Abstract
This article examines the literary connection between the laws of cult centralization and animal slaughter in Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27. After establishing a set of criteria for determining the literary connection between two texts, the author compares and analyzes the textual evidence in Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27. This study concludes that the connection between the two passages may not be one of literary dependence of one text upon the other as has been widely assumed by many scholars. Instead, even though both texts attempt to deal with the same socio-religious issues, they may have been literarily independent of each other.
1. Introduction
The literary relationship between the laws of cult centralization and animal slaughter in Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 is a subject of much debate. 1 Two opposing positions are prominent with regard to this issue. The first position argues that Lev. 17 is a response to the legislation in the Deuteronomic Code (D), which had legitimized profane slaughter. 2 According to the advocates of this theory, the legal innovation proposed by the Holiness Code (H) in Lev. 17 prescribes a strict ban on secular animal slaughter while at the same time assuming the Deuteronomic cultic centralization. That said, the priority of D over H is postulated. By contrast, the second position, which argues the priority of H over D, contends that the legal innovation to legalize profane slaughter in D is an attempt to relax H’s strict prohibition of secular slaughter. 3 The proponents of this view also believe that D is advancing the cultic centralization law in H, which despite its prohibition of multiple altars still assumes the legitimacy of multiple sanctuaries. According to this view, D comes after H to promote a stricter centralized cult by banning other sanctuaries at the expense of H’s ban on profane slaughter.
This study compares and analyzes the textual evidence of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 in order to determine the type of literary connection between these two passages. To that end, I first address some methodological issues concerning how to determine the literary connection between parallel texts and propose a set of criteria for determining the literary relationship between two texts. I then compare the texts of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27, compile a list of the similarities and dissimilarities between the passages, and analyze the textual data based on the proposed method. I conclude that the relationship between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 is not one of literary dependence of one text upon the other. Instead, these texts, despite their attempts to address the same socio-religious issues, may have been independent of each other.
2. Method for determining literary connection
Michael A. Lyons correctly points out various factors that may contribute to disagreements in the discussion of literary dependence of biblical texts. He observes, ‘Disagreements about the direction of literary dependence exist because of prior commitments to a particular theory of composition, different standards for evaluating evidence, and the inherent difficulty in working with texts that show evidence of a complex compositional process’. 4 In order to minimize these problems, Benjamin Kilchör avers that an approach to examining the relationship between biblical texts should start with the final text, without presupposing a certain model of the composition of the Pentateuch or a certain religio-historical theory. 5 He further suggests analyzing the literary relationship of the texts ‘by tabularizing their vocabulary and laying the texts side by side in a synopsis’. 6
To examine the literary connection between parallel texts, I propose the following steps. The first is the analysis of common materials shared by both texts to determine possible textual connections. Lyons posits, ‘Where there is material common to two texts, one must be able to provide evidence to demonstrate that the common material is secondary and derivative in one text, but not in the other’. 7 This principle prematurely assumes that common materials indicate a literary connection in which one text must have derived from the other. 8 However, as pointed out by Meir Malul, there are at least four possible textual connections that may explain similarities between two texts: (1) Direct Connection, that is, a direct dependence of one text upon the other; (2) Mediated Connection, that is, text A did not depend directly on text B but through a third text which stems from text B; (3) Common Source, that is, both texts depend on a common source; and (4) Common Tradition, that is, both texts are not literarily dependent but share a common tradition, for example, literary, religious, and legal. 9 In other words, the fact that two texts share similarities does not necessarily indicate direct literary dependence.
Furthermore, the types of commonality shared by texts may indicate the degree of literary dependence between texts. A more direct literary connection is suggested by the presence of more verbal parallels between two texts. By contrast, the fewer the verbal parallels shared by texts, the harder it is to posit a direct literary connection between them. Nevertheless, even with the presence of verbal parallels, a direct connection cannot be simply assumed without further examination since a mediated connection or a common source may be the reason for the parallels. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to determine whether the verbal parallels may be explained via models other than a direct connection. It should also be noted here that the analysis of common materials can only be used to determine the possible textual connections without indicating the direction of literary dependence.
Second is the analysis of divergent materials in the texts. There are two types of divergent materials in parallel texts. A borrowing text may introduce (1) modification of the source text to demonstrate polemical intent or (2) interpretive expansions of the source text. 10 In the first category, the borrowing text contains polemical adjustments of the source text that ‘conceptually move away from the one context to another’. 11 This criterion, however, is less helpful in determining the literary dependence between two texts when one text is not polemical against another but rather both texts respond to the same issue from different perspectives. In the second category, as noted by David M. Carr, there are various expansions of the source text that a borrowing text may introduce: (1) substantial pluses vis-à-vis that text; (2) expansion of the source text (fairly fully preserved) with fragments from various locations in the Bible (less completely preserved); (3) expansion that fills what could have been perceived as an apparent gap in its parallel; (4) expansive material in character speeches, particularly theophanic speech; and (5) an element which appears to be an adaptation of an element in the other text to shifting circumstances/ideas. 12
However, not every criterion in Carr’s list is helpful in every case. For example, Carr’s fourth criterion appears not to be useful in the case of a comparison between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 due to the nature of the corpora of H and D. The book of Deuteronomy is composed as the last speech of Moses before his death. In that sense, the Deuteronomic legal collection is placed in the mouth of Moses, although the voices of Moses and Yahweh are sometimes blended into one. By contrast, the book of Leviticus, including H, is framed as a direct speech of Yahweh. Due to the difference in the literary genre between the two texts, this criterion is not used in this study.
It is also crucial to note that while a later text tends to expand the base text, the base text may be abbreviated in the borrowing text. 13 Kilchör warns that the criterion of brevity (lectio brevior) should not be used without explaining the driving force behind the abbreviation of a text, especially in the case of D and H. He notices that the principle of lectio brevior is often employed when D is shorter than H, while the same criterion is not used when H is shorter than D. 14 To avoid this unfair use of the criterion, Kilchör suggests that it is necessary to explain the rationale for the abbreviations of the source text in the borrowing text. That said, the principle of lectio brevior is not always reliable for determining the direction of literary dependence. However, as correctly argued by Lyons, ‘If the non-parallel material in the longer text can be shown to be interpreting the parallel material, the shorter text is more likely to be the source’. 15
Third is the analysis of the possible incongruous elements in both texts. According to this criterion, a later text may ‘display indications of its original context that are incongruous with the new context’. 16 Carr, however, does not include incongruity as one of his criteria for determining literary dependency because he deems this criterion unreliable. He points out that although some later texts may display incongruous elements, ‘scholars are less prone to assume such negative things about late texts’. 17 Even so, he acknowledges that incongruity ‘might still be a useful criterion, but it was not confirmed in [his] study’. 18 That said, in this study, if incongruous elements are found in a parallel text, it may indicate relative lateness.
Last is the analysis of the conceptual connection between both texts. According to this criterion, ‘the borrowing text may be conceptually dependent on the source text in such a way that the reader is forced to supply information from the source text in order to understand the borrowing text’. 19 In other words, a borrowing text may be harder to understand without prior knowledge of the source text since the concepts crucial for understanding the borrowing text are available in the source text.
3. Literary analysis of Leviticus 17 and Deuteronomy 12.20–27
Generally speaking, the correspondence between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 can be divided into three thematic categories. The first category is the stipulations concerning profane animal slaughter (Lev. 17.3–7; Deut. 12.20–22). The next category deals with ritual activities at the central sanctuary (Lev. 17.8–9; Deut. 12.26–27). The third category contains the regulations concerning blood, that is, the ban on blood ingestion and the proper disposal of blood (Lev. 17.10–14; Deut. 12.23–25). It should be noted that the orders of the themes in Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–28 are not the same, and the sections do not neatly correspond with each other. 20 Also, Lev. 17 begins with an introduction (vv. 1–2) and ends with the ban on eating a carcass, both of which have no correspondence in Deut. 12.20–28. 21
3.1. Profane slaughter
Two common elements are shared between Lev. 17.3–7 and Deut. 12.20–22 with regard to profane slaughter. First, both texts assume a central sanctuary, in which all sacrifices should be offered. 22 For H, the central sanctuary is the tabernacle of Yahweh at the entrance of the tent of meeting (v. 4), whereas D refers to it as ‘the place which Yahweh will choose to put his name’ (v. 21). 23 Second, both texts deal with the same issue, namely, the legitimation of profane slaughter. 24 As evident from Table 1, except for these thematic parallels and two commonly used words אשׁר “which” and יהוה “Yahweh,” the two texts only share one other word, namely, זבח ‘to slaughter’, which is not unexpected since both texts deal with animal slaughter laws. The paucity of shared lexemes between the two passages indicates the different set of intentions and concerns of the authors of each text. 25 In fact, Lev. 17.3–7 and Deut. 12.20–22 are substantially different in various aspects.
Comparison between the legislations on profane slaughter.
First, Lev. 17 prescribes a strict banning of all profane slaughter except in the central sanctuary, whereas Deut. 12 allows animal slaughter outside of the central sanctuary. The rationales for the opposing rules on profane slaughter are different, and neither text seems to address or to be aware of the concerns raised by the other text. Leviticus 17 provides two reasons for the ban on profane slaughter, both of which are religious in nature. 26 According to v. 4, anyone who slaughters an animal outside of the central sanctuary without offering it as a gift to Yahweh at his altar commits a capital sin because the person has shed blood. The punishment for this violation is that the individual is cut off from among his people. According to Jacob Milgrom, profane slaughter constitutes murder in H, and the only way to expiate the murder of animals is by dashing the blood on the altar of Yahweh (cf. v. 11). 27 The authors of Lev. 17 add a second rationale for the prohibition of profane slaughter, namely, because it may lead to idolatry. Without the ban on profane slaughter, H is concerned that ‘anyone involved in secret demon worship might claim that he merely killed the animal outside the camp’. 28
By contrast, D permits profane slaughter for a practical reason. The pairing of the centralization formula with the authorization to engage in secular slaughter indicates that the authors of Deuteronomy recognized the difficulty that may arise from their cultic centralization program. Deuteronomy 12.20–21 prescribes, If the place, where Yahweh your God will choose to put his name, is far from you, you may slaughter from your herd and from your flock which Yahweh has given you, as I have commanded you, and you may eat in your gates whenever you desire.
This concern about distance, however, is not shared by the authors of Lev. 17, who firmly proscribe profane slaughter outside of the central sanctuary, that is, the tent of meeting.
Scholars have debated the question of textual priority by speculating about the possible polemical intents of one text against the other. Christophe Nihan, who believes in the priority of D over H, argues that the sacrifice to foreign gods became popular because of D’s legislation that allows common slaughter. He opines, The implications of D’s innovation are denounced in the clause of 17:7a stating that if the Israelites sacrifice to other gods, polemically referred to here as ‘satyrs’ (שעירם), it is because they have been allowed to slaughter animals outside the precinct of the central sanctuary!
29
In other words, one could posit that D’s legislation on profane slaughter has created a shifting circumstance, namely, idolatry, that forces H to respond by completely prohibiting secular animal slaughter. On the contrary, it is also possible to contend that D’s prescription of profane slaughter reflects a concern for the impracticality of H’s strict prohibition of profane animal slaughter.
Having observed both possibilities, Esias E. Meyer concludes, ‘There appears to be some modification and “polemical intent” going on, with one text correcting another, but this does not really help us to determine which one is the older’. 30 Nonetheless, it is odd that although both passages prescribe opposing stipulations with different reasons, there is no indication that one text attempts to respond to the rationales raised by the other text. P neither shows awareness of D’s concern that the central sanctuary may be too far for some people nor tries to address it. Similarly, D does not endeavor to explain away H’s concerns that profane slaughter constitutes a capital sin of murder or that it may lead to idolatry. Simply put, neither text is responding to the other text, which is peculiar if one text is intended to correct the other.
Moreover, the lists of animals in Lev. 17 and Deut. 12 are different. In Lev. 17.3, three animals are mentioned as representing animals that cannot be slaughtered outside of the central sanctuary: שׁור ‘ox’, כשׂב ‘lamb’, and עז ‘goat’. By contrast, Deut. 12.21 only has two animals, namely, בקר ‘cattle’ and צאן ‘sheep’. Bernard M. Levinson has convincingly demonstrated that the list of animals in Deut. 12.21 is a textual reworking of Exod. 20.24. 31 He correctly observes that the second pair of sacrificial animals את צאנך ואת בקרך ‘your sheep and your cattle’ in Exod. 20.24 is inverted in Deut. 12.21 to read מבקרך ומצאנך ‘from your cattle and from your sheep’. The lemmatic parallels between Deut. 12.21 and Exod. 20.24 indicate that the former may have depended upon the latter. By contrast nevertheless, the absence of lemmatic parallels between Lev. 17.3 and Deut. 12.21 presents a difficulty in establishing a textual connection. The same is true concerning the lists of unclean animals that cannot be used for sacrificial purposes in both texts. According to Lev. 17.13, which is part of the section that deals with blood regulation, examples of unclean animals that may be killed outside of the central sanctuary in the hunting process are חיה או עוף ‘beast or bird’. By contrast, the examples of unclean animals in Deut. 12.22, which is part of the section that discusses profane slaughter, are את הצבי ואת האיל ‘the gazelle or the deer’.
Another interesting difference between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12 concerns the use of the different verbs for slaughter. In Lev. 17, the verb שׁחת is used, whereas Deut. 12.21 uses the verb זבח. 32 The verb זבח is used in Deut. 12.21 to refer to mundane slaughter despite the fact that its occurrences elsewhere in the Old Testament always bear cultic connotations. 33 That said, Deut. 12.21’s use of the verb זבח to denote profane slaughter requires an explanation. Milgrom believes that the use of this verb instead of the more technical term שׁחת is because D is not familiar with P’s technical use of the verb. He argues, ‘The absence of שׁחת in Deut. 12, 15, 21 and indeed, in all of D, is probably due to D’s ignorance of its technical meaning as developed by P’. 34 Although this explanation is possible, it is unlikely, or at least questionable, because it is based on the unproven negative view of D.
A more likely explanation for the use of the verb זבח in Deut. 12.21 is that it indicates D’s textual reworking of Exod. 20.24, as demonstrated by Levinson. According to him, the authors of Deut. 12.21 reformulated Exod. 20.24 to legitimate profane slaughter by using the same verb employed in the Exodus altar law. In his words, In its paradoxical reuse of the Exodus altar law to sanction local secular slaughter, Deuteronomy has appropriated and deliberately redefined the original verb. In the new context, it no longer retains its original meaning—cultic sacrifice—but instead denotes its opposite—slaughter, but not at an altar.
35
In light of this observation, the notion that D is ignorant of the technical meaning of cultic terms has to be rejected. On the contrary, the authors of D intentionally changed the cultic association of the verb זבח to serve their agenda. In fact, without the use of the verb זבח, it would have been difficult for D’s readers to identify Exod. 20.24 as the literary source for Deut. 12.21. By that logic, if D intended to respond to P’s legislation, it would have been easier for D’s readers to identify Lev. 17 as D’s literary source had it used the same verb שׁחת. Instead, D chooses to identify Exod. 20.24 as its literary source.
3.2. Blood ingestion and proper disposal
Although Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 clearly differ with regard to the issue of profane slaughter, their provisions on blood are strikingly similar. Both texts prohibit blood ingestion for the same reason, which is because the life is in the blood.
As evident from the comparison above (Table 2), the passages share the following lexemes: אכל ‘to eat’, דם ‘blood’, בשׂר ‘flesh’, נפשׁ ‘life’, שׁפך ‘to pour out’, הוא ‘[it] is’, כי ‘because’, על “on”, and the negative particle לא ‘not’. Interestingly, except for the words הוא and the commonly used preposition על, the shared lexemes in these texts are also shared with the older priestly legislation in Gen. 9.4–6. 36 Thus, although one could argue that there may be a literary dependence between the two texts in this particular case, the possibility that Lev 17.10–14 and Deut. 12.23–25 may have shared a common source, namely, Gen. 9.4–6, should not be dismissed.
Comparison between the legislation on blood ingestion and disposal.
H and D are also different in their use of verbs to refer to blood pouring. In Lev. 17, two different verbs are employed to denote blood pouring. When it refers to pouring blood in a cultic context, the verb זרק is used (v. 6). By contrast, the verb שׁפך is used when the blood pouring is in a non-cultic context (vv. 4, 13). The Deuteronomic authors, however, use the same verb שׁפך for cultic and non-cultic contexts. 37 The priority of either text cannot be argued merely from this verbal difference since polemical intent may be posited in both directions. H may be trying to correct D’s desacralization of blood, whereas D may be trying to desacralize blood to serve his centralization program. Alternatively, D’s tendency to use non-cultic terms like שפך and P’s propensity for cultic-related words like זרק may be explained as stemming from different sociological perspectives without having to posit that one text depends on the other. 38
Polemical intent can also be detected in the provisions on the proper disposal of blood in a non-cultic context. For the author of Deut. 12.24, the blood should be poured out on the earth like water. Here, the blood of profane slaughter is considered no more valuable than water. According to Lev. 17.13, however, even the blood of unclean animals that cannot be used for cultic purposes has value and should be poured out and covered with earth. It is noteworthy that similar yet contrasted regulations are phrased very differently in both texts. In addition, except for the use of the verb שׁפך, there is virtually no similarity in word choice and syntax: Lev. 17.13 – Deut. 12.24 - על־הארץ
It is impossible to determine which legislation is the response to the other since dependence in both directions is within the realm of possibility. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that D rejects P’s theology that the spilt blood of animals requires satisfaction. According to this view, Deuteronomy renounces the older view in Lev. 17 by asserting that the blood of an animal from profane slaughter is no more valuable than water. 39 On the other hand, it is also possible to posit that P corrects D’s program of blood desacralization even in a non-cultic setting.
Furthermore, the blood regulation in Lev. 17.10–14 appears to be more expanded than in Deut. 12.23–25. For example, it specifies that the ban on blood ingestion applies to ‘any one of the house of Israel or of the resident aliens among them’ (Lev. 17.10; cf. vv. 12–13). In Deut. 12.23–25, no specific recipients are mentioned although elsewhere D makes the distinction between Israelites and resident aliens (14.21, 29; 16.11, 14). In addition to the shared reason ‘for the blood is the life’, H also adds another reason for the prohibition against eating blood: ‘I have given it for you on the altar for atonement of your lives because it is the blood that atones by means of life’ (Lev. 17.11). Although the absence of this reason in D can be explained by claiming that it is less concerned with the use of blood in a ritual context, it is not clear why D would have deleted the reference to the house of Israel and the resident aliens if the priority of H is argued for.
3.3. Centralized cult
Even though D allows animal slaughter outside of the central sanctuary, it insists that all rituals must be performed in ‘the place that Yahweh will choose’ (v. 26b). In this regard, H stipulates a similar commandment but in a negative way by warning that the person ‘who offers a burnt offering or sacrifice but does not bring it to the entrance of the tent of meeting to offer it to Yahweh, that person shall be cut off from his people’ (Lev. 17.8b–9). Besides the name Yahweh and the relative complementizer אשׁר, neither of which can be considered as significant lexical parallels due to the frequent use of the words, four other lexemes are shared by the passages: בוא ‘to enter (qal) or to bring (hiphil)’, עשׂה ‘to make’, עלה ‘burnt offering’ and זבח ‘sacrifice’ (Table 3). Despite the use of parallel words, the focus of each text is different. First, the authors of Lev. 17.9 and Deut. 12.26 use the verb בוא in different stems and meanings. Furthermore, the authors of Lev. 17.8–9 are concerned with the place to offer the burnt offering and sacrifice, that is, the entrance of the tent of meeting. By contrast, the authors of Deut. 12.27 are more interested in what to do with the burnt offering and sacrifice at the central sanctuary: when offering עלה a person should offer both flesh and blood on the altar of Yahweh, but when it is a זבח only the blood shall be poured out on the altar of Yahweh and the meat may be consumed (Table 3).
Comparison between the legislation on ritual activities at the central sanctuary.
Furthermore, both texts contain expansive materials when compared to each other. As in the prohibition against blood ingestion, Lev. 17 once again specifies the recipients of the warning, namely, any person of the people of Israel and of the resident aliens (v. 8). While Deut. 12 lacks this reference to the recipient of the command, it lists more types of offering than Lev. 17. In addition to עלתיך ‘your burnt offerings’ and זבחיך ‘your sacrifices’, Deut. 12.26 has קדשיך אשר יהיו לך ונדריך ‘your holy things that you may have and your vow offerings’. The reference to the recipients in Lev. 17.8 could be understood as filling the apparent gap in Deut. 12.26–27, whereas the reference to more offerings in Deut. 12.26 could also be understood as filling the gap in Lev. 17.8–9. Therefore, the principle of lectio brevior appears to be unhelpful in this case.
The phrase על מזבח יהוה ‘on the altar of Yahweh’ is shared by both Lev. 17.6 and Deut. 12.27. The only difference is that the phrase is followed by an apposition אלהיך ‘your god’ in Deut. 12.27: Lev. 17.6 – Deut. 12.27a – ודם זבחיך
It is difficult to argue for the relative lateness of D based on the addition of אלהיך since the similar phrase מזבח יהוה אלהינו ‘the altar of Yahweh our God’ can be found in other places in H (e.g., Josh. 22.19, 28, 29). 40 In other words, this phrase is not an exclusively Deuteronomic expression nor is it exclusively priestly. Rather, the use of the phrase ‘the altar of Yahweh’ may arise from the tradition that refers to the altar at the central sanctuary as ‘the altar of Yahweh’ as opposed to other local altars during the time when H and D were composed. Thus, the use of this phrase alone cannot be used to indicate literary dependence. 41 The same is true for the verbal difference in the stipulation to pour out the blood of sacrifices on the altar of Yahweh in Lev. 17.6 and Deut. 12.27, in which the verbs זרק and שפך are used, respectively. As noted above, the use of cultic terms by H and non-cultic ones by D may be explained by their differing sociological perspectives.
4. Conclusion
After comparing the opposing views of Milgrom and Otto concerning the literary relationship between H and D, Meyer astutely notes that the arguments for the direction of literary dependence in the case of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 are not primarily based on the textual evidence but instead on one’s presupposition regarding the composition of the Pentateuch. He observes, Milgrom’s reading of Lev. 17 is so intermingled with this broader understanding of the development of P and H as preexilic documents that to adopt his reading would basically mean accepting Kaufmann …. On the other hand, to side with Otto, one must first broadly accept Wellhausen’s understanding of P as a product of the exilic/postexilic period. One would also have to agree that P came after Deuteronomy.
42
Having analyzed the relationship between the two passages by using Lyon’s criteria for determining literary dependency, Meyer pessimistically concludes that no set of criteria may be useful in determining the chronological priority of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12. The problem with Meyer’s conclusion is that he assumes that there must be a literary dependency between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.
This study yields the following results. First, Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 share almost no verbal parallels that they do not also share with P. This observation suggests that a common source may explain the parallels between the two texts. Second, since it is possible to show polemical intent in both texts, the principle of modification does not help to determine literary dependency. Third, the principle of lectio brevior also appears to be unhelpful to determine the literary connection between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27 since both texts contain expansive materials that the other text does not. Fourth, both texts include pluses that could have been perceived as filling apparent gaps in the other text. Fifth, no incongruous elements are detected in both texts. This is evident, for instance, from the consistent and coherent use of the person/number/gender of verbs with their pronominal suffixes and the number/gender of nouns. Last, both texts are conceptually independent of each other, in that they can be easily understood without the other text.
In light of the aforementioned evidence, this study concludes that there may not have been any direct literary dependence between Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27. Some of the similarities between the two texts may be attributed to the use of a common source, namely, P. Furthermore, H and D may have a connection that is more than merely a common source. With regards to the relationship between P and D, Weinfeld hypothesizes, It is my view that the divergences between the two schools of P and D stem from a difference in their sociological background and not a variance in their historical-chronological setting. The problem at hand concerns two independent ideologies arising from two similar circles, and not necessarily from two distinct historical periods.
43
Likewise, if the two schools of H and D shared the same historical period and responded to the same socio-religious issues, albeit from different perspectives, it may explain the commonalities between them, particularly in the case of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12.20–27. 44
Footnotes
1.
Besides the laws of cult centralization and animal slaughter, scholars have also recognized other significant correspondences between Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code. For the list of the correspondences, see, for instance, Jeffrey Stackert, Rewriting the Torah: Literary Revision in Deuteronomy and the Holiness Legislation, FAT 52 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), pp. 7–8.
2.
Over a century ago, Julius Wellhausen stated that the intention of the proscription of secular slaughter in Lev. 17 “is simply and solely to secure the exclusive legitimation of the one lawful place of sacrifice; it is only for this, obviously, that the profane slaughtering outside of Jerusalem, which Deuteronomy had permitted, is forbidden” (Prolegomena to the History of Israel, trans. J. Sutherland Black and Allan Menzies [Edinburg: A. & C. Black, 1885], p. 50). Other proponents of this view include, for example, Alfred Cholewiński, Heiligkeitsgesetz und Deuteronomium: eine vergleichende Studie, AnBib 66 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1976), pp. 149–78; Eckart Otto, “Innerbiblische Exegese im Heiligkeitsgesetz Levitikus 17-26,” in Levitikus als Buch (Berlin: Philo, 1999), pp. 125–96; Christophe Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch: A Study in the Composition of the Book of Leviticus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 411.
3.
Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014), pp. 213–14; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. 1453. It has also been argued that Deut. 12:20–28 is a late stratum in D that seeks to reconcile the contradictions between the animal slaughter laws in Deut. 12:13–28 and Lev. 17. For more information, see Alexander Rofé, “The Book of Deuteronomy: A Summary,” in Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2002), pp. 1–8.
4.
Michael A. Lyons, From Law to Prophecy: Ezekiel’s Use of the Holiness Code (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), p. 59.
5.
Benjamin Kilchör, “The Direction of Dependence between the Laws of the Pentateuch,” ETL 89 (2013): p. 4.
6.
Kilchör, “Direction of Dependence,” p. 4.
7.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, p. 60.
8.
David M. Carr, for example, argues that intertextuality in Israelite literature may not always be “a process of visually consulting, citing, and interpreting separate written texts” (Writing on the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], p. 159.
9.
Meir Malul, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Legal Studies, AOAT (Kevelaer/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Butzon & Bercker/Neukirchener, 1990), pp. 89–91.
10.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, pp. 61–62, 65–66.
11.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, p. 61.
12.
David McLain Carr, “Method in Determination of Direction of Dependence: An Empirical Test of Criteria Applied to Exodus 34,11-26 and Its Parallels,” in Gottes Volk Am Sinai: UntersuchunGen. Zu Ex 32-34 Und Dtn 9-10, VeröffentlichunGen. Der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft Für Theologie (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, 2001), p. 126. Carr’s sixth criterion—a later text tends to combine linguistic phenomena from disparate strata of the Pentateuch—does not deal with expansion of source text. This criterion is not helpful in the case of Lev. 17 and Deut. 12:20–28 since the use of this criterion presupposes a certain kind of compositional model, which is avoided in this analysis.
13.
Carr, “Method,” p. 121.
14.
In his words, “Insbesondere in Diskussionen um die Abhängigkeitsrichtung zwischen H und D fällt auf, dass da, wo D kürzer ist als H, das Kriterium der Kürze oft ohne weitere Begründung als Beweis für das Abhängigkeitsgefälle von D nach H gebraucht wird, während umgekehrt da, wo H kürzer ist als D, vom Kriterium kein Gebrauch gemacht wird” (Benjamin Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora: Das Verhältnis von Deuteronomium 12-26 zu Exodus, Levitikus und Numeri, BZABR 21 [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015], p. 39).
15.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, p. 66.
16.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, p. 61.
17.
Carr, “Method,” p. 113.
18.
Carr, “Method,” p. 126.
19.
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, p. 61. Emphasis original.
20.
For example, the regulation on the disposal of sacrificial blood in Lev. 17:6 is part of the first category, whereas the corresponding regulation in Deut. 12:27b appears in the second category.
21.
The absence of an introduction in Deut. 12:20–28 may be explained by positing that this section is part of a larger literary unit (Deut. 12), which already has an introduction in 12:1.
22.
Although H presumes a central sanctuary, the notion that it advocates centralized worship that bans all other sanctuaries has been questioned, for example, by Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, pp. 1503–14.
23.
While it is apparent that Deut. 12 strictly prohibits multiple altars and sanctuaries, Lev. 17 is silent about the existence of other sanctuaries. This fact has led some scholars, for example Milgrom, to argue that Lev. 17 only prohibits multiple altars but still allows multiple sanctuaries. While this view is possible, it is unlikely since it is incomprehensible that a sanctuary would have no altar to perform ritual.
24.
According to Milgrom, the banning of profane slaughter is the legal innovation of Lev. 17 since centralization has been prescribed in the older priestly source (Leviticus 1-16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [New York: Doubleday, 1991], p. 29). Baruch J. Schwartz, however, rejects the idea that the ban on profane slaughter is H’s innovation since it is presupposed not only in H but also in P. According to him, instead of disagreeing on this issue, H “explicitly articulates a position maintained by P as well” (Baruch J. Schwartz, “‘Profane’ Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly Code,” HUCA 67 [1996]: p. 15). Cf. also John E. Hartley who rejects the idea that Lev. 17 deals with profane slaughter (Leviticus [Dallas: Word, 1992], p. 271).
25.
In her discussion on the prohibition of child sacrifice that appears in both D and H, Lauren A. S. Monroe explains the lack of the term mlk in D’s legislation on child sacrifice, despite its presence in H, as an indication that “a different set of intentions and concerns underlies the prohibitions in each text” (Josiah’s Reform and the Dynamics of Defilement: Israelite Rites of Violence and the Making of a Biblical Text [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], p. 36).
26.
Schwartz rejects the notion that Lev. 17 prohibits profane slaughter. According to him, “[Lev. 17] does not prohibit profane slaughter, because in the priestly view there is no such thing as profane slaughter. All slaughter of sacrificeable livestock is by definition a sacrifice, either to YHWH or to some other deity; it is never mere butchery” (“‘Profane’ Slaughter”, p. 23; emphasis original). Schwartz further argues that P only recognizes profane slaughter in the interim period before the establishment of the cult of Yahweh, namely when the central sanctuary had not existed. Nevertheless, this argument is doubtful since in places where a central sanctuary is assumed by P no prohibition against profane slaughter is found. Also, the theory that all slaughter was originally a sacrifice in ancient Israel has been criticized by Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, p. 1453.
27.
Jacob Milgrom, “Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11,” JBL 90 (1971): p. 155; This idea has been contested by Rolf Rendtorff, “Another Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11,” in Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), p. 27. Milgrom, however, defends his argument by pointing out that the use of the phrase “to shed blood” elsewhere in the Old Testament connotes the intentional murder of a human being, and blood shedding is considered legitimate when the expression is followed by the prepositions ‘el or ‘al (Leviticus 17-22, p. 1457); Cf. Meir Paran, Forms of the Priestly Style in the Pentateuch: Patterns, Linguistics Usages, Syntactic Structures (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1989), pp. 270–71.
28.
Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), p. 243.
29.
Nihan, From Priestly Torah, p. 411.
30.
Esias E. Meyer, “Leviticus 17, Where P, H, and D Meet: Priorities and Presuppositions of Jacob Milgrom and Eckart Otto,” in Current Issues in Priestly and Related Literature: The Legacy of Jacob Milgrom and Beyond (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), p. 364.
31.
Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 36–38. Levinson’s theory has been challenged by John Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 66. For Levinson’s rebuttal, see “Is the Covenant Code an Exilic Composition? A Response to John Van Seters,” in In Search of Pre-Exilic Israel: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar (London; New York: T&T Clark International, 2004), p. 299.
32.
Cf. Norman Henry Snaith, “Verbs Zābah and Sāhat,” VT 25 (1975): pp. 242–46.
33.
Jacob Milgrom, “Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of Deuteronomy,” HUCA 47 (1976): p. 1.
34.
Milgrom, “Profane Slaughter,” p. 15, n. 49.
35.
Levinson, Deuteronomy, p. 38.
36.
Here I follow the scholarly consensus that assigns Gen. 9:1–17 to the Priestly stratum. Cf. Erhard Blum, Studien Zur Komposition Des Pentateuch, Beiheft Zur Zeitschrift Für Die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 189 (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1990); Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), p. 104; Nihan, From Priestly Torah, pp. 61–63. Bill T. Arnold voices a dissenting opinion and contends that Gen. 9:1–17 should be assigned to H (“The Holiness Redaction of the Flood Narrative (Genesis 6:9–9:29),” in Windows to the Ancient World of the Hebrew Bible: Essays in Honor of Samuel Greengus, eds. Bill T. Arnold, Nancy L. Erickson, and John H. Walton [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014], pp. 28–35). Even if Arnold’s position is accepted, the conclusion that both Lev. 17 and Deut. 12 may have shared a common source and are not dependent on each other does not change.
37.
Schwartz, “‘Profane’ Slaughter,” p. 25; Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, p. 1461.
38.
As in the case of the use of זבח, in which D is aware of the cultic sense of the verb but deliberately chooses to alter its meaning, the use of שפך in this occasion does not necessarily indicate D’s ignorance of the meaning of זרק.
39.
Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 214. See also Moshe Weinfeld, The Place of the Law in the Religion of Ancient Israel (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 22; According to Michael Fishbane, the desacralization of ritual blood in Deuteronomy is based on the language of Lev. 17 (Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel [Oxford: Clarendon, 2004], p. 294, n. 665). Nevertheless, Fishbane’s assertion is questionable since, as pointed out earlier, the shared language between D and H may be attributed to the use of a common source, namely, Gen. 9:4–6.
40.
Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, p. 1461.
41.
This is what Lyons calls the criteria of awareness of context, namely, words that assume a fixed shape because of social setting. See Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, pp. 69–72.
42.
Meyer, “Leviticus 17,” p. 367.
43.
Weinfeld, Place of the Law, p. 80.
44.
It is plausible to argue that one text may parallel another text or a series of texts because of their shared socio-religious background without having to posit a direct textual dependency. One notable case is Laura Quick’s study of the relationship between Deuteronomy 28 and the ancient Near Eastern curses, in which she argues that “the curses of Deuteronomy 28 parallel those of the Aramaic epigraphs and the Neo-Assyrian treaty texts due to the reality of the ritual world of its authors, rather than because of any particular textual tradition at their disposal.” (Deuteronomy 28 and the Aramaic Curse Tradition [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018], p. 166; Emphasis original). Another noteworthy example is Monroe’s conclusion that the relationship between 2 Kgs 23 and H, which share certain common interests but lack linguistic conventions, is not due to a direct literary dependence but because “these two compositions appear to share a common socioreligious and intellectual orientation” (Josiah’s Reform, p. 43). These studies seem to confirm Carr’s hypothesis that intertextuality in ancient Israelite literature was more complex than simply a matter of direct literary dependency (Writing, p. 159).
