Abstract
Drawing on the arguments that hebel is the thesis of Ecclesiastes as well as Qoheleth’s rhetorical tool, this essay examines hebel’s connection with Qoheleth’s ambiguities and contradictions. Understanding hebel in terms of its basic meaning, that is, vapour, we argue that Qoheleth employs the image as his rhetorical strategy because of its opaque and fluctuating character. Being opaque, hebel is an ideal symbol for delineating phenomena which are ambiguous and hard to define. Coupled with its capacity for infinite change, the opacity allows hebel semantic inexhaustibility, making it a versatile device for describing the fluctuating nature of reality. As everything is opaque and in constant change, Qoheleth cannot offer advice in absolute terms and often ends up making contradictory statements.
The history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes has seen a long debate on numerous issues. Among others is the enigmatic hebel, a term that many consider the book’s thesis and which some think is Qoheleth’s rhetorical tool. 1 One question arising from these theories is: as the thesis, how programmatic is hebel for the rest of the book? Relevant to this question are two other issues debated in Qoheleth scholarship: the book’s ambiguities 2 and contradictions. 3 Though there has been much discussion about each of the three issues, their relationship has not been adequately explored. 4 Given that hebel is programmatic for the book, it is necessary to understand its connection with the latter two. We will begin with discussion of the interpretation of hebel in recent decades.
1. Understanding the Enigmatic Hebel
Ecclesiastes opens with this thesis statement: ‘hăbēl hăbālîm … hakkōl hābel’ (1.2). The word hebel (הבל) literally means ‘vapour’ or ‘breath’ 5 ; thus, literally, Qoheleth says, ‘Vapour of vapours … Everything is vapour’. The meaning of ‘vapour’ is elusive in many ways, as the scholarly discussions show below.
1.1 Different Approaches to Hebel
A plethora of meanings have been proposed for hebel, which is mainly translated as a single word: ‘vanity’ (ESV), ‘meaningless’ (NIV), ‘worthless’, ‘futile’, ‘absurd’, ‘transient’, and ‘ephemeral’. 6 The multiple translations betray the fact that the meaning of hebel is as elusive as its literal connotation suggests, and that it defies any attempt to confine it to a single meaning. Consequently, attempts to capture the meaning of ‘vapour’ have led to a ‘ballooning landscape of research’, 7 and even lively debates, as exemplified by the recent exchange of views between M. Sneed and M. V. Fox. For decades, many scholars have adopted Fox’s argument that hebel means ‘absurd’, 8 but recently Sneed has challenged the argument, which in turn has led to a response from Fox. Fox points out that Qoheleth’s use of hebel is unique, thus ‘absurd’ is a legitimate translation. 9 While noting the uniqueness of Qoheleth’s use of the term, Sneed contends that on lexical-semantic grounds hebel cannot mean ‘absurd’ because such a meaning is not found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. For Sneed, hebel means ‘futile’, or ‘worthlessness/worthless’, ‘for the majority of usages’. 10
Interestingly, despite their differences, both scholars agree that hebel in Ecclesiastes is used as a metaphor. 11 As such, their debate raises the question whether as a metaphor the significance of hebel can be exhausted by any single meaning, or more to the point, whether the uniqueness of Qoheleth’s use of hebel can be appreciated in semantic terms alone. These questions are not new, but were already raised as early as the turn of the last century. Many scholars argued that instead of taking it as a word, hebel was best taken as a metaphor or symbol. 12 Of interest is D. B. Miller’s argument that as a symbol, hebel is ‘an image which holds together a set of meanings, or “referents” that can neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed by any single meaning’. 13 For Miller, as a symbol, hebel holds three basic metaphorical senses: insubstantiality, transience, and foulness. 14 While this represents a big step forward, Miller’s proposal may not have exhausted what the symbol is capable of conveying, as we will show below.
1.2 A Proposed Approach to Hebel
The fuller significance of understanding hebel as symbol can be appreciated by drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s concept of symbolism. Ricoeur observes that symbols ‘are opaque’ and such ‘opacity constitutes the depth of the symbol, which, it will be said, is inexhaustible’. 15 This description is particularly apt for the hebel symbol, for vapour is inherently opaque, meaning unclear or ambiguous. We surmise that Qoheleth chooses ‘vapour’ as his programmatic symbol because of its ‘opacity’ the depth of which leads to ‘inexhaustibility’. Yet the inexhaustibility of ‘vapour’ is not just due to its opacity, but also to its incessant change. Being capable of constant change, vapour is a flexible (thus versatile) image to describe diverse phenomena. As such, not only is hebel incapable of being exhausted by a single meaning (as Miller correctly argues), but also by multiple meanings or referents. Such inexhaustibility is betrayed by the plethora of meanings and referents proposed in biblical scholarship. It is likely, as L. Wilson surmises, that the multiplicity of hebel’s meanings has been anticipated—in fact intended—by Qoheleth, so as to highlight the enigma of reality. 16
If this is correct, we propose to always keep the literal connotation of hebel (i.e., ‘vapour’) in mind. This is by no means to suggest that we translate the term as ‘vapour’ in all its occurrences, rather to always keep in mind the image and nature of ‘vapour’ wherever it occurs. 17 Interestingly, the two characteristics of hebel noted above have been subjects of interest in recent wisdom studies. Some scholars speak of the ceaseless change that it signifies, 18 while others focus on its ambiguous (‘vaporous’) character. Taking the latter view, Wilson notes that hebel is used to express the view that ‘reality is complex, ambiguous and enigmatic’. 19 Also, calling it a ‘lively tensive-symbol’, G. D. Salyer contends that hebel is chosen for its opacity so as to create ‘a definite sense of ambiguity regarding the book’s overall theme’. 20 Building on these views, below we will show the close connection between Qohelet’s hebel, his ambiguities, and the contradictions, which in turn will enhance our appreciation of Qoheleth’s hebel.
2. Vapour and Qoheleth’s Worldview
The thesis statement ‘Everything is vapour’ implies that vapour is the lens through which he views ‘everything’. This becomes evident when we examine the pairing of ‘vapour’ with ‘everything’. It is an intriguing pairing for the visual similarity of the respective Hebrew words: הבל and הכל. They are different by only one stroke in the respective middle consonant (ב versus כ). An interesting way of viewing the pairing has been proposed by J. Jarick, who suggested that we view them as one on top of the other, forming ‘the most compact form of parallelism to be found in the Hebrew Bible’. 21 If Jarick is correct, the compact parallelism may well intimate that ‘everything’ and ‘vapour’ are to be seen as inextricable from each other (i.e., ‘everything’ is ‘vapour,’ ‘vapour’ is ‘everything’). 22 More interestingly, the pairing intimates the fluidity of things: how things can change thanks to a minute ‘stroke’.
The question is, to what does ‘everything’ (הכל) refer? Commentators have either taken it as an all-encompassing term (referring to everything under the sun) 23 or a term with limited referents. 24 The strategic position of the remark may help clarify what ‘everything’ entails. The statement ‘Vapour of vapours. Everything is vapour’ occurs in 1.2 and 12.8, practically framing Qoheleth’s entire discourse. Between the two framing verses are the repetitive use of hebel, serving as a refrain which ‘unifies the entire book’. 25 For this reason, it is widely noted that hebel ‘shapes’ 26 and ‘guides’ 27 how the reader understands Qoheleth’s discourse. This being the case, the term ‘everything’ (hakkōl) should encompass every topic discussed within the frame. If so, every topic in Qoheleth’s discourse is expected to have the characteristics of vapour or should be viewed through those characteristics.
That this is the case is made evident in the following verses, where Qoheleth elaborates his hebel thesis by means of a question (1.3) and his cosmology (1.4-8). Both topics illustrate his worldview, which also serves as a commentary on the thesis statement ‘everything (hakkōl) is vapour’. He starts with the question if ‘every’ (hakkōl) human activity brings ‘profit’ (yitrôn, 1.3). The term yitrôn, which has been variously translated, 28 is one of the key words of Qoheleth’s discourse (it occurs 10 times in the book). It is a commercial term used by Qoheleth to evaluate if something is ‘good’ or ‘profitable’ (yōtēr) (e.g., 7.11). 29 The fact that the term comes on the heels of the thesis statement suggests that hebel is connected with the question about the ‘profit’ of what humanity does. 30 On the basis of the immediate context (esp. 1.4-8), scholars generally take it to be a rhetorical question which implies a negative answer. For instance, taking hebel to mean ‘futility’ or ‘illusion’, Sneed thinks that hebel is the antonym of yitrôn, and argues that the answer to 1.3 is futility. 31 By confining the meaning of hebel to the two words, Sneed misses the opportunity to bring out the rich significance of the symbol, especially the ambiguous character of ‘vapour’. As expected, such a limited definition results in seeing 1.3 as a rhetorical question.
Because of the many ambiguities in 1.4-8, Wilson and some others rightly question taking 1.3 as a rhetorical question. 32 To this argument we add that Qoheleth’s own remark in 1.2 challenges such a reading. If everything behaves like ‘vapour’ (i.e., is in a state of flux and ambiguous), it stands to reason that this question does not necessitate a ‘no’. Instead, it can be either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or sometimes ‘yes’ and at other times ‘no’, or even ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Put differently, just like vapour, the outcome of humans’ efforts is fluctuating and ambiguous, thus one will never know for sure.
The uncertainty is reinforced by Qoheleth’s observations regarding nature that follow immediately, the ‘cosmos poem’ in 1.4-8. 33 This section is widely noted to be the commentary on the thesis statement in 1.2 as well as the answer to the question in 1.3. 34 Relevant to our purposes are the natural analogies in 1.4-7. 35 Qoheleth points out that people and nature share a common phenomenon: they are dynamic and ceaselessly changing. To many commentators, the change is cyclical. 36 This notion is supported particularly by 1.6, in which the cyclical idea is heightened by the repetitive use of the root sbb (‘to turn’ or ‘go around’, once in 1.6a, thrice in 1.6b, c) and the presence of šub (‘to return’, 1.6c). 37
While the ceaseless change fits in well with the nature of vapour, the pattern, however, may not be as straightforward as it seems. As recent scholarship has noted, behind the seemingly repetitive and cyclical change is a picture replete with ambiguity. First, does ‘generation’ (dôr, 1.4a) refer to a period of time, or generations of people or cycles of nature? The ambiguity has led to different interpretations. D. N. Freedman, J. Lundbom, and R. N. Whybray think it means periods of time; 38 but quite a number of exegetes argue that it refers to generations of people. 39 G. S. Ogden, in light of the ‘earth’ in 1.4b, contends that the word means cycles of nature; 40 but J. Crenshaw argues that it encompasses both nature and people. 41 Likewise, some scholars take ‘earth’ (hā’āres, 1.4b) to mean the physical earth, but for M. V. Fox it refers to humanity as a whole (le monde). 42
The connection between 1.a and 1.4b is also obscured by the problematic (multivalent) conjunction waw. 43 One may take it as an adversative waw, 44 thus seeing the latter (the unchanging ‘earth’) as a contrast to the former (the ever-changing ‘generations’): ‘but the earth stands forever’ (1.4b). 45 However, the conjunction may also mean ‘while’ (thus non-contrasting). 46 The different readings of the conjunction lead to different readings of the verse. If the conjunction is adversative, both ‘generations’ and ‘the earth’ are the focus of attention; if it is not, the earth will just be the backdrop for the moving generations. Even an adversative reading can lead to different meanings. Some have read it as a contrast between the transitory generations and the permanence of the earth, 47 while others have taken it as intending a contrast between the constant change of ‘generations’ and the unchanging earth. 48 Given the indeterminacy of the text, apparently the analogy is capable of having more than one meaning.
The seemingly repetitive (thus cyclical) change of the sun is not free from ambiguity either. At issue is the intended meaning of the participle šô’ēp. Does the sun pant in exhaustion (or in pain, as in Isa. 42.14 and Jer. 14.6) or does it move eagerly (as in Job 7.2 and Ps. 119.131; cf. 19.6)? Most commentators understand the former; 49 but in keeping with his positive view of Qoheleth in general, Whybray contends for the latter. 50 The context has little to offer about Qoheleth’s intent, thus it can go either way.
Ambiguity also arises from the syntax of 1.6: what is the subject of this verse, what is ‘going’ (hlk) between the south and the north? The verbs of the first two clauses (1.6a) have no subject, so the subject is left open: it could either be the sun in 1.5a or the wind at the end of 1.6b. The majority of commentators argue for the latter. 51 But some other scholars contest this majority view. Appealing to ancient Jewish interpreters, S. Japhet claims that the sun is the subject of all the verbs in 1.6, and in doing so, she has to take the wind in 1.6c to mean the ‘spirit’ of the sun. 52 In the same vein, S. Weeks observes that the absence of a subject in the first two clauses ‘would usually lead us to take as implicit the preceding subject—the sun.’ 53 Such a reading is not to be discounted, considering that the Soph pasuq that marks the end of 1.5 was not added till much later in the transmission of the text and thus it is possible that before the Masoretic punctuation, 1.6 was once part of 1.5. However, one may counter such an argument by seeing here a literary technique in Hebrew poetry. As some scholars have noted, the subject (assuming it is the wind) is intentionally delayed, so as to let the reader think it is the sun that turns round and round, only to surprise them with the ‘real’ subject (the wind) at the end (1.6c). 54 Thus we concur with Weeks that we need ‘to recognize an ambiguity’ in this verse. 55
The most discussed ambiguity of the poem is 1.7, whose reading is complicated by the obscure ‘el-mĕqôm šehannĕhālîm hōlkîm. The obscurity in part is due to the relative particle še, which may indicate a point of departure (‘from’) or arrival (‘to’). Depending on one’s reading, the phrase may mean ‘to the place from which the streams go’ (if so, the motion is repetitive/cyclical) or ‘to the place to which streams go’ (meaning the streams constantly flow forward into the sea). 56 The problem is compounded by the uncertainty of the expression šābîm of the šābîm + lālāket construct: does it mean ‘return’ or ‘do something once again’? 57
As a result of these ambiguities, the text is open to two readings: the flow of the streams is either repetitive (between their origins and the sea) or one-directional (from their origins to the sea). Taking šābîm to mean ‘return’, many exegetes posit the former. 58 This argument is usually built on the understanding that the preceding analogies are cyclical (and especially the repetitive use of šûb in 1.6). 59 This interpretation, however, is not without difficulties. As Weeks points out, such a reading cannot be sustained without emending the text (i.e., adding the preposition min [‘from’] to the relative particle še), which is not supported by the ancient versions of Ecclesiastes. 60 Besides, it also runs counter to common sense, for we know that no streams ‘flow’ back to their origins. For these and other reasons, some scholars posit the view that the flow is continuous. 61
While the emendation problem is certainly a difficulty, the ‘common-sense’ problem can be explained by the ancient Near East worldview. The author may have had an ancient version of the hydrological cycle in mind (the origins of streams and the seas were connected by subterranean water tunnels, and water flowed to and fro between them), 62 but we are unsure if this is indeed on the mind of the author. Nevertheless, the other interpretation is not without challenge either. The view that the streams flow forward is complicated by the argument that šābîm lālāket means ‘return’ rather than ‘flow again’. 63 In sum, the divided opinions noted above betray the indeterminacy of the text, so T. Krüger is correct to observe that one can draw either notion from the text. 64
3. Vapour as Rhetorical Strategy and Reality
While one may argue that the preceding ambiguities are unintentional (i.e., the author was unaware of them), 65 for many scholars they constitute a rhetorical strategy. J. J. Lavoie argues that the ambiguities are Qoheleth’s ‘stratégie rhétorique’, 66 while Salyer calls it Qoheleth’s ‘rhetorical ambiguity’, meaning ‘a literary design which frustrates the reader in such a way that the “whole truth” is never disclosed in any satisfactory way’. 67 For Wilson, the ambiguities are not merely a rhetorical device, but also a reflection of reality. Calling it Qoheleth’s ‘artful ambiguity’, Wilson views the literary device as reflective of Qoheleth’s realization that ‘life is ambiguous, enigmatic’. 68
Wilson’s argument finds support in 1.7, as ‘the streams analogy’ may well reflect Qoheleth’s struggle with ambiguities in general. Understanding life is as difficult as knowing why streams never fill the sea. The language is made obscure in order to leave the reader to wonder: ‘Is it because the streams flow back or flow forward?’ Qoheleth’s answer would be: ‘Well, who knows?’ Such would also be the answer to the question in 1.3. As a matter of fact, such uncertainty appears throughout Qoheleth’s discourse, as he repeatedly asks: ‘Who knows?’ (mî yôdēa’, 2.19; 3.21; 6.12a; 8.1) 69 and ‘Who can tell?’ (6.12b; 8.7b; 10.14).
While we agree with Wilson’s argument that ambiguity is indeed a rhetorical strategy and a reflection of reality, we would further argue that rhetorical ambiguity is bound up with Qoheleth’s rhetoric of hebel. Interestingly, as Ingram’s study shows, in terms of its distribution, the second highest frequency of the appearance of hebel occurs in chapter 1 (six times), second only to chapter 2 (nine times). 70 One may say that Qoheleth’s worldview is virtually ‘replete’ with hebel, or ‘shrouded’ in the mist of hebel, harking back to the הבל and הכל construct (1.2) that intrigued us earlier. Taken together, all this implies that ambiguities (and the ensuing enigma) are an integral part of the hebel world, and that hebel is the best rhetorical tool for delineating that world.
4. Vapour and Qoheleth’s Contradictions
We will now turn to the connection between Qoheleth’s rhetorical strategy and the much-debated contradictions. 71 Quite a few modern scholars ascribe the contradictions to multiple authors, 72 while some attribute them to voices imagined by a single author, 73 and still others think that they arise from Qoheleth’s quotations. 74 Others, however, ascribe the contradictions to Qoheleth’s concept of reality; they are a reflection of either Qoheleth’s perception of the antitheses of life, 75 or two opposite forces in nature, 76 or two ‘antinomies’ that are ‘equally valid but contradictory principles’ 77 or a ‘polar strategy’ to rebut traditional wisdom. 78 While each of these theories has shed some light on the contradictions, our interest is in the views that attribute the contradictions to Qoheleth’s perception of reality. We will argue below that they are more than just mechanical antitheses, antinomies, or polarities. This will become evident once we reexamine the contradictions together with Qoheleth’s rhetoric of hebel as proposed earlier in this essay.
4.1 Contradictions as Part and Parcel of the Hebel World
It is worth noting that discussions of Qoheleth’s contradictions have not adequately explored the connection between the contradictions, hebel as symbol, and Qoheleth’s rhetorical strategy. While Sneed, drawing on Miller, takes hebel as Qoheleth’s rhetorical tool, he does not view the contradictions as contradictions, but as a rhetorical process to ‘destabilize’ the assumptions of traditional wisdom. 79 Certainly, a few scholars do see a connection between hebel and its ambiguity, but treat it only in passing. 80
E. M. Good is closer to the point we will make here, as he notices the association between hebel and irony. As he avers: ‘Qoheleth uses the term hebel to mean something very close to “irony” and “ironic”’ 81 and to ‘point out incongruities’. 82 By ‘irony’ Good means an incongruity ‘between “is” and “ought.”’ 83 One of Good’s examples is ‘It is incongruous that wise and fool, good and bad, pious and impious, come to the same destiny’. 84 But strictly speaking, many of Qoheleth’s contradictions are distinct from such ‘incongruities’. Rather than just a disjunction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, they generate a dissonance between affirmation and negation. In other words, it is a disharmony between ‘A is so’ and ‘A is not so’. For instance, while Qoheleth says wisdom ‘is’ profitable at one place (7.12), he says it ‘is not’ profitable elsewhere (9.11).
Crenshaw’s recent discussion is more helpful, as he directly links Qoheleth’s contradictions to hebel. He proposes that the contradictions are ‘a rhetorical strategy suggesting hebel’. 85 Taking hebel to mean ‘futile’, Crenshaw contends that hebel signifies a universe without rationality, and as such it gives rise to Qoheleth’s ‘tenuous conclusions’. 86 We will build on Crenshaw’s observation, but continue the discussion in a slightly different direction. Instead of taking hebel to mean ‘futile’, we will turn our attention to the basic character of vapour: incessantly changing and ambiguous. We argue that instead of illustrating ‘futility’, the contradictions are part of Qoheleth’s rhetorical strategy to highlight the fluctuating and opaque character of the hebel world. As a programmatic symbol, it should be expected that hebel and its characteristics (1.4-7) might be reflected in Qoheleth’s wise sayings. 87 Being in a state of flux, things in the hebel world guarantee no fixed effects, thus they allow no fixed maxims. Realizing this fact, Qoheleth cannot give advice in absolute terms, but only utter the opposite as circumstances call for, resulting in contradictions. That this is the case will be demonstrated by some examples below. These selected examples are chosen because they involve the key themes of Qoheleth’s discourse: wisdom, enjoyment, and theodicy. Therefore, though not exhaustive, they illustrate well how his rhetoric of hebel works on the representative concepts in his discourse.
4.2 The Hebel of Wisdom
If in the book’s opening Qoheleth asks, ‘Is there any profit (yitrôn) in the hebel world?’ (1.3), with regard to wisdom, he begins by answering yes: Wisdom is good with inheritance and profitable (yōtēr) to those who see the sun (7.11)
However, he continues with an intriguing saying: For wisdom is a shadow (ṣēl) as money is a shadow (ṣēl) The profit (yitrôn) of knowledge is that wisdom preserves the life of its possessor (7.12)
While the second line (7.12b) may reinforce the positive assessment of wisdom in 7.11, the notion is complicated by the obscure term ṣēl in the first line (7.12a). The term ṣēl is open to different readings and has been translated alternatively as ‘shadow’ 88 or ‘protection’. 89 Readers who are familiar with Qoheleth’s ambiguity may ‘smell’ hebel here: does he mean ‘money is protection’ or ‘money is shadow’? In fact, it can go either way. In light of the remark ‘wisdom preserves the life of its possessor’, ṣēl may mean ‘protection’; yet the close association between vapour and shadow would lead one to think ṣēl means ‘shadow’ (e.g., 6.12). Read in light of the ambiguity implied in 1.3 noted earlier, Qoheleth may have left the meaning ambiguous. We concur therefore with Seow that the ambiguity is intentional, to show that ‘many words are elusive, like wind (hebel)’. 90 If this is correct, what Qoheleth says in 7.11-12 is: the profit of wisdom is ambiguous, as it can be either positive or negative.
The hebel of wisdom, as it were, displays a different characteristic in 2.12-14. Instead of ambiguity, it demonstrates its fluctuating nature. Qoheleth turns to wisdom (ḥokmâ, 2.12) and finds profit (yitrôn) in it (2.13). Yet the profit is in a state of flux, because upon death the wise is no better than the fool, thus the profit is cancelled out (2.14b-16). Qoheleth calls such an experience hebel: ‘this is also hebel’ (2.15).
The observation of the foregoing vapour-like behaviour may also explain Qoheleth’s other contradictions. Elsewhere, without using the term hebel, Qoheleth points out the ambiguous nature of wisdom: food is not to the wise, nor wealth to the intelligent, nor favour to the knowledgeable (9.11c-e)
91
In keeping with the ambiguity of wisdom’s profit mentioned in 7.11-12, here the sage states that being wise (ḥākām), intelligent (byn), or knowledgeable (yd’) does not necessarily bring the expected profit. Notice that he does not say that wisdom certainly brings no profit, but that it does not necessarily bring profit, because he soon associates the profit of wisdom with ‘time (‘ēt) and event (pega’)’ (9.11f). 92 This implies that if the time is right, wisdom may bring profit. Nevertheless, in Qoheleth’s theology, ‘time’, like hebel, is an elusive variable, as he elaborates in the immediately following line: ‘because humankind does not know their time (‘ēt)’ (9.12a). This harks back to what Qoheleth reveals in the ‘catalogue of time’ (3.1-8). While God ‘has made everything (hakkōl) beautiful in its time (‘ēt)’ (3.11a), both his actions and timing are elusive: ‘humankind cannot find out what God has done (āśāh) from the beginning to the end’ (3.11c). 93
The in-flux nature of wisdom is elaborated upon further in the story of a wise man in 9.13-15. The fact that this man is wise but poor implies that wisdom has not brought him the expected profit (echoing 9.11c-e). This state of wisdom changes when peacetime changes to wartime. His wisdom proves its worth when he saves the town by it (9.15a). Yet when peacetime returns, nobody remembers him (9.15b). Qoheleth sums up the fluctuating nature of wisdom by two contradictory remarks; though he says “wisdom is better than might’ (having yitrôn, 9.16a), he also says ‘the wisdom of the poor man is despised’ (having no yitrôn, 9.16b). These remarks are contradictory in that Qoheleth affirms that both are correct, though each is correct in its specific time. The story in 9.13-15 is significant because it shows how the fluctuating nature of hebel contributes to Qoheleth’s contradiction in 9.16 in particular, and perhaps his contradictions in general. The nature of hebel simply does not allow him to offer a fixed assessment, but only a specific assessment at a specific time.
A similarly fluctuating phenomenon is found in Qoheleth’s comment on the effect of wisdom. He states that wisdom makes the wise’s face shine and changes a ‘hard’ face (we’ōz pānâw yešunne’, 8.1b), and taken together they may imply cheerfulness. 94 If cheerfulness is the yitrôn of wisdom, the yitrôn is in a state of flux; because elsewhere, Qoheleth points out that an increase of wisdom does not necessarily mean an increase of cheerfulness; quite the contrary, as wisdom increases, so do grief and pain (1.18). 95 Qoheleth describes such experience as ‘striving after the wind’ (1.16-17), a natural force that is as fluctuating as vapour. 96
4.3 The Hebel of Enjoyment
We will now turn to Qoheleth’s contradictory remarks on enjoyment. To understand these contradictions, it is necessary to become familiar with his vocabulary. Qoheleth’s vocabulary for enjoyment (e.g., śimhâ and śāmēaḥ) and its metaphors (such as eating and drinking) are closely associated with the term ‘good’ (tôb or tôbâ), so much so that ‘good’ seems to be a term bound up with enjoyment, as reflected in expressions such as ‘look into good’ (2.1), ‘see good’ (2.24; 3.13), ‘do good’ (3.12), ‘find good’ (5.17, ET 5.18), and ‘be in good’ (7.14). 97 For Qoheleth, enjoyment is ‘good’ because it is a gift from God, a point he repeatedly makes in the book (2.26; 3.13; 5.18 [ET 5.19]). In his theology, everything God has created is ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ (yāpeh, 3.11). So the sage declares, ‘Look, what I find good (tôb) and beautiful (yāpeh) is to eat and drink and find good … which God has given him’ (5.17, ET 5.18).
Also related to the idea of ‘good’ is yitrôn. At times Qoheleth defines yitrôn by whether something is ‘good’ (tôb). Naturally, the opposite of ‘good’ (i.e., bad, rā’ or rā’â) is considered the antonym of yitrôn. For instance, wisdom is called ‘good’ (tôbâ, 7.11), thus considered profitable (yitrôn, 7.12). On the contrary, giving up one’s hard-earned achievements is bad (rā’â, 5.15a, ET 5.16a) and has no yitrôn (5.15b, ET 5.16b). It is helpful to keep all these words (tôb, yitrôn, rā’ or rā’â) in mind as we examine Qoheleth’s contradictory views on enjoyment, because they are part of Qoheleth’s rhetorical strategy to delineate the hebel nature of enjoyment.
In Qoheleth’s discourse, even a ‘good’ gift of God such as enjoyment is subject to the nature of hebel. In 2.1-11, he intends to ascertain whether enjoyment is ‘good’ (tôb, i.e., if it has yitrôn, 2.1b). But immediately he announces, ‘Look, it was also hebel’ (2.1c). In fact, the discourse on enjoyment is framed by two references to hebel (2.1c and 2.11c), mirroring the hebel-frame of the whole book (1.2 and 12.8). The framing signals quite clearly that the ‘good’ of enjoyment is subject to hebel. By hebel, here Qoheleth means ‘no yitron’, as he qualifies hebel with the phrase ‘there is no yitrôn’ (2.11d).
However, as noted, the fluctuating nature of hebel allows no cast-in-stone advice. In the very passage he declares that enjoyment is hebel and without profit, Qoheleth recommends enjoyment. Matching his remark ‘there is no profit’ (‘ên yitrôn) (2.11) is the advice ‘There is nothing better (‘ên tôb) for a person than to eat and drink and find enjoyment (tôb, lit. “good”) in his toil’ (2.24ab). More ironically, the ên yitrôn in 2.11 is matched with four occurrences of tôb (two in 2.24, two in 2.26).
As has been widely noted, the remark in 2.24 is the first of Qoheleth’s seven calls to enjoyment, which, taken together, leads Whybray to call him the ‘Preacher of Joy’. 98 Whybray correctly observes that the reason for the call to enjoyment varies from one context to another; however, he does not link the variation to the fluctuating nature of hebel. 99 Ironically, the very reason for advising enjoyment is also hebel; for prior to the commendation of enjoyment (2.24) are the repeated complaints that life is hebel (2.21-23). As it turns out, the very call to enjoyment is driven by the nature of hebel. Each of his commendations of enjoyment is occasioned by the ‘effects’ of hebel, such as the unfathomability of reality (3.11) or the uncertainty of retribution (which he called ‘hebel’, 8.13-15) or the inevitable change from life to death (3.19-22; 5.14 [ET 5.15]; 9.5-10; 11.8-12.7). Enigmatically, Qoheleth’s discourse of enjoyment shows the ever-changing character of hebel: one hebel phenomenon (such as the unfathomability of reality or death) drives him to another hebel phenomenon (i.e., enjoyment), which has already been found hebel earlier (2.11). This being the case, the argument that enjoyment is invalidated by hebel is imprecise; 100 rather, enjoyment is part of the incessant change from one hebel phenomenon to another, just like the nature of vapour.
The ever-changing nature of the hebel world is further illustrated by the fact that enjoyment is not an absolute prescription for every hebel phenomenon. At times, what Qohelet finds better is quite different: It is better to go to a house of mourning than to go to a house of feasting. because it is the end of all humankind and the living set their hearts to it (7.2)
The argument that Qoheleth’s ‘only’ advice for facing death is enjoyment
101
fails to consider this passage. While it is true that Qoheleth repeatedly employs the ‘better than’ formula to recommend enjoyment (e.g., 2.24; 3.12, 22; 8.15),
102
here he uses the same formula but breaks the pattern. Far from being mechanical, when confronted with the reality of death, instead of enjoyment, he advises reflection, as he remarks, ‘because it is the end of all humankind and the living set their hearts to it’ (7.2c, d).
103
Likewise, confronted with the same reality, he prefers sadness to laughter (an expression of enjoyment), because it is good for the heart: Sadness is better than laughter, for a face of sadness is good for the heart (7.3)
This recommendation is perplexing not only because it is the opposite of Qoheleth’s repeated calls to enjoyment, but also because it makes a fool out of those who heed these calls. Indeed, Qoheleth puts it succinctly (and rather shockingly): The heart of the wise is with the house of mourning, The heart of the fool is with the house of enjoyment (7.4)
Here reflection is made a distinguishing mark of the wise, while enjoyment and laughter are characteristic of the fool, as Qoheleth clarifies: Because like the crackling of thorns under the pot, so is the laughter of the fool (7.6ab)
Interestingly, commentators who see the connection between Qoheleth’s calls to enjoyment and death have left out the fluctuating phenomenon in their discussions. 104 Instead, Fox explains that commendations of enjoyment are just a temporary diversion from the harsh realities of life, and being cognizant of death is Qoheleth’s real attitude. 105 We argue that for Qoheleth, enjoyment is an integral element of life rather than a temporary diversion; for repeatedly he refers to enjoyment as humankind’s ‘portion/reward (ḥeleq)’ for their labour under the sun (2.10; 3.22; 5.17-18 [ET 5.18-19]; 9.9), 106 and for this very reason he offers the repeated calls to enjoyment. Therefore, there may be another reason for Qoheleth’s contradiction in 7.2-4, and the reason may well be part of his hebel strategy. The contradiction arises from his intention to show that everything is ‘vapour’; therefore, he cannot offer fixed advice.
This foregoing argument finds support in the fact that his contradiction is followed immediately by another hebel formula: ‘This is also hebel’ (7.6c). It is likely, as Krüger notes, that hebel here refers to the immediately foregoing verse (7.6ab) or all the preceding verses (7.1-6ab). 107 The former would mean that the fool is deemed hebel (for their pursuit of enjoyment and laughter in the face of death); whereas the latter would mean both the wise and the fool are hebel. The first reading is complicated by Qoheleth’s earlier assertion that death cancels out any difference between the wise and the fool, which he also deems hebel (2.14-15). In light of this assertion, it can be argued that hebel refers to both the wise (and reflection) and the fool (and enjoyment). More precisely, given his overall rhetoric of ambiguity, there is good reason to think that the phrase ‘This is also hebel’ in 7.6 is a veiled reminder that what reflection or enjoyment will turn out to be is like vapour; it is in a state of flux and obscure to humankind. In other words, Qoheleth reminds the reader not to jump to the conclusion, for the final verdict on reflection or enjoyment remains open.
If this is correct, the ambiguity also suggests that at this point Qoheleth becomes ambivalent regarding whether, when faced with death, one should opt for enjoyment or reflection. The ambivalence may well anticipate his ‘two-prong’ approach to death later. As some interpreters observe, toward the end of his discourse, Qoheleth advises both enjoyment and reflection as a way to face the inevitable death (11.7-12.8). 108
4.4 The Hebel of Divine Justice
Qoheleth also applies his rhetoric of hebel to divine justice. Frequently, he expresses a belief in God’s justice, as he warns the reader: ‘know that for all these things God will bring you to judgement’ (11.9c). His idea of divine justice is similar to the action-consequence nexus in the Israelite wisdom tradition: God gives one their due (e.g., Prov. 10.4, 26, and 26.20). So those who fail to fulfill their vows to God will incur divine wrath (5.5; ET 5.6). Typical of the wisdom tradition, premature death is one of the manifestations of theodicy (e.g., Prov. 10.27), as Qoheleth warns: Be not overly wicked, neither be a fool; why should you die before your time? (7.17)
However, as has been noted, at times Qoheleth contradicts the conviction by pointing out some anomalies. He observes that a righteous person dies in his righteousness (presumably prematurely), but a wicked person enjoys longevity despite his wickedness (7.15). Elsewhere, while he affirms that the wicked will not live long (8.13), in the same breath he says the righteous gets the consequence of the wicked, while the wicked enjoys the reward of the righteous (8.14).
As with many of his contradictions, these are also inseparable from hebel. Qoheleth begins the anomaly in 7.15 by telling the reader that it happens in his ‘days of hebel’ (bîmê hěblî) (7.15a). The construct form of hebel is read as a construct noun (e.g., ‘vanity’ KJV, ESV), or as an adjective (‘meaningless’, NIV; ‘ephemeral’, ‘fleeting’, or ‘brief’) by some commentators. 109 It is more helpful, however, to keep the basic character of hebel in mind. Faced with the anomaly, Qoheleth ascribes to divine retribution characteristics common to things in ‘days of hebel’; that is, constant change and ambiguity.
Such reading of the hebel in 7.15 would make better sense of the following contradictory remarks: Be not overly righteous, neither be overly wise; why should you destroy yourself? Be not overly wicked, neither be a fool; why should you die before your time? (7.16-17)
The significance of the remarks has been debated among scholars. 110 Relevant to the issue at hand is the view that these remarks represent the golden mean. 111 This argument finds support in the fact that similar ideas are found in the works of other ancient Near East cultures, such as the Proverbs of Ahiqar. 112
Some have taken the golden mean as a warning against the hubris of excessive righteousness or wisdom, 113 but we argue for a more pragmatic interpretation. In light of Qoheleth’s ambivalence in 7.1-6 and 11.8-12.7 noted earlier, there is good reason to think that Qoheleth recommends a play-it-safe attitude here. As divine retribution is like the constantly changing vapour, the consequence of righteousness or wickedness is uncertain. Righteousness can bring either longevity or premature death; likewise, wickedness can cause either longevity or premature death. Furthermore, because it is opaque, one will never know which way things may go. As such, it is best not to practice only one but both and in moderation, as Qoheleth explicitly states in the immediate context: ‘It is good that you grasp this and not let go of the other’ (7.18ab). Probably the ‘this’ and ‘other’ refer to the two pieces of advice in 7.16-17, 114 so as to reinforce moderation. Such a flexible attitude is in keeping with the fluctuating nature of vapour. In effect, Qoheleth’s advice is ‘Living in the days of vapour, one should move with vapour’.
The hebel connection with Qoheleth’s contradiction is even more conspicuous in 8.13-14. The contradiction is ‘bracketed’ by the thematic refrain ‘gam-zĕh hābĕl’ (this is also vapour) (8.10 and 8.14). This is another example of Qoheleth’s rhetoric of hebel, implying that the issue is to be viewed through the lens of hebel. Already, we notice some ‘vaporous’ character in his expressions as the discussion begins (8.10). The second clause of the MT is made ambiguous by the absence of a locative adverb: ‘the wicked are buried’ (qbr) (8.10b), which is followed by the third clause, ‘they came (bw’) and went (hlk) to the holy place’ (8.10c). Though many commentators view 8.10c as separate from 8.10b (thus disconnecting the wicked’s burial from the holy place), in fact, the syntax is uncertain. As the MT stands, it is possible that the 3 mp of bw’ (‘they’) in 8.10c refers to the ‘wicked’ in the preceding clause. If so, the locative adverb is the holy place, which means the wicked are buried in the holy place.
The LXX translator, however, separated the two clauses by adding an adverb (τάφους, ‘tombs’) to 10.8b and changing the verb qbr to εἰσαχθέντας (‘brought’): εἰς τάφους εἰσαχθέντας (‘brought into the tombs’). In doing so, the LXX disconnects the burial of the wicked from the holy place in the subsequent clause. Following the LXX, some modern commentators view 8.10c as a separate clause and even emend qbr (‘buried’)’ to qrb (‘approach’): ‘the wicked are approaching and entering the holy place’; 115 in this way they avoid the burial issue completely.
If the MT is correct (which is supported by the Vulgate, Peshitta, and Targum), we have another case of injustice here. The wicked are not only ‘accorded proper burial’, 116 they are also buried in a ‘holy place’. 117 Nevertheless, because of the ambiguity of the text, one cannot tell for certain. 118 If such opacity is deliberate, the ending phrase of this verse (‘this is also hebel’, 8.10e) should mean ‘this is also misty’, instead of what is generally thought. 119 In short, divine justice is ambiguous to Qoheleth.
If divine justice is ambiguous in 8.10, it is ambiguous as well as fluctuating in the following verses. While at first Qoheleth says that it is good to fear God (8.12) and the wicked will not live long (8.13), in the immediate verse he shifts to the opposite: the righteous receives the consequence of the wicked, and the wicked enjoys the reward of the righteous (8.14).
Based on 8.11, Fox notes that despite his firm belief in God’s justice, Qoheleth recognizes that retribution is contingent upon God’s timing. 120 This is corroborated by Qoheleth’s remark about time: ‘God will judge the righteous and the wicked, for there is a time for every matter and for every deed’ (3.17). Apparently, Qoheleth sees this as a problem. When God’s time is slow to arrive, it emboldens the wicked, as he comments, ‘When the sentence of an evil deed is not carried out, therefore the hearts of the people are filled with evil doing’ (8.11).
While Fox is correct that the contradiction arises from the timing of divine judgment, it is important to view the timing in light of its hebel framing noted earlier (8.10, 14): like vapour, God’s timing is shrouded in opacity. God has made everything beautiful in its time (3.11a), ‘yet humans cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end’ (3.11c). So while divine retribution is dependable (3.17), the opacity of God’s timing allows wickedness to occur in the place of justice (3.16). Qoheleth concludes his discussion of divine justice in 8.13-14 by reiterating what he has already mentioned in 3.11c, that God’s retribution is opaque to humans: ‘I saw all God’s work, no human being can find out what is done under the sun. Despite all their efforts to search it out, humans cannot discover. Even if a wise man claims he knows, he cannot really comprehend it’ (8.17).
5. Conclusion
In this essay, we have taken a fresh look at Qoheleth’s programmatic term hebel. Taking it literally (‘vapour’), we read hebel as a symbol in Qoheleth’s discourse. We argue that Qoheleth employs the symbol as his rhetorical strategy because of its opaque and fluctuating character. Being opaque, hebel’s is an ideal symbol for delineating phenomena that are ambiguous and hard to define. Coupled with hebel’s character as ceaselessly changing, the opacity facilitates hebel’s semantic inexhaustibility, making it a versatile device for describing various states of fluctuating reality. As such, hebel is not just multivalent, but also multi-function and thus an effective rhetorical strategy for Qoheleth’s purposes.
Our discussion has demonstrated the effectiveness of this rhetoric of hebel in delineating the hebel world. In the hebel world, ‘everything’ behaves like ‘vapour’, ambiguous and always in a state of flux, such as Qoheleth’s experiences with wisdom, enjoyment, and divine justice. Given their vapour-like character, the experiences do not allow for explanations or advice in absolute terms. For this reason, Qoheleth turns to hebel as a rhetorical strategy. This explains why this sage changes his mind on the themes noted above, resulting in the widely noted contradictions. Our analysis of the rhetorical strategy also reveals that Qoheleth’s contradictions are not necessarily mechanical patterns of ‘antitheses’, ‘antinomies’, or reflections of a ‘polar strategy’ (contra what some scholars have argued). In Qoheleth’s rhetoric of hebel, life defies any fixed pattern of ‘either/or’ or ‘yes/but’. While such patterns may appear at times, at other times life is also a matter of ‘both/and’, 121 at yet another time just ‘yes’, and at yet another time ‘no’. In sum, ‘everything is hebel’, in flux and opaque.
Footnotes
Author’s Note
Samuel T. S. Goh is now affiliated to Brisbane School of Theology, Australia.
1.
As M. V. Fox (A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999], p. 163) argues, hebel is ‘a thesis that we can expect to see validated in the following monologue’. Drawing on D. B. Miller, M. R. Sneed notes that hebel is a rhetorical tool against traditional wisdom; see M. R. Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism in Ecclesiastes: A Social-Science Perspective (SBLAIL 12; Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2012), pp. 170-75.
2.
Representative of such interest are L. Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1-11: A Wisdom Technique?’, in Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, ed. A. Schoors, pp. 357-65 (BETL; Leuven: Peeters, 1998); and D. Ingram, ‘Riddled with Ambiguity: Ecclesiastes 7:23-8:1 as an Example’, in The Words of the Wise Are Like Goads: Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century, ed. M. J. Boda et al., pp. 219-40 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013).
3.
M. V. Fox has devoted two books to the subject: Qoheleth and His Contradictions (BLS, 18; Decatur, GA: Almond, 1989) and A Time to Tear Down and A Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). Also see M. Rose, ‘Qohéleth, le maître: Compréhension de l’univers et compréhension de soi’, Variations herméneutiques 3 (1995), pp. 3-22. Recently, see F. J. Backhaus, ‘Kohelet und die Ironie: vom Umgang mit Widersprüchen durch die Kunst der Ironie’, BN 101 (2000), pp. 29-55; and S. Ramond, ‘Ya-t-il de l’ironie dans le livre de Qohélet?’, VT 60 (2010), pp. 621-40.
4.
Though recently J. Crenshaw (Qoheleth: The Ironic Wink [Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2013], pp. 30-32) discusses the relationship between hebel and Qoheleth’s contradictions, as will be shown, Qoheleth has more to offer than what his brief treatment reveals.
5.
K. Seybold, ‘הֶבֶל, hebhel’, TDOT 3:313-20.
6.
For a recent survey of its interpretation history, see R. L. Meek, ‘Twentieth- and Twenty-First-Century Readings of Hebel (הֶבֶל) in Ecclesiastes’, CBR 14.3 (2016), pp. 279-97; and Meek, ‘The Meaning of הבל in Qoheleth: An Intertextual Suggestion’, in The Words of the Wise Are Like Goads: Engaging Qoheleth in the 21st Century, ed. M. J. Boda et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), pp. 241-45. See also D. B. Miller, ‘Qohelet’s Symbolic Use of הבל’, JBL 117 (1998), pp. 437-54; and his fuller discussion in Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes: the Place of Hebel in Qohelet’s Work (SBLAB 2; Leiden: Brill, 2002), esp. pp. 91-156.
7.
Meek, ‘Twentieth- and Twenty-First-Century Readings of Hebel in Ecclesiastes’, p. 291.
8.
Fox (Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 31, 185) argues that ‘absurdity’ is the best translation for hebel. J. Crenshaw (Ecclesiastes [OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987], pp. 58, 70) uses ‘futile’ and ‘absurd’ for hebel interchangeably; see also B. L. Berger, ‘Qoheleth and the Exigencies of the Absurd’, Int 9.2 (2001), p. 149.
9.
M. V. Fox, ‘On הבל in Qoheleth: A Reply to Mark Sneed’, JBL 138/3 (2019), p. 560.
10.
M. Sneed, ‘הבל as “Worthless” in Qoheleth: A Critique of Michael V. Fox’s “Absurd” Thesis’, JBL 136/4 (2017), pp. 890-94, here p. 894.
11.
E.g., Sneed, ‘הבל as “Worthless” in Qoheleth’, p. 889; Fox, ‘On הבל in Qoheleth’, p. 560.
12.
Among them was Fox (Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 29), who pointed out that in the whole Old Testament hebel is almost always used in a metaphorical sense; the only exception is Isa 57.13. See also D. C. Fredericks, Coping with Transience: Ecclesiastes on Brevity in Life, BS (Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), esp. p. 12; K. A. Farmer, Who Knows What Is Good? A Commentary on the Books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes (ITC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), esp. pp. 143-46; L. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), pp. 206-8.
13.
Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes, p. 15.
14.
Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes, pp. 92-97.
15.
P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. E. Buchanan (Boston: Beacon, 1969), p. 15.
16.
Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1-11’, p. 361.
17.
In keeping with what Seybold (‘הֶבֶל, hebhel’, 314-15) observes, the term consistently retains the meanings ‘vapour’ and ‘mist’. It is worth noting that the term is used literally in Job 7.16, Isa 57.13, Ps 62.44, and Ps 144.4. S. Weeks intimates a similar awareness as he translates hebel ‘hot air’, and notes that ‘it may be quite inappropriate just to seek a meaning that fits every context’; see S. Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (New York/London: T & T Clark, 2012), pp. 104-6.
18.
C. S. Knopf, ‘The Optimism of Koheleth’, JBL 49.2 (1930), p. 196; J. Jarick, ‘The Hebrew Book of Changes: Reflections on Hakkōl Hebel and Kakkōl Zĕmān in Ecclesiastes’, JSOT 90 (2000), p. 85.
19.
Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1-11’, p. 362.
20.
G. D. Salyer, Vain Rhetoric: Private Insight and Public Debate in Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup 327; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), p. 256.
21.
Jarick, ‘The Hebrew Book of Changes’, pp. 80-81. He also points out similar cases of ‘compact parallelism’, such as דור הלך and דור בא (p. 81).
22.
Cf. Jarick, ‘The Hebrew Book of Changes’, p. 82.
23.
E. S. Christianson, A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup 280; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), p. 89.
24.
Fox (A Time to Tear Down, p. 40) observes that it refers to things in the sphere of human life.
25.
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, pp. 34-35.
26.
Miller, ‘Qohelet’s Symbolic Use of הבל’, p. 437.
27.
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 23.
28.
It is rendered as ‘gain’ (NIV, RSV); ‘profit’ (KJV; Longman, Ecclesiastes, p. 65); ‘advantage’ (Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 59); and ‘surplus’ (C. L. Seow, Ecclesiastes [AB; New York: Doubleday, 1998], p. 22).
29.
Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 103; Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 27.
30.
E. M. Good (Irony in the Old Testament [Sheffield: Almond, 1981], p. 179) makes a similar observation in his study of the irony in Ecclesiastes.
31.
Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism in Ecclesiastes, pp. 160-64, 172, 248-51; on the meaning of hebel, recently he proposes ‘worthless’ (‘הבל as “Worthless” in Qoheleth’, pp. 890-94). Holding similar views are R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 36; T. Krüger, Qoheleth, trans. O. C. Dean (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), p. 49; N. Lohfink, Qoheleth, trans. S. McEvenue (CC; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), p. 37; P. Enns, Ecclesiastes (THOTC; Grand Rapids, MI/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011), p. 33.
32.
Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1.1-11’, p. 359; Ingram, Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes, pp. 147-48.
33.
To borrow the terminology of Christianson, A Time to Tell, p. 47, n. 92. The demarcation of the poem varies from one scholar to another. Some scholars see 1.9-11 as part of the poem, e.g., F. Rousseau, ‘Structure de Qohelet 1:4-11 et plan du livre’, VT 31.2 (1981), p. 201; R. N. Whybray, ‘Ecclesiastes 1.5-7 and the Wonders of Nature’, JSOT 41 (1988), pp. 105-6; R. E. Murphy, Ecclesiastes (WBC; Dallas: Word Books, 1992), p. 5; G. S. Ogden, Qoheleth (2nd ed.; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2007), p. 34. However, based on the low density of two indicators of poetry—parallelism and metaphors—we follow the view that 1.9-11 is a prosaic unit; see, e.g., Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 111; A. Wright, ‘The Riddle and the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth’, CBQ 30 (1968), p. 333.
34.
Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 111; M. V. Fox, Ecclesiastes (JPSBC; Philadelphia: JPS, 2004), p. 4; also Lohfink, Qoheleth, p. 40.
35.
Contra Murphy (Ecclesiastes, p. 7), who argues that the unit is to be divided into 1.4-6 and 1.7-8, we agree with K. J. Dell (‘The Cycle of Life in Ecclesiastes’, VT 59.2 [2009], p. 183), who notes that 1.4-7 is a unit distinct from the rest of the poem; and A. Schoors (Ecclesiastes [HCOT; Leuven: Peeters, 2013], p. 51), who contends that in terms of content 1.7 and 1.4-6 belong together as a unit.
36.
Jarick, ‘The Hebrew Book of Changes’, 85; Dell, ‘The Cycle of Life in Ecclesiastes’, pp. 183-85; B. Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth (SSU 10; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), p. 66.
37.
M. Carasik, ‘Qoheleth’s Twists and Turns’, JSOT 28 (2003), pp. 192-209; Ogden, Qoheleth, pp. 34-36; N. Samet, ‘Qoheleth 1.4 and the Structure of the Book’s Prologue’, ZAW 126.1 (2014), pp. 93-94.
38.
D. N. Freedman and J. Lundbom, ‘דוֹר, dôr’, TDOT 3:169-81; Whybray, ‘Ecclesiastes 1.5-7’, p. 106.
39.
E.g., Lohfink, Qoheleth, p. 41; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 7; Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 114.
40.
G. S. Ogden, ‘The Interpretation of דור in Ecclesiastes 1.4’, JSOT 34 (1986), pp. 91-92.
41.
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 62, followed by Ingram, Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes, p. 59.
42.
M. V. Fox, ‘Qoheleth 1.4’, JSOT 40 (1988), p. 109.
43.
For the problematic waw, see R. C. Steiner, ‘Does the Biblical Hebrew Conjunction –ו Have Many Meanings, One Meaning, or No Meaning at All?’, JBL 119.2 (2000), pp. 249-67.
44.
Meaning ‘but’, see GKC §154a.
45.
E.g., Krüger, Qoheleth, pp. 49-50.
46.
E.g., Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 6, n. 4a.
47.
Krüger, Qoheleth, pp. 49-50; Lohfink, Qoheleth, p. 41.
48.
Fox, ‘Qoheleth 1.4’, p. 109; Fox, Ecclesiastes, p. 5. For other kinds of contrast that have been proposed, see Samet, ‘Qoheleth 1.4’, p. 94.
49.
E.g., Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 63; Loader, Ecclesiastes, 20; Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 107.
50.
Whybray, ‘Ecclesiastes 1.5-7’, p. 108.
51.
Dell, ‘Cycle of Life’, p. 184, may be representative of the majority.
52.
S. Japhet, ‘Goes to the South and Turns to the North (Ecclesiastes 1:6): The Sources and History of the Exegetical Traditions’, JSQ 1.4 (1993-94), pp. 289-322.
53.
But Weeks is cautious enough not to assume the sun as the sole subject of 1.6; he treats the wind as the subject of 1.6c; see S. Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (LHBOT; New York: Bloombury T&T, 2012), pp. 47-49.
54.
Good, ‘The Unfilled Sea’, pp. 66-67; Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity’, pp. 357-58.
55.
Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 49.
56.
Krüger, Qoheleth, p. 47, n. 7b.
57.
Joüon-Muraoka §102g.
58.
E.g., A. H. McNeill, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), p. 56; Lohfink, Qoheleth, pp. 39, 41; Seow, Ecclesiastes, pp. 100, 108-9; Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 36.
59.
See Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 42, followed by Schoors, Ecclesiastes, pp. 70-71.
60.
Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, pp. 50-51, n. 14.
61.
E.g., G. A. Barton, Ecclesiastes (ICC; T&T Clark, 1908), p. 74; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, pp. lxxi, 8.
62.
Samet, ‘Qoheleth 1.4’, p. 99.
63.
E.g., Young-Jin Min, ‘Where Do the Rivers Flow? (Ecclesiastes 1:7)’, BT 42.2 (1991), pp. 228-30.
64.
Krüger, Qoheleth, pp. 50-51; also Whybray, ‘Ecclesiastes 1.5-7’, p. 109.
65.
Though D. Ingram argues that the ambiguity is deliberate, he admits that what is ambiguous to the modern reader may not have been ambiguous to the author; see D. Ingram, ‘Riddled with Ambiguity: Ecclesiastes 7:23-8:1 as an Example’, in The Words of the Wise Are Like Goads Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century, ed. M. J. Boda et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), pp. 219-20.
66.
Lavoie, ‘Ironie et ambiguïtés en Qohélet 4, 13-16’, p. 32.
67.
Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, pp. 126-27.
68.
Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1,1-11’, p. 362.
69.
It is remarkable that out of its 10 occurrences in the Hebrew Bible, the phrase appears four times in Ecclesiastes. See J. L. Crenshaw, ‘The Expression of mî yôdēa’ in the Hebrew Bible’, VT 36.3 (1986), pp. 274-88.
70.
Ingram, Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes, p. 127.
71.
Though an issue debated since ancient times, Qoheleth’s contradictions still generate interest up to the present; See recently for instance, J. Oleneva, ‘Rabbinic Response to Qoheleth’s Contradictions: Concepts of Wisdom’, Judaica 72 (2016), pp. 253-75.
72.
Among others, C. G. Siegfried, Prediger und Hoheslied (HKAT; Göttingen: Vanenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1898), pp. 2-12; Barton, Ecclesiastes, pp. 44-45; Rose, ‘Qohéleth, le maître’, pp. 3-22; A. Pinker, ‘Ecclesiastes II: Themes’, JBQ 41.3 (2013), p. 166.
73.
T. A. Perry, Dialogues with Koheleth (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 15-16; K. R. Greenwoods, ‘Debating Wisdom: The Role of Voice in Ecclesiastes’, CBQ 74 (2012), pp. 480-88.
74.
R. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World (New York: Bloch, 1955), pp. 73-74; R. N. Whybray, ‘The Identification and the Use of Quotations in Ecclesiastes’, in Congress Volume 1980 (VTSup, 32; Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 437-45. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, p. 20; L. Schwienhorst-Schönberger, ‘Kohelet: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung’, in Das Buch Kohelet: Studien zur Struktur, Geschichte, Rezeption und Theologie (BZAW 254; Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1997), p. 19; also Krüger, Qoheleth, pp. 18-19.
75.
G. R. Castellino, ‘Qoheleth and His Wisdom’, CBQ 30.1 (1969), esp. pp. 16, 25.
76.
Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 40.
77.
Fox, Time to Tear Down, p. 3.
78.
J. A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qoheleth (BZAW 152; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1979); the theory is refined, more clearly articulated, and applied in his commentary Ecclesiastes, trans. J. Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986).
79.
Also intriguingly, Sneed fails to touch on the ambiguous nature of hebel; see Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism in Ecclesiastes, esp. pp. 160-62, 171-75.
80.
Both Wilson (‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1-11’, pp. 363-63) and Salyer (Vain Rhetoric, p. 128) mention in passing the link between the ambiguity of hebel and Qoheleth’s contradictions.
81.
Good, Irony in the Old Testament, p. 182.
82.
Good, Irony in the Old Testament, p. 182.
83.
Good, Irony in the Old Testament, p. 37.
84.
Ibid. In other words, the two types of people ought not to come to the same destiny, but they actually do.
85.
Crenshaw, Qoheleth: The Ironic Wink, p. 30.
86.
Crenshaw, Qoheleth: The Ironic Wink, pp. 29-31.
87.
Some scholars have noted that the analogies have a bearing on the form and content of Qoheleth’s discourse. See Murphy, Ecclesiastes, xxix; C. G. Bartholomew, Reading Ecclesiastes (AnBib 139; Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1998), p. 253; N. Kamano, Cosmology and Character: Qoheleth’s Pedagogy from a Rhetorical-Critical Perspective (BZAW 312; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter), 2002.
88.
See LXX and Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 230.
89.
See ESV, NAS; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 60.
90.
Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 250.
91.
As Miller notes, in quite a few places Qoheleth describes the enigma of wisdom without using hebel, such as 1.16-18, 3.11, and this passage; see Miller, ‘Qoheleth’s Use of הבל’, p. 443, n. 24.
92.
Literally pega’ refers to an event or incident, often translated ‘chance’ (see ESV, NAS, also Lohfink, Qoheleth, p. 121). It may be a synonym to ‘ēt (see Jean-Jacques Lavoie, ‘Temps et finitude humaine: Étude de Qohélet ix 11-12’, VT 46.4 [1996], p. 443). Certainly, its use with ‘ēt indicates a close link with the concept of time. Some scholars have noted that the two words serve as a hendiadys, which reflects the concept of ‘ēt in 3.1-8; see Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 146; Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 156.
93.
The phrase ‘the beginning to the end’ suggests the (period of) time in which God made things beautiful. As such, both God’s actions and his timing are unfathomable.
94.
See Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, 246. S. C. Jones (‘Qoheleth’s Courtly Wisdom: Ecclesiastes 8:1-9’, CBQ 68.2 [2006], 215) does not exclude ‘cheerfulness’ as one of the possible connotations, though he argues that there is more to the wise’s shining face than just cheerfulness.
95.
Here what wisdom brings is not a surplus of cheerfulness, but a surplus of pain; see Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 76.
96.
While works done under the sun are ‘all vapour (הבל הכל) and striving after the wind’ (1:14), the pursuit of wisdom is described as ‘striving after the wind’ (1.17).
97.
See Fox (Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 64-66); E. P. Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric (BZAW 353; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2005), p. 34.
98.
R. N. Whybray, ‘Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy’, JSOT 23 (1982), p. 87.
99.
Whybray (‘Preacher of Joy’, p. 88) offers four reasons: God’s gift, the necessity to accept one’s lot, the brevity of life, and the unknown future.
100.
Contra W. H. U. Anderson, Qoheleth and Its Pessimistic Theology: Hermeneutical Struggles in Wisdom Literature (New York: Mellen Biblical, 1997), p. 74.
101.
See M. S. Rindge, ‘Mortality and Enjoyment: The Interplay of Death and Possessions in Qoheleth’, CBQ 73.2 (2011), p. 280.
102.
Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric, esp. 72-80; N. Lohfink, ‘Qohelet 5:17-19—Revelation by Joy’, CBQ 52.4 (1990), p. 634.
103.
As Lee (The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric, 19) observes, the expression ‘set one’s heart’ (ntn lb) is one of Qoheleth’s catch-words. It represents Qoheleth’s mode of reflection (e.g., 1.17).
104.
Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric, pp. 72-80; Rindge, ‘The Interplay of Death and Possessions in Qoheleth’, pp. 265-80.
105.
Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 70; cf. Fox, Time to Tear Down Time to Build, pp. 123, 127-28; and Fox, Ecclesiastes, p. 44.
106.
Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 58-59.
107.
Krüger, Qoheleth, p. 136.
108.
Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric, p. 72; also G. S. Ogden, ‘Qoheleth XI 7-XII 8: Qoheleth’s Summons to Enjoyment and Reflection’, VT 34 (1984), pp. 28-30. It is worth noting that hebel begins and rounds off the discussion of the changes from youth to death in 11.7-12.8 (11.8 and 12.8).
109.
E.g., Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 251; Krüger, Qoheleth, p. 139; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 140; Fox, Ecclesiastes, p. 48.
110.
For a survey of the diverse interpretations, see W. A. Brindle, ‘Righteousness and Wickedness in Ecclesiastes 7:15-18’, AUSS 23 (1985), pp. 244-51.
111.
Whybray (Ecclesiastes, p. 12) disputes this, but scholars such as J. H. Choy argue for it on the basis of the context; see J. H. Choy, ‘The Doctrine of the Golden Mean in Qoh 7.15-18: A Universal Human Pursuit’, Biblica 83.3 (2002), pp. 358-74.
112.
See B. Porten and A. Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Egypt (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbraun, 1993), 3:45.
113.
See Choi, ‘The Doctrine of the Golden Mean in Qoh 7.15-18’, pp. 362-63.
114.
Krüger, Qoheleth, p. 141; Fox, Ecclesiastes, p. 49.
115.
E.g., G. R. Driver, ‘Problems and Solutions’, VT 4 (1954), p. 230; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 153.
116.
See Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 284; also Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 44.
117.
It is unclear what Qoheleth means by ‘holy place’, which normally refers to the temple. Seow (Ecclesiastes, p. 285) opines that it refers to the synagogue. Regardless of what it means, the thought of the wicked being buried in such a place offends Qoheleth’s sense of justice.
118.
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, pp. 80-81, n. 10a, b.
119.
‘Vanity’ (e.g., KJV, ESV) or ‘absurd’ (e.g., Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 153).
120.
Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 127-30.
121.
Wilson, ‘Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1.1-11’, p. 363.