Geopolitical economies of development and democratization in East Asia: Themes,concepts,and geographies

Abstract

The term geopolitical economy has been used in a variety of ways within geography and other disciplines. This introduction to the special issue on geopolitical economies of development and democratization in East Asia discusses two of the major ways in which the term has been used—as “geographical political economy” and as “geopolitics plus political economy”—outlining an approach to articulation of these two forms of geopolitical economy.

Keywords

Geopolitical economy East Asia Geography Cultural political economy “Provincializing” approaches

Introduction

“Geopolitical economy” (GPE) is a term with a somewhat short and spotty, if suggestive, history. It has been used rather imprecisely by a number of different authors, in a variety of distinct contexts, and often seems to supply little more than a way of glossing the notion that geography and/or geopolitics plays a crucial role in relation to political economic processes. In contrast to this term, the geography and history of struggles over development and democratization in East Asia has been long, complex, and intensively studied over many, many decades. Can a term that is not quite yet a full-fledged concept within a well-defined analytical framework be developed in ways that help us better analyze geographical-historical processes like those marking East Asian development and democratization (inclusive here of Southeast Asia)? That is the challenge we address in this special theme issue, which grows out of a workshop held at the University of British Columbia in May 2015.

This effort itself has a history. Several years ago, a small group of us who have been involved in the study of these kinds of geographical and historical issues, particularly Bae-Gyoon Park, Jinn-yuh Hsu, Jamie Doucette, Young-Jin Choi, and myself (see, e.g. Doucette and Riel Müller, 2016; Glassman, 2011; Glassman and Choi, 2014; Hsu, 2011, 2012, 2017; Park, 2005, 2011; Park et al., 2014)—formed a loosely structured research network to promote workshops and joint projects exploring both past and present geographies of East Asian development. We chose the term “geopolitical economy” to summarize the general interests of researchers in the network, and have organized a series of conferences, roundtables, and workshops expressing our interest in furthering geopolitical economic approaches to the study of East Asia. This commitment may predispose many of us to believe that the term “geopolitical economy” has more potential utility than some other scholars will believe it to have. Without attempting to determine in advance what is correct, this special theme issue is devoted to exploring some of the potential and the limits of GPE approaches—specifically, to issues in East Asian development, but more generally as well. Our goal is to both interrogate the term in order to see to what extent it might be developed into a more full-blown conceptual framework for analysis and to explore some of the varied kinds of phenomena in East Asia—namely, industrial transformation, urban growth and land conversion, territorialization and geopolitical conflict—that we think both commend and pose challenges for a GPE approach.

In the introduction to this special issue, I outline elements of this agenda by providing a brief overview of ideas that are central to the evolution—and potential further articulation—of a GPE approach, highlighting along the way some of the contributions of the articles in the special issue. I conclude with a brief note on some potential filiations between GPE analyses and other projects such as cultural political economy and “provincializing” approaches to urbanism.

GPE: From term to concept?

In suggesting that GPE has frequently been more a term than a concept, I am employing a distinction between words that are used merely to broadly designate phenomena making routine appearances in everyday language-games (like, for example, the term “air”) and words that are used with somewhat greater precision, within more theory-laden language-games that give the word some specific analytical power (like, for example, the term “oxygen”). In claiming that GPE has often been used more as a loosely construed part of general language-games than as an analytical concept within more theoretically restrictive language-games, I am suggesting that GPE has not always been developed in ways that can provide it with specific forms of analytical power. One of the goals of this special issue is to see to what extent the term can be further articulated so that it might provide more of such power.

A notable feature of GPE as a term is that it has had at least two distinct uses which, while not mutually exclusive, are somewhat different in the kinds of phenomena they foreground and, thus, in the emphases they provide. In one use, “geopolitical economy” is fundamentally a shortened expression of the term “geographical political economy.” In this use, the point is to call attention to the specifically spatial dimensions of political economy. For example, in Radhika Desai’s recent book on GPE, the “geo” is highlighted as calling attention to the global scale: “Unlike comparative political economy, geopolitical economy focuses on the world level” (Desai, 2013: 15; see also Desai, 2015). This contention is central to Desai’s production of a global political economy of capitalist development, framed largely by concerns with uneven and combined development on a world scale and focused on the roles that states play in global financial management—in the neoliberal era as well as in earlier historical periods. Desai also points out other dimensions of GPE; and as I will note below, other dimensions of GPE should include attention to the socio-spatial variegation and complexity of political economic processes, not simply emphasis on the importance of the global scale.

Deborah Cowen and Stuart Elden, in their introduction to a special virtual issue of Society & Space, articulate a variant on the use of GPE as shorthand for “geographical political economy,” while also emphasizing the spatial complexity that should be flagged by the prefix “geo” (Cowen and Elden, 2013):

Geopolitical economy is a notion that, broadly conceived, challenges some of the narrowly state-centric assumptions of conventional political economy, and yet does not simply work in the same register as international political economy. To both, it insists on the importance of the spatial register, the “geo” added to the political economy, in a way that includes, but cannot be simply reduced to, the international.

Cowen and Elden, it should be noted push GPE in directions that are decidedly less state-centric than Desai’s account. In both kinds of account, however, the “geo” is used most fundamentally to call attention to the spatial dimensions of political economy. GPE as geographical political economy thus provides a fairly broad geographical framing of capitalist development, one that can be associated with the generative work of geographers like David Harvey (see, e.g., Harvey, 2003, 2005, 2006; see also Barnes et al., 2012; Peck, 1998, 2010; Sheppard, 2016; Sheppard and Barnes, 1990; Sheppard et al., 2009). This is the approach to GPE—and to the complexities of socio-spatial relations—utilized by Helga Leitner and Eric Sheppard in their analysis of land dispossession in Jakarta (what they call “contested accumulation by displacement”), in this special issue; and it is also an approach on which they elaborate explicitly in their separate commentary piece (and see Sheppard, 2011). In their account of land issues in Jakarta, while the state unquestionably plays a role in displacement, so too do a wide array of actors who contest and negotiate both dispossession and the re-production of commons, at a variety of scales and in a variety of forms.

As Desai, Cowen, and Elden also point out, it is possible to tie the “geo” in GPE more closely to the “political”—that is, to emphasize the distinctively “geopolitical” moment within analyses of geographical political economy. Thus, a second distinct use of the term GPE pushes specific aspects of geopolitics more to the foreground. Such usage dates back at least to one of the earlier deployments of the term GPE within geography, in the work of John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge. In 1989, as the Berlin Wall was crumbling, Agnew and Corbridge announced a “new geopolitics,” one in which “geo-political economy is replacing classical geopolitics as the fundamental context for the constitution of foreign policy” (Agnew and Corbridge, 1989: 267; emphasis in original; see also Agnew and Corbridge, 1991, 1995: 6). Agnew and Corbridge did not provide a detailed explanation of the term GPE, identifying it broadly with the roles played by geopolitics in new political economic developments that they claimed decenter global power—specifically, eroding US hegemony (cf. Agnew, 2005)—while generating a much more globalized economy.

Agnew and Corbridge’s use of the term GPE drew enough attention that Gearóid Ó Tuathail devoted several paragraphs in a 1998 text on geopolitics to explaining GPE a la Agnew and Corbridge, describing it as blending “the Marxian political economy of the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci and the idiosyncratic writings on space of the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre with a qualified antitextualist critical geopolitics,” thus creating “a hybrid of geopolitics and political economy” (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 18). On these broadly hybrid foundations, GPE with a geopolitical inflection gained some traction within geography, without the term GPE being elaborated in detail.

More generally, this sort of approach to GPE dovetails in many respects with the geographical literature on relations between geopolitics and geoeconomics (e.g. Cowen and Smith, 2009; Essex, 2013; Sparke, 1998, 2005, 2007). Matt Sparke, for example, positions the emergence of geoeconomics as part of “the reinvention of geopolitics in the context of economic interdependency,” a process that especially affects border politics insofar as it simultaneously de-territorializes and re-territorializes global economic space (Sparke, 1998: 66). In this context, geoeconomics does not displace geopolitics per se but forces a change in its specific characteristics, driving geopolitical calculation away from classic concerns about the security and wellbeing of general populations toward efforts at positioning state actors within global networks. Sparke elaborates on some of these relations between geopolitics and geoeconomics in his commentary for this special issue.

Some of the possibilities for a specifically Gramscian approach to the dialectics between geopolitics and geoeconomics are worked out by Seung-Ook Lee, Joel Wainwright, and Glassman in their contribution to this special issue. Their paper specifically assesses processes of territorialization, explaining why these processes not only need to be theorized in relation to capitalist productive and reproductive practices but need to be historicized. Historicizing territorialization, and thus seeing it in its varied possibilities rather than through the essentializing gaze of nation-state-centrism, enables us to critically assess the multiple and competing forms—and scales—of power relations shaping state boundaries. As Lee et al. show, moreover, Gramsci provides tools that help us work through the spatial dimensions of capitalist development in ways that go beyond merely associating geography with the inter-national dimensions of political economy, while at the same time preserving a space for the notion that states play crucial roles in capitalist development, including through geopolitics. They illustrate this point by briefly comparing US leaders’ previous promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Chinese leaders’ ongoing promotion of the One Belt One Road strategy. (On the latter, see also Sum, 2015.)

In recent work on East Asia, Glassman, and Young-Jin Choi have likewise employed the term GPE in a way that—while largely anchored in a Gramscian approach—foregrounds some of the specifically geopolitical determinants of East Asian industrialization, as part of a broader geographical political economy (Choi and Glassman, 2018; Glassman, 2011; Glassman and Choi, 2014). In particular, building on the work of Jung-en Woo (1991; Woo-Cumings 1998), Vivek Chibber (1999, 2003), and Bruce Cumings (1984, 1999, 2005), Glassman and Choi suggest that the geopolitics of war in East Asia—and not merely the broad spatial dimensions of political economy—need to be foregrounded if we wish to understand phenomena such as the highly differential industrial development trajectories of countries such as South Korea, Thailand, and Philippines.

The third piece in the special theme issue takes up this specific geopolitical economic problematic. Jinn-yuh Hsu, Dong-Wan Gimm, and Glassman examine some of the differences between industrial development patterns in South Korea and Taiwan, showing that while war spending per se was far more important to industrial transformation in South Korea than in Taiwan, geopolitical decisions conceived more broadly were equally important to industrial trajectories in both countries. The authors also take up the spatial register explicitly, noting that South Korean/Taiwanese differences can be seen not only at the national level but can be theorized in relation to the specific, local development trajectories of industrial zones such as Ulsan and Kaohsiung.

GPE articulated

As the foregoing examples show a general emphasis on the variegated spatial dimensions of political economy and a more specific emphasis on the integration of geopolitical and political economic forces are not mutually exclusive, and in fact can be potentially complementary; but the difference in emphasis sometimes entails different conceptualizations of the processes being analyzed. Cowen and Elden, for example, rightly note the dangers of a state-centrism that may follow from placing undue emphasis on the activities nation-state actors, a challenge Desai meets by focusing especially on the activities of transnational capitalists. Yet it also needs to be insisted that major and highly consequential activities such as trade agreements and war—the latter of which has been especially important within the developmental history of East Asia—cannot be adequately dealt with if the nation-state as a complex entity is not adequately addressed and theorized. As Bob Jessop has long argued, moreover, it is not merely capital that acts in and through states, but broader groups of social actors (Jessop, 1985, 1990, 2002; Jessop and Sum, 2006). The “strategic coupling” of state and society produces specific ensembles of nation-state institutions that—in the reifying language common in neo-realist international relations theories—“act” to produce outcomes that include national state policies. Geopolitical actions, ranging from trade negotiations to war and intelligence gathering, are among these; and the specific processes that produce major state initiatives in such domains are the focus of GPE approaches that foreground the geopolitical. The differences in the accounts of urban development issues offered by Hsu et al., on the one hand, and Leitner and Sheppard, on the other, illustrate the different analytical emphases that potentially follow from adopting one or another emphasis within GPE. These kinds of differences are drawn out in two of the commentary pieces for this special issue, by Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, and by Leitner and Sheppard.

At the same time, I want to suggest that one way to develop GPE as part of a specific conceptual framework, rather than merely as a loose signifier of an array of ideas, is to focus on the intertwining of the geopolitical and the socio-spatial within GPE. I choose here to refer to this way of focusing as the construction of an articulated GPE—articulated in the dual sense that the geopolitical and the socio-spatial are always already intertwined, and that the one gives expression to the other, geopolitics always being expressed spatially and socio-spatial relations always being expressed in part through forms of geopolitical power. GPE as articulation foregrounds the ways that geopolitical and socio-spatial dimensions of GPE are always already intertwined and mutually constitutive. Several theoretical provisos attach to this way of seeing GPE.

First, it is important in making out the case for the deep intertwining of geographical political economy and geopolitics that the conception of socio-spatial relations deployed is suitably flexible—not simply a variant on the common nested scales approach to social space. As Sheppard (2002) has argued in surveying the space-times of globalization, the spatial forms of globalizing capitalism are not exhausted merely by a listing of different scales; rather, the spaces of globalization include heterogeneous forms ranging from blocks of territory to different types of networks—and even “wormholes,” where activities taking place in one location (e.g. financialization in Northern cities) seem to quickly disappear and reappear in other, non-adjacent locations (e.g. Southern property markets).

Moreover, it can be argued that these variegated political economic morphologies have been characteristic of international, transnational, and globalizing political economic processes over very long periods of time—including in early capitalist commodity chains (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986), complex socio-spatial relations between sovereigns and territories in “pre-capitalist” Europe (Teschke, 2003), “mandala” forms of state power in early and early modern Southeast Asia (Wolters, 1999), and many other political economic processes. It is precisely for this reason that Gramsci’s sensibilities about territoriality in a 19th-century Europe marked by the unevenly developing activities of different capitalists, state leaders, workers, peasants, and organic intellectuals provide an important resource for thinking about general issues of socio-spatial flexibility in political economy.

Second, it is particularly important in articulating geographical political economy and geopolitics to foreground the point made by Jessop, that states are institutional ensembles, rather than allegedly unified actors ruling—or exercising the juridical monopoly of legitimate violence—over unified blocks of territory. The “territorial trap” of construing transnationalized economic activities as if they took place within national containers applies as well to conceptions of the state that lock them conceptually into territorial spaces, which are in reality far more fungible (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Glassman, 1999). The general morphological flexibility of political economy is not something standing in opposition to rigid state forms but rather something that is realized in and through states, including through their own socio-spatial variegation—this encompassing transnational governance institutions, imperial political and military alliances, sub-national political structures, and overlapping legal and/or communications jurisdictions.

Third, and this basically summarizes and synthesizes the above two points, the geopolitical socio-spatial flexibility and variegation that needs to be foregrounded in an articulated GPE is not the flexibility and variegation of political economy and/or geopolitics in the abstract, it is the flexibility and variegation of what Kees van der Pijl calls concrete “state/society complexes” (van der Pijl, 1984, 1998). Concrete state practices and political economic processes are not two different kinds of things but, rather, the same thing, viewed through two different lenses. Geographical political economy constitutes one such lens, geopolitics plus political economy another. Articulating the two by foregrounding suitably spatially flexible notions of political economic and geopolitical processes builds a foundation for a GPE approach that provides considerable analytical leverage, thus promising to elevate GPE from a loose term to a generative concept.

Conclusion

While it is not possible to sum up all the various possibilities for thematics addressing East Asian development through an articulated GPE approach, the three articles in this special issue, along with the three commentaries, provide some beginnings. Toward enriching those beginnings, I conclude this introduction with indications of two places in which it is important to recognize potential limits of GPE, in any form—thus highlighting more indirectly some of the potential for further development of GPE approaches. In both of these areas, I point to the complementary contributions of work by contributors to the special issue—work which has flown under different (but compatible) conceptual banners.

First, whether as geographical political economy, as an emphasis on the role of geopolitics within the political economy of development, or as an articulation of the two, GPE will be less useful if it is construed as an imperial frame of interpretation in which the political economy of development and democratization is subordinated to either broad spatial dynamics or geopolitics. Instead, I see potential for GPE approaches to bring to the fore specific—and sometimes unduly neglected—aspects of development dynamics, ideally in symbiosis with like-minded but distinctive approaches. The work in cultural political economy (CPE) undertaken by Sum and Jessop seems a straightforward example. GPE approaches, while they have certainly dealt with cultural issues, have not so typically foregrounded interpretive strategies for the analysis of culture; and where they have moved beyond the broad geographical political economy register, they have most often focused on specific geopolitical dynamics of war and state-to-state relations. CPE, in contrast, constitutes an elaborate and carefully argued approach to the relationship between culture and political economy, as articulated in specific state practices (Sum and Jessop, 2013). In this sense, GPE and CPE are potentially mutually supportive approaches—though, as is the case with any such theoretical enterprises, the “devil is in the details.”

Second, while the ways it can be used to foreground path-dependent effects of geopolitics could be construed as a virtue of GPE, it would be deadening and overly deterministic to construct GPE accounts of East Asian development and democratization as presenting the teleological playing out of past geopolitical conflicts—and all the more so if geopolitics is taken only to emanate from the global core. GPE approaches can be as readily deployed to highlight multi-scalar challenges to existing geopolitical economic relations as to highlight their sedimented layers of geographical-historical determination. Leitner and Sheppard’s work on Jakarta, in this issue, and their provincializing manifestos on urban theory, serve as apt reminders that given dispensations of power within cities of the Global South reflect an array of forces including the global, the national, the local, and various networks of actors that don’t fit readily into any of these scalar boxes. It is thus not only that various local actors have the capacity to contest and transform certain sedimented practices but that theory itself—in the case of their discussion, urban theory—needs to be reconstructed in this process so that it is less Eurocentric and more inclusive of the kinds of realities that have shaped urbanization and development processes in places such as East Asia (Leitner and Sheppard, 2016; Sheppard et al., 2013). Here, too, there is space for constructive symbiosis between “provincializing” approaches to critical geography and an articulated GPE that can foreground the transnational activities through which have been formed contemporary terrains of struggle over phenomena like urban livelihoods. This is a prospectus for what we might call not only a critical but a provincializing GPE—and here, too, the working out of any such prospects will no doubt depend on the details.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014S1A3A2044551). The authors also acknowledge the receipt of funding from the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies (PWIAS) at the University of British Columbia (Grant #F14-02074), and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC Connection Grant #F14-03197), for the “Geopolitical Economies of Development and Democratization in East Asia” PWIAS International Research Roundtable during which some of this material was presented in May 2015.

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