Indian public-sector trade unionism in an autocratic political climate: The distinctive case of Gujarat

Communist influence and the bigger picture: Telecommunications unions

The Indian government restructured its national telecommunications organisation on a commercial basis as a PSU in 2000, adopting its current name of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL 2009). With this change, single union national collective bargaining was introduced for non-executive workers (i.e. the work group examined in this study), and awarded to the union with the highest membership. An official national membership verification of the unions in BSNL is held every two years in order to review and resolve this issue. This is a very important event that overshadows much of BSNL’s industrial relations. This is not least because pay rates are negotiated on this basis rather than as a result of central government’s periodic Pay Commissions, which govern most public-sector workers. The communist-orientated BSNL Employees’ Union (BSNL EU) won the membership verification for 2008-09, as it had done previously in 2006 and 2004 (BSNL EU interview). Key details of the 2008-09 BSNL membership verification results are contained in Table 2. The fourth union, Bharatiya Telecom Employees’ Union (BTEU-BSNL), is also listed in Table 2 but secured less than 2 per cent in the membership verification nationally, and just 1 per cent in Gujarat. It had been formed shortly before the 2008-09 membership verification, and was aligned with the pro-BJP federation, BMS (BSNL EU 2009: 9). Whilst its recent formation was presumably a significant obstacle to its performance in the membership verification, to have secured a mere 1 per cent in Gujarat is conspicuous in itself. One can only assume that many Gujarati BMS sympathisers employed by BSNL threw in their lot with the National Federation of Telecom Employees (NFTE BSNL) and the National Union of BSNL Workers (FNTO). These two unions formed an alliance for the membership verification, which evidently provided the only feasible chance of defeating BSNL-EU, with the latter supported by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM).

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Table 2.

‘Results of 4th membership verification for electing a majority representative union of non-executive employees in BSNL held on 21 January 2009’, based on the Chief Returning Officer’s report.

‘Constituency’ 1	Total of valid votes	BSNL Employees’ Union	Electoral alliance of National Federation of Telecom Employees BSNL and National Union of BSNL Workers (FNTO) 3	BTEU (BSNL)	10 Other Unions
Gujarat 2	19,353 (89.1%)	8,622 (39.7%)	7,784 (35.9%)	210 (1.0%)	2,515 (11.6%)
All India total vote 2	234,198 (94.33%)	124,052 (49.97%)	95,225 (38.35%)	4,174 (1.68%)	9,313 (3.75%)

1

For BSNL organisational purposes, the country is broken down into ‘circles’, which normally equate to a state.

2

Percentages for unions are of the total number of (all) union members entitled to vote.

3

Combined vote for the alliance formed by NFTE BSNL and National Union of BSNL Workers (FNTO). The latter agreed for tactical reasons that this alliance should be promoted under the NFTE BSNL banner, and whilst its own union’s name still had to appear on the ballot paper, FNTO urged its members to vote for NFTE BSNL. Fewer than 1% of FNTO voters in Gujarat and nationally failed to support this alliance, marking the ballot paper in favour of their own union; this group is excluded from the table.

Regarding BSNL EU, it is notable that it won the membership verification in Gujarat as well as nationally (Table 2). At the core of its policy and campaigning was a clear and consistent position in opposition to privatisation, particularly with regard to the defence of job security and pensions: ‘Every [branch] meeting we repeat this message’ (BSNL EU interview). It also accused the other BSNL unions of being pro-management. The union summed up its policy in terms of campaigning for BSNL’s business survival whilst also campaigning for a telecommunications service for the people (BSNL EU interview). Its most recent pay claim had been submitted in December 2008, and it had adopted an incremental strategy of sanctions to press management to negotiate, i.e. demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes and finally full-scale strikes. Management initially showed no interest in the claim, but BSNL EU’s victory in the membership verification in January 2009 persuaded management to commence negotiations.

When asked about its membership verification victories, BSNL EU stated that the key ingredient was not actually, ‘the numbers of members unions have, [but] the passion’. Regarding collective attitudes and communalism in the Gujarat context, BSNL EU stated, ‘We cannot work alone. We work as (a) mass … Each and every employee interacts’; and ‘Caste and communal factors [are] overridden by the [BSNL EU’s] policies’ (BSNL EU interview). The union also had a well developed training programme for its union activists, with ‘Circle [i.e. state] secretaries trained, then district secretaries, then branch.’ In short, the picture that was painted seemed to indicate a very efficient and integrated union organising strategy, linking the union’s internal structure with its training and communication policy. As for its political links, ‘Two way communication is there’ between BSNL EU and the CPM union federation, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU). ‘CPM (is) supporting us … Support is strong from the CPM leader and CPM MPs.’

Based on the interview data, both the National Federation of Telecom Employees (NFTE) and the National Union of BSNL Workers (known commonly by workers as ‘FNTO’) did not seem to place as much emphasis on opposition to privatisation as BSNL EU. NFTE feared that the government would sell off a percentage of its shares in BSNL, posing a threat to pay and conditions, but it emphasised that its first priority was the survival of the company (NFTE interview). In 2008-09, job security was also under threat in BSNL for those in the 50s age group, and in response, NFTE was preparing for national union agitation and campaigning to persuade BSNL to negotiate on this issue. It demanded that natural justice principles be applied in that the affected person should at least be heard by the employer if threatened with the loss of their job. A ‘strike will be the last resort of the agitation’ (NFTE interview). NFTE believed that the particular circumstances of Gujarat as a state were of little significance in the context of BSNL issues on a national basis. This point gives credence to BSNL EU’s view that union organisation gained strength from BSNL’s nation-wide organisation, with central government policy towards the sector being a critical factor that galvanised unions. Whilst it was reported that NFTE was not politically affiliated – ‘We don’t want to become a tool of a political party’ (NFTE interview) – it did lobby particular MPs and government ministers, and had been traditionally associated with the Communist Party of India’s All-India Trade Union Congress (CPI; AITUC).

FNTO’s main union demands focused on BSNL’s national wage review. As with the other two main unions, job promotion was seen as a significant issue for the union nationally. There had also been national union agitating calling for BSNL’s implementation of the 3G spectrum (which provided a more reliable, extensive mobile phone service and better reception than the previous technology), the argument being that BSNL’s customer base would increase. There had been national union campaigns around this issue, including a national strike. FNTO stated that its alliance with NFTE operated at national, state and district levels, whilst it viewed its relationship with BSNL EU as rather poor. However, it still favoured a united front between the three main unions on common issues and wherever possible, and between non-executive and executive workers in BSNL. At a state level, it also demonstrated its solidarity with the Gujarat State Employees Co-ordinating Committee’s mass agitation in autumn 2008 (see below). Referring to its political affiliation to the Congress Party, FNTO representatives stated that this provided lobbying power and good opportunities to exert political pressure (though few details of this were made available by the interviewees).

Workers united: The Gujarat state government sector

The Gujarat State Employees Co-ordination Committee (GSECC) was the joint union organisation that brought together Gujarat state government workers in a very broad range of occupations and departments. It was formed in 2002 and represented the workers of seven union federations (GSECC interviews). These were the Gujarat State (GS) Employees Federation, the GS Panchayat Employees’ Confederation, the GS Officers’ Federation, the GS Revenue Federation, the GS Class 4 Employees’ Federation, the GS Primary Teachers’ Federation, and the GS Corporation Employees’ Federation. In addition, as one of the GSECC joint secretaries made clear when interviewed, the Ahmedabad municipal corporation workers’ unions supported the GSECC. The occupational and sectoral groups included primary-school teaching and non-teaching staff, those employed in public works, engineers, technical design workers, clerical workers in the police force, state administrative workers, health workers and emergency service workers. It was suggested that the GSECC covered 350 different job designations, including the main class 1 to 4 job grades and the more senior class 1 and 2 officer grades (GSECC interview). The Committee claimed that Gujarat was the only state in India in which all four classes and all seven federations were united under one union co-ordinating committee, and that the GSECC had established a much greater level of unity than elsewhere. Prior to its foundation in 2002, each of the seven federations had put forward separate demands to the state government. It was reported that the employer had made use of divide-and-rule tactics, and that there had been previous union splits when campaigns and agitation had been organised. However, this had not occurred again since the GSECC had been set up.

The first of the interviews with the GSECC was attended by about six officers and committee members, though most of the responses were by the committee’s senior officer. A second interview was conducted at a later date with one of the GSECC joint secretaries. A third interview was conducted with the GS Primary Teachers’ Federation, an affiliate of the GSECC.

The main preoccupation of the GSECC in terms of union campaigns and demands was to secure the implementation of the 6th Central Pay Commission recommendations within Gujarat. This in itself is a scenario common to many other states, in that once central government workers are awarded a pay rise by the Central Pay Commission, tensions usually follow between state governments and state government workers, as the latter strive for pay parity with their fellow workers in central government. The situation in Gujarat brought the GSECC into direct confrontation with the BJP-led state government as the employer. Two leading members of each of the seven union federations at a state level were elected to co-ordinate and lead the campaign for implementation of the 6th Pay Commission in the state. A similar approach was adopted to establish the necessary union organisation at district level.

In the autumn of 2008, the GSECC organised a mass demonstration and rally in Ahmedabad, with a one-day strike on 6 December. The union committee claimed that it stopped traffic for ten hours, and that 150-200,000 workers took part. A video recording produced by the GSECC, and made available to this article’s authors, gives some indication of the large and impressive extent of the demonstration and union rally. The GS Primary Teachers’ Federation formed a major element of the five-kilometre march, with around 100,000 of its members present (GS PTF interview).

In response to this pressure, the state government as employer commenced negotiations with the unions on 16 December 2008, involving the state finance minister and senior members of the Gujarat government. Three days later, a settlement was agreed that seemed to be a considerable victory for the unions. The GSECC reported that this was the only state in India in which every aspect of the 6th Central Pay Commission would be implemented, back-dated to 1 January 2006. It was agreed that workers would get the increase on their wages from 1 April 2009, with the back pay paid into a workers’ provident fund from which they normally receive payment on retirement. Regarding the latter, this was in fact a compromise compared with central government workers, who had the whole amount paid in cash. Although the 6th Pay Commission implementation was clearly the dominant demand, other issues that the GSECC engaged in included medical, transport and annual leave allowances and concessions.

There were further interesting points made in relation to the GSECC’s methods of organisation and political strategy. Regarding emergency service workers, they were involved in the GSECC unions, but the GSECC chose not to draw them into union agitation due to the impact on the community. Instead, they wore black badges at times of industrial action to indicate their support. Regarding unions in the municipal corporations in Gujarat, it was stated that the GSECC did also attempt to link these unions together. The latter lent some support to the GSECC – as evidenced in the autumn 2008 pay agitation. When asked about communal questions, the unambiguous response of the GSECC senior officer was that there was no caste but the workers’ caste, and that as a union co-ordination committee, ‘We have no religion but the worker’. It was also very interesting to note that when asked about the BMS unions, it was stated that they did not join the GSECC, but the BMS senior union official in Gujarat was allegedly opposed to Narendra Modi, the state’s chief minister.

Regarding the political positions of the GSECC officers, it was reported that personal beliefs and differences were allowed, but workers came first. That said, a senior officer of the committee described Modi in strongly autocratic terms, a view from which other members of the committee did not dissent. Finally, at an all-India level, the GSECC did not want links with any of the politically affiliated union federations, but it did send delegates to the twice-yearly conferences of the All India State Government Workers’ Federation. As was apparent on more than one occasion in the interviews for this study, union representatives sometimes emphasised the non-political nature of their union’s position, but other documentary or historical evidence cast doubt on this. With regard to the GSECC, when it organised its pay campaign rally on 6 December 2008, it invited former Gujarat chief ministers Shankarsingh Vaghela (ex-BJP, now Congress) and Suresh Mehta (BJP rebel) to the rally, although the state government actually prevented both from attending (Indian Express 2009). Whether this was no more than a tactical initiative by the GSECC or was indicative of other political allegiances (possibly in terms of a Congress-led alliance) is hard to say, but either way, this typifies some of the deeper political complexities often hidden beneath the surface of Indian trade unionism.

Workers divided: Municipal bus services

The Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service (AMTS) has traditionally provided bus services in Gujarat’s biggest city, Ahmedabad. In 2002, AMTS faced severe financial problems, with workers receiving no wages for two months as a result. Extensive outsourcing followed. Combined with the financial crisis, this led to a fundamental restructuring of the organisation and the bus operation in the city. These developments resulted in a reduction initially from 800 to 250 AMTS buses, though subsequently this figure increased to 375. It compared with 500-550 buses owned and run by private operators (interview with the union representatives of Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh) ² . Pay and working conditions amongst the private bus operators were much inferior to those of AMTS workers, and the four trade unions recognised by AMTS for collective bargaining purposes made few if any inroads into trying to organise and represent these workers. This was in contrast to two small communist unions that were not recognised for collective bargaining purposes, one of which paid particular attention to organising the temporary bus workers employed by private operators.

The four unions that had collective bargaining rights were: (1) Karnavati Nagar Parivahan Mazdoor Sangh (KNPMS); (2) Naukar Mandel; (3) the Ahmedabad General Mazdoor Union (AGMU) and (4) Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh (MMS). In their different ways, the first two of these unions leant varying degrees of support to the BJP, with KNPMS being a BMS affiliate. However, when interviewed, the KNPMS union representatives tended to play down the closeness of their union’s links with the BJP. At the same time, the BMS position with regard to core union issues in AMTS did not seem to pose much of a challenge to the pro-BJP employer. For example, regarding AMTS and private bus operators, it was stated that, ‘Such competition will improve the service for passengers’. In light of the financial crisis and radical changes to AMTS in 2002, ‘There’s no point in arguing with the management’ (KNPMS interview). Apparently, KNPMS was added to the list of unions with collective bargaining rights in 1996 by the new BJP administration in Ahmedabad (interview with the trade union, AMTS Karmachari Sangh). Similarly, the bus workers’ union, Naukar Mandel, took a soft approach to the question of the restructuring and business needs of AMTS. The essential difference here was that Naukar Mandel was more opportunist than ideologically driven. As one representative of a competing AMTS union put it, ‘[KN]PMS is like a child of the BJP, but Naukar Mandel is just like a monkey that is after a sweet’ (AGMU interview).

The Ahmedabad General Mazdoor Union (AGMU) and Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh (MMS) were both essentially pro-Congress at the time of the fieldwork. The AGMU was formally affiliated to the INTUC, and thus allied explicitly with the Congress Party. This union’s representative believed that unions in Gujarat were weaker than in some other states, suggesting that Chief Minister Modi exercised sole power: ‘He has become a one man show … Unions don’t have power because of him … So unions have lost their strength’.

As for Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh (MMS), it had its roots in the non-party political Gandhian union tradition and the original Ahmedabad-based Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh or Textile Labour Association (MMS interview; Kamath and Kher 1993). However, in more recent years, it had become broadly sympathetic and supportive of the INTUC and Congress Party (MMS interview). In the bus sector, AGMU and MMS did not give the employer an entirely free rein, but, whilst there were sporadic instances of militancy, neither did they see their relationship with the employer in terms of class confrontation and adversarialism. They both recognised the need to make some concessions to the employer’s business needs: ‘We want to eat the eggs, but the “red flag” [i.e. communist] unions want to eat the hen’ (MMS interview).

In addition to the four recognised unions in AMTS, there were the two unions that were not recognised for collective bargaining purposes. These were AMTS Karmachari Sangh and the Gujarat Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), and they both adopted a consistently militant stance vis-à-vis the employers. They attempted to organise the most exploited workers in the bus services, made use of legal test cases as a means of mobilising these workers, and promoted strong class-based, non-sectarian approaches to union activity. For this study, the AMTS Karmachari Sangh general secretary was interviewed. Whilst some documentary evidence about the GFTU union was examined, it was not possible at the time to interview the GFTU’s general secretary. These two unions had a broadly similar political orientation. Both had communist links. Karmachari Sangh was an affiliate of the CPM trade union federation, CITU. The GFTU was linked both to an Ahmedabad-based human-rights organisation staunchly opposed to communalism and to a small locally-based political party in the Stalinist tradition. They also appeared to adopt similar methods of organising workers and challenging the employer, in the absence of a right to participate in collective bargaining with AMTS. Karmachari Sangh had been formed in 1989 in AMTS with the aim of contesting what it saw as the corrupt relationship that the then three unions with collective bargaining rights had with the employer. A militant union with minimal resources, its general secretary was on strike with all other lawyers at the labour courts offices on the day of the interview. In these circumstances, he took over one of the labour court rooms, and we conducted the interview there. When asked where his union office was, he pointed out of the window to a garden seat opposite the AMTS bus depot. The bus workers knew that this was where he was based, and would simply cross the road from the bus station to talk to him if they wanted advice or representation. Apparently undeterred by the lack of resources, these circumstances seemed to symbolise the overall attitude and approach of this union.

The BJP regime in Gujarat

The BJP has embraced a staunchly nationalist agenda focused on traditional concepts of Hindu identity, aspects of which were reflected to varying degrees in the stance taken by its fellow RSS affiliate, the union federation BMS. This is in sharp contrast to notions of class consciousness and workers’ internationalism. Gujarat is a very important stronghold for the BJP, with its firm hold on the reins of power both at state government level and municipal level in Ahmedabad. The BJP in Gujarat has also embraced a market agenda, and places much emphasis on trying to attract big business investment (Naqvi 2009; Nayar 2009). It had taken a hard line in attempting to hold down the pay and conditions of public-sector workers (albeit unsuccessfully in autumn 2008), whilst at the same time attempting to demonstrate an increased level of efficiency in the state and municipal administrations. In addition, the spectre of the 2002 atrocities in Gujarat continued to haunt the community. Therefore, one would reasonably expect this to have been a hostile environment for independent trade unionism.

Opportunities and limits of pro-BJP unions

However, regarding the BMS unions in our study, the interview data did not indicate any evidence of institutional incorporation vis-à-vis the state and municipal governments. As for the Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service, neither the BMS union there, KNPMS, nor the BMS ‘fellow traveller’, Naukar Mandal, appeared to be involved in any formal arrangement with its employer or the BJP Ahmedabad municipal government that was any different to that of the other three recognised unions. There was thus no indication of an openly corporatist relationship. What seems more likely is that KNPMS, Naukar Mandal and the BMS union for state government workers had received discrete privileges that other unions were denied, alongside presumably significant channels of communication between these unions and the BJP. Although this was sometimes suggested in the interviews with other unions, not surprisingly it proved too difficult to substantiate in any detail. (Regarding BMS unions in BSNL unions, of course this was not a relevant question, since BSNL was an all-India public-sector employer.) Whatever the detail of such political channels of communication and influence, the BMS union in the bus-service sector gained explicitly and fundamentally in terms of the provision of collective bargaining rights to it by the BJP in government. More generally, the industrial relations/political trade-off between BMS unions and the BJP employer was a compliant union stance in exchange for BJP employer patronage and periodic concessions to BMS.

The compromises, concessions and conciliatory attitudes of the pro-BMS unions were easy to identify and especially apparent in the case of AMTS. Whilst Naukar Mandal took an essentially opportunist approach to the situation – which would seem to be the basis on which it courted the BJP – KNPMS (the BMS union in AMTS) was pulled in the direction of its employer by its ideological loyalties, alhough as noted above, there were contradictions in the latter situation. KNPMS may well have been torn between its expected BJP adherence and the suspected concerns within the BJP itself about Modi’s charismatic, individualised and autocratic style of leadership (an issue that was often raised in the Indian press, as well as indicated by the GSECC). There was also the arguably fundamental contradiction between its (qualified) BJP loyalties and its need to maintain credibility amongst its working-class members, as well as their support. The latter were not going to be satisfied, ultimately, by loyalty to a Hindu identity alone. This last point is important in that it probably placed significant limits on the extent to which BMS could publicly demonstrate its allegiance to the BJP in government, whilst also showing at least some commitment to winning gains for its members as workers. However much BMS members embraced Hindutva, they still had to heat their stoves, feed their families and pay the rent – tough everyday challenges in the context of low-paid manual work in India.

The weaknesses of pro-Congress unions and small bargaining units

Turning to the pro-Congress unions in the municipal bus-service sector - i.e. AGMU and its ‘fellow traveller’, MMS – it was clear that they did not have an essentially confrontational relationship with the employer. However, it was difficult to establish whether or not they had adopted a more concessionary approach with the advent of the BJP state and municipal governments. Certainly, the circumstances of the bus-service provider AMTS made it very difficult for them to win significant concessions from the employer under the BJP regime, with the balance of power heavily stacked against them. In addition, the philosophy of these two unions was clearly stated in that the meeting of workers’ needs was seen to coincide significantly with the protection of the employer’s business needs. Within the all-India telecommunications organisation, BSNL, an indication of pro-Congress union weakness was in the alliance that had emerged between the pro-Congress union and another telecommunications union – i.e. FNTO and NFTE; but this was played out in terms of a partnership aimed at winning sole national bargaining rights in BSNL, and removing the CITU union from this position. It also turned out to be unsuccessful.

Union merits of large bargaining units, class ideology, grassroots organisation, solidarity and bold leadership

In terms of public-sector union ‘defiance’ of the BJP in Gujarat, and based on the sectors studied, there were three obvious examples. First, within BSNL, the Employees’ Union secured very impressive victories in the successive campaigns held every two years to secure and maintain sole national collective bargaining rights. These victories were fundamental for the BSNL EU to increase its membership, to maintain members’ morale, and to train and organise its activists. They were also important for campaigning amongst the workforce, not least in terms of opposition to BSNL privatisation. Each of its victories seemed to have strengthened its power and influence, and the EU’s only opponent worth considering was the Congress-orientated NFTE/FNTO alliance in BSNL. Even when operating as allies, NFTE and FNTO were in a weak position. In addition, the BJP political regime in Gujarat gave the BMS union, BTEU-BSNL, no evident advantage in the BSNL national union bargaining rights campaigns.

Second, the Gujarat State Employees’ Co-ordination Committee mounted a very impressive and successful campaign in the autumn of 2008, demanding the implementation by the BJP Gujarat state government of the 6th Central Pay Commission recommendations. This was a very important and direct act of defiance by Modi’s trade union opponents, who were employed by his own government, and apparently no attempt was made to stop or attack the demonstration or arrest its organisers (provided that they were members or representatives of the unions in question [Indian Express 2009]). One of the crucial achievements of the GSECC was its ability to build a carefully constructed alliance between diverse groups of state government workers and unions and, as the interview data suggested, to provide strong but sensitive leadership for this alliance. The declared intention of the GSECC was to build on its 2008 pay victory in preparation for future union campaigns targeted at the Modi-led state government as its employer.

Third, the circumstances of the two communist unions in AMTS – Karmachari Sangh and the GFTU – made it much more difficult for them to challenge the status quo, and they were relatively weak and somewhat marginalised. The BJP as employer clearly would not contemplate offering them collective bargaining rights because of their political orientation and militancy, whilst providing this to both the pro-BMS unions and pro-Congress unions. However, it was clear that neither of these communist unions were likely to be compromised by the employer or the BJP in government, or to cease their activities. Generally they organised the most exploited workers. They proudly demonstrated their determination to oppose communalism, and frequently used legal test cases to publicise the gains they could win for workers and to mobilise workers’ support. Neither union seemed deterred by a lack of collective bargaining rights and (at least in the case of Karmachari Sangh), it was suggested that this was an actual advantage in terms of strategy and methods of mobilising workers. Although they were small organisations commanding apparently minimal resources, neither union seemed to be on the brink of collapse. The data suggested that a strong political commitment, class-conscious ideology, organisation and practice, and bold leadership were central features of their resilience and defiance.

Final comments

In conclusion, the distinctive nature of the BJP’s politics and the fact that it had secured a strong base in both the state and the municipal governments in question clearly had a major impact on unions in forcing them to formulate a strategic and political response to it. Firstly, in some cases the BJP’s position of power in effect drew unions towards it, and not just unions formally affiliated to BMS. Second, in other cases, the BJP regime seemed to encourage new alliances in opposition to it. Third, in yet other instances unions were ostracised, but there was evidence that these unions could still organise small-scale but very determined resistance. Fourth, the BMS unions, in addition to the opportunities they had as recipients of political patronage, also faced significant dilemmas and contradictions in the situation, which acted as restraints on them.

Whilst there is little doubt that the BJP regime in Gujarat and in its largest city, Ahmedabad, is a harsh climate for truly independent trade unionism that aims to challenge the employer and win significant concessions for its members, our study found no evidence of BJP hegemony with regard to trade unionism in Gujarat. Influenced by a complex web of factors – including larger bargaining units, a staunch adherence to union solidarity regardless of communal identities or party political sympathies, bold local leadership, and class-based perspectives and ideology – public-sector trade unionism in Gujarat presented a significant oppositional focus for workers. Even unions that were ideologically sympathetic to the BJP faced limits to the extent to which they could capitalise on their relationship with the BJP state and municipal governments. In short, we conclude that whilst Gujarat is an important testing ground for whether the BJP in power can contain, control and ultimately defeat organised labour, it faces considerable and probably insurmountable obstacles in this regard.

Cutting through these explanatory factors are fundamental political questions. The distinctive nature of Indian unions’ party political loyalties have often been a mixed blessing for workers and the unions themselves. Unions linked to a particular political party have yearned for the day in which their party would exercise political power. When this day has arrived, such unions have usually gained from their party-political connections, but this has also often caused divided loyalties between their parties in government and their union members, compromising the union. In addition, the traditional party-political allegiances of most Indian trade unions have often been a serious obstacle to union solidarity in the face of a tough employer, especially in the public sector, as some of our data indicate. Apparently in recognition of these problems, the union representatives we spoke to often played down the party links their unions had, whilst our evidence indicated that the party links in many cases were indeed present and important.

The nature of the gains and problems for unions with links to political parties was also fundamentally related to the particular ideologies of the unions and parties. In other words, as in other countries, many Indian unions have conflicting views about capitalism, and what sort of society they want to see in the future. Regarding the BJP, whether it emphasises caste identity or Indian identity, its ideology essentially denies the importance of class and thus implies the need for employer patronage to secure improvements for workers. In contrast, CPM ideology – whatever differences there might be between its rhetoric and reality in government – emphasises the inevitability of workers’ exploitation under capitalism, and the need to participate in the class struggle and fight for an alternative society. Pro-Congress unions are essentially reformist, and therefore they recognise business needs as legitimate, and try to improve workers’ pay and conditions within those limits. Divisions between unions in India are often fuelled by bitter political conflict, related to different political ideologies but also to the complex interplay of the latter with power struggles, political opportunism and the serving of the various vested interests of influential individuals and groups.

Bhattacherjee (1999, 2001) suggests that trade-union political allegiances in India may have weakened somewhat in the post-1991 period (except for BMS), and he may well be right. However, and in spite of the emergence of some new union organisations in India that have championed independence from political parties, Indian trade unionism cannot escape its particularly political history. Party politics continue critically and extensively to inform trade union practice. In addition, as in other countries, Indian unions also frequently think and behave politically regardless of any party affiliation, and indeed, public-sector unions can hardly avoid doing so (as indicated in our study by the case of the Gujarat state government workers’ union co-ordinating committee). Where trade unionists behave politically outside of party politics, they will still adopt various political methods and are influenced by political ideology, not least in terms of how they view the nature of the employment relationship, and the nature of government and the state.

To trade union activists in many other countries – for example, in much of Western Europe and not least in Britain – a lot of these issues will sound familiar:

Politically, our case studies in Gujarat highlight important, basic questions for trade unions in many diverse national contexts in terms of whether and how they might relate to a political party; and whether and in what circumstances this might increase their power and influence vis-à-vis the employers, and more widely in terms of affecting government policy and changing society. Of course, this brings us back to the fundamental questions of how particular unions view the nature of the employment relationship, which is related to their underlying ideology, and to whether (and if so how) they want to change society.

Therefore, we would suggest that our research has resonance internationally in terms of some basic trade union issues. Hopefully, this makes the study of wider interest and relevance beyond the state of Gujarat. However, we recognise the significant limits of generalising from our case studies, and wish also to emphasise the importance of contextual factors specific to Gujarat, viz.,

The combination of all of these particular contextual factors is critical to our analysis. Our analysis is thus rooted in a complex configuration of contextual explanatory factors specific to Gujarat, of explanatory factors that are significant more generally in India, and of factors that evidently have a much wider significance related to international trends regarding the changing role of the public sector, the state (de)regulation of capitalism and the nature of trade union ideology, its shifting political orientation, and its methods and response.