cultural lens, and determine their level of support for policies based on how compatible those policies are with deeply held cultural values. Thus, individuals more closely aligned with Mexican culture should express greater support for popular Mexican positions, while individuals more closely aligned with U.S. culture should express greater support for popular U.S. views. This is true even for individuals who have been born in the U.S. and lack Mexican heritage. Prior research has demonstrated that proxy measures of acculturation such as English proficiency and foreign-born status predict differences on political issues like standardized testing (Garcia, 2010), immigration (Branton, 2007), and abortion (Branton, Franco, Wenzel, & Wrinkle, 2014; Jones et al., 2013).

Three studies have used flawed proxy measures of acculturation to predict death penalty support. The first reported that foreign-born individuals were less likely to support the death penalty (Unnever & Cullen, 2006). In contrast, Sanchez (2006) found that foreign-born Latinxs who were less proficient in English were more likely to support capital punishment relative to U.S.-born Latinxs who were more proficient in English. A single item asking how important Latinxs considered it to acculturate to U.S. culture failed to reach statistical significance, however (Sanchez, 2006). Finally, Spanish versus English language preferences and country of birth (U.S.-born vs. foreign-born) were found to be unrelated to death penalty support in the third study (Baik, 2012).

These proxy measures are flawed for several reasons. First, while it is reasonable to assume that foreign-born individuals may be less acculturated to the United States, individuals born in the United States also vary greatly in their level of acculturation. For example, an individual born and raised in a U.S.-Mexico border city like San Diego or El Paso would be expected to be less oriented toward U.S. culture (and more oriented toward Mexican culture) than an individual born and raised in a small town in Wyoming or Maine. Second, an individual can be oriented toward Mexican culture without being fluent in Spanish. For example, their parents might cook authentic Mexican foods, they may have many close friends with Mexican heritage, and they may listen to Spanish music—none of these scenarios require an individual to speak fluent Spanish. Most importantly, the proxy measures force individuals into a dichotomous “Mexican” or “U.S.” category instead of acknowledging that every individual falls somewhere on a continuum between the two cultures (Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010).

The ARSMA-II (Cuellar et al., 1995) is an improvement over these proxy measures because it measures how closely oriented individuals are to U.S. culture relative to Mexican culture. In other words, it is a continuous rather than dichotomous measure of acculturation. The ARSMA-II also uses 30 items to measure acculturation rather than a single item, as the proxy measures do. The increased number of items provides a more accurate picture of individuals’ level of orientation toward U.S. and Mexican cultures.

Common Predictors of Death Penalty Support

Within the United States, death penalty support is typically divided along several demographic and attitudinal lines (Adinkrah & Clemens, 2018). Men, for example, are more likely to support capital punishment than women (Britto & Noga-Styron, 2015; Unnever & Cullen, 2012), although a few studies fail to find a significant effect for gender in multivariate models (e.g., Schadt & DeLisi, 2007). Race also predicts death penalty support, with Black Americans reporting lower levels of support than Whites (Rodgers, 2012; Unnever & Cullen, 2007). Latinx death penalty support is generally lower than that of Whites, but greater than that of Black Americans (Dugan, 2015; Leal, 2007). Many studies find age unrelated to death penalty support in multivariate models (Lytle & ten Bensel, 2016; Rodgers, 2012), although a handful have found that older participants are more likely to support the death penalty (Britto & Noga-Styron, 2015; Jones et al., 2013). Education is another variable generally found to be unrelated to death penalty support (Britto & Noga-Styron, 2015; Unnever & Cullen, 2012). At least one study, however, reported that participants with higher levels of education were less likely to support capital punishment (Unnever & Cullen, 2007).

Regarding political views, conservatives are more likely to express death penalty support than liberals (Unnever & Cullen, 2010, 2012). When it comes to religious views, several studies have demonstrated that Catholics support the death penalty in equal numbers to non-Catholics, despite the Catholic church’s official stance against capital punishment (e.g., Unnever & Cullen, 2012). A handful of studies, however, suggest Catholics may be less likely to support the death penalty (Sanchez, 2006; Soss, Langbein, & Metelko, 2003).² Religious involvement—as measured by how often participants attend religious services—tends to be a better predictor of death penalty support. Specifically, individuals with greater religious involvement are less likely to support capital punishment (Unnever & Cullen, 2010, 2012), although Bohm (2017) identified several studies that reported a positive association between individuals’ religious beliefs and their level of death penalty support.

Several other factors are commonly examined in relation to death penalty support. First, findings are mixed regarding the relationship between majoring in criminal justice and supporting capital punishment. Some studies report that criminal justice (CJ) majors are more likely to support the death penalty (Lambert, Hogan, et al., 2008; Vollum & Buffington-Vollum, 2010; Vollum, Mallicoat, & Buffington-Vollum, 2009). Other studies fail to find a difference in death penalty support among CJ and non-CJ majors (Adinkrah & Clemens, 2018; Wu, Sun, & Wu, 2011). Second, strict adherence to the rules set by those in leadership positions, referred to as authoritarianism, is positively associated with death penalty support (Stack, 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Third, several studies have found that individuals who consume media on a regular basis are more likely to support the death penalty (Buckler, Davila, & Salinas, 2008; Unnever, Cullen, & Roberts, 2005). Fourth, individuals who hold more punitive views are more likely to support capital punishment (Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; Stack, 2004). Finally, some studies have found fear of crime to be positively associated with death penalty support (Unnever & Cullen, 2007; Wozniak, 2017).

Current Study

The present study improves on prior research that has relied on flawed, single-item proxy measures of acculturation by using the 30-item Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans-II (ARSMA-II; Cuellar et al., 1995). Two research questions are examined:

Does acculturation influence death penalty support?

Does the significance of predictors for death penalty support vary among Mexican- and U.S.-oriented subsamples?

Method

Sample

A random sample of 1,861 college students from two Texas public universities, one situated along the U.S.-Mexico border, was collected during the Fall 2017 semester. Many of the students who attend the Texas public university located at the U.S.-Mexico border live in Mexico and commute to school in Texas. Thus, randomly sampling a university at the U.S.-Mexico border and a university further away from the border ensured the sample contained both U.S.-oriented and Mexican-oriented participants. A random number generator was used to select courses being taught during Fall 2017. Surveys were administered both in-person and online. CJ students were oversampled to obtain a sample large enough to compare CJ majors to non-CJ majors.³ This was accomplished by randomly selecting 15 CJ courses to survey in addition to any CJ courses that were randomly selected from the entire Fall 2017 course catalog.⁴ Students who were not present in class the day the survey was administered were sent an email containing the online survey link. Sixty-four responses were removed because respondents indicated they had already taken the survey in another class. One hundred ninety-five observations were dropped because participants answered no or did not respond to an item asking whether they had told the truth on the survey. Similarly, 61 participants were dropped because they answered true or did not respond to an item asking if they did not pay attention when answering the survey. Two responses were removed because the participants were under 18, and 92 responses were removed because participants were more than two standard deviations above the mean on age, and therefore outliers. Finally, 160 responses were dropped because the participants responded don’t know to the dependent variable. Thus, the final sample consisted of 1,297 college students.

Dependent Variables

Participants were asked “Which best describes your attitude toward the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?” (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2012). Responses consisted of strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, don’t know, somewhat support, and strongly support. Following Updegrove and Orrick’s (2018) example, don’t know responses were removed from the sample, while strongly oppose and somewhat oppose responses were coded as 0, and somewhat support and strongly support responses were coded as 1.⁵ Almost three quarters (71%) of the sample expressed death penalty support (see Table 1). This figure closely mirrors a recent Texas study that reported 74% of participants supported the death penalty (Ramsey, 2013).

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics of Sample (N = 1,297).

Variable	M (SD)	Minimum	Maximum	%	N
Dependent variable
Death penalty support					1,297
Support				71.47	927
Oppose				28.53	370
Independent variables
Anglo-acculturation	1.16 (1.35)	−2.24	4		1,171
Control variables
Race/ethnicity					1,294
− Non-Latino White				27.43	355
− Non-Latino Black				8.89	115
− Non-Latino Other				5.49	71
− Latinx				58.96	763
Sex					1,290
− Female				62.81	809
− Male				37.19	479
Age	20.75 (2.38)	18	30		1,297
College major					1,293
− CJ-Major				36.35	470
− Non-CJ Major				63.65	823
Catholic					1,293
− Catholic				39.13	506
− Non-Catholic				60.87	787
Religious involvement	1.61 (1.26)	0	4		1,294
Media exposure	3.47 (0.74)	1	5		1,278
Political conservatism	3.82 (1.52)	1	7		1,289
Right-wing authoritarianism	12.54 (4.67)	5	25		1,189
Punitivity	3.18 (0.98)	1	5		1,297
Confidence in courts	2.63 (0.94)	1	5		1,296
Fear of crime	2.17 (0.90)	1	4		1,286

Note. CJ = criminal justice.

Independent Variable

Acculturation was measured using the 30-item ARSMA-II (Cuellar et al., 1995).⁶ Studies have demonstrated the ARSMA-II to possess strong reliability and validity (American Psychological Association, n.d.; Bauman, 2005; Cuellar et al., 1995; Jimenez, Gray, Cucciare, Kumbhani, & Gallagher-Thompson, 2010). In addition, Cuellar and colleagues (1995, p. 276) referred to the first version of the ARSMA as the “most popular measure employed to assess acculturation.” Thirteen items comprising the Anglo Orientation Subscale (AOS) were summed and divided by the total number of items (13). Sample items consisted of “I enjoy listening to English language music” and “I enjoy English language movies.” All items were answered with not at all (1), very little or not very often (2), moderately (3), much or very often (4), and extremely often or almost always (5). Similarly, 17 items comprising the Mexican Orientation Subscale (MOS) were summed and divided by the total number of items (17). Sample items included “My thinking is done in the Spanish language” and “My family cooks Mexican foods,” and were scored according to the same Likert scale. A continuous overall acculturation score was obtained by subtracting the mean MOS score from the mean AOS score. Scores greater than zero indicated individuals who were more acculturated to U.S. culture, while scores less than zero indicated individuals who more closely identified with Mexican culture. More extreme values indicated greater orientation toward that culture.

Control Variables

Race and ethnicity was measured using a series of dummy variables for non-Latinx Blacks (1 = yes, 0 = no), Latinxs (1 = yes, 0 = no), and non-Latinxs of another race (1 = yes, 0 = no).⁷ Non-Latinx Whites served as the comparison group. Sex was measured dichotomously (1 = male, 0 = female). Age was measured continuously. College major was measured dichotomously (1 = CJ major, 0 = non-CJ major). Catholicism was also measured dichotomously (1 = Catholic, 0 = non-Catholic). A Likert-type scale captured religious involvement using the item, “How often do you attend religious services?” (0 = never, 1 = only on special occasions, 2 = once a month, 3 = once a week, 4 = more than once a week).

Media exposure was measured using a scale consisting of 5 items (α = .56).⁸ The items included were “How often do you follow what is going on in the news by . . .”: (a) reading a newspaper, (b) watching television, (c) listening to the radio, (d) reading trending news on the Internet, and (e) seeing social media posts from friends (1 = once a month or less, 2 = less than weekly, but more than once a month, 3 = 1-2 times a week, 4 = 3-4 times a week, 5 = at least once a day). The five items were summed and divided by five to get participants’ mean media exposure.

Political conservatism was measured according to the item, “How would you describe your political views?” (1 = extremely liberal, 2 = somewhat liberal, 3 = lean liberal, 4 = in the middle, 5 = lean conservative, 6 = somewhat conservative, and 7 = extremely conservative). Right-wing authoritarianism was measured using five items (α = .87) adopted from a larger authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 2006). These items are, “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just ‘loud mouths’ showing off their ignorance,” “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas,” “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining everything,” “This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society,” and “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs” (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral/don’t know, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree).

Punitivity was measured according to the item, “People who break the law should be given harsher sentences” (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neutral/don’t know, 4 = somewhat agree, and 5 = strongly agree; Stack, 2004). Confidence in the courts was measured using the item, “What is your level of confidence in the courts and legal system?” (1 = no confidence at all, 2 = slight confidence, 3 = moderate confidence, 4 = strong confidence, and 5 = complete confidence; Stack, 2004). Finally, fear of crime was measured using a scale consisting of six items (α = .92). The items included were “How worried are you about . . .”: (a) being assaulted by someone, (b) having your car stolen, (c) being robbed or mugged on the street, (d) having someone break into your home, (e) having your property damaged, and (f) being sexually assaulted (1 = not worried at all, 2 = slightly worried, 3 = somewhat worried, 4 = very worried; Grubb & Bouffard, 2014). The six items were summed and divided by six to get participants’ mean fear of crime.

Analytical Plan

An independent-samples t test was used to examine whether the average level of acculturation differed between death penalty supporters and opposers. Following this, a logistic regression model was calculated with death penalty support as the dependent variable and acculturation as the independent variable while controlling for a variety of common death penalty predictors. Finally, the sample was separated into individuals more oriented toward the United States (acculturation > 0) and individuals more oriented toward Mexico (acculturation < 0).⁹ Split sample logistic regression models were then calculated to examine whether the significance or direction of predictors changed based on whether individuals were more oriented toward U.S. or Mexican culture. Multicolinearity between variables was explored and found not to be an issue.

Results

At the bivariate level, individuals who supported the death penalty were significantly more acculturated to U.S. culture than individuals who opposed the death penalty, t(1169) = −5.85; p < .001 (see Table 2). Mexican-oriented individuals were significantly less likely to support the death penalty than U.S.-oriented individuals (60.6% and 74.8%, respectively) (χ²[1] = 22.22; p < .001).

Table 2.

Differences in Death Penalty Support Based on Anglo-Acculturation.

Variable	Support death penalty (N = 840)	Oppose death penalty (N = 331)	Test statistic
Anglo-acculturation	1.31 (1.32)	.80 (1.38)	t(1,169) = 5.85***
	Mexican orientation (N = 367)	Anglo orientation (N = 924)
Death penalty support	60.6%	74.8%	χ²(1) = 22.22***

***p < .001, two talied.

Even after controlling for a variety of common predictors of capital punishment, logistic regression results demonstrated that acculturation was still significantly associated with death penalty support (Exp (B)= 1.37; p < .001; see Table 3). Specifically, a one-unit increase in acculturation to U.S. culture increased the odds of supporting the death penalty by 37%. Several of the control variables also reached statistical significance. Males (Exp (B)= 1.45; p < .05), individuals who were more politically conservative (Exp (B) = 1.15; p < .05), individuals who were more authoritarian (Exp (B) = 1.05; p < .05), and individuals who were more punitive (Exp (B) = 1.42; p < .001) all expressed greater death penalty support. In contrast, greater religious involvement (Exp (B) = .70; p < .001) was associated with decreased support for capital punishment.

Table 3.

Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Influence of Anglo-Acculturation on Death Penalty Support (N = 1,033).

Independent variables	β	Exp (B)	SE
Constant	−3.05**	0.05	.91
Sex	.37*	1.45	.17
Non-Latinx Black	−.09	0.91	.32
Latinx	.35	1.42	.25
Other race	−.64^†	0.53	.35
Fear of crime	.10	1.10	.09
Political conservatism	.14*	1.15	.06
Catholic	.12	1.13	.17
Religious involvement	−.36***	0.70	.06
Age	.02	1.02	.03
CJ college major	.32^†	1.60	.18
Right-wing authoritarianism	.05*	1.05	.02
Punitivity	.35***	1.42	.08
Confidence in the courts	.15^†	1.16	.08
Media exposure	.15	1.17	.10
Anglo-acculturation	.31***	1.37	.08
Pseudo R² = .110; χ² (15) = 136.18, p < .000

Note. CJ = criminal justice.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Turning to the split sample logistic regression models, level of acculturation remained significant in both the Mexican-oriented (Exp (B) = 1.88; p < .05) and Anglo-oriented subsamples (Exp (B) = 1.32; p < .05; see Table 4). Similarly, punitivity was still positively associated with death penalty support, while religious involvement remained negatively associated with death penalty support, in both samples. Several differences also emerged between the subsamples, however. Criminal justice majors in the Mexican-oriented subsample were 523% more likely to support the death penalty than noncriminal justice majors, whereas this predictor failed to reach statistical significance in the Anglo-oriented subsample. Being male (Exp (B) = 1.68; p < .05), more conservative (Exp (B) = 1.20; p < .05), higher in authoritarianism (Exp (B) = 1.42; p < .001), and having greater media exposure (Exp (B) = 1.35; p < .05) all predicted greater death penalty support in the Anglo-oriented subsample, but not the Mexican-oriented subsample. Similarly, individuals who were not Black, White, or Latinx were 53% less likely to support the death penalty in the Anglo-oriented subsample relative to Whites, but this predictor did not reach statistical significance in the Mexican-oriented subsample.

Table 4.

Logistic Regression Coefficients for Predictors of Death Penalty Support for Mexican- and Anglo-Oriented Subsamples.

Independent variables	Mexican orientation (N = 262)			Anglo orientation (N = 766)
Independent variables	β	Exp (B)	SE	Β	Exp (B)	SE
Constant	.25	1.28	1.92	−4.22***	0.01	1.17
Sex	.25	1.28	0.32	0.52*	1.68	0.21
Non-Latinx Black	.81	2.26	1.78	−0.07	0.94	0.33
Latinx	−.57	0.56	1.18	0.44	1.56	0.30
Other race	.68	1.97	1.74	−0.75*	0.47	0.37
Fear of crime	.22	1.24	0.15	0.08	1.09	0.12
Political conservatism	.01	1.01	0.12	0.19*	1.20	0.08
Catholic	−.00	1.00	0.31	0.07	1.07	0.22
Religious involvement	−.37**	0.69	0.12	−0.40***	0.67	0.08
Age	−.03	0.97	0.06	0.04	1.04	0.04
CJ college major	1.83**	6.23	0.58	0.27	1.31	0.20
Right-wing authoritarianism	−.01	0.99	0.04	0.06*	1.06	0.02
Punitivity	.56**	1.75	0.17	0.35***	1.42	0.10
Confidence in the courts	.05	1.05	0.15	0.21^†	1.23	0.11
Media exposure	−.07	0.93	0.19	0.30*	1.35	0.13
Acculturation	.63*	1.88	0.30	0.28*	1.32	0.14
	R² = .116; χ² (15) = 40.55,p < .001			R² = .131; χ² (15) = 112.38,p < .000

Note. CJ = criminal justice.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Discussion

Mexican culture is prevalent throughout much of Texas—for example, 87% of Latinxs possess Mexican heritage (Pew Research Center, 2015). A key facet of Mexican culture is the nation’s extensive history of opposing capital punishment (Meade, 2010). The present study used the 30-item ARSMA-II (Cuellar et al., 1995) to examine whether individuals who are more closely aligned with Mexican culture are less likely to support the death penalty than individuals more closely aligned with U.S. culture. The ARSMA-II improves on previous measures of acculturation, which relied on flawed proxy measures such as English language proficiency and foreign-born status (Baik, 2012; Sanchez, 2006; Unnever & Cullen, 2006). In addition, the present study tested whether the significance or direction of common death penalty predictors changed based on whether individuals were more oriented toward U.S. or Mexican culture. Several interesting findings emerged.

First, the findings reaffirm the importance for researchers to consider cultural context when assessing public attitudes toward the death penalty, even when the sample comes from a single nation like the United States. As this study demonstrates, individuals more closely oriented to the dominant culture (United States) are increasingly likely to support policies that enjoy official government and public support in portions of the United States, whereas individuals more closely oriented to Mexican culture are more likely to oppose the death penalty in keeping with Mexico’s rich tradition of rejecting capital punishment, and the official stances of the Mexican federal and state governments (Meade, 2010).

A second, related finding is that many of the variables that predicted death penalty support in either the Mexican- or Anglo-oriented subsample were nonsignificant in the other subsample. This finding reaffirms what researchers have long known—that the significance of predictors for death penalty support varies across cultures—while also demonstrating the importance for researchers to take within-country variations into account. Individuals who are more closely oriented to cultures outside of the mainstream U.S. culture cannot be assumed to hold the same views as individuals more closely oriented to U.S. mainstream society, even if they were born in the United States or have resided there for many years. Future research should continue to identify culture-specific factors capable of predicting variations in death penalty support.

The implications of these findings paint a complex portrait of the future of the death penalty in Texas and other southwestern states where Mexican culture exerts a strong influence. On one hand, high rates of immigration from Mexico may hasten the dismantling of Texas’ capital punishment system, especially in communities where there is little external pressure to conform to mainstream U.S. culture. The physical and political reach of these communities can only be expected to grow as Texas’ demographics continue transforming the state into a Latinx majority state with primarily Mexican heritage (Pew Research Center, 2015; Potter & Hoque, 2014). This demographic shift ensures that, at least for the foreseeable future, the influence of Mexican cultural values will only grow stronger and extend their reach further in Texas. As a result, U.S.-born non-Latinxs living in Texas may take on aspects of Mexican culture, including opposition to the death penalty.

On the other hand, findings from the present study demonstrate that individuals who take on aspects of U.S. mainstream culture are more likely to support the death penalty. Thus, Mexican immigrants who begin adopting aspects of U.S. culture would be expected to display greater tolerance toward capital punishment. This suggests that the future of the death penalty in Texas and other southwestern states may depend on whether the number of Mexicans immigrating to the U.S. outpaces the number of Mexican Americans becoming acculturated to U.S. culture, including its use of capital punishment. If this proves to be the case, abolitionists may take comfort in the fact that Texas’ rapidly growing Latinx population is likely to slow immigrants’ sense of urgency toward becoming acculturated.

The future of capital punishment in Texas is further complicated by the finding that Mexican-oriented criminal justice majors are more likely to support the death penalty relative to noncriminal justice majors. This suggests that there is a unique criminal justice culture that Mexican-oriented individuals may become acculturated to, thereby increasing their support for the death penalty. Alternatively, this finding may be better accounted for by a selection effect, with individuals who believe in the government’s authority over individuals being more likely to both pursue criminal justice-related education and support the government’s right to kill convicted murderers. Regardless of the underlying explanation, this finding suggests that Mexican-oriented criminal justice students, once in the field, may not use their positions to dismantle Texas’ capital punishment system from within.

As with any research effort, the current study has several limitations. First and foremost, the sample consisted of randomly selected students from two Texas universities. Although criminal justice studies (Payne & Chappell, 2008)—and death penalty public opinion research in particular (Adinkrah & Clemens, 2018; Baker, Lambert, & Jenkins, 2005)—routinely rely on student samples, many in the field object to the use of student samples due to generalization concerns. In the present study, the use of a random sampling design and multiple data-collection sites helps allay some concerns.¹⁰ In addition, at least two studies have reported that student attitudes toward the death penalty generalize well to larger populations more representative of the general U.S. population (Chappell & Payne, 2007, as cited in Burgason & Pazzani, 2014; Maggard, Payne, & Chappell, 2012). Thus, while the present study’s reliance on a student sample should be noted as a limitation, findings from student samples still hold value in many instances (Bouffard & Exum, 2013; Wiecko, 2010).

A second limitation is that while the present study controlled for a variety of common predictors of death penalty support, it is impossible to control for all possible influences. For example, some studies have found a positive relationship between death penalty support and socioeconomic status (Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2007), although others have found this relationship to be nonsignificant (Unnever & Cullen, 2012; Wozniak, 2017). Other studies have reported a positive relationship between gun ownership and death penalty support (Britto & Noga-Styron, 2015; Saad, 2013; Stack, 2003). An additional limitation is the inability to determine whether participants were born in the United States, Mexico, or another country. This prevented controlling for foreign-born status. Related to this, the present study also lacked a means to identify second- or third-generation immigrants. Future research should explore whether generation status is associated with death penalty support. Although this study demonstrates that acculturation influences death penalty support, the lack of qualitative data precludes identifying an explanation of why and how this influence occurs.

A final point worth considering is that while the majority (87%) of Latinxs in Texas report Mexican heritage (Pew Research Center, 2015), no monolithic Latinx culture exists. Latin American countries differ from each other in many ways. Brazilians, for example, speak Portuguese rather than Spanish. Latin American countries are also divided over how closely aligned they wish to be with the United States. Countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are more openly critical of the United States (and oppose any U.S. influence in Latin America), while countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru view the United States more favorably (Miroff, 2014; Sanchez Nieto, 2013). The historical relationship between an immigrant’s country of origin and the United States may influence which aspects, if any, they adopt from the dominant U.S. culture. Similarly, Mexico, like the United States, has important regional differences that may influence how likely Mexican immigrants to the United States are to orient themselves toward aspects of the dominant U.S. culture (Paz, 1994).

Conclusion

Researchers have long known that death penalty support varies according to cultural context. This study reaffirms this general principle while drawing attention to the existence of intra-country cultural variations in death penalty support. Researchers studying multicultural countries like the United States must be careful to take cultural orientations into account, especially when conducting public opinion research on populations residing in states along the U.S.-Mexico border, where Mexican culture exerts a strong influence. The present study demonstrates that individuals who are more closely aligned with Mexican culture are less likely to support the death penalty. Conversely, individuals who are more closely aligned with U.S. culture are more likely to support the death penalty. As Latinxs with Mexican heritage continue immigrating to the United States and moving to nontraditional migration areas, Mexican culture stands poised to play a key role in reshaping public attitudes toward capital punishment in the United States.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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