Abstract
The law of levirate marriage (Deut. 25.5–10) requires the levir to marry his sister-in-law, while at the same time allowing him to be released from this obligation. This article argues that these inherent contradictory trends relate to the fact that the law forces the levir to marry a woman whom he did not choose. This coercion runs counter to the biblical laws of marriage, which predicate marriage and divorce on the man's will. Through a close reading of the law this article seeks to demonstrate the tension reflected between two contradictory values: that of raising up the name of the deceased, on one hand, and a man's right to choose the woman he wishes, on the other. It appears that due to the levir's aversion towards the widow the legislator allows this to prevail over the moral obligation, but does not forgo expressing disapproval of this decision.
Keywords
The law of levirate marriage, found in Deut. 25.5–10, is formulated as a casuistic law comprising two stages. The first stage of the law (vv. 5–6) requires that in the event that a man dies leaving a widow but no children, his brother (the levir) must marry the widow. The second stage of the law (vv. 7–10) addresses a situation where the brother does not wish to fulfill this obligation (vv. 7–8), and sets down the legal procedure that is to be followed in this case (vv. 9–10). Many scholars maintain that the intention behind the second stage of the law is to allow for the brother not to fulfill his obligation of levirate marriage. The prevailing assumption is that the two stages of the law as we have them were set down by the Deuteronomic legislator, 1 which precludes the possibility that the clause allowing for release from the obligation reflects a later addition to the law. 2 This being the case, we might assert that the formulation of the law reflects contradictory intentions from the outset: on one hand, the obligation to marry a deceased, childless brother's widow; on the other hand, the possibility of not marrying her.
In this article I wish to argue that the inherent contradiction relates to the fact that the law of levirate marriage forces the levir to marry a woman whom he did not choose. As Volgger notes, this coercion runs counter to the biblical laws of marriage, which predicate marriage and divorce on the man's will. 3 I wish to demonstrate that the law reflects the tension between two contradictory values: that of establishing a name for the deceased, on one hand, and a man's right to choose the woman he wishes to many, on the other.
This hypothesis will be substantiated below through a close reading of the law. As I shall demonstrate, the use of literary method may help to clarify the law. 4 Before embarking on that discussion, I would like to focus on the meaning of the concept of ‘establishing a name’, as it appears in the law, and to clarify the importance of this concept in the Bible, as well as discuss the biblical view of a man's right to choose a wife.
The Meaning and Significance of ‘Establishing a Name’
The biblical levirate law repeats insistently that the aim of the law is to ‘establish the name’ (םש םיקהל) of the deceased. This expression appears twice in the law (vv. 6–7) and then once again in negative formulation, ‘that his name may not be blotted out in Israel’ (לארשימ ומש החמי אלו, v. 6). 5 The explicit attention to the ‘establishing’ of the name is unique to the Bible and it has no parallel in other ancient Near Eastern legal systems. 6
As to the meaning of the expression ‘establishing the name’, two main suggestions have been proposed. Firstly, the expression may be interpreted as an obligation to bear progeny for the deceased. 7 On this view, the law assumes that the name of a person is ‘established’ and eternalized through his progeny. 8 If he has no progeny, his name is obliterated. 9 This idea is supported by many biblical proofs and by comparison with extra-biblical sources. Firstly, in the Bible we find ‘name’ (םש) mentioned in juxtaposition with ‘seed’ (עדז). 10 Moreover, in the very same context in which the law in Deuteronomy uses the expression ‘establishing the name…’ (Deut. 25.7), the narrative in Genesis uses the expression ‘establishing seed…’ (Gen. 38.8). Thus, a parallel is created between the ‘name’ and the ‘seed’. In addition, some scholars point out that the biblical root ם״בי comes from Ugaritic and Akkadian, and its meaning is related to that of the word for progeny. 11 Moreover, the fact that the son born of the levir is considered the son of the deceased brother is unique to the biblical system. This substantiates the idea that the main purpose of the biblical law is to produce a son for the deceased. 12
A different view proposes that the term ‘name’ is used in the context of the law mainly in the sense of inheritance. 13 On this view, the purpose of the law is to ensure that the estate of the deceased is inherited by his progeny. 14
The words that the widow utters during the ceremony of release, ‘Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house’, may reinforce the connection between the law and the inheritance. 15 This may offer support to the assumption that the unborn heir is meant to inherit from his dead father and to build his house. It must be pointed out, however, that beyond this allusion the law makes no explicit mention of bequeathing. 16 In any event, whether the significance of ‘establishing the name’ is the commemoration of the deceased or the bequeathing of his estate to his son, the Bible appears to attach great importance to the matter. 17
As Pedersen asserts, ‘Nothing has such an effect in Israel as the danger that the name may be exterminated… By providing progeny for his brother he [the levir] maintains his name…he guards his soul against obliteration.’ 18
The Right to Choose a Wife
The biblical levirate law does not simply demand that the levir engage in sexual relations with the widow until she bears a son to his brother, but rather obligates him to marry his deceased brother's wife. 19 In other words, it forces him to marry a woman without regard for whether he actually desires her as his wife.
Volgger notes that aside from this law, the only other situation in which biblical law forces a person to marry a specific woman is the case of rape (Deut. 22.28–29). In that context, the obligation of the rapist is part of the sanction applied to him. 20 The levir, in contrast, is not a criminal. Fate has led him to a woman whom he is obligated to many in the wake of the death of his brother who left no children. The law obligating him to marry her seemingly does not make this obligation dependent on his desire for an emotional or sexual connection with the widow. This is so even though in many marriage narratives and in laws relating to marriage, the Bible does display an awareness of the element of choice and desire that is an integral part of the process by which a man and woman become bound to each other. 21
An expression of the importance of choice in the marriage process is to be found, inter alia, in a law in Num. 27.1–11, which is closely connected with the law of levirate marriage. 22 This law allows for daughters to inherit their father's estate in the event that the father has left no sons. Nevertheless, following the desire of the elders of the tribe to maintain the estate within the inheritance of the tribe in Numbers 36, the law requires that the daughters marry only members of their own tribe. This obligation is formulated (Num. 36.6) as follows:
This is what the Lord has commanded concerning the daughters of Zelophehad: They may marry anyone they wish, provided they marry into a clan of their father's tribe.
The law recognizes the right of the daughters of Zelophehad to choose ‘anyone they wish’. The law of levirate marriage, in contrast, prevents the man from marrying the woman whom he thinks best. 23
Certain scholars have addressed the tension between the will of the individual and his obligation towards the collective, 24 maintaining that ‘[t]he exact reason for the levir's unwillingness to many his brother's widow is not given’. 25 Unlike these scholars, I believe that the law focuses clearly on the levir's aversion to the widow as the reason for his refusal.
The Law of Levirate Marriage: ‘Establishing a Name’ vs. Forced Marriage
The analysis of the language of the law that is proposed below reveals, to my mind, the tension between the two values that coexist within it: the memorialization of the deceased, represented by the widow, and the right of the individual to choose ‘whomever he wishes’, represented by the levir. The tension between these two contradictory values is hinted at already in the first stage of the law, but it surfaces more clearly in the voices of both the levir and the widow in its second stage.
The first stage of the law is formulated as follows:
When brothers dwell together and one of them dies and leaves no son, the wife of the deceased shall not be married to a stranger, outside the family. Her husband's brother shall unite with her: he shall take her as his wife and perform the levir's duty. (Deut. 25.5) 26
Three different verbs are used to describe the act of levirate marriage: א״וב (‘unite’), ח״קל (‘take [in marriage]’), and ם״בי (‘perform the levir's duty’). The verb ח״קל is used in the Bible inter alia to denote marriage, while the verb א״וב, in the context of a man and woman, usually denotes sexual relations. 27 The verb ם״בי refers specifically and exclusively to the act of levirate marriage. 28
It seems reasonable to assume that the use of the verb ם״בי indicates the exceptional nature of this relationship. It is unique in terms of the circumstances in which the marital bond is created, the legal status of the child or children that it produces, and the manner in which the connection is severed in the event that the levir is not interested in entering into the marriage. 29
It would seem that the use of the verb ח״קל is necessary in order to define the legal status of the widow. Had the legislator simply used the formula המביו הילא אובי one might have thought that the act of levirate marriage entails one-time sexual intercourse, or engaging in intercourse resulting in the birth of a child. The use of the verb ח״קל clarifies that the levir is required to marry the wife of the deceased. 30 The use of both verbs—ח״קל and ם״בי—indicates that the bond between the levir and the widow includes two legal dimensions: firstly, the marriage; secondly, the levirate, which is different from a regular marriage. 31
In describing marriage, the Bible usually uses either the verb ח״קל or the combination of verbs ח״קל and א״וב. 32 It should be noted, though, that the use of these two verbs in this particular law is different and unique in two ways. Firstly, the use of these two verbs in other sources always follows the same order: first ח״קל, then א״וב, reflecting the reality in which the marriage ceremony precedes engagement in intercourse. The law of levirate marriage is the only instance in which the verbs appear in the opposite order: ‘Her husband's brother shall unite with her (הילע אובי): he shall take her (החקל) as his wife’ (v. 5). 33 Secondly, the verb א״וב, in the context of marriage or sexual relations, almost always appears with the preposition לא. 34 The expression לע אב, in the context of sexual relations, appears in only one other place in the Bible, other than this law. 35 The two word pairs לא א״וב and לע א״וב are used mainly in the Bible in other, non-sexual contexts. The expression לא א״וב usually denotes arriving at a destination or encounter. The expression לע א״וב, in contrast, usually appears in negative contexts, describing the advent of war, distress or catastrophe. 36 The fact that the legislator uses הילע אובי to describe the relations between the levir and the widow may arise from the fact that then relationship does indeed spring from catastrophe.
Another possible explanation for this unique expression concerns the nature of the bond that is created between them. The expression לע אוב, like םע בכש (‘to lie with’), describes the sexual act. The verb ב״כש, used with the preposition םע/תא, appears in biblical law and narrative mainly in the context of rape or forbidden sexual relations. 37 The fact that the description of levirate marriage uses the expression לע א״וב, which is similar, in principle, to םע/תא בכש, may indicate the problematic nature of the relationship that is created between the widow and the levir, both in terms of the coercion entailed and in terms of the proximity of this relationship to a category of forbidden sexual relations. 38 We might therefore say that the very formulation of the law—with its use of both verbs, ח״קל and ם״בי; with its reversal of the customary order of the verbs א״וב and ח״קל; and with its unique use of the expression לע א״וב—already hints at the problematic nature of levirate marriage.
The second part of the law addresses a situation in which the levir is unwilling to fulfill his obligation. This clause opens with the words, ‘But if the man does not want (ץפחי אל) to marry (תחקל) his brother's widow…’ (v. 7). Attention should be paid to the fact that in turning the focus to the man's feelings, the legislator uses specifically the verb ח״קל, which alludes to the broader concept of the marital relationship, rather than the verb ם״בי, which would emphasize the obligation towards the deceased brother. In addition, it should be noted that for the first time in this law, the levir is referred to as ‘the man’. To my mind, this hints at the legislator's recognition of the levir as a ‘man’, giving expression to his desires and his personality. 39 The widow, in contrast, is still referred to as ‘his brother's widow’ (ותמבי) and not, for example, as ‘the woman’. Thus, the law contrasts the man and his desires, on one hand, with his widowed sister-in-law, representing his obligation, on the other.
The verb ץפח is often used in the Bible to describe a ‘want’ or ‘wish’, and it also appears in several places in the context of relations between a man and a woman. In Deuteronomy, the verb appears in the context of the law concerning the captive woman: 40
And you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her (הב תקשחו), and would take her to wife… Then, should you not want her (חב תצפח אל םא), you must release her outright… (Deut. 21.11–14)
This instance is of importance for our discussion, because it involves a two-stage relationship between the man and the woman: in the beginning, ‘you desire her’; later, ‘should you not want her’. The expression ‘not wanting her’ (חב תצפח אל ) would seem to indicate the opposite of ‘you desire her’ (הב תקשחו). Against this background, the wording of the condition in our law, ‘And if the man does not want to (ץפחי אל) marry her’, along with the man's own words further on—‘I do not (יתצפח אל) want to marry her’—serve to clarify his motives: he does not desire the woman, and perhaps feels aversion towards her. As already noted, many scholars have argued that the levir offers no explanation for his refusal. 41 I maintain that his justification is set forth explicitly in the law, through the use of the verb ‘want’ (ץ״פח). This verb, in its context in this law, does not denote ‘desiring’ in the general sense, but rather a man's want for or interest in a particular woman.
Following the levir's refusal, the woman appeals to the elders. The claim that she voices before them is, ‘My husband's brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother’. Based on what the brother-in-law has done—or, more precisely, what he has not done—she continues: ‘He refuses (ןאמ) to perform the duty of a levir’. 42 Attention to her words reveals that they do not match the protasis, ‘But if the man does not want to marry his brother's widow…’; nor, as we shall see below, do they match the claim of the man himself: ‘I do not want to many her’. 43 Her words are clearly connected to the intention of the law that ‘The first son that she bears shall be accounted to the dead brother…’, and the command, ‘Her husband's brother shall unite with her … and perform the levir's duty’. By these words she argues that what he does not wish is actually to perform, through her agency, his obligation to his brother. 44
In this context Bartor notes that the same individual referred to in the law as ‘the man’ (v. 7) is called ‘my husband's brother’ (ימבי) by the widow. She is unwilling—perhaps unable—to view him as merely a ‘man’, who may or may not desire her as a wife. She views him first and foremost as the levir, the individual obligated to perform his fraternal duty by marrying her, and it is in these terms that she speaks of him. 45
Before turning our attention to the levir's response, we note here, as Weisberg does, that the law of levirate marriage is the only law in the book of Deuteronomy in which we hear a woman's voice. 46 This unusual phenomenon is understood by some scholars as reflecting the fact that only the widow knows whether the levir has in fact performed his duty or not. It seems that the mention of this possibility is prompted to a considerable extent by the description of the behavior of Onan, in the story of Judah and Tamar (Gen. 38.9). However, unlike Onan's act of deception, the unwillingness of the levir to marry his sister-in-law is an openly declared matter. Thus, the idea that the widow and the levir might be living to all outward appearances as a married couple has no basis in the text. 47
A different explanation for the unusual phenomenon of a woman's voice in this law is that her voice in fact represents the party who can no longer make its own voice heard—the deceased husband. It seems that in the absence of a son, the widow alone is left to demand her late husband's right to memorialization. 48 The fact that the law does not direct the demand for levirate marriage to the father of the deceased, in the event of the brother's refusal, may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, such a demand would create a conflict for the father between the interest of his dead son, who must be memorialized, and the interest of his living son, who refuses to perform this memorialization. 49 The widow, on the other hand, seeks only the benefit of her deceased husband. A second explanation might be based on the fact that the way of the world is for a son to die after his father, such that usually it is the widow who is left to demand the rights of the deceased. 50 The juxtaposing of the woman's voice with that of the levir serves to present these contrasting interests in their pure form: the establishment of the name of the deceased, spoken in the voice of the widow, and the right to desire, or not desire, a particular woman, spoken in the voice of the man—the levir. 51
In the wake of the widow's appeal, the levir is summoned for clarification. The elders speak to him and he ‘insists’ (literally, ‘stands’) and declares: ‘I do not want (יתצפח אל) to marry her’. 52 As noted above, the levir's story accords with the language of the protasis, ‘But if the man does not want (ץפחי אל) to many his brother's widow’, which is fundamentally different from the accusation leveled at him by the widow. 53 The levir does not argue that he does not wish to establish a name for his brother. What he says is that he does not want the widow as his wife. Attention should be paid to the fact that the man does not repeat the protasis in full, saying, ‘I do not wish to marry my brother's widow’. Instead, he refers to ‘her’, the direct object connected to the verb ‘to take (in marriage)’ (התחקל). This may hint to his feeling of distance from the woman, and a desire to avoid referring to her by any title (‘my brother's widow’) that might create a connection between them. 54 This position is the opposite of that of the widow who, as noted above, refers to her brother-in-law in terms of the connection between them: ‘my husband's brother’ (ימבי, v. 7).
The echoing of the protasis in the words of the levir emphasizes that the testimony ‘I do not want (יתצפח אל) to many her’ is the sole justification recognized by the law as a legitimate reason for it not being fulfilled. A different possible reason—‘I do not desire to establish a name for my brother’ (v. 7)—is not presented in the law as a legitimate reason to avoid levirate marriage. I shall return to this point below, in relation to the story of Tamar and Judah.
In contrast to the clear voices of the widow and the levir, the voices of the elders are not heard in the law. It must be assumed that the elders sit and discuss the motives for the refusal, emphasize the importance of memorializing the deceased, and once again ask the levir to overcome his aversion to the widow and to fulfill his obligation. 55 In this instance they cannot summon witnesses, since the levir's claim that he does not desire this woman is a wholly private matter to which only he can testify. The tension mentioned above, between a person's faithfulness to himself and his faithfulness to his brother and his family, is the crux of the matter. Bartor notes that the law of levirate marriage is the only biblical law in which we find a report of the act of speech without the text actually recording the speech. She argues that the legislator refrains from quoting the words of the elders because they have no real effect on the levir. 56 I propose, in contrast, that the legislator refrains from quoting them because they have no clear, unequivocal statement to offer. The legislator, aware of the problematic nature of the law, places no decisive statement in the mouth of the elders concerning a man's obligation to marry a woman against his will. This idea is reinforced by the way in which the text refers to the levir in the elders’ summons. While v. 7 speaks of ‘the man’ versus ‘the levir’, the elders summon ‘him’. This impartial and detached appellation may reflect their neutrality with regard to the two positions presented to them. 57 The fact that they are not given a voice reflects, to my mind, the fact that their position is not as clear-cut as are those of the levir and of the widow. Their ‘silencing’ expresses the complexity of the situation.
Only when the levir insists that he does not wish to many the widow because of his aversion to her—and, as noted, only for this reason—do the elders allow the levir to evade his responsibility, while sanctioning him with a ceremony that entails humiliation.
Daube notes that this is the only biblical law in which the punishment stipulated for a violator of the law is humiliation. 58 It would seem that the uniqueness of this punishment is related to the uniqueness of the case. The levir has caused no bodily or property damage to his brother; he has only harmed his name—in other words, the abstract concept of his eternal existence. Accordingly, the legislator applies neither corporal nor monetary punishment: he is punished only through the abstract assets of honor and name.
Some scholars maintain that the punishment of humiliation is a relatively light one, in comparison with other punishments meted out in the Bible, while others view it as a most severe punishment. 59 Owing to the highly unusual nature of this punishment, it is difficult to assess its severity. It should be noted that the question of the severity of the punishment directly affects our perception of the legislator's evaluation of the levir's choice. If the levir is given a severe punishment, we must conclude that the legislator feels himself unable to force a marriage, but nevertheless denounces the levir for following his heart. If the punishment is not severe, we might say that the legislator displays understanding of the fact that the levir's feelings prevent him from fulfilling his obligation, and that this understanding is expressed in the prescription of a relatively lenient sanction.
During the ceremony, the law requires that the woman declare, ‘Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house’. 60 This language is new to the law; it differs from the definition of the purpose of the law—’The first son that she bears shall be accounted to (or “shall be established in the name of”) the dead brother, that his name may not be blotted out in Israel’, and from the widow's claim in v. 7: ‘My husband's brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother…’ Carmichael proposes that the accusation is formulated thus in order to create a direct, proportional parallel between the act—‘who does not build up his brother's house’—and the denunciation: ‘the house of him whose shoe is removed’. 61 However, it must be stated that the law already shows a clear connection between the fact that the man who does not ‘establish a name’ has ‘his name called…’ (v. 10). 62 Thus, Carmichael's proposal reinforces a parallel that actually already exists.
I wish to propose another explanation for the transition from the ‘establishing a name’ that has been used throughout the wording of the law, to the ‘building of a house’ that appears only at its conclusion. The focus on the building of the house serves to mitigate the guilt of the levir. It seems that the levir has indeed succeeded in persuading the elders that he is prompted not by a vengeful or selfish desire to avoid establishing a name for his brother, but rather by his aversion to the widow. For this reason, the accusation directed at him is focused with great precision on the result: this man is not building up his brother's house. 63 Effectively, the elders have not accepted the widow's claim that ‘my husband's brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother’. This hypothesis strengthens our view that the elders release the levir from his obligation out of an understanding that there cannot be a marriage between a man and a woman whom he does not want as a wife. Had the levir been motivated by a hostile attitude towards his brother and an unwillingness to establish a name for him, the law would not allow him to evade his responsibility. It turns out, then, that the law recognizes the levir's right to many solely in accordance with his own will and desire, while at the same time denouncing him for his decision to invoke this right, owing to the great importance that the law attaches to the idea of ‘establishing a name’. 64
Contradictory Trends in the Law of Levirate Marriage and Discussion of the Development of the Law
The question of the relationship between the law of levirate marriage in Deuteronomy and the biblical narratives (Gen. 38 and Ruth 4) and laws (Lev. 18.16; 20.21; Num. 27.1–11; 36.1–13) associated with it, is addressed extensively by different scholars. Some maintain that through study and comparison of the various sources, it is possible to reconstruct the development of the law. 65 The explanations offered for the two seemingly contradictory directions embodied in the biblical law are often based upon a proposed understanding of this development. 66 The fundamental assumption underlying explanations that seek to identify the process of the law's development is that the law of levirate marriage is an ancient one, and that its formulation in Deuteronomy reflects an attempt to weaken it by proposing a possible release from the levirate obligation. 67
For instance, one of the explanations linking the contradictory directions embodied in the biblical law with its development points out that the law of levirate marriage seemingly contradicts the laws of forbidden sexual relations (Lev. 18.17; 20.21), which forbid a man from marrying his brother's wife. 68 According to Morgenstern, the law in Deuteronomy represents a developmental stage that allows the levir to marry the widow, under very restricted circumstances, while the law in Leviticus represents the final stage of the law, forbidding altogether a marriage between a man and his sister-in-law. 69
Contradicting his view is the fact that the laws of forbidden sexual relations were already familiar at the time of the Deuteronomic law, both in Israel and more generally in the ancient Near East. 70 It would seem that we must therefore adopt the view of Neufeld, who argues that:
An institution like the levirate, which occupied so important a place in the social structure of the time, allowed itself the liberty of making a pure inroad into the provision of [Lev.] 18:16 and formed simply an exception to the law. 71
In addition, it should be pointed out that if we accept the argument that the release from the law is connected to the levir's moral hesitation to many his brother's wife, we must ask why the law prescribes a humiliating ceremony for someone who displays moral sensitivity. 72
Setting aside specific explanations based on attempts to reconstruct the process of the law's development, it should be noted that many scholars regard any such attempt as methodologically unsound. Weisberg argues that since one source is a casuistic law while the other merely mentions law or custom in the context of a story, many of the differences may be regarded as incidental. 73 According to Westbrook, the biblical law is not comprehensive; it contains ‘particular aspects of the legal institution involved’. 74 The narrator assumes that the reader is aware of the law, and addresses only an unusual application. Thompson asserts that the function of the law is to sketch the basic principles, while the narrative describes how the principles and spirit of the law were implemented in certain instances. 75 Another approach to the connection between the law and the narrative is proposed by Carmichael, who suggests that the legislator contemplates the different narratives and attempts to formulate a law that is based on them. 76 Thus, in his view, discrepancies between the law and the narrative reflect not the development of the law but rather the legislator's refinement of it.
A detailed discussion of these theoretical questions lies beyond the scope of the present study. As demonstrated above, I tend toward the assumption that the contradictory directions of the law arise from the inherent problem of forced marriage, rather than reflecting stages of the law's development. Below I wish to address a number of differences between the law in Deuteronomy and the story of Judah and Tamar in Genesis, and to show how these differences substantiate my argument that the reason for the levir's release from the obligation to many his brother's widow relates to his aversion to her.
The Law of Levirate Marriage in Deuteronomy and its Relationship to the Story of Judah and Tamar
There are two main differences between the law of levirate marriage in Deuteronomy and the case described in Genesis 38. The first is the discrepancy between the humiliation to which the levir is subjected in the biblical law, and the death sentence meted out to Onan. The second relates to the fact that the narrative in Genesis seems to suggest that the levir is unable to release himself from his obligation, while Deuteronomy allows for such release. On the basis of these differences, some scholars have proposed that Deuteronomy presents an intermediate developmental stage in the obligation of the levir, in comparison with his obligation as presented in the story of Judah and Tamar (Gen. 38). 77
Based on the reading of the law proposed in this article, I wish to point out another fundamental difference between Onan and the levir presented in Deuteronomy—a difference which, to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been addressed. After Judah commands Onan, ‘provide offspring (or “establish seed”) for your brother’ (Gen. 38.8), the text offers a glimpse into Onan's thinking (‘But Onan, knowing that the seed would not count as his…’) and his motives (‘so as not to provide offspring for his brother’, v. 9). Thus, Onan's refusal to establish seed for his brother arises from selfishness that prevents him from fathering a child for the sake of his brother. 78 The words of the widow in Deuteronomy, ‘My husband's brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother’, sit well with Onan's intention. 79 Moreover, from the description in the text it seems that Onan shows no aversion towards Tamar; on the contrary, he takes her as his and engages in sexual relations with her. Unlike Onan, the levir in Deuteronomy declares that his refusal is related to his aversion to the widow and not, as per her accusation of him, to an unwillingness to establish a name for his brother. Another difference between the two scenarios relates to the levir's integrity. While Onan acts deceitfully, the levir in Deuteronomy declares openly his unwillingness to carry out the levirate marriage. It seems, therefore that the motives and comportment of Onan and of the levir are fundamentally different. 80
This qualitative distinction may explain the differences between the law in Deuteronomy and the narrative in Genesis as an expression of the different circumstances of each, rather than as a result of development of the law. While the law allows for a release for the levir from his obligation, with the understanding that a man cannot be forced to many a woman whom he does not desire, the narratives describes a levir who refuses to perform his duty out of a desire to prevent the ‘establishing of a name’ for his brother. If we adopt Carmichael's position as to the relationship between the narrative and the law, we might say that in the wake of the narrative in Genesis, Deuteronomy legislates a law that limits the release from the obligation to this single instance: an aversion to the woman. 81
Conclusion
The law of levirate marriage may lead the levir to a situation in which he has to choose between his obligation to his deceased brother and the family, and remaining faithful to himself and his own will and desire. 82 A close reading of the law brings this difficulty to the surface. 83 The legislator avoids forcing the man to marry a woman he does not want as a wife. At the same time, the law views with severity the failure to ‘establish a name’—and, effectively, the ‘blotting out of the name’—that arises from the levir's refusal. In the struggle between will and duty it appears that the legislator allows the levir's personal will to prevail over the moral obligation, but still feels impelled to denounce this choice and to immortalize it. Perhaps the legislator hoped in this way to create a situation in which the individual would choose his obligation to society and its values over adherence to his own personal preferences.
Footnotes
1.
Dvora E. Weisberg, ‘The Widow of Our Discontent: Levirate Marriage in the Bible and Ancient Israel’, JSOT 28 (2004), pp. 1403–29 (411–12, 426); Eryl W. Davies, ‘Inheritance Rights and the Hebrew Levirate Marriage, Part 2’, VT 31 (1981), pp. 257–68 (261); Julian Morgenstem, ‘The Book of The Covenant: Part II’, HUCA 7 (1930), pp. 165–67. Gershon Brin, Studies in Biblical Law: From the Hebrew Bible to the Dead Sea Scrolls (trans. Jonathan Chipman; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), pp. 44–45, offers a different reading, according to which this unit belongs to a category of laws whose structure follows an ‘if and ‘if not’ model, where the sanction appearing in the second section of the law is not meant as a legitimate alternative, but rather as a punishment intended as a deterrent. It should be pointed out that the law of levirate marriage is unique in that its ‘if not’ clause relates to the willingness of the subject: ‘If the man does not desire to take…’ Further support will be cited below for a reading of vv. 7–10 as reflecting a legitimate possibility of release from this law.
2.
Timothy M. Willis, The Elders of the City: A Study of the Elders—Laws in Deuteronomy (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), pp. 250–51. Willis does not rule out the possibility that the law has its source in a pre-Deuteronomic collection. For further discussion see Morgenstem, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 184. For the linguistic integrity of this law, see Assnat Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative: A Study in the Causuistic Laws of the Pentateuch (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), p. 106 n. 50. This integrity and the literary analysis proposed below may support the assumption that the two parts of the law are connected.
3.
David Volgger, ‘Dtn 25, 5–10—Per Gesetz zur Ehe gezwungen?’, BN 14–115 (2002), pp. 173–88 (185–88). Volgger resolves the problem by positing that the law is addressed not to the levir himself, but rather to the broader family circle of the deceased.
4.
One of the first studies to address the relationship between law and literature was that of R. Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’, Harvard Law Review 97.4 (1983), pp. 4–68. For a review of the development of research on ‘law and literature’ and on ‘law as literature’, see Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, pp. 1–7.
5.
The words ‘that his name may not be blotted out in Israel’ represent a motive clause. For the role of motive clauses in biblical law, see B. Gemser, ‘The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law’, in Congress Volume: Copenhagen, 1953 (VTSup, 1; Leiden: Brill, 1953), pp. 50–66 (with no reference to this particular verse).
6.
For a study of ancient Near Eastern laws dealing with levirate marriage or matters associated with it, see Kenneth A. Kitchen and Paul J.N. Lawrence (eds.), Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East (3 vols.; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), I, pp. 288–89, 667, 673. For a discussion of the relationship between the biblical law of levirate marriage and ancient Near Eastern laws in this regard, see Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws (Darmstadt: Scientia, 1975), pp. 240–50; Willis, The Elders, pp. 243–50; Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 161, and below.
7.
Millar Burrows, ‘Levirate Marriage in Israel’, JBL 59 (1940), pp. 23–33 (31–33).
8.
In contrast to this view, Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 164, and Burrows, ‘Levirate Marriage’, pp. 32–33, maintain that the importance of bearing a child is bound up with the ancestor worship which is performed by the son of the deceased. Ephraim Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws (London: Longmans, Green, 1944), p. 26, disagrees, asserting that by the stage of the formulation of this law, ancestor worship was no longer obligatory, and the law therefore reflects no concern for its performance.
9.
Concerning the severity with which this outcome of ‘obliteration’ is viewed, see Jan Christian Gertz, Die Gerichtsorganisation Israels im deuteronomischen Gesetz (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), p. 205.
10.
See, e.g., 2 Sam. 14.7; Isa. 14.22; 66.22. For further discussion of the connection of ‘name’ with ‘seed’, see Johannes Pedersen, Israel, Its Life and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 254–58; Thomas and Dorothy Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth’, VT 18 (1968), pp. 86–87.
11.
The words ‘that his name may not be blotted out in Israel’ represent a motive clause. For the role of motive clauses in biblical law, see Gemser, ‘The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law’ (with no reference to this particular verse).
12.
As to the question of the status of additional children that might be born from this union, see Raymond Westbrook, Property and the Family in Biblical Law (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), p. 82, and (for a different opinion) Willis, The Elders, p. 289.
13.
In many laws of the ancient Near East, the law paralleling the biblical levirate marriage is connected to the inheritance of the deceased. It should nevertheless be pointed out that, according to Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, p. 50, ‘The ancient Hebrew levirate law was formed independently and uninfluenced in any serious degree by the levirate customs of surrounding peoples’. See also Westbrook, Property and the Family, pp. 74–75.
14.
Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, p. 87, claims that the term ‘name’ in the Bible is used for both a person's property and for his progeny. In his view, the bequeathing of the inheritance is an inseparable part of the previously mentioned aim of bearing progeny for the deceased. For this view see also Donald A. Leggett, The Levirate and Goel Institutions in the Old Testament (Cherry Hill, NJ: Mack Publishing, 1974), pp. 48–54, and Eryl W. Dawes, ‘Inheritance Rights and the Hebrew Levirate Marriage, Part 1’, VT 31 (1981), pp. 138–44 (141–42). Davies echoes this position and uses it to explain the events in Ruth 4, in his article,’ Ruth IV 5 and the Duties of the Gō’ēl, VT 33 (1983), pp. 231–34. Westbrook, Property and the Family, p. 75 n. 1, argues that a legal term must have one single meaning, and the term ‘name’ cannot relate to both progeny and property. Therefore he maintains that ‘establishing the name of the dead’ concerns only his property. For a similar view see Willis, The Elders, pp. 287–91.
Thompson, Legal Problems, p. 88, concludes from the argument of the daughters of Zelophehad, ‘Why should our father's name be diminished?’ (Num. 27.4), that the inheritance of the estate of the deceased by his brother does not suffice to ‘establish a name’. For discussion of whether daughters are considered as ‘establishing a name’, see Weisberg, Levirate Marriage, pp. 169–70.
15.
Although the word ‘house’ (תיב) is often used in the Bible in a metaphoric sense (see Ruth 4.12; Gen. 45.11; Deut. 14.26; 1 Sam. 1.2; 25.6 and elsewhere), the juxtaposition of the verb ‘build up’ (הנב) with the noun ‘house’, in the vast majority of its appearances in the Bible—and especially in the other three appearances in Deuteronomy (20.5; 22.8; 28.30)—denotes the physical construction of an actual house. Nevertheless, I tend to agree with Willis's interpretation (The Elders, p. 290) of the expression ‘build up a house’ as being meant not only in the physical sense, but also in the sense of succession and the continuation of the lineage.
16.
Furthermore, as Burrows, ‘Levirate Marriage’, p. 29, points out, the law gives no indication of what happens to the inheritance in the event that the levir is unwilling to marry his widowed sister-in-law. In other words, if the bequeathing of the inheritance is the main issue that the law is meant to address, it is left unresolved.
17.
A completely different perspective, shifting the focus away from the term ‘establish a name’, suggests that the law of levirate marriage is meant to protect the rights of the widow. See, e.g., Davies, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 1’, pp. 142–44; Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, p. 30; Frederick E. Greenspahn, When Brothers Dwell Together: The Preeminence of Younger Siblings in the Hebrew Bible (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 53. There is no denying that the law, like other laws in Deuteronomy, does provide protection for the widow. Still, neither the formulation of the law nor its details offer any proof that concern for the widow is its focus. For further proposals for understanding the intention of the law, see Westbrook, Property and the Family, pp. 71–74.
18.
Pedersen, Israel, its Life and Culture, p. 256.
19.
Davies, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 1’, p. 143; Westbrook, Property and the Family, pp. 84–85. Contrary to this view, Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, p. 95, maintains that the levir is meant to engage in intercourse with the widow only until a child is born. Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, p. 282, notes that this is the prevailing practice in certain societies.
20.
Volgger's interpretation of this law (Ehe gezwungen, p. 173) is that the man has already expressed willingness to marry the woman by engaging in intercourse with her, and therefore the law permits itself to obligate him to many her.
21.
For the element of love or charm in the betrothal of a woman in the narrative, see Gen. 30; Judg. 14.1–3; 16.4; Esth. 2.17 and elsewhere, and in the law of divorce in Deut. 24.1. See also Volgger, Ehe gezwungen, p. 179.
22.
For the relationship between the two laws, see Benjamin Kilchör, ‘Levirate Marriage in Deuteronomy 25:5–10 and its Precursors in Leviticus and Numbers: A Test Case for the Relationship between P/H and D’, CBQ 77 (2015), pp. 429–40 (432).
23.
For discussion of what happens to the inheritance if the daughters of Zelophehad do not many members of their tribe, see Belkin, ‘Levirate’, p. 305.
24.
Ray G. Abrahams, ‘Some Aspects of Levirate’, in Jack Goody (ed.), The Character of Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 167, formulates this tension as follows: ‘Levirate… maintain[s] and preserve [s] the individual identity of one beyond his normal life by the sacrifice of at least part of the individuality of the other’. See also Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, pp. 106–109, and Willis, The Elders, p. 259.
25.
Willis, The Elders, p. 292. His view is shared by Dawes, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 2’, p. 261; Morgenstem, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 167; Weisberg, ‘Widow’, p. 409; and Gertz, Die Gerichtsorganisation, p. 204.
26.
Some scholars maintain that the description, ‘If brothers dwell together’ reflects a legal situation (Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, p. 282; Thompson, pp. 89–90). Others maintain that the expression should be viewed not as a legal limitation, but rather as a description of the context in which the law usually applies (Leggett, The Levirate, p. 48; Weisberg, ‘Widow’, p. 412). For further discussion of the meaning of the expression, see J.P. Burnside, The Signs of Sin: Seriousness of Offence in Biblical Law (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), pp. 90–91; Dawes, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 2’, pp. 264–66; Westbrook, Property and the Family, p. 78.
27.
For ח״קל, see BDB, p. 543 (e). For א״וב, see BDB, p. 98 (coire cum femina). To indicate marriage the text may use just the verb ח״קל or a combination of both verbs. See, for example, Gen. 38.2; Exod. 2.1; Deut. 22.13; Ruth 4.13.
28.
For the meaning of the verb ם״בי, see above.
29.
Another notable aspect of the law is the fact that it facilitates a relationship which is defined in Lev. 20.21 as forbidden. This point is discussed further below.
30.
See above, n. 19.
31.
For a similar understanding see Westbrook, Proper!)’ and the Family, p. 84. In Belkin's view (‘Levirate’, p. 283), the connection with the levir is in fact ‘a continuous marriage’; see also his discussion on pp. 310–11. For the rabbinical position on this question, see Weisberg, Levirate, pp. 134–35.
32.
See above, n. 27.
33.
According to Burrows, ‘Levirate Marriage’, p. 28, and Westbrook, Property and the Family, pp. 84–85, the marriage of the levir with the widow entails no ceremony. Westbrook bases his argument on the order in which the verbs appear in the verse, observing that ‘there would hardly be a wedding ceremony after consummation’. It seems that the Talmud (b. Kid. 13b–14a) likewise hints at this view.
34.
The highly unusual nature of the expression in this law might explain the fact that, in the Samaritan version, the familiar הילא אובי appears instead. The uniqueness of this expression is even more conspicuous in light of the connection between the biblical law and the story of Tamar and Judah. Judah commands Onan (Gen. 38.8), ‘Join with (לא אב) your brother's wife’, while in Deut. 25.6–7 the law is formulated,’ Her husband's brother shall unite with her’ (הילע אובי).
35.
In Gen. 19.31 Lot's elder daughter tells her sister: ‘Our father is old, and there is not a man in the earth to consort with us (ונילע אובל) in the way of all the world’.
36.
See BDB, pp. 97–98. For לא א״וב in the sense of meeting or encounter, see Gen. 6.18; 19.3; Deut. 17.14, 19. For לע א״וב in negative contexts, see Gen. 6.17; 2 Kgs 15.19; 21.12; Jer. 19.3, and elsewhere. (Nevertheless, occasionally we find לע א״וב in a positive context and לא א״וב in a negative context; see, e.g., Jer. 32.42.)
37.
See, e.g., Gen. 34.2; Lev. 20.11–20; 2 Sam. 13.11.
38.
In this context it should be noted that both explanations proposed here for the expression לע א״וב could apply to the situation of Lot's daughters (see n. 35).
39.
For in-depth discussion of the various appellations for the levir and the widow in the law, see Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, pp. 177–79. In contrast to our own position, Bartor maintains, among other suggestions (p. 178), that the appellation שיא reflects the character's subjective point of view, as a man who is unwilling to fulfill Ms obligation, rather than the position of the legislator.
40.
BDB renders the verb ‘delight in’. For use of the verb in the context of relations between a man and a woman, see Gen. 34.19; Deut. 21.14; Esth. 2.14.
41.
For the view that the justification does not appear in the law, see above, n. 25.
42.
Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 108 n. 52, notes that the verb ן״אמ is used in the Bible to denote ‘rebellion’.
43.
For the significance of variation in the reading of biblical law, see James W. Watts, Reading Law: The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), p. 73.
44.
For this reason I reject Bartor's view that ‘She anchors his refusal in the relationship between him and her…, as though she had said: “he refuses to marry me”…’ (Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 108).
45.
Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 178.
46.
Weisberg, ‘Widow’, p. 411. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, p. 291, notes the positive attitude towards women in Deuteronomy in comparison with other biblical collections of laws. For expression of this attitude, see 14.29; 24.17; 27.19, and elsewhere.
47.
For further discussion of this issue see below.
48.
For the purposes of comparison, the fact that Zelophehad has daughters allows them—rather than his widow—to be the voice that demands his rights (Num. 27.1–11). For a similar view, see Volgger, Ehe gezwungen, p. 182; Weisberg, ‘Widow ‘, p. 409.
49.
A conflict of this sort—albeit in different circumstances—is to be found in the story of Tamar and Judah (Gen. 38). Out of concern that Shela, too, will die after marrying Tamar, Judah decides not to give him to her, and thereby not to facilitate the levirate (v. 11).
50.
Calum M. Carmichael, ‘A Ceremonial Crux: Removing a Man's Sandal as a Female Gesture of Contempt’, JBL 96 (1977), pp. 321–36 (328), maintains that the fact that the levirate marriage usually takes place after the death of the father is the reason that the legislator involves the elders in the implementation of the law. See p. 328 n. 23.
51.
For the role of direct speech in casuistic law, see Assnat Bartor, ‘The Representation of Speech in the Casuistic Laws of the Pentateuch: The Phenomenon of Combined Discourse’, JBL 126 (2007), pp. 231–49 (233–35). Bartor asserts that: ‘The use of combined discourse in the casuistic laws enhances the bivocality (or polyvocality) of the text by bringing into play a plurality of speakers and attitudes’. The analysis of the words of the levir and of the widow presented below serves to strengthen this view.
52.
It may be that the explicit mention of him ‘standing’ hints at a legal procedure that is undertaken, as in the description in Deut. 19.17.
53.
Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 107.
54.
Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 178.
55.
For further possible arguments offered by the elders, see Willis, The Elders, p. 294.
56.
Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 109.
57.
In contrast to this view, Bartor (Reading Law as Narrative, p. 177), maintains that the generic appellation ‘him’ reflects the levir's distancing of himself from fulfillment of his duty.
58.
Daube, ‘Consortium’, pp. 77–78. For further discussion of the sanction and its significance, see also Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, p. 93. For the significance of the actions performed during the release ceremony, see Burnside, The Signs of Sin, pp. 105–20.
59.
For the view that the punishment is a lenient one, see Westbrook, Property and the Family, p. 82; Dawes, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 2’, p. 261; Gertz, Die Gerichtsorganisation, pp. 199–200. For the opposite view, see Daube, Consortium, pp. 78–79; Volgger, Ehe gezwungen, pp. 184–85. For the rabbinical position on this question, see Belkin, ‘Levirate’, pp. 327–28.
60.
Daube, Consortium, pp. 77–78, proposes, based on a comparison with Esth. 6.9, 11, that ‘So shall it be done…’ is a fixed linguistic formula for denunciation or praise. Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 179, notes that the widow refers to the levir here for the first time by the appellation ‘man’ (שיא), maintaining that this term reflects the widow's internalization of the change in his status.
61.
Carmichael, ‘A Ceremonial Crux’, p. 331.
62.
See Willis, The Elders, p. 298 and n. 153.
63.
For the meaning of the expression ‘build up a house’ here, see above, n. 15.
64.
Willis, The Elders, p. 304, asserts, ‘City elders lead the way in encouraging members of community to consider of utmost importance the moral integrity and social solidarity of their community’.
65.
For a summary of the stages of development, see Davies,’ Inheritance Rights Part 2’, pp. 263–67; Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, pp. 171–74, 180–83; Leggett, The Levirate, pp. 271–91; Kilchör, ‘Levirate Marriage’, pp. 439–40. These various scholars are not of a single mind as to the nature of the connection between all of the above sources and the law of levirate marriage, nor as regards the dating and stages of development that they reflect. For a discussion of the various opinions, see Willis, The Elders, p. 252; Belkin, ‘Levirate’, pp. 287–288; see also Weisberg, Levirate, pp. 33–34 in this regard.
66.
Jacob M. Mittelmann, Der altisraelitische Levirat (Leipzig: A. Teicher, 1934), p. 31; Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 165.
67.
Gertz, Die Gerichtsorganisation, pp. 207–206, offers a different view. He argues that the law in its present form reflects a reality in which the law is known, but not practiced. In his view, the legislator seeks on the one hand to emphasize the importance of the law, while on the other hand adapting to the prevailing reality, in which release is a possibility. Unlike the other scholars presented above, Gertz does not believe that the legislator seeks leniency in the law.
68.
Weisberg, ‘Widow’, pp. 405, 417; Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, p. 183 n. 235.
69.
Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, pp. 164–65.
70.
Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, p. 96. The Hittite law deals with marriage to the wife of a brother who has died as part of a collection of laws pertaining to incest. See Ephraim Neufeld, The Hittite Laws (London: Luzac, 1951), pp. 53–57, who asserts (p. 192) that this law appears among the incest laws to emphasize its exception.
71.
Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, pp. 1–42. This view is also shared by Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, p. 285. The Talmudic sages maintained a similar understanding of the contradiction; see Belkin, ‘Levirate’, p. 325.
72.
For other opinions see Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, pp. 166–67, who links the development of the law with the development of the rights of the widow, and Davies, ‘Inheritance Rights Part 2’, pp. 257–60; Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, pp. 96–99; and Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, pp. 173–74, who link the development of the law with consideration for the rights of the levir.
73.
Weisberg, Levirate, p. 29.
74.
Westbrook, Property and the Family, p. 71.
75.
Thompson, ‘Some Legal Problems’, pp. 88–89. For a similar view, see Willis, The Elders, pp. 252–53, 283–86. See also, recently, Joshua Berman, ‘The History of Legal Theory and the Study of Biblical Law’, CBQ 76 (2014), pp. 19–39, who draws a distinction (pp. 20–26) between statutory law and common law. He maintains that biblical law actually represents the latter category, while biblical scholars mistakenly understand it as the former.
76.
Carmichael, ‘A Ceremonial Crux’, p. 325.
77.
As proposed, e.g., by Morgenstern, ‘The Book of the Covenant’, pp. 165, 180.
78.
Belkin, ‘Levirate’, p. 279, understands the situation in this way; see also Weisberg, Levirate, p. 109.
79.
Onan's act probably reflects an ugly relationship with his brother. For the similarity between this relationship and that prevailing among the brothers in Jacob's household, see Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 3–12.
80.
From Onan's decision to act deceptively there follows his decision to spill his seed. It is quite possible that this deed causes Ms punishment to be even more severe.
81.
Calum M. Carmichael, Women, Law, and the Genesis Traditions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), pp. 66–68, assumes that the treatment of the recalcitrant levir arises from the instance of Onan in Gen. 38. However, he does not mention the distinction that I propose above between the two instances.
82.
The biblical law does not address the possibility of the widow refusing the levirate marriage. As noted by Weisberg, ‘Widow’, pp. 405–406, both the law and the two narratives related to levirate marriage (Gen. 38 and Ruth 4) reflect the woman's wish to proceed and the aversion of the man concerned. The Talmud (b. Yeb. 4a) releases the widow from marriage to a levir who suffers from lesions of the skin. For discussion of other sources in the Babylonian and Palestine Talmuds addressing the rabbinical attitude towards a woman who is unwilling to many a levir, see Adina M. Yoffie, ‘Refusal of the Levirate Marriage: A Woman's Rights’, Conservative Judaism 52.3 (2000), pp. 22–29.
83.
Contrary to our view, Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative, p. 110, maintains that attention to the voices contained in the law exposes the outlines of the reform that it underwent. As noted above, I believe that the problem exposed by the law is not a reflection of its development, but rather an expression of its inherent tension.