Drawing up the missing link: State-society relations and the remaking of urban landscapes in Chinese cities

Introduction

In a periodical assessment of the state of the field concerning Chinese politics, the Harvard political scientist Elizabeth Perry identified some encouraging trends in the study of state-society relations as “auspicious omens” signaling a transition of the field from only a “consumer” (dependent for its analytical insights upon imports from the study of other countries) into a “producer” (capable of generating original analyses of interest to comparativists in general) (Perry, 1994: 713). Over the past two decades, the “auspicious omens” envisioned by Perry have increasingly been turned into reality as major theoretical and methodological advancements are made generating profound impacts upon nearly all disciplines of the social sciences. Surprisingly, state-society interplay does not appear to be of great interest to geographers as our attention has been overwhelmingly drawn to the changing state-market relations that characterized what is known as neoliberalization.

The recent outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled an intriguing, if not entirely surprising, process in which the “circulation and accumulation of capital as money value flows in search of profit” have been powerfully intervened and interrupted by what Harvey described as the “moments of social reproduction” (Harvey, 2020). As the nation-states across the globe found their ways to engage with the society through social distancing, restriction over population mobility, and drastic lockdown of neighborhoods and communities, new theoretical questions are raised concerning how a variety of state-society relations has been formed in different countries to reshape the landscapes of uneven development globally, regionally and locally. These issues have not been adequately addressed in the existing literature dominated by the concerns with the neoliberal narrative of state-market relations. The purpose of this research is to help draw up the missing link.

This study identifies a distinct pattern and process of urban transformation in contemporary China where the emergence and reproduction of an urban landscape rest upon not so much the reformation of state-market relations but instead a negotiation, mediation and reconciliation of the interest between the state and society. In a socialist economy undergoing market transition, ambiguity of property rights definition and the peculiar functioning of a fragmented authoritarian Party-state have made it difficult if not impossible for market forces to play their roles in the (re)making of the urban landscape. The importance of land commodification as a main source of financing the project of “landed urbanization” has turned the redevelopment of urban land into a battlefield where various segments of the state and society compete to take their share of the anticipated benefits (Lin, 2014). Many projects of urban (re)development would meet strong resistance and blockage from existing land users until they are either satisfactorily compensated or voluntarily motivated with a significant portion of the income to be generated from the projects. As such, success or failure of urban (re)development hinges on the negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation of the interest of the governments and the major stakeholders affected. The key to understanding the emergence and continuing transformation of the restless urban landscape lies in neither the operation of free market mechanism nor the reforming of state-market relations but instead the reformation of state-society relations. Theoretically, drawing up the missing link concerning state-society interplay may provide new insights to solve the myth of an urban China so ambivalent when seen in the lens of neoliberalism preoccupied by state-market relations. Methodologically, taking China’s state-society relations seriously may serve as an important pathway to reconcile the ever-lasting tensions between exceptionalism and universalism or epistemology and ontology that have characterized the studies of comparative urbanism involving China (Ley and Teo, 2020; Peck, 2015; Zhou et al., 2019).

The balance of this paper is organized in three parts. It starts with a clarification of the definitional and methodological issues of the research. This is then followed by a critical evaluation of ongoing debates over the nature, dynamics and spatiality of urban transformation and introduction of an alternative framework. Attention is then turned to the actual situation of urban redevelopment in China which is examined and demonstrated in two levels, namely an identification of the changing pattern of urban development for the country covering the 340 cities at and above the prefectural level and an investigation of the local practices of urban renewal in the city of Guangzhou. Findings of this research and their implications for theoretical advancement and planning as well as policy making are elaborated in the end.

Definitional and methodological issues

The purpose of this research is to investigate the continuing transformation of China’s urban landscapes against the backdrop of ongoing theoretical enquiry into the changing nature and dynamics of urbanization. The research is organized to address several specific questions. How do we make sense of the spectacular urban landscape recently emerged in Chinese cities? How and why has China recently changed its emphasis in urbanization from urban sprawl into urban redevelopment? How have the projects of urban redevelopment, often considered to be costly financially and contentious socially, been brought about? Who are the major stakeholders involved and how do they interact in bearing the costs and benefits of redevelopment? What important insights can be obtained from the Chinese experiences for a better understanding of the diverse trajectories of urban transformation in the new era of (post-)COVID-19 when the behavior and organization of the human population are subject to profound changes? The working hypothesis made and tested is that success or failure of the projects of urban redevelopment in Chinese cities depends on the contestation, negotiation and mediation of the interest held by the state (central state and local governments) and the major stakeholders involved (developers, affected factory workers, urban residents, and villagers in the city).

The empirical study is carried out at two levels, including a systematic analysis of the data for China’s 340 municipalities at and above the prefectural level to identify the general pattern of changes in urban redevelopment and a detailed case study of the local practices in the city of Guangzhou that has been designated by the central authorities as a site for the experiment of urban renewal. In this research, we follow the Chinese official categorization of urban development into two main types, namely newly added urban land (增量土地) and redevelopment of existing land (存量土地). Urban redevelopment is therefore defined and measured by the redevelopment of existing land including the extent of redevelopment, the way in which it has taken place, and its spatial variation. In the case of Guangzhou, urban redevelopment refers specifically to the redevelopment of what are officially categorized as “three olds” (三旧改造), namely old factories, neighborhoods, and “villages-in-the-city”.

Our analysis of the manners in which land redevelopment has taken place is based on the means of land disposition and transaction available in China’s land market. Currently, land disposition and transaction in China’s land market are undertaken through administrative allocation (划拨), paid conveyance of land use rights (出让) and leasing (租赁). The paid conveyance of land use rights may take the modes of close-door negotiation (协议), public tendering (招标), auctioning (拍卖), or listing (挂牌). This categorization is important because it provides an interesting angle to understand the nature and dynamism of land redevelopment in terms of the influence of the command economy (allocation) vis-à-vis the growth of the market track (public tendering, auctioning and listing). Our explanation of the spatial variation of urban land redevelopment at the national level involves a cross-sectional analysis of the possible correlation between the importance of land redevelopment in local land supply and population density, level of economic growth as measured by per capita GDP, and degree of openness as measured by the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to total fixed assets investment (FAI). The sample we used comes from China’s 340 municipalities at or above the prefectural level. ¹ The time period covers the years from 2003 (the starting point when China introduced new rules to make it compulsory for all commercial and industrial land transactions to be undertaken through public tendering, auctioning or listing) to 2015. Our data on urban land redevelopment are obtained from China’s Ministry of Land and Resources and the other urban social, demographic and economic data are gathered from the State Statistical Bureau.

Our case study is based on the city of Guangzhou—China’s southern gateway where special allowance was granted by the central authorities in December 2008 to practice “redevelopment of the three olds” (三旧改造) (i.e. old factories, old neighborhoods, and old villages). For the limitation of space, our case study focuses on a comparative analysis of two “villages-in-the-city” (城中村), namely Liede (猎德) and Yangji (杨箕). ² These two cases are chosen for a focused study on the considerations that they are among the very few cases having completed the course of redevelopment and hence holding necessary information for a systematic assessment. They are also the two interesting cases with similar location and yet very different results of redevelopment. Moreover, these are the two cases that have attracted heightened international attention and diverse interpretations (Guo et al., 2018; Lin, 2015; Wu et al., 2018). Data and information are collected through semi-structured interviews, archival documentary research, and field investigations. It should be acknowledged that the case of Guangzhou is not typical, comprehensive and representative enough to make any generalization applicable to all Chinese cities. Nonetheless, a detailed case study locally is meant to be a tool to cross-check with and supplement our analysis of the general pattern at the national level. Moreover, any significant insights obtained from the investigation of a case that has served as the national laboratory for reforming urban redevelopment may provide important references for future studies elsewhere. Before the results of the empirical study are presented, a critical engagement with existing theoretical enquiry is in order so as to better situate this particular research endeavor.

Reinterpreting the transformation of the urban landscape and China’s urban land politics

Notwithstanding the dark sides of population concentration and close contacts displayed in the recent COVID-19 pandemic, theoretical interpretation of the growth of cities and transformation of the urban landscape has long been based upon a strong faith in the benefits generated from a large population size and high concentration (Berry, 1973; Scott and Storper, 2014). The operation of agglomeration economies is seen as fundamental to understanding not only the growth of cities but also their internal structure and the transformation of the urban landscape. On the assumptions of isotropic space, distance decay, free market competition, minimum state intervention, perfect information and rational choice, a bid-rent model is reckoned to be the logic explaining the existence and transformation of the urban landscape (Alonso, 1964). The spatial differentiation in income, race and ethnicity, and family size is identified as the basic factors giving rise to the internal structure of cities. Fundamental to the modernization school is a belief in the existence of a common pattern that characterized the internal structure of cities and the urban landscape, and this common pattern is attributed to pre-existing market mechanism.

Interpretation of the city as the center of modernization and the urban landscape as the naturalized object with its own intrinsic pattern and logic is contested by others who see the city as a volatile territory of crises, uneven development, and restless transformation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Leitner et al., 2007). In the narratives of neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism, cities are interpreted as the key institutional arena in and through which neoliberal political strategies are initiated to enhance place-based competitive advantages so as to capture and fix mobile capital in the era of intensified global competition. The key to understanding the growth of cities and transformation of the urban landscape is not so much in the concentration of population and the agglomeration economies but rather in the “creative destruction” of state-market relations.

Until recently, the established urban theories derived from the experiences of Anglo-America had been considered to have limited use, if not completely irrelevant, when applied to the Chinese cities under state socialism. For decades, Chinese cities in the Mao era of state socialism had been seen as “unique” and incomparable with their capitalist counterparts (Ma and Hansen, 1981; Whyte and Parish, 1984). In recent years, however, market reforms and globalization have profoundly transformed the landscape of Chinese cities. While the legacy of the earlier socialist city has remained visible, a new spatial ramification of marketization and globalization (development zones, shopping malls, villa-housing, gated communities, etc.) has been added onto many Chinese cities often at a distance away from the old city center (Huang, 2020; Ma and Wu, 2005; Wu et al., 2007; Wu and Gaubatz, 2013). The result has been a juxtaposition of the two spatial elements of the plan and market: the persistent legacy of the old socialist cities co-existing with the new city of commercialization, skyscrapers, and stratified and segregated neighborhoods. The emergence of “the new Chinese city” and profound transformation of China’s urban landscape have raised legitimate questions concerning whether or not and to what extent Western-based theorization of the growth and spatiality of urbanism is applicable to the new urban reality in globalizing China (Lim, 2014, 2019; McGee et al., 2007; Su, 2012, 2015). Given the existence of a well-established body of literature on urban renewal, gentrification and displacement in the West, important attempts have been made to examine (and debate over) how urban redevelopment in Chinese cities bears any similarities with or differences from their Western counterparts (He, 2007; He and Wu, 2009; Ley and Teo, 2020; Newman and Wyly, 2006; Wyly et al., 2010).

It would be narrow-minded and self-amusing to insist on Chinese exceptionalism and completely shut the door for dialogue and engagement with Western-based urban theories. Following on the same logic, it would be over-simplistic and misleading to advocate a direct importation and wholesale application of the fashionable concepts and theories derived from Western experiences into Chinese reality. A constructive alternative would be to situate the Chinese case in the context of ongoing theoretical debates and advancements. The purpose is, as Peck has suggested, “not merely to apply, confirm, nuance, complexify, ‘disaggregate’ or otherwise break down theory claims, in a one-way and purely deconstructive fashion, but rather to engage in the active reconstruction of these claims, interrogating, adjudicating, and ‘speaking back’ to evolving explanatory frames and framework, in a critical and dialogic manner” (Peck, 2017: 331–332). When evaluated “in a critical and dialogic manner”, current theoretical interpretations based on the notions of agglomeration economies and neoliberalization would reveal their own limitations and difficulties.

The long established wisdom to attribute the growth and transformation of cities to the functioning of agglomeration economies and the urban land nexus is built on the premises that there exists a well-established market economy, that land property rights are unambiguously defined and effectively protected, and that conducive legal and institutional frameworks are in place to bring about and safeguard the orderly concentration of urban activities. Unfortunately, these premises can hardly be found in many countries of either the developing world or actually existing forms of socialism where private property rights are not clearly defined and protected, operation of market forces is subject to government distortion and manipulation, and the legal and institutional systems are poorly developed. These political and social conditions would impose severe constraints upon any theoretical model that (over)emphasizes the functioning of agglomeration economies at the expense of state power relation and other institutional forces (Chien and Woodworth, 2018; Howell et al., 2020; Hsing, 2010; Lim, 2019; Lin, 2009; Su, 2012).

The theory of neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism has offered a broader and open perspective with greater sensitivity to the structural logics of global market forces and the neoliberal agenda of capital accumulation. Yet its strength has paradoxically turned out to be its weakness. The notion of “the market as the new emperor” has been questioned and debated as market means differently to different people and has been dealt with inconsistently among cities and regions (Haila, 2007; Zhu, 2009). The treatment of the state and market as if they were two diametrically opposed principles of social organization is clearly an over-simplification of the case. Many studies have revealed the variegated and mutating nature of state-market relationships contingent upon various geographical political economies (Glassman, 2018; Leitner et al., 2007; Peck et al., 2009). Even when the urban political project of neoliberalization is understood as an evolving, mutating, and polycentric process with remarkable uncertainty, flexibility, hybridity, and geopolitical contingency, there is still the unresolved issue concerning the internal dynamics of the state and market respectively. In many developing economies of the global south where the rule of law and the logic of market are either primitive or absent, placing the emphasis on an imagined interplay of the state and market at the expense of other mechanisms such as the state-society nexus may well obscure the real dynamics of urban transformation .

With a scale and speed of urbanization that can hardly be matched elsewhere in time and space, phenomenal growth and transformation of Chinese cities in recent decades have presented a rare and valuable opportunity to interrogate, adjudicate, and “speak back” to evolving explanatory frameworks identified above (Hsing, 2010; Huang, 2020; McGee et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Wu and Gaubatz, 2013). In contrast with the situation in which urban growth is based upon the operation of agglomeration economies, the growth and transformation of the urban landscape in China in recent decades are contingent upon a rapidly changing political economy characterized by a fragmented authoritarian Party-state (re)asserting its legitimacy in the global wave of neoliberalization, an increasingly sophisticated society where individual economic interests overtake political concerns, and a variegated space of accelerate urbanization and uneven urban transformation. The interplay of an assertive yet fragmented Party-state and an open and better informed society has taken three important forms that have direct consequences upon the transformation of China’s urban landscape.

First, cities under redevelopment have become the sites of contestation and negotiation between the central state determined to sustain its legitimacy, local governments concerned of place promotion and revenue generation, developers taking their share of the urban fortune, and original land users protecting their interests through “rightful resistance”. ³ Success or failure of the projects of urbanization and urban (re)development depends upon how negotiation and reconciliation are made between the (local) state as land owners and the segments of the society as existing land users. Secondly, centralized decision-making in a hierarchical top-down fashion that characterized the command economy under state socialism in the past is moderated by a decentralized process in which the projects of urbanization and urban (re)development are initiated and practiced locally. The greater the degree of decentralization, local involvements, and public participation, the greater the chance for the projects of urban (re)development to become successful. Thirdly, existing land users who occupy old factories, old neighborhoods, and “villages-in-the-city” would not cooperate with the local state in urban redevelopment unless they are motivated by a considerable share of the income and profits to be generated from urban (re)development. The greater the share of income and benefits taken by existing land users, the greater the likelihood for the urban (re)development projects to be successful.

The key to understanding why and how the state project of urbanization and urban (re)development are able to break the ground successfully in certain places but fail in others lies not so much in the allegedly pervasive and universal functioning of agglomeration economies or the bid-rent model but instead in the interplay of a fragmented authoritarian Party-state and a diverse society holding different and at times conflicting interests in the process of urbanization. Those cities (or districts within a city) capable of forging a mutually accommodative state-society relations are likely to be successful in transforming the old urban landscape into new ones. Others less capable of doing so will be stuck and become left behind. What really matters to the emergence and uneven transformation of the urban landscape in contemporary China is therefore not so much the functioning of agglomeration economies or the reformulation of state-market relations as described in the prevailing urban discourse but rather an evolving and increasingly sophisticated state-society interplay that has become instrumental to the urban revolutions taking place across the country. This conceptual proposition requires necessary testing and evaluation against actual practices and experiences—a task to be dealt with in the remainder of the paper.

China’s new dynamics of urbanization and remaking of the urban landscape

In recent years, China’s continuing urbanization has demonstrated significant changes with its emphasis shifting increasingly from urban sprawl into urban renewal. Since the late 1990s, massive farmland loss as a result of urban sprawl has become an alarming concern of the central leadership as it threatened the national interest in food security and social stability. Meanwhile, increased marketization and opening up have made Chinese farmers better informed of their rights and the real value of their land, making it increasingly difficult and costly for rural to urban land conversion. A central state deeply concerned of the national interest in food security combined with a better informed, more sophisticated, and diverse society has forced Chinese municipal governments and land developers to go beyond the early practices of extensive urban expansion and turn attention toward the redevelopment of existing urban land as an alternative. The result has been a new mode of urbanization increasingly dominated by urban redevelopment (He et al., 2020; Lin, 2015).

The shifting emphasis of China’s urbanization from urban expansion into urban renewal would become evident when we analyze the land statistics for Chinese cities at and above the prefectural level. Figure 1 shows that there has been a steady growth of the supply of urban construction land since 2003 and a substantial increase in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. With the exception of 2009, the year immediately after the 2008 financial tsunami, redeveloped urban land has contributed over 50 percent of the land supply. Chinese Land Management Law requires that new urban construction land converted from cultivated land must seek approvals from either the State Council or the provincial authorities depending on the size of the land (China, 1998, Articles 44 and 45). Figure 2 analyzes the records of government approvals of land conversion since 1998 when the Land Management Law was enacted. The share of farmland conversion in newly developed construction land has dropped from 56 to 41 percent during 1998–2013. Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the important role played by the redevelopment of existing urban land in the process of urbanization.

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Figure 1.

Urban land development in Chinese cities: new land conversion vis-à-vis redevelopment, 2003–2015. (Data source: China Ministry of Land and Resources, 2004-2016, digital database.)

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Figure 2.

China’s approved cultivated land conversion as a source of newly added construction land, 1998–2013. (Data source: China Ministry of Land and Resources, 1999–2014, digital database.)

Is there a general pattern characterizing the variation of urban redevelopment across the country? Does urban redevelopment take a position of greater significance in those cities with a central location, dense population, higher level of economic growth, and greater degree of openness as common intuition would suggest? Figure 3 presents the results of our statistical analysis of the correlation between the percentage of urban redevelopment in local land supply and key demographic, economic and geographical status for the 334 Chinese municipalities at and above the prefectural level for which consistent data are available. Contrary to normal expectation, no significant correlation is found between the extent of urban redevelopment and level of urban economic growth. As for population density and degree of openness, a weak positive correlation is identified. The only result that comes as no surprise is the significant negative correlation found between the extent of urban redevelopment and the distance of the city away from provincial capital cities (Figure 3).

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Figure 3.

Spatial variation of the share of urban redevelopment in local land supply vis-à-vis population density, per capita GDP, degree of openness and location in Chinese cities, 2003–2015. (Data source: China Ministry of Land and Resources, 2004–2016, digital database.)

Figure 4 maps out the spatial variation of the percentage held by urban redevelopment in local land supply for all Chinese cities at and above the prefectural level. At a first glance, there was no conceivable pattern showing a variation of urban redevelopment along with that of population density, level of economic growth and degree of openness. Nonetheless, a close analysis identifies an intriguing pattern that goes against common intuition: urban redevelopment plays a role of greater significance in the local land supply of those cities in the central and interior regions than in the demographically dense and economically advanced coastal region (Figure 4(a)).

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Figure 4.

China’s urban land redevelopment by modes, 2003–2015. (a) Total land supply. (b) Allocation. (c) Negotation. (d) Conveyance. (e) Tender/auction/listing. (Data source: China Ministry of Land and Resources, 2004-2016, digital database.)

To probe further into the geography of urban redevelopment, we adopt a disaggregate approach and map out the spatial variation of the percentage held by urban redevelopment in local land supply for Chinese cities according to different modes of land disposition and transaction, namely state administrative allocation (划拨), conveyance (出让), negotiation (协议), and public tendering/auctioning/listing (招拍挂) (Figure 4(b) to (e)). Among these four modes of land disposition, state administrative allocation is the one that is least transparent and least competitive as it is monopolized by the state (usually executed by the municipal governments) free of the consideration of market value, and it usually involves the assignment of the rights to use state-own land for non-commercial activities (e.g. education, healthcare, community services, etc.). Negotiation is the second-least transparent and competitive because it involves the land owners and land developers holding a close-door negotiation to strike a deal acceptable to both parties. Conveyance, especially the mode of public tendering/auctioning/listing, is the one with which the assignment of land use rights is undertaken in an open, transparent, and competitive manner.

It is interesting to see that urban redevelopment has played a role of greater significance in those modes of land disposition that are either monopolized by the state (划拨) or arbitrarily determined by close-door negotiation (协议) than in those modes of land disposition under open market competition (conveyance (出让), public tendering, auctioning and listing(招拍挂)). Even for state administrative allocation (划拨), urban redevelopment has enjoyed higher popularity in the relatively underdeveloped central and interior regions than in the advanced coastal region (Figure 4(b)). It appears that the extent of urban redevelopment has little to do with population density, level of economic growth, or degree of marketization and openness but is shaped directly by how the decisions for land use rights assignment (i.e. allocation, conveyance, negotiation, public tendering/auctioning/listing) are made and by whom. This is not difficult to understand. In a socialist economy under the regime of fragmented authoritarianism, local Party-state officials enjoy considerable discretionary power to operate and manipulate land redevelopment. State manipulated land redevelopment with poor transparency and accountability provides a “low road” to development opted for by the underdeveloped regions whereas the “high road” of redevelopment through open market transaction tends to be associated with the demographically dense and economically advanced coastal region. Furthermore, redevelopment of the existing urban land usually involves negotiation between the municipal government and some sophisticated original land users. The greater the power and benefits guaranteed for original land users (either through state allocation exclusively or close-door negotiation), the greater the chance for the redevelopment of existing urban land to proceed and take a prominent position. This is an interesting point that has become evident from not just our macro-level statistical analysis but also the empirical case study presented in what follows.

Urban redevelopment in Guangzhou: A tale of two “villages-in-the-city”

Among Chinese cities, Guangzhou is characterized by its gateway location distant from the political center in Beijing but well-connected overseas. This special location, in conjunction with a distinct Cantonese culture that values flexibility, pragmatics, and adaptability, has made the city an important site for testing new ideas and doing unconventional experiments. To the reformers up in Beijing, the core of the national economy in central and eastern China would remain intact should any reform experiment fail in this southern frontier. It is thus not surprising that, when the central leadership in Beijing was keen on exploring urban renewal as an alternative to continuing urban expansion, Guangzhou was designated by the State Council in December 2008 as a site of experiment to practice possible institutional reforms through the scheme of “renewal of the three olds” (三旧改造), namely old factories, neighborhoods and villages in the city. An important part of the scheme of “renewal of the three olds” is the redevelopment of the “old villages” or “villages-in-the-city” (城中村)—the subject of the case study here.

The Liede village is one of the 52 villages (城中村) identified by the municipal government for a “complete transformation” (全面改造). ⁴ The size of the village is moderate in the context of southern China. At the time when the renewal project was initiated in 2007, the village had a registered population of 6,500 (3,300 households), and a land area of 33.75 hectare. There was a migrant population estimated at 23,000—three times larger than the local population—who took Liede as their habitat with low-priced rental housing. Despite its moderate size, Liede was singled out by the municipal government to become the first “village-in-the-city” for redevelopment because of the special location it held right at the heart of the new city center. In the latest version of city planning formulated after Guangzhou was chosen on 2 July 2004 to be the site of the 2010 Asian Games, a new city center in the name of the Pearl River New Town (珠江新城) is to be built to impress the region and the world and Liede happened to be an “old, messy, and dirty” (旧, 脏, 乱) village located within one block from the new city center (Figure 5).

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Figure 5.

Location of Liede and Yangji in Guangzhou.

With a keen understanding of the costly and controversial nature of the project of urban renewal, the municipal government made a special concession financially to allow the village to keep the income of land conveyance that normally would have to be remitted to the state. The power of decision-making was also decentralized: the village was asked to be the leading agent (改造主体) responsible for its “self-redevelopment” (自行改造) inclusive of demolition, compensation, and resettlement. All village land, estimated at 33.75 hectare, was divided into three parts, about one-third of the land—a land parcel measured at 11.42 hectare or 33.83 percent of the total land area—was earmarked for conveyance to commercial developers so that the income generated could provide the fund needed for the redevelopment project. Another half of the land, measured at 17.11 hectare, was identified for the building of high-rise housings and other community services (public school, temples, ancestor halls, sports and recreation centers, etc.) for the resettlement of all villagers. A third portion was reserved for the building of a five-star hotel owned by the collective corporation for the generation of recurrent income that would give dividends to the villagers as shareholders. On September 2,92,007 the parcel of land earmarked for sales to commercial developers went for auctioning and it generated a land conveyance income of 4.6 billion yuan to be used by the Liede collective organization to cover the costs of redevelopment estimated at 3.458 billion yuan. Through a decentralization of the power of decision-making and with a financial concession of giving up the land conveyance income to villagers as original land users, the municipal government has managed to make this project a relatively successful experiment of “self-redevelopment”.

The redevelopment of the village is characterized by increased intensity and improved efficiency of land use. Low-rise village houses are replaced by high-rise buildings of 26–40 stories. Floor area ratio (容积率)—the ratio of total floor area constructed to total land area—has increased from 2.06 to 5.13 suggesting that more than twice of the original floor area has been built per unit of land. As housings are packed up in high-rise buildings, green and open space has been opened up. The building coverage ratio (建筑密度)—the ratio of the base area of all buildings to the total land area—has reduced from 60 percent to 28.1 percent whereas green space ratio(绿地率)—the ratio of green area to total land area—has increased from 5 percent to 30 percent.

Improved efficiency of land use has not come about without costs, however. As traditional village housings (村屋) are demolished and replaced by high-rise apartments, the social network and rural community lifestyle germinated and cultivated there for hundreds of years have been severely disturbed if not totally destroyed. Perhaps the most noticeable victims are the migrant workers in the village whose population size was several times larger than the villagers. The demolition of the village and its resettlement with modern and yet more pricey apartment buildings have meant that the low-cost habitat upon which the migrant population have rested and the social networks they have built for communication and mutual assistance have been completely destroyed. Ironically, it is the project of modernization and urbanization to which the migrant population have contributed so much that has deprived them off their rights to live and worked in the city.

The Yangji village has held so many common characteristics with Liede that these two cases may be seen as an interesting twin of Guangzhou’s “villages-in-the-city” undergoing redevelopment. Like Liede, Yangji occupies a central location in the new CBD of the city and has been identified by the municipal government as among the 52 villages subjected to complete transformation (Figure 5). The scale of the village is similar to that of Liede. At the time when the redevelopment project was initiated, Yangji reportedly had a total population of 15,033 (including a local population of 5,163 and a migrant population of 9,870) and a land area of 11.49 hectares. The official scheme applied for Yangji’s redevelopment was similar to what has been adopted for Liede. The village was asked to be the leading agent (改造主体) bearing its own costs for “self-redevelopment” (自行改造).

All village land in Yangji was divided into two parts, namely the land for sale to commercial developers so as to generate the fund needed to cover the costs of demolition and resettlement and the land for the resettlement of the displaced villagers. The first part of land took up 54.63 percent (6.28 ha) of the village land and had to change its ownership from collective to the state so that it could be sold to developers. The balance of the land remained owned and operated by the villagers collectively. In other words, redevelopment was carried out through a practical combination of complete transformation (全面改造) and comprehensive renovation (综合治理) which is identical to what has been done in the case of Liede. Moreover, the standards used in Liede for compensation in the process of demolition and resettlement have also been applied to the case of Yangji because these two villages share a common location (they are actually close neighbors).

Despite their common location, similar size and status, shared scheme and approaches as well as consistent compensation standards, the results of redevelopment have turned out to be striking different for the two villages. Whereas the redevelopment of Liede has been generally considered successful and acceptable, the redevelopment of Yangji has become so controversial and contentious that it attracted heated attention nationally and internationally. Although the majority (98 percent) of Yangji’s villagers had signed the agreement for redevelopment, eighteen village households refused to accept the deal for resettlement and were ordered by the court to evacuate on May 24, 2011. The village houses of the “nail households” (i.e. those who refused to move) were demolished by force on March 2,12,012 including the residence of a 40-year-old female villager Li Jie’e (李洁娥). In the morning of May 92,012 Li Jie’e committed suicide in front of TV cameras jumping out from the roof of her house. The tragedy became headline news locally, nationally and even internationally. The controversial saga continued to evolve into a bitter battle between the villagers who had moved out waiting for resettlement and a few “nail households” who refused to accept the deal for resettlement. It was not until July 2,32,013—three years after demolition broke the ground—that all “nail households” eventually agreed to move out. Yangji’s redevelopment project was finally completed May 2016 and it took eight years to run its course—much longer and more difficult than its neighbor Liede that took only three years for completion.

Why then have these two “villages-in-the-city” sharing a common location, identical scheme and consistent compensation standards demonstrated an outcome of redevelopment that differs so sharply? A careful investigation has identified some subtle differences that may be easily overlooked, but they bear interesting and significant insights into the sophisticated dynamics of urban redevelopment at a finer scale (Table 1). The first difference lies in the extent of the financial concession made by the state as an incentive to motivate villagers to engage in urban redevelopment. The two villages were both asked to self-finance the redevelopment project and both opted for fund raising by selling a parcel of their land to commercial developers. In the case of Liede, land sales has generated an income of RMB4.6 billion to cover the expenses of demolition and resettlements estimated at RMB3.458 and the balance was kept for its own use. Nothing was remitted to the state. By contrast, Yangji’s land sales to the commercial developer of Guangzhou R&F Properties (广州富力集团) on January 1,82,011 generated an income of RMB2.35 billion which included RMB1.88 billion to cover the expenses of demolition and resettlement and another RMB470 million as land conveyance fee for remittance to the state (collected by the municipal and district governments). In other words, the state made a complete financial concession and gave up its rights to collect the land conveyance fee in the case of Liede, but the state made no financial concession in the case of Yangji.

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Table 1.

Comparison of the redevelopment of Liede and Yangji, Guangzhou, China (sources: interviews and archival research by the author with the assistance of YANG Si from Sun Yat-sen University).

		Liede Village (2007–2010)	Yangji Village (2008–2016)
Population at Redevelopment	Local	7,865	5,163
	Migrant	23,000a	9,870
Land Area (ha)		33.75	11.49
Property Reassignmentsb		Tripartite	Dichotomous
State Concession		Income from land sales (RMB4.6 billion) granted to Liede to support redevelopment	Income from land sales (RMB472 million) remitted to municipal and district governments at the 8:2 ratio
Developer Involvement		Limited involvement in land sales only without involvement in demolition and resettlements	Extensive involvements in land sales and responsible for demolition and resettlements
Decision Making		Bottom-up: initiated by the village and approved by the district/municipal government	Top-down: initiated by the district government, village collective organization and developer
Lineage Structure		Uniform/Coherent: 4 kinship groups Li (50%), Liang, Lin, and Mai	Diverse/Sophisticated: 7 kinship groups led by Yao (25%), Li, Qin, Liang, etc.
Floor Area Ratio (容积率)	Before	2.06	3.02
	After	5.13	5.64
Housing Value (Yuan/m²)	Before	3,000-4,000	4,500
	After	20,000-30,000	65,618
Housing Rental(Yuan/m²)	Before	10–15	20
	After	30–50	50
Time Duration		3 Years	8 Years
Grievance/Resistance		Minimum/Manageable	Suicide, Contentious, Widely Publicized

^aThe number of migrant population was estimated at 11,000 by Wu et al (2018: 9); 17,000 by Guo et al (2018: 1429); and 23,000 by the Tianhe district government (Lin, 2015: 877)

^bFor Liede, a tripartite approach was adopted. The village land collectively owned was divided into three parts, namely one-third being converted into state-owned for sales (conveyance) to commercial developers so as to generate the income to finance the redevelopment project, one-half being used for resettlements and the balance for the building of a five-star hotel owned by the collective to generate recurrent revenue. For Yangji, a dichotomous approach was opted. The village land collectively owned was divided into two parts with over half of the land being converted into state-owned for sales to commercial developers and the balance for the resettlements of villagers.

The second difference between the two cases lies in the extent and manner of involving commercial developers in the process of redevelopment. In the case of Liede, the role played by commercial developers (Guangzhou R&F Properties 广州富力集团, KWG Group Holdings合景泰富地产, and Sun Hung KaiProperties新鸿基地产) was very limited: they were responsible for the commercial development of the parcel of land obtained through conveyance and were not involved in demolition and resettlement. In the case of Yangji, involvement of the commercial developer was much more extensive than that for Liede. The developer (Guangzhou R&F Properties广州富力集团) was responsible for not only the commercial development of the parcel of land obtained through conveyance but also demolition, resettlements, and redevelopment of residential land as well as village community services and public utilities. Although negotiation for compensation and allocation of housing for resettlement were theoretically undertaken by the Yangji Collective Organization, the real boss who would pay the bills for demolition and resettlement was the commercial developer. Whereas negotiation and mediation concerning compensation and resettlement were handled internally in Liede, they were dealt with externally in Yangji turning into many battles bitterly fought between individual villagers and the commercial developer.

Another interesting characteristic that sets the two cases apart is their lineage structure. Liede is endowed with a relatively simple and coherent lineage structure in which an overwhelming majority of villagers shares a common ancestor with the surname of Li (李) and the remaining hold the surnames of Liang (梁), Lin (林) and Mai (麦). By contrast, the lineage structure that characterizes Yangji is more diverse and sophisticated with four major kinship groups, namely Yao(姚), Li(李), Qin (秦) and Liang(梁), taking their share of equal importance. A relatively simple and homogenous lineage organization in Liede has helped make it easier for coordination, mediation and reconciliation. For Yangji, the information obtained through interviews suggested that reconciliation was difficult not only because of the existence of four different kinship groups holding different vested interests but also because of the intervention and manipulation of different developers externally.

Finally, the manner in which redevelopment decisions were made has been different between these two cases. In the first case, the Liede Economic Development Corporation was entrusted as the leading agent fully in charge of the redevelopment project. The Tianhe district (天河区) government was responsible for planning and design whereas the municipal government remotely and indirectly monitored the process through zoning and plot ratios. In the second case, the Yuexiu district (越秀区) government to which Yangji belongs has played a role more actively and strongly than its peer in Tianhe especially in the controversial issues concerning demolition, compensation, and resettlement. Taking all stakeholders into account, the decision-making process has been steered primarily by the collective organization internally and on the grassroots level for Liede, but it has been intervened more strongly, directly, and extensively by the municipal and district governments as well as the commercial developer from outside for the controversial case of Yangji.

The tale of these two villages with many common characteristics (location, size and status, compensation standards) but showing a diverse pattern of redevelopment (one relatively peaceful whereas the other highly controversial and delayed) suggests that the key to understanding success and failure of urban redevelopment or the transformation of the landscape from village houses into skyscrapers of a (post-)modern metropolis lies not so much in what has been prescribed by conventional wisdom (central location, agglomeration economies, state-market relations). Instead, what has been directly responsible for the diverse pattern displayed appears to be the way in which the (local) state (municipal and district governments) and society (collective organizations, villagers, developers, etc.) (re)position themselves and interact one another in the process of urban redevelopment. This finding is consistent with what has been identified from the analysis of the general pattern of land redevelopment at the national level where the spatial variation of land redevelopment is found to be shaped more significantly by how decisions are made and by whom than by free market forces.

Conclusion and discussion

In the recent decade, the widely proclaimed dawn of an urban age and global sweep of urbanism have brought back important issues of perennial debates concerning the nature of cities, why and how they develop, and what holds the key to explaining the transformation of the urban landscape. The popular notions are to see the city either as the center of globalization where agglomeration economies anchor or the arena in and through which a hollowing out state makes space to accommodate the rolling out of the forces of global capitalism. This study identifies a pattern and process of urban transformation that deviates from conventional wisdom. The remaking of the Chinese urban landscape is effectively shaped not so much by forces of agglomeration economies or bid-rent dynamism but instead by a negotiation and reconciliation of the interest between the state and society. The formidable obstacles blocking urban redevelopment are overcome by institutional changes locally made to motivate existing land users with a decentralized power of decision-making and a share of the land conveyance income previously monopolized by the state.

Our analysis of the spatial variation of urban redevelopment for the Chinese cities at and above the prefectural level has identified an intriguing pattern of urban redevelopment that owes more to factional politics and fragmented authoritarianism than the reasoning of agglomeration economies or bid-rent nexus. The extent of an urban redevelopment is shown to have little to do with population density, level of economic growth or degree of openness. Instead, the emerging geography of urban redevelopment is shaped by how land disposition decisions are made and by whom. Urban redevelopment tends to prevail in those modes of land disposition that are either monopolized by the state or subject to close-door negotiation. Geographically, state manipulated land redevelopments are more commonly found in the central and interior regions where local Party-state officials resort to either state allocation or close-door negotiation by taking advantage of their discretionary power and institutional convenience. The greater the discretionary power and benefits granted by the local state to original land users (either through state allocation exclusively or close-door negotiation), the greater the chance for the redevelopment of existing urban land to take place. It appears that Chinese land users are more interested in the exclusivity of the assignment of land property rights than transferability.

The comparative study of the redevelopment of two “villages-in-the-city” in Guangzhou has provided insights consistent with the findings of the macro-level statistical analysis. A similar central location and common standards for compensation have yielded different results of redevelopment. What has set the two cases apart lies in how the fragmented authoritarian state interacted with a diverse and fractional society. Notwithstanding tightened political control from the central state, local Party-state officials at the municipal and district levels are interested in urban image building for place competition and keeping the market prices of land and housing for local revenue generation. Political and financial concessions are made by the local state to legitimize its leadership and prevent any deeper and systematic changes. Meanwhile, key stakeholders from the society (i.e. original land users, developers and individual villagers) often have formal or informal connections with the local Party-state and are equipped with diverse bargaining power that can make a significant difference in the urban redevelopment process. In Liede the village collective organization enjoys a better discretionary power granted by the local state taking the forms of political and financial concession whereas in Yangji the municipal government takes away all of the conveyance income and the developer manipulated decision-making. Disputes and contestation are internalized in Liede but they have turned into a battle bitterly fought between villagers and the developer in Yangji. Theoretically, our comparative study of Liede and Yangji with common location but different outcome of redevelopment is significant at least on two counts. First, success or failure of an urban redevelopment project appears to owe more to the interplay of a fragmented authoritarian state and a diverse society than to the popular belief in location, agglomeration economies, and bid-rent logics. Second, studies of China’s changing state-society relations have until recently been occupied by the debate between those who see a homogenized society facing a uniform/powerful sate and others who portrait a strengthening society undermining a discredited state. Available evidence from this case study supports neither side of the perennial debate. The different local state discretionary power granted to the two villages and the diverse formal/informal connections between the local Party-state and key stakeholders of the society that characterized the different paths and trajectories of urban development in this case suggest an interesting conceptual alternative to see a fragmented authoritarian state being interweaved with a better informed, more diverse and increasingly sophisticated society although the orbit and premise of interaction remain delineated by the Party-state.

The case of urban redevelopment analyzed here appears to bear some interesting similarities with what has been extensively documented in the West. Redevelopment has intensified the contradictions between the use-value and exchange-value of the land. Compensation has failed to cover the subjective value of the land to the displaced residents and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Displacement has become a new factor leading to class polarization and social stratification (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Wyly et al., 2010). An increasingly sophisticated array of methods have been used to resist displacement in the form of “rightful resistance” (O’Brien, 1996). Yet the Chinese case is characterized by its collective ownership of the land with incredible ambiguity and vulnerability to manipulation. Redevelopment in this case has involved resettlement of the villagers as land owners and displacement of the migrant population as renters. The discretionary power of the local state and its selective concession made to the society are instrumental to the paths of redevelopment. Taking China’s state-society relations seriously appears to be an important pathway for urban specialists to take on the controversial and daunting task of comparative urbanism involving China. Further research is needed to see how the pattern and process of urban redevelopment identified from this case study can be seriously compared and contrasted with what has taken place elsewhere.