Abstract
J. A. Hobson’s Imperialism was first published in 1902, at the peak of British imperialism, when imperial expansions fostered national imagination and pro-imperial propaganda blinded many citizens both in England and overseas. J. A. Hobson deals with imperialism in the way Marx dealt with capitalism: he unveils its financial instruments, political mechanisms and ideological arrangements.
The study consists of two parts – the economic basis and the ideological basis of imperialism. The division represents somehow the Marxist dichotomy of base and superstructure, with the first comprehending the forces and relations of production, and the latter referring to derivative products of economic life as culture, science, ideology, etc.
The first part, ‘Economics of Imperialism’, illuminates the drives for imperialism and also the financial and political mechanisms of imperialism. The author makes a distinction between colonialism and imperialism, and this distinction is crucial for understanding his work. ‘For convenience, the year 1870 has been taken as indicative of the beginning of a conscious policy of imperialism’ (p. 57). What is the dividing line, the political cordon sanitaire between colonialism and imperialism?
The author argues that traditional colonialism was the outlet of surplus population. It led to new permanent colonial settlements in the overseas territories, mostly territories with favourable climate conditions and low local population. To protect British people overseas, British rule was also established there. Imperialism, Hobson points out, means political annexation with colonial settlements. Imperial domination is defined as the targeting of populated areas with a temporary corpus of navy, diplomats, military, clerical and administrative staff, instead of permanent colonies.
Hobson argues that imperialism is masked by the old ideas of colonialism – the excess of population and productive powers – yet these ideas veil the complex financial and political mechanisms of new imperialist developments.
The first myth is the myth of overproduction. As imperial mythologies imply, overproduction derives from efficient labour, productive technologies and the racial superiority of the British population. This is, according to Hobson, one of the ill-recognised economic truths. Commodities produced within a country cannot be consumed within the country, because some people are underpaid, and some others accumulate financial means far beyond their needs and demands. The resultant overproduction comes from ‘Mal-distribution of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country’ (p. 107). Elites accumulate financial means far beyond their demands; foreign territories are needed not for surplus population, but for reinvestment of surplus capital, accumulated via mal-distribution. So the second myth is the myth of overpopulation. It is not colonial settlers but private financial investments that have to be protected by British rule in overseas territories (p. 84). The state engages in protecting private investments at the public expense. The practices of imperialism, Hobson argues, are ‘irrational from the standpoint of the whole nation, it is rational enough from the standpoint of certain classes in the nation’ (p. 80).
Financial capital is merging with media and politics. Via domestic nationalist pro-imperial propaganda, financial elites present interests of their own as the interests of the nation: the working class is informed of its pride in being citizens of empire. The state is attracted by imperial splendour and international prestige, and engages in the military defence of imperial markets. The derivative industries of imperialism (naval, military and administrative) develop; new cognitive elites (the clerical, administrative, military, missionary and diplomatic corpus) establish themselves in their positions and constitute the self-perpetuating cycle, promoting further imperial interests. The interests of the few are mistaken for the interests of the nation, and defended at public cost. The few, as Hobson calls them, are the ‘parasites of imperialism’. Imperialism, he argues, is the fruit of ‘false economy’ (p. 108), and social reform, in his opinion, is the only remedy.
The second part, ‘Politics of Imperialism’, reveals the politics and ideologies of imperial expansion. It illuminates the inconsistencies and internal contradictions of the ‘survival of the fittest’ ideology and the mismatch between ideological proclamations and the brutal reality of imperial practices. British imperial policies are criticised on the basis of utilitarian aspects, as British imperial politics impair both colonised and the coloniser, creating a pathological limbo instead of forms of self governance and self-sufficient economies.
The second part is interesting mostly in historical retrospect, as these ideologies have been largely condemned during the 20th century. Surprisingly, the first part, ‘Economics of Imperialism’, remains intellectually provocative, and important issues are relevant more than a century after its original publication. Companies and corporations are still following the recipes of success once described with disapproval by Hobson. Generally, mobile financial capital has become more deterritorialised to haunt the world like a spectre. Financial capital has become transnational. Cooperation between state and capital has taken new forms, but it still goes hand in hand with the old mythologies of growth and foreign investment as the panaceas for welfare. Yet distribution, not growth, is at the core of the question. Social reform is the cure according to this classic text, but not ongoing exploitation based on growth and expansion.