Abstract
As moral agents, the characters in the book of Ruth operate under pronounced circumstantial constraints. Examining how characters' speeches project a ‘self’ that ‘answers the glance of the other’ (Monika Fludernik), and utilizing Michel de Certeau's notion of narrative's spatial syntax, this article examines how geographical, social, and bodily spaces encourage and discourage certain self-identifications and actions and how the crossing of, and tactical behaviors within, these spatial boundaries inform our perceptions of moral agency. Bakhtin's concept of ‘event-ness’ also contributes to our understanding of how the book's plotting of human behavior invites further moral reflection.
Keywords
1. Introduction
In her 2011 SBL Presidential Address 1 Carol Newsom employs insights from neuroscience and ethnopsychology to explore literary representations of moral agency in Second Temple Jewish literature. She takes as her starting point the neuroscientific observation that
the default state of consciousness is fragmented and conflicted. Different physiologically and genetically based systems, as well as acquired beliefs and preferences, compete within the person, leading to an unsystematic and uncoordinated series of impulses and desires. The executive self that mediates among these impulses and allows the person to act with coordinated intention over time does not simply emerge biologically by default. It is much more a cultural achievement, historically facilitated and transmitted in large part by religious practices. 2
She then presents and applies the schema of ethnopsychologists Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock 3 who attempt to map moral agency across cultures. In their proposed grid Heelas and Lock
work with two coordinates: location and control. Location refers to the differentiation every society makes between the perceiver and his or her environment. Roughly speaking, this is a differentiation between self and other or between internal and external… The second vector, control, is a way of conceptualizing activity or passivity, that is, whether a person is seen as ‘in control’ or ‘under the control’ of someone or something else. 4
With this analytical framework in mind, Newsom traces how moral agency is conceptualized in various Second Temple texts, showing how moral agency is affirmed, how internal or external impairments of moral agency are conceivably overcome, and how, in certain instances, moral agency is denied.
Following Newsom's theoretically adventurous lead, I, too, will exercise a transdisciplinary reach to consider how issues of moral agency affect the construction and perception of literary characters in the book of Ruth. 5 Three theoretical impulses steer the following reading: postclassical literary theorist Monika Fludernik's insights on narration and identity, 6 social philosopher Michel de Certeau's notion of narrative's spatial syntax, 7 and literary theorist and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the ‘event-ness of Being’. 8 This theoretical constellation permits some other ways to think about ‘location’, ‘control’, and ‘conflicted consciousness’.
Fludernik observes that conversational narratives are inevitably presentations of the self and often function to protect ‘face’, to vindicate one's identity, to bolster one's image. 9 Since the book of Ruth employs more conversation, proportionately speaking, than any other biblical narrative, we have the opportunity to consider how character speeches present, protect, save ‘face’ as they indicate the capacity or incapacity to enact moral agency or as they elicit moral accountability from others.
Conversations, of course, always take place in a context; consequently, some attention to space is in order. According to de Certeau, ‘Every story is a travel story—a spatial practice' 10 —which functions not only to ‘link together’ different spaces or to plot movements from one place to another, but also to construct, regulate, reflect how spaces are constituted by different kinds of activities and practices. In de Certeau's schema there are ‘proper’ places that are ‘owned’ and strategically controlled by powerful, willful subjects, institutions, or social systems, and there are ‘other’ subjects who, deprived of ‘proper’ location, find ways to utilize and ‘consume’ established places in order to survive. In this discussion we will explore how geographical, social, and bodily spaces encourage and discourage certain practices and how the crossing of, and tactical behaviors within, those spatial boundaries inform our perceptions of moral agency.
Space cannot be divorced from time. We consider in the reading below how spatial practices capitalize or attempt to control time, and how human choices both shape and are shaped by the spatial and temporal matrix. Making a brief appearance is Bakhtin's concept of ‘event-ness’, which, in the context of literary theory, refers to the ability of some narratives to capture the unpredictability, and therefore the ethical accountability, of human actions. The way in which the book of Ruth plots the ‘eventness’ of human behavior invites further reflection about how the book itself exercises moral agency in its rhetorical context.
2. Answering the Glance of the Other
'[T]he self is projected in the first place’, writes Fludernik, ‘in order to answer the glance of the other’. 11 The first ‘self considered here is the figure of Naomi. Naomi begins as a bit player in someone else's narrative, a story launched by a ‘proper’ place's failure to live up to its name. Famine in Bethlehem, the ‘House of Bread’, prompts Naomi's husband Elimelek to move his family to Moab. Under the control of her husband and extenuating circumstances, Naomi gradually emerges as an intelligible self in an ambivalent world where life, death, and foreignness press upon her identity. Eventually bereft of her husband and sons, and left only with her two Moabite daughters-in-law, Naomi must make a move or face absorption into foreign space. Hearing a rumor of bread now available in the ‘House of Bread’, she chooses to return home with her daughters-in-law providing initial escort.
At some undisclosed geographical point between Moab and Judah, Naomi attempts to dismiss her young companions with a blessing (1.8–9):
Go, return, each to the house of her mother.
May Y
as you have dealt with the dead and with me.
May Y
Then she pauses, drops the pious pretense, and offers practical advice: 13
Find security!—in the house of another husband!
The syntactical shift marks a corollary shift in tone and worldview. The blessing, dictated by religious custom, imagines a world where the deity's moral behavior parallels worthy behavior in the human realm. But as we soon learn, Naomi's personal view of Y
Embracing her and weeping, the two girls protest, insisting they will return with her to her people. Naomi's rejoinder continues her pragmatism, exposing her understanding of the world's limited options, her own sense of personal hopelessness, her body's failure to inspire desire or to be fertile space, and her honest perception of Y
Return, my daughters. Why would you go with me?
Are their sons in my belly who could become husbands for you?
Return, my daughters. Go!
—for I am too old to have a husband!
If I were to say, ‘There is hope for me—
even if I had a husband tonight—
and even if I bore sons—
would you then wait until they had grown?
would you then sequester yourselves, live without a husband?
No, my daughters, for my bitter situation far exceeds yours
For the hand of Y
As Tod Linafelt has argued, the poetry in the characters’ speeches in Ruth 1 indicates heightened emotion that reveals the characters’ inner selves.
15
Stammering, too, is a sign of authenticity, of unrehearsed direct speech. Naomi's faltering poetry ‘answers the glance of the other’ with a stumbling, emotional, and seemingly sincere confession of her inability to be the kind of moral agent that she perceives the two girls need. Her bodily space is barren; her social sphere is bleak; and she is too busy dodging Y
Orpah departs, but Ruth remains, despite Naomi's unfiltered admonishment to return with her sister-in-law ‘to her people and her gods’. With the cultural and religious differences that separate the women now bluntly voiced, Ruth has an alibi
16
to depart. Naomi has exposed the root of what could, in cultural perception, be the cause of her own misfortune: living in a foreign space among foreign people who worship foreign gods can hardly meet with Y
Ruth, however, is unwilling to adopt this alibi and erases Naomi's projected differences with her own terse, but impassioned poetry:
Do not press me to abandon you, to return from following you,
for where you go, I go; and where you stay, I stay.
Your people—my people! Your god—my god!
Where you die, I die, and there I will be buried.
Thus may Y
if even death separates me from you. (1.16–17)
Affirming her willingness and ability to traverse whatever spatial, social, and existential boundaries necessary, Ruth takes her place alongside Naomi, even acknowledging Y
Upon seeing Ruth's determination, Naomi ‘ceases to speak to her’. What does this intentional silence communicate? Acquiescence? Relief? Annoyance? A mix of these emotions?
Their arrival in Bethlehem forces another self-revelation ‘to answer the glance of the other’. ‘Is this Naomi?’ ask the women of the town. Naomi counters with a new identity:
Do not call me Naomi ['My Sweetness']!
Call me Marah ['Bitter']!
For Shaddai has caused exceeding bitterness for me.
I went away full, but Y
Why call me Naomi
when Y
and Shaddai has made evil for me? (1.20–21)
Naomi continues to see herself in Joban terms, ‘under the control’ of a deity who is presented as having his own ‘unsystematic and uncoordinated series of impulses and desires’. On the one hand, he is depicted as malicious and capricious; on the other hand, the legal language suggests just cause for accusation. Building upon her earlier claim that Y
3. Proper Places and Tactical Maneuvers
Once in Bethlehem, Naomi recedes into an unidentifiable space while Ruth and Boaz take center stage. Focalizing identity markers abound for these two characters, beginning with the narrator's summation at the end of ch. 1. The accrual of labels—'Naomi's daughter-in-law’, ‘the one returning from the fields of Moab’, and the oft-repeated ‘Ruth the Moabite'—shows Ruth to be a body out of place, in need of explanation, definition, qualification. 21 Moreover, the specific allusion to Moab makes her morally suspect. 22 However, Boaz, too, begs for social definition, and the narrator obliges with a corresponding pile of descriptors: Naomi's ‘kinsman, on her husband's side’, ‘a man of substance [an ליח רובג שיא]’, ‘from the family of Elimelek’. When ‘Ruth the Moabite’ ventures out to glean, she just so happens onto the field of Boaz who, we are reminded, is ‘a member of Elimelek's extended family’ (2.3). This information, as well as Ruth's Moabite label, is repeated yet again at the end of the ch. 2. If the Moabite label marks Ruth as a body out of place, as a stranger in need of aid, as a foreigner of dubious morals, Boaz's various designations ground him firmly in society as ensconced, entitled, financially endowed, and morally responsible.
In de Certeau's terms, Boaz occupies a ‘proper’ place, a place that is owned, strategically set apart from all that is ‘other’, a place that can be mastered through sight, where the owner's ‘eye can transform foreign forces into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and “include” them within its scope of vision’.
23
He strides onto his own field, ‘answering the glance of the other’ with pious greeting: ‘Y
Ruth as foreign immigrant, on the other hand, does not fit neatly into the social system. She has no ‘proper’ place and instead occupies an ‘in-between’ space. While Boaz strategically structures his space to meet his ends and to shore up his identity, Ruth must rely on what de Certeau calls ‘tactics’, ‘calculated action[s] determined by the absence of a proper locus’. 26 The difference in social location is particularly striking in how the two characters are subject to time. De Certeau asserts that an owned, ‘proper’ place represents ‘a triumph of place over time’, in that ‘it allows one to capitalize acquired advantages, to prepare future expansions, and thus to give oneself a certain independence with respect to the variability of circumstances’. 27 In contrast, one who operates tactically in the terrain of others depends heavily on time, waiting upon possibilities, seizing chance and opportunity from moment to moment. Boaz's agricultural success points to his social and economic ability to control his future. Ruth has no such control. She insinuates herself into the proper spaces of others, seizing opportunities to ‘make do’ in ways that stretch, manipulate, and transgress the social boundaries. 28 Unlike the inactive Naomi, she ventures into public space with a plan to use that space to her advantage, namely to glean in the field of one who might show her favor (2.2). As chance would have it, she lands in Boaz's field, quickly gets the measure of this socially structured space, and waits for opportunity.
Boaz, naturally defaulting to the ‘panoptic practice' 29 of an owner of proper space, immediately spies a foreign element in his domain and seeks to position her socially. ‘Whose girl is this?’ he asks (2.3). His overseer stammers, ‘She is the Moabite girl, the one returning with Naomi from the fields of Moab…’ (2.6–7). The overseer depicts her as an immigrant, someone out of place, a Moabite who should be in Moab's fields, and yet here she is, uninvited and unexpected, both in Boaz's field and in his field of vision. For Ruth's part, this is not coincidental, since she sets out intentionally to find someone ‘in whose eyes I might find favor’.
The overseer stumbles on, relaying her request to glean ‘among the sheaves after the reapers’. An appeal for favor well beyond typical gleaning practices, Ruth's request represents, to use de Certeau's language, a certain ‘poaching’ on the space of others. 30 Rather than requesting to join his labor force as any able-bodied young woman might do at harvest time, she asks, though unentitled, to glean immediately behind the reapers where the sheaves are being bound. 31
Recognizing the social and geographical boundaries Ruth has already crossed, Boaz (summoning his ‘executive self and adjusting the structure of his domain) immediately attempts to restrict her movements, insisting that she stay in his field close to his young women, and that she keep her eyes on her work. His word choices here (2.9) and elsewhere (2.15, 16) indicate that, without his protection, her safety is not assured. 32 She responds with exaggerated gratitude, simultaneously probing his motives: ‘Why have I found favor in your eyes—that you should notice me—when I am a foreigner?’ (2.10)
Boaz's answer reveals that he knows more than he lets on. ‘It has indeed been told to me’, he says to her, ‘of all that you have done for your mother-in-law after the death of your husband. You left behind your father, mother, and birthplace to come to a people you did not know before’ (2.11). In true command of his ‘proper’ place, he not only sees all, he knows all. He deems Ruth's traversing of space and identity a remarkable narrative, reminiscent of Abraham's legendary migration and deserving of accommodation. In de Certeau's terms, the surprising ‘tactics’ of the stranger call for a reconfiguring of ‘proper’ space. Ruth's travel narrative inspires divine hospitality and protection in an otherwise menacing situation, and changes the rules of engagement with newcomers in Boaz's own fields.
Throughout her exchange with the pious landowner, Ruth tests, if not transgresses, social boundaries. Not only does she question the reasons for his favor, she seeks yet more favor (2.13): ‘May I [continue to] find favor in your eyes, my lord, for you have comforted me. You have spoken to the heart of your maidservant.’ Then, with a quick recovery of propriety, she adds, ‘even though (of course) I am not one of your maidservants’, implying perhaps a willingness to be something more. By noon the self-avowed ‘foreigner’ who is ‘not even one of the maidservants’ is dining with the reapers, and eating from Boaz's plate (2.14). Her occupation of the reapers’ domain pays off abundantly, with more grain than any ordinary gleaner could possibly hope for, and substantially more food than a day's wage could purchase (2.17). While Boaz may attribute this success to Y
At day's end Naomi stirs at the sight of Ruth's hard-earned food, and manages a generic blessing on ‘the one who noticed you’ followed by a more enthusiastic blessing upon hearing the name Boaz, describing either him or Y
Naomi, like Boaz, also expresses concerns about Ruth's movements. When Ruth teases her saying, ‘Yes, and he told me to stick close to his young men until the end of the harvest’, Naomi quickly counters with instructions to ‘go out with his young women’ instead (2.21–22). Her expressed concern for Ruth's welfare, notably absent from their morning exchange, represents the gradual emergence of Naomi's moral sensitivities.
The chapter thus ends with the introduction of food into Ruth and Naomi's ambiguous space, bringing with it tangible connections to Bethlehem's soil 34 and the hesed of both deity and kin. This expands and reconfigures their plight both socially and temporally. Modest plans for the short term are discussed (2.21–22), and the language of proximity (‘close to us’, ‘going out’ with Boaz's female workers, staying in Boaz's field) accentuates how spatial dynamics affect the potential for moral agency on the parts of all the major characters.
4. Poaching Private Space
With the end of the harvest season, tactical opportunities diminish. Naomi, continuing to rally her ‘executive self’, makes additional plans for Ruth's movements. Seeking for Ruth, and indirectly for herself, ‘security’ (חונמ), and knowing her own body no longer to be fertile ground, she uses Ruth's body as a down payment for economic and social stability. 35 The plan, substantially more dangerous than Ruth's venturing solo into the harvest fields, involves a further poaching of space. Ruth's prospective destination telescopes from public to private to bodily space: from the threshing floor, to ‘the place where [the man] lies down’, to ‘the place of [Boaz's] feet’ (ויתלגרמ) (3.4). As it turns out, Boaz retires some distance from his workers, showing the threshing floor, like his grain fields, to be a socially structured space; the foreign interloper, however, noting the social map, makes do with what she finds, transforming a hierarchical situation into one of horizontal(!) intimacy.
She risks numerous accusations—prostitution, promiscuity, entrapment—any of which can be easily tied, through allusion and stereotype, to her foreign identity. The extent of potential scandal can be seen in the secrecy of her arrival, her stealthy departure, and Boaz's concern that no one know of her nocturnal visit. But as the risk is high, so is the possible rate of return: חונמ, home, rest from back-breaking labor, and a secure place in the House of Bread—in other words, a ‘proper’ place.
As with all tactical maneuvers, timing is everything. A man satisfied, tipsy, and tired (3.7) is less likely to guard his personal space. As Ruth infiltrates that space, the question of identity surfaces again: ‘Who are you?’ the man asks, startled (3.9). ‘I am Ruth your handmaid. Spread your skirt/wing over your handmaid’, she continues, ‘for you are a redeemer’. As interpreters, we are literally and figuratively ‘in the dark’, unable to see what is taking place or to parse the enigmatic exchange. Nevertheless, the invitation to share the same space is clear. Bodies touch. Boundaries are crossed. Identities are redefined. And moral agency is on the line.
Both Ruth's behavior and word choices playfully, urgently challenge Boaz's earlier speech lauding the protective nature of Y
As these indeterminate labels, redeemer and ליח תשא, flutter elusively in the night air, the climactic scene concludes with the foreign woman having inserted herself into the most private of communal spaces—the bed of a prominent landowner. What anyone else might view as scandalous, Boaz labels hesed, thus turning moral convention on its head. Ruth emerges in the early light with both a promise of redemption and a load of highly symbolic seed, representing both food and future progeny, not simply for herself, but to fill the emptiness of Naomi.
Upon her return Naomi asks, ‘Who are you, my daughter?’ Although a puzzling question, it encapsulates well our inquiry here. Who, indeed, is Ruth after this cloaked (and uncloaking) venture under the skirt of darkness? How is she to be identified? How would we describe her as a ‘moral agent'? Bakhtin would say, the ‘answerability of the actually performed act is the taking-into-account in it of all the factors—a taking-into-account of its sense-validity as well as of its factual performance in all its concrete historicity and individuality’. 37 Or in short, the answer depends upon how we understand the rest of the story.
5. Tricks and Trade-Offs
In ch. 4 the issues of property and redemption move to the gate, the spatial and symbolic portal to the community. Contemporary readers might, at this point, feel ambushed by the narrative, having been encouraged to commiserate with these seemingly destitute widows, only to discover that they have had undisclosed economic resources all along. The ancient audience would have been, no doubt, less naïve about either the likelihood of the landholding or the asset it represents. Since land has little value unless there are laborers to work it and resources for payroll, land ownership does not guarantee self-sustainability. In other words, legally owning a plot of ground does not ensure a ‘proper’ place.
As Boaz's interchange at the gate makes clear, Naomi, as Elimelek's childless widow, holds the rights to her husband's inheritance. There are no immediate blood brothers, as the haggling over redemption shows. Should the land not be sold, it would, upon Naomi's death, seemingly go to Ruth as the childless widow of Mahlon, Elimelek's firstborn son. 38 This would explain in part the initial textual problem in 4.5, where the first kethib reads, ‘On the day you acquire the field from the hand of Naomi and from Ruth the Moabite…’ Ruth, then, emerges as an ליח תשא (a ‘woman of substance’) in the same register that Boaz is an ליח רובג שיא (a ‘prominent man of substance’). Both are people of ‘property’ even if it is a matter of degree. This would explain how the ‘whole gate of the people’ can identify her as an ליח תשא (3.11), despite her Moabite origins. This is social description, not moral evaluation.
Ruth's prospective landownership sheds a different light both on her nocturnal overtures on the threshing floor and Boaz's subsequent public performance at the gate. Naomi and Ruth have a claim on a ‘proper place’, but no power to control what happens there. If they give up their land claim through a sale, they resign themselves to a life in ‘in-between’ space. The proceeds of the sale might support them temporarily, but would eventually be depleted. But in order for the land to be of any benefit, to truly ‘own’ it in de Certeau's sense, they need resources to cultivate it. An alliance with Boaz secures the land, the resources, and future financial stability. But Boaz has his reputation to consider, and social pressure can be a powerful constraint on moral agency. Were Boaz simply to marry Ruth without involving the custom of redemption, he could be perceived as a land-grabber who exploits and exacerbates economic inequality. And he might appear particularly avaricious if willing to marry a Moabite in order to expand his real estate holdings. For a man eager to protect his community standing, this would be unacceptable. On the other hand, he seems to be quite open to Ruth's advances, promising to fulfill her request and pressing her to stay the night with him. He is clearly willing to have Ruth remain a fixture in his ‘proper’ domain. How does he balance desire, ethical obligation, and concern for his reputation? Ruth gives him the solution.
As Jennifer Koosed observes, Ruth, throughout the story, plays the role of a classic trickster. 39 On the threshing floor, in true trickster fashion, Ruth offers at outrageous risk the key to cultural change, the gift of creative compromise—a gift that she and Naomi desperately need implemented. As de Certeau points out, trickery is a tactic of the weak, often the only option. By contrast, the powerful are too often ‘bound’ by their ‘very visibility’ and can ill afford to ‘take chances with feints’. 40 To the socially prominent Boaz Ruth also offers the gift of trickery itself, the tactic that ensures that compromise gets a hearing. This is a gift that he both accepts and employs with aplomb at the city gate to effect a solution to everyone's advantage—except, of course, the nearer kinsman's.
The trickery involves navigating and manipulating officially structured space—intercepting the ‘closer’ redeemer, staging a hearing at the gate, mustering the necessary elders, summoning witnesses—in short, constructing a ‘proper’, formal occasion to handle what appears to be a perfunctory sale of land. But taking his cue from Ruth, Boaz seizes this opportunity to make a questionable social maneuver look like a virtuous one. By creating a public spectacle over which honor and shame hang like Damoclesian swords, the nearer redeemer is first pressured to say yes to the land redemption—since it is clearly the responsible thing to do and besides, if he refuses, Boaz will undertake the responsibility, showing himself to be the better man (4.4). But no sooner than the kinsman says yes, he is pressured to say no. Why? The answer turns on how one untangles the textual problems in 4.5. If we read both kethivs in 4.5, and alter the punctuation only slightly, Boaz says to the kinsman: ‘In the day that you acquire the field from the hand of Naomi and from Ruth the Moabite, the wife of the dead I acquire to raise up the name of the dead to his inheritance’. In other words, Boaz voluntarily takes on the responsibility of levirate marriage even though neither he nor the nearer kinsman is under any obligation to do so. The prospect of a child coming along later to claim the very property upon which the kinsman is about to expend good capital forces him, as Boaz knows it will, to renege. The kinsman suffers public embarrassment while Boaz comes off looking the hero. By rewriting the appropriate ‘practices’ of ‘proper’ space, Boaz gets the farm; he gets the girl; he gets public acclaim; he is a redeemer writ large, both providing security to the needy women and ensuring the dead are not forgotten.
Publically validated, Ruth marries Boaz, expanding and formally occupying Boaz's ‘proper’ domain. The land she is destined to inherit is ‘properly’ absorbed into the estate of a Bethlehemite citizen, and she and Naomi acquire economic stability. Ruth's divinely granted offspring, like that of Rachel, Leah, and Tamar (three other notorious tricksters), ‘builds up the house of Israel’ (4.11–12). The townswomen declare the baby to be Naomi's son, redeemer, and sustainer (4.15). Moreover, the women's reminder to Naomi that her daughter-in-law who loves her is better to her than seven sons is, perhaps, not hyperbole. Ruth has tied land, family, and economic capital together in ways that a son could never do. Fulfilling her vow to Naomi, through means that neither of them likely imagined, the enterprising Moabite has shown how the tactical navigations of geographical, social, and ethically ambiguous places can create new spaces where the dead can be remembered, survivors can find new life, and at least certain strangers can belong.
6. Postscript: The Story's Moral Agency
Moral agency in the book of Ruth is not confined, however, to the internal workings of the story world. The narrative discourse as a whole also operates as moral agent in its creation of communal space for moral reflection. While I analyze this in more detail elsewhere,
41
here I simply call attention to how the intersection of character and plot supports moral reflection by capitalizing on what Bakhtin identifies as the ‘event-ness of Being’, in which each ‘step taken’ (postupok) is an indeterminate, unpredictable, but ‘answerable deed’ set against a range of alternative behaviors. There are, in other words, more possible outcomes than actual outcomes, and the story's power lies in how it frames its characters’ behaviors with alternative unrealized but conceivable futures. At every critical juncture, alternate plots ‘sideshadow'
42
the narrative action, indicating how things might have happened differently: Elimelek could have waited out the famine in Bethlehem as did Boaz. Naomi could have remained a widow in Moab. Ruth could have, like Orpah, gone back home. She could have chanced upon someone else's field—someone who might not have offered her protection. She could have, as Boaz observes, gone after a younger man. She could have been discovered and publically humiliated at the threshing floor. Boaz could have responded differently to her overtures. He could have continued to use Y
Footnotes
1.
Carol Newsom, ‘Models of the Moral Self: Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism’, JBL 131 (2012), pp. 5–25.
2.
Newsom, ‘Models’, p. 6.
3.
Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self (London: Academic Press, 1981).
4.
Newsom, ‘Models’, pp. 7–9; cf. Heelas and Lock (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies, p. 7.
5.
The book of Ruth has lured all sorts of ethical inquiries into its gravitational pull: from the classic works on hesed by Nelson Glueck (Hesed in the Bible [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1967; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011]) and Katherine D. Sakenfeld (The Meaning of Hesed in the Bible [HMS 17; Scholars Press, 1978; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002]) to readings exploring characters’ mixed motives (Danna Nolan Fewell and David M. Gunn, Compromising Redemption: Relating Characters in the Book of Ruth [Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009]; Tod Linafelt, Ruth [Berit Olam; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999]; Jennifer L. Koosed, Gleaning Ruth: A Biblical Heroine and her Afterlives [Studies on Personalities in the Old Testament; Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2011]). On the political front, arguments about the book's response to Ezra–Nehemiah and other texts have been endlessly rehearsed, and contextual readings addressing issues of gender, class, and ethnicity have proliferated beyond manageable citation.
Ideas building upon Fewell and Gunn (Compromising Redemption) and subsequent elaborations of Linafelt (Ruth) are too numerous in this essay to cite individually. For recent overviews of critical and interpretive issues, see Tamara Cohn Eskenazi and Tikva Frymer-Kensky, Ruth: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation (JPS Bible Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2011), and Jeremy Schipper, Ruth: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (Anchor Yale Bible; New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming).
6.
Monika Fludernik, ‘Identity/Alterity’, in David Herman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 260–75.
7.
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 115–30.
8.
M.M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (ed. Vadim Liapunove and Michael Holquist; trans. Vadim Liapunov; Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1993).
9.
Fludernik, ‘Identity/Alterity’, p. 260.
10.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, p. 115.
11.
Fludernik, ‘Identity/Alterity’, p. 261.
12.
All translations in this article are the author's.
13.
See Jeremy Schipper, ‘The Syntax and Rhetoric of Ruth 1:9a’, VT 62 (2012), pp. 642–45.
14.
The ‘mother's house’ mentioned in the first line is but a temporary spatial location, a transition point to a ‘husband's house’. See Gen. 24.28 and Songs 3.4; 8.2, where the ‘mother's house’ represents a place for courtship, lovemaking, and marriage arrangements.
15.
Tod Linafelt, ‘Narrative and Poetic Art in the Book of Ruth’, Int 64 (2010), pp. 118–29; see also his ‘Poetry and Biblical Narrative’, in Danna Nolan Fewell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Biblical Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming [online, 2015; print, 2016]).
16.
Bakhtin, Philosophy of the Act, uses ‘alibi’ to refer to the reasons one fails or refuses to act accountably.
17.
Fewell and Gunn, Compromising Redemption, pp. 26–28, 72–76.
18.
Helpful discussions of this expression include Allen Guenther, ‘A Typology of Israelite Marriage: Kinship, Socio-Economic, and Religious Factors’, JSOT 29 (2005), pp. 387–407; Tamara Eskenazi, ‘The Missions of Ezra and Nehemiah’, in Oded Lipschits and Manfred Oeming (eds.), Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), pp. 509–29; Katherine E. Southwood, Ethnicity and the Mixed Marriage Crisis in Ezra 9–10. An Anthropological Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 165–68.
19.
As neuroscientists remind us, the prefrontal cortex of the brain, employed when making moral decisions, is not fully formed until one's mid-twenties. While ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’ were obviously conceptualized differently in the ancient world, biblical literature makes a common correlation between age and wisdom.
20.
On ‘narrative wreckage’, see Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [2nd edn, 2013]).
21.
On the use of descriptors and labels as opposed to pronouns, see Catherine Emmott, ‘Constructing Social Space: Sociocognitive Factors in the Interpretation of Character Relations’, in David Herman (ed.), Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences (CSLI Lecture Notes, 158; Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2003), pp. 295–321.
22.
See Gen. 19; Num. 25.1–4, and the discussion of Fewell and Gunn, Compromising Redemption, pp. 69–74.
23.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, pp. 35–36.
24.
Fludernik, ‘Identity/Alterity’, p. 261.
25.
Fewell and Gunn's term in Compromising Redemption, pp. 40, 83, 115 n. 28.
26.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, pp. xix, 36–39.
27.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, p. 36.
28.
On ‘making do’, see de Certeau, Everyday Life, pp. 29–42.
29.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, p. 66.
30.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, pp. 37–42.
31.
The overseer's speech is notoriously garbled. Its ambiguity, along with the proleptic summary in 2.3, has generated debate regarding whether Ruth is standing waiting for permission to glean or has already taken her place among the gleaners. If she is asking for special treatment, the former scenario makes the most sense, since the overseer is not authorized to grant her request. Moreover, given her intention to ‘find favor’, she would not likely settle for the overseer's ‘favor’ but would opt for higher stakes.
Another consideration: no other gleaners are actually mentioned. The pressures of harvest season would in actuality provide paid work for any able-bodied gleaner. Clearly Boaz has other young women in his employ, so why does Ruth not simply ask for a job? She seems to be asking for something more lucrative.
32.
Fewell and Gunn, Compromising Redemption, pp. 42–44, 76–77, 84–85; David Shepherd, ‘Violence in the Fields? Translating, Reading, and Revising in Ruth 2’, CBQ 63 (2001), pp. 444–63.
33.
A ‘redeemer’ refers to a close male relative who is especially obligated ‘to the living and the dead’, namely, to avenge a family victim of violence or to intervene in situations of economic hardship, by keeping family land and/or family members from falling into the hands of creditors. Matthew J. Suriano (‘Death, Disinheritance, and Job's Kinsman-Redeemer’, JBL 129 [2010], pp. 49–66. has posited, based upon its usage in Job, that a redeemer was obliged to remember the dead and to keep their names from being forgotten. In a post-exilic context, ‘redeemer’ would also be imbued with the theological overtones of Second Isaiah where a divine redeemer promises to restore the displaced to their homes.
34.
See Koosed's sustained attention to food and agriculture in the book of Ruth (Gleaning Ruth).
35.
Although the text's kethib-qere stutters over ‘I’ and ‘you’, suggesting Naomi's subjectivity is intimately bound to Ruth's. See Stephanie Powell, Amy Beth Jones, and Dong Sung Kim, ‘Reading Ruth, Reading Desire’, in Fewell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Biblical Narrative (forthcoming).
36.
Based primarily on its usage in Prov. 31.10, ליח תשא is variously translated. See Fewell and Gunn, Compromising Redemption, pp. 127–28 n. 40.
37.
Bakhtin, Philosophy of the Act, p. 28
38.
While it is commonly assumed that women in ancient Israel could not own property, the stories of the daughters of Zelophehad (Num. 27.1–11), Achsah (Josh. 15.18–19//Judg. 1.14–15), Abigail (1 Sam. 25), the woman of Shunem (2 Kgs 8), Job's daughters (Job 42.15) as well as the ליח תשא in Prov. 31 attest to women owning property. See further S.J. Osgood, ‘Women and the Inheritance of Land in Early Israel’, in G.J. Brooke (ed.), Women in the Biblical Tradition (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), pp. 45–47; Eskenazi and Frymer-Kensky, Ruth, pp. xxviii-xxix; and Samuel L. Adams, Social and Economic Life in Second Temple Judea (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2014), pp. 74–77.
39.
Koosed, Gleaning Ruth, pp. 5–6, 14–16, 75–77.
40.
De Certeau, Everyday Life, 37
41.
On how the story uses various strategies and ambiguities to create, for a community experiencing immigration anxiety, a discursive space for critical reflection about social identity and moral responsibility, see Danna Nolan Fewell, ‘The Ones Returning: Ruth, Naomi, and Social Negotiation in the Post-Exilic Period’, in Martien Halvorsen-Taylor and Katherine Southwood (eds.), Women and Exile: Conceptualizations of Gender in the Exilic Period (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, forthcoming).
42.
On the narrative strategy of sideshadowing, see Gary Saul Morson, Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 20–22, 117–72.
43.
Morson's phrase in Narrative and Freedom, p. 22 (emphasis his).
44.
To name but a few, Ronald M. Hals, The Theology of the Book of Ruth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968); Edward E. Campbell Jr, Ruth: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB, 7; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975); Robert L. Hubbard Jr, The Book of Ruth (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988); Kirstin Nielsen, Ruth (OTL; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997).
