Abstract
In this Special Issue of the Journal, an international assemblage of scholars and practitioners revisit the problems posed by crime and punishment by emphasizing a unique approach to the administration of justice. The uniqueness of this approach represents the thematic focus of the Special Issue. In brief, the set of articles challenge the reader to regard justice not as something that one does to offenders or law violators through the meting out of proportionate punishments. Instead, justice is recognized as an ethic in which decisions about the proper course of correctional treatment, offender therapy, or even disciplinary sanction are filtered, first and foremost, through the philosophy of virtue (e.g., Adshead, 2014; Arrigo et al., 2011; Roy, 2017).
Researchers note that the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, criminology and law, social work and offender rehabilitation increasingly have turned to the philosophy of virtue and the ethics of justice to address a range of concerns about crime and punishment (Arrigo & Sellers, 2022; Sellers & Arrigo, 2021). Several recent examples include the jurisprudence of dignity (Henry, 2011), the criminology of trust (Walgrave et al., 2021), the phenomenology of redemption (Pycroft & Bartollas, 2021), and the psychology of forgiveness (Lacey & Pickard, 2015). In each of these instances, “well-being [is the] object of science: How science should define well-being, how it should measure it and the role of philosophy of in all of this [are central]” (Alexandrova, 2018, p. ix). How do the assembled articles in this Special Issue showcase the importance of this philosophy as a basis to rethink crime and punishment?
In their article on practice frameworks in correctional and forensic mental health, Ward and McDonald outline the function of such frameworks, examine the role of their underlying ethical assumptions, and explain the importance of these normative values in furthering the work of correctional research and practice. As the authors explain, practice frameworks are a unique type of theory. They fill the gap between explanatory theories, knowledge categories, normative assumptions, and treatment models. Understanding the values component of practice frameworks, including their related principles, helps to specify where and how treatment concerns such as moral repair, risk reduction, or community integration can meaningfully occur.
In their theory-based article derived, in part, from moral and jurisprudential psychology, Williams and Arrigo examine the significance of justice as virtue, especially for advancing individual well-being and the common good. Writing within the aretaic tradition of Aristotle, the authors review a set of concerns that remind the reader why the “being” (the virtue) of justice is essential to reconceiving the problem of crime control and the practice of offender therapy. They critique the collapsing of justice with law, demonstrate how the prevailing legalistic conception of justice is grounded in a singular view of human nature, suggest how justice might be more appropriately rooted in natural moral predilections, and offer a provisional explanation of the psychological structure of justice as a twofold moral disposition.
In her article on criminal harm stemming from the wildlife trade of endangered species (e.g., reptiles), Sollund provides a legal critique (of law enforcement) with relevance for rethinking the rights of all nonhuman animals. Broadly, she utilizes the Criminal Justice Wildlife Conservation and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene (CRIMEANTHROP) project as a foundation for addressing these issues. Wildlife trade is an increasing problem worldwide that causes species extinction, connects to organized crime, and contributes to social unrest. Regulated through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), it (CITES) constitutes severe branches of species justice, ecojustice, environmental justice, and animal rights. As the author explains, the harms nonhuman animals experience as victims of wildlife trade represent a wider concern than what is typically recognized through the methods and practices of conventional criminology. Sollund’s article aims to redress this deficiency. By relying on CRIMEANTHROP empirical findings and theoretical direction from the justice perspective of green criminology as well as Martha Nussbaum’s concept of dignified existence, the author proposes a radical shift in the purpose and operation of CITES.
The final article, written by Snacken, Devynck, and Uzieblo, considers the issue of social integration for released prisoners, emphasizing the role of human dignity and the status of fundamental rights for ex-incarcerates. The authors note that prisoner dignity and rights have been, for more than three decades, increasingly protected by international bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These protections (should) extend to the social reintegration of prisoners. But what happens when an offender is too dangerous to return to society? The authors note that psychiatric/psychological assessments are a major element in this decision-making. They refer to this decision-making as the “new penal power” and argue that it often eclipses dignity and rights protections. Snacken and colleagues examine three facets of this problem. These include the European human rights perspective on dignity and social reintegration, the experiences and mental suffering of Belgian prisoners who find themselves languishing in prison as a consequence of structural concerns in risk assessment and risk management practices, and the professional perspective on standards and practices derived from scientific insights that could mitigate some of the impediments to advancing the human dignity of dangerous felons.
Rounding out this Special Issue is a Commentary authored by Mark Palermo, editor-in-chief of the Journal. The Commentary considers the relationship between scientism, ethics, and evil. Of particular concern for Palermo is the relationship between mens rea (i.e., guilty mind) and cerebrum reus (i.e., guilty brain). He questions how much (really, how little) we “know” about the “truth” of who the criminal offender (especially the psychopath) is, and how limited (really, how ineffective) forensic neuroscience appears to be when it comes to deepening our understanding of psychiatric nosology, correctional treatment, and the existential (non-reductionist and non-essentialist) dimensions of the human condition.