Defining the ‘sick society’: Discourses of class and morality in British right-wing newspapers during the 2011 England riots

Yobs, mobs and morons: Setting the scenes of anarchy

The front-page headlines below feature the foreground coverage of harder crimes, dramatic images and focus on the police in order to depict the level of destruction caused by rioters. Unsurprisingly, these featured anarchistic symbols of burning cars, fires, flames from buildings, masked looters and acts of vandalism. This was understandably a discourse of civil disobedience that framed the extent of disorder. The Daily Mail, Daily Express, Guardian, i-newspaper, Daily Star and Sun all used the image of a man in a hooded tracksuit and masked face in the foreground with a burning car behind him in Hackney. The Independent and Mirror both used another picture taken in Hackney of a man, again with his face covered, holding a can of Special Brew lager in the foreground, walking past a burning car in the background. The Telegraph and Times showed dramatic images of burning buildings, with the former showing a member of the public jumping from a window to escape a fire. As the headlines accompanying these images show, themes of anarchy and mob rule were prominent:

It is worth noting that the Guardian and Independent were more focused on the police’s efforts and position in the conflict than the other newspapers, which – despite the Independent’s headline, above – featured more prominent references to ‘the mob’ and discussions about those within it. Nonetheless, the notion that the police had lost control of the streets still prevailed. The headlines above are not surprising, but they do provide the foundations for complex discursive elements that featured thereafter. They also set a context for the resistance that occurred in efforts to suppress certain explanations for the riots. As psychologists Reicher and Stott argue:

So the accusation of mindlessness, the lazy language of the ‘mob’ … is not just wrong. It is positively dangerous. It stops us paying attention to what crowd actions tells us about how rioters understand their society. It stops us from addressing how these understandings come about. It dooms us to more disaffection, more division and more violence. (2011)

At this stage, the notion of mob rule and anarchy on London’s streets suggested the law and order of a civilised society had been compromised by a mindless group who were detached from society – rather than a group who were products of society, or held a conscious view of their role (or lack of a role) in society. It is to my sample of the right-wing press that I now pay closer attention in this analysis.

Suppressing cynical lefties: The discourse of criminality (pure and simple)

The Daily Mail accompanied its 9 August front-page headline, ‘The anarchy spreads’, with an extract from its comment page: ‘To blame the cuts is immoral and cynical. This is criminality pure and simple’ (9 August 2011). Political editor Tim Shipman’s article was also headlined, ‘Left wing cynics blame the Tory cuts for mayhem’. He wrote:

Left-wing politicians have cynically sought to make political capital out of the riots, blaming government cuts for the orgy of violence. Labour MPs and activists lined up to make excuses for the thugs, spouting claims that disadvantaged youth had no option but to smash up high streets. (9 August 2011: 8)

Both Shipman’s article and the comment piece in the Mail criticised the BBC for the attention they gave to community workers who were blaming cuts and social deprivation for the riots:

Much of the violence and widespread looting which has swept across London can be blamed on government cuts, poverty and homelessness, if you believe the BBC. (2011: 8)

And in the Daily Mail:

Inevitably, the BBC is determinedly helping to peddle this myth – seeking out community leaders who blame a lack of youth clubs for the looting, and revelling in footage of Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg being harangued by residents blaming ‘Coalition cuts’. (9 August 2011: 12)

The Mail’s position here was common throughout responses to the riots (including other media, public and political sources beyond the scope of this analysis). In fact, the Mail provided its own community source, Lindsay Johns, to counter this view. Under the headline, ‘A stinging rebuke from an inner-city youth worker: Apologists for these thugs should hang their heads in shame’, he argued:

We are told the rioters have been motivated by their rage at inequality, deprivation and unemployment. Some have blamed police brutality; others have wailed about ‘Tory cuts’ or the closure of youth clubs. But such explanations are as misguided as they’re immoral. In reality, there is no justification for the outbreak of carnage that’s gripped the capital. (Johns, 9 August 2011: 12)

As in the Mail’s comment piece, the riots themselves were not just seen as acts of immorality; those seeking to provide political and social explanations were immoral too. In depoliticising the context of the riots, it is interesting that Johns blamed ‘mindless criminality’ and ‘opportunistic materialism’ as explanations for looting: ‘What we witnessed was despicable. Far from representing a political act, it was nothing more than a mixture of mindless criminality and opportunistic materialism’ (2011: 12).

On 9 August, the Sun featured a two-page spread employing a discourse of mindless violence. Headlined, ‘Rabble without a cause’ under a title banner saying, ‘Thugs’ orgy of mindless violence’ (Crick et al. 2011: 5), witnesses provided accounts. The following witness statements echo Ken Clarke’s description of a ‘feral underclass’ and Cameron’s claims of family breakdown:

There were little kids running around everywhere. They can’t have been much older than eight. They were telling their older brothers when police were on the move. … An off-duty bus driver said ‘They were like animals. It’s very frightening’.

The Sun’s editorial column the same day commented, ‘As The Sun has said, this has nothing to do with protests over the shooting of a Tottenham man by police. This is anarchy, pure and simple’ (2011: 8). Whilst this is similar to the Daily Mail’s response (‘criminality’, ‘pure and simple’) it is also concerned with distancing the riots from any association with a protest against the police.

The Daily Telegraph on 9 August did feature more articles about general policing issues, calls for more aggressive police strategies, and other concerns about online threats from rioters’ organisation via social networks. However, its coverage still reflected a similar, oppositional and critical voice against arguments that connected the riots with the economic crisis, austerity and social deprivation. For example, the Telegraph’s editorial comment on 9 August argued that ‘real’ communities were being overlooked because of soft excuses for criminality:

The word ‘community’, heard so often in the past few days, has become a euphemism for an allegedly disfranchised group of young men and women whose alienation from the mainstream of society is used to excuse criminal behaviour. For years, the police have been encouraged to ‘engage’ with these people. But the real community surely comprises the law-abiding majority. (2011: 21)

Its other main point supported the response of David Lammy as a voice of opposition against ‘bleeding heart liberals’ who sought to explain the ‘mindlessness’ and ‘greed’ of rioters:

The view of this real community is not to be heard in the sentiments of bleeding heart liberals, who always find an explanation for such behaviour beyond opportunistic greed and mindless vandalism. Rather, it was provided by David Lammy, the local Labour MP. His unequivocal condemnation of the rioters needs to be replicated by others in his party who have, grotesquely, blamed Government spending cuts for the disorder. (2011: 21)

Notably, this was an instance in which a discourse of materialism and greed appeared without mobilising further socio-economic commentary on a consumer society or wider societal structures. Furthermore, as Bridges argues in his research, the conclusions Lammy drew from the riots were significantly flawed in the insight they provided:

Many would dispute Lammy’s description of current police-black community relations, whether in Tottenham or elsewhere in London and other cities. For example, in the three months to the end of June 2011, there were 6,894 police stop and searches in the local borough of Haringey, with only eighty-seven of these resulting in an arrest and conviction. London-wide and national statistics consistently show that stop and searches have increased steadily and are directed disproportionately at black and Asian youth in particular. (2012: 4-5)

But it should be noted that a Telegraph column printed next to its own editorial comment provided a similar opinion to that it was criticising. Under the headline, ‘The underclass is lashing out at a Britain that has turned its back’, columnist Mary Riddell blamed the left and right for their neglect of a social underclass and the growing inequalities of society during an economic crisis:

The real causes are more insidious. It is no coincidence that the worst violence London has seen in many decades takes place against the backdrop of a global economy poised for freefall. The causes of recession set out by J. K. Galbraith in his book, The Great Crash 1929, were as follows: bad income distribution, a business sector engaged in ‘corporate larceny’, a weak banking structure and an import/export imbalance. … Today, Britain is less equal, in wages, wealth and life chances, than at any time since then. Last year alone, the combined fortunes of the 1,000 richest people in Britain rose by 30 per cent to £333.5 billion. (2011: 20)

This was an isolated piece in the Telegraph, but it is still interesting that editorially there was space for this variation and complexity, if only as an exception to the general rule. Although Riddell acknowledged that reductionist arguments blaming just the cuts or race relations are too simplistic, she did attempt to provide an economically critical perspective:

This is not a cri de coeur for the failed and failing. Nor is it a lament for the impoverished. Mob violence, despicable and inexcusable, must always be condemned. But those terrorising and trashing London are also a symptom of a wider malaise. (2011: 20)

It is not entirely surprising that this column appeared, since comment sections do allow space for variation of opinion that might differ to the general editorial values of the paper. However, the thorough and critically engaging account from Riddell was printed next to the Telegraph’s editorial comment that day, which directly dismissed the type of explanation that she provided.

So it is clear from the discursive elements considered above that these newspapers made explicit attempts to critically oppose voices that sought to provide ‘sympathetic’ explanations for the riots. It was this discursive mechanism that developed into instances of blame towards political correctness hindering police efforts to control the violence. For example, amongst various articles supporting aggressive police tactics to control the riots, James Slack’s analysis article in the Daily Mail featured the headline: ‘Rudderless Met Crippled by liberalism’. Slack argued that political correctness – mainly due to the Stephen Lawrence case – hindered police efforts to control the riots:

The appalling handling of the heinous murder of Stephen was born out of incompetence, yet the Macpherson inquiry branded the police ‘institutionally racist’ – and they have been doing their hands tied behind their backs ever since, especially considering large numbers of the protagonists are black teenagers. (12 August 2011: 11)

The Sun’s associate editor, Trevor Kavanagh evoked similar accusations of blame whilst also referring to issues of benefits and social welfare:

So, who is responsible and what can we do about it? Well, don’t blame the police on the streets of Hackney, Croydon or Brixton for letting Britain down. Blame their politically-correct commanders and the handwringing politicians who adopt the cringe position when the ‘underprivileged’ resort to violence. Blame the Macpherson Report which emasculated our police by branding the entire force ‘institutionally racist’. Blame lawmakers like Justice Secretary Ken Clarke or Labour’s ‘equalities’ crusader Harriet Harman who believe a slap on the wrist is the answer. And blame hypocrites like Ken Livingstone and the race relations industry who have made a good living out of grievance politics and the victimhood of workshy whingers. (2011: 12-13)

These instances demonstrate how various interdiscursive mechanisms were cutting into the construction of blame and calls for harder policing and judicial responses – an issue to which I return below. ² What is also interesting about Kavanagh’s piece is that he resorted to a criticism of the welfare state; contradicting other discourses, which argued that immorality transcended social class. It is those instances in which class complexity complicated discourses of blame, class and morality that I address below.

An unlikely mob, and the case of Laura Johnson: A discourse of confusion (and paradoxical persuasion) in representations of the accused

In this section, I consider some of the discursive dynamics that functioned as ‘paradoxically persuasive’ (Kelsey 2012) mechanisms of discourse; serving an immediate (albeit contradictory) purpose that still maintained a broader, social and political agenda. In previous work, I have considered how certain stories or discursive features might appear to contradict the ideological interests or political position of a particular source or newspaper (which we understand through the contextual and historical knowledge that we bring to our readings of texts). Despite the apparent contradictions that occur, a more nuanced contextual reading considers how different discursive mechanisms serve particular purposes in immediate and temporary environments. This reading can actually help to make sense of the ideological positions that are maintained through such ‘contradictions’ rather than compromising the broader interests that they serve. Particularly in the case of Laura Johnson, we see a temporary purpose served: Johnson was used as a discursive device to oppose suggestions that the riots were a product of social deprivation. But these stories actually complicate and contradict later developments in other stories, when the government targeted housing benefits (which I address below) in order to punish some rioters in addition to their legal convictions. Despite the contradictions within these stories and events, the ideological consistency that these discourses serve operates beyond the contradictory foreground in a longitudinal context that functions beyond their immediate production and purpose. Hence the stories covered below, within the broader discursive landscape that I cover in this article, can be interpreted through this understanding of paradoxical persuasion.

Before considering the discourse of confusion that occurred when rioters appeared in court, it is important to recognise the context of a moral public versus the immoral (‘scum’) rioters that had been established beforehand. Discourses of community defiance against the riots were often mobilised through two stories: large voluntary groups turning out for street clean-ups; and members of the public physically defending their streets against rioters. The clean-ups featured images of the public with brooms often held in the air to imply defiance and victory. A girl with a message written across her top saying ‘Looters are scum’ also featured as a large image in the Sun and Mail. Whilst these discourses juxtaposed the moral consensus of law-abiding citizens with the faceless identity of the ‘mob’ (or ‘scum’), this binary construction was interrupted by the profiles of the accused appearing in court: ‘Postman, school mentor, charity worker, lifeguard, boy of 11. The unlikely rioters hauled to court’ (Greenwood, 11 August 2011: 6-7).

Acknowledging the ‘unlikely’ profiles here, this article recognised an element of unexpected complexity in the demographic profile of rioters: ‘But while the trouble has been largely blamed on feral teenagers, many of those paraded before the courts yesterday led apparently respectful lives’. The Daily Telegraph’s front page that day invoked Cameron’s phrase in response to the riots, with the headline, ‘Our sick society’, which was accompanied by the following: ‘As Cameron condemns riots, suspected looters in court include a boy of 11, a grammar school girl, and a teaching assistant’ (Gilligan 2011: 1).

Another Telegraph headline on the same day, said: ‘Girl who has it all is accused of theft’, and provided a detailed account of Laura Johnson: ‘Laura Johnson appears as far removed as possible from the lawless “underclass” said to have been blighting Britain’s streets’ (Whitehead & Watt 2011: 3). In Gilligan’s article, he also wrote, ‘They were, some told us, the alienated poor, those without hope, lashing out in rage and despair. But as the accused London rioters started appearing in court they included university students, a rich businessman’s daughter and a boy of 11’ (2011: 1-2). Even within Gilligan’s article, there is another implicit understanding of a ‘type’ of person who fits the profile of Cameron’s ‘sick society’:

Most defendants conformed more closely to Mr Cameron’s ‘sick society’ template. There was Richard Myles-Palmer, with a foot-long list of convictions, found wheeling a shopping trolley full of stolen power tools through south London. He and his co-defendant, Jason Gary White, pleaded guilty. Humble in the dock in their white issue T-shirts, they were transformed men when they emerged from court, masked up and making hand signals of defiance. (Gilligan 2011: 2)

Gilligan’s reference to ‘most defendants’ holding previous convictions is also problematic. Ball and Drury have explained in their research that statistics were used inaccurately – and ideologically – in response to the riots, arguing that ‘it is very likely that those who were arrested and/or charged, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the August riots, were primarily those with (extensive) criminal records whose faces were uncovered and secondly those who had no previous record but were unmasked’ (2012: 12). As they point out, due to the use of CCTV, the former group were far more likely to be arrested than any other thanks to the police records used to identify unmasked individuals (2012: 12). It was also the case that police authorities recognised this bias in statistics, as demonstrated by an exchange between acting commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, and the Home Affairs Committee during the weeks following the riots. ³ In response to Gilligan’s report at the time, this is important, since its presupposition partly informs support for harder judicial responses.

The Sun’s front page on August 11 also listed the occupations of some of the accused: ‘Lifeguard, postman, hairdresser, teacher, millionaire’s daughter, chef and schoolboy 11’, followed by a story across pages 4 and 5, headlined, ‘Mansion gates to magistrates’ (Sabey et al. 2011: 4-5). A heading across the top of the page also said, ‘Riot courts meet an unlikely mob’. Before covering the various identities of the accused and their occupations, it focused on Laura Johnson:

A teenage girl hauled into court for allegedly being part of a mob of 200 looters is the privileged daughter of millionaire parents. Laura Johnson, 19 – one of dozens to appear in court yesterday – is said to have been arrested behind the wheel of a car filled with stolen electrical goods, cigarettes and alcohol worth over £6,000. … Privately-educated Johnson has two brothers. Neighbour David Turner said: ‘They are a nice, respectable family. They never caused any problems.’ (2011: 4-5)

It is significant that this featured a background source expressing such surprise, describing the Johnson’s as a ‘nice, respectable family’. The concept of feral teenagers or family background is implicitly excluded from the Johnson family profile, unlike those of other rioters that fit the more predictable stereotype of a ‘sick society’ that I explore below. But this was a subtle exception to the rule, with most responses making an example of Johnson. For example, the front page of the Daily Mail on 12 August featured a picture of Laura Johnson, next to the main story and headline stating ‘You’re a disgrace to your country’ (2011: 1). Page 7 then featured a story about Johnson: ‘A star pupil from £1m home. How did she end up in the dock?’ This article was primarily focused on the disbelief that someone from such a background had become involved in looting:

Whatever the reasons for Laura’s ignominious predicament, they appear to have nothing to do with alienation or despair; not that this is any excuse for the shameful events that have scarred the country this week. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a young woman with a brighter future; a future which has now been jeopardised; perhaps irrevocably so. (Bracchi 2011: 7)

Another Daily Mail article showed how complex (and contradictory) this discourse became in Richard Littlejohn’s column, in which materialism and moralism were a central point of blame. He used Enfield as an example of an area that did not support the concept of social deprivation:

Enfield isn’t a deprived inner-city ghetto, it’s a peaceful middle-class suburb. The disturbances there weren’t a protest against police brutality. A few hooligans figured the police would be so busy down the road in Tottenham that it was the perfect opportunity to rob the local Vodafone dealer. … One thing is certain: this wasn’t about poverty, not in the material sense. If there’s poverty, it’s spiritual poverty, moral poverty and poverty of ambition. (9 August 2011: 15) ⁴

In this instance, Littlejohn suggested that materialism and greed transcend social class – partly due to the location of the riots. His efforts to clarify what is ‘certain’ about the riots reflected a recurring, modal tendency in language throughout responses to the riots; an ideological motivation to establish an absolute ‘truth’ about what was happening. In the context of this being a Daily Mail article – and the broader discursive knowledge of what these responses were suppressing in their opposition to discourses of deprivation – it is clear that this was not an attempt to mobilise critical discourses of structural issues in society, and/or the economic context of materialistic greed and consumption, as cultural products of consumerism. Rather, this was another instance of what became a fragmented field of confusing and inconsistent discourses seeking to argue that the immoral ‘others’ in society transcended social class.

A two-page spread in the Daily Mail on 12 August continued to highlight the spread of social demographics across looter profiles that transcended social class. Under the caption ‘Children, graduates, a musician… The court marathon goes on’, these pages features images and accounts of rioters including an aspiring musician who stole a violin; a student and Baptist Church mentor who looted a jewellery shop; an estate agent accused of attempted theft from PC World; and a ballet student who looted two flat-screen televisions. On this spread the Mail ran a piece, headlined: ‘Shameless! Jailing of a TV lookalike’. This article was about a man who was jailed for assaulting a police officer, and who was cast as a lookalike of the Shameless television show character, Frank Gallagher. Clearly relying on the stereotype evoked by this comparison, it described Bernard Moore as follows:

Moore, 46, a beggar and Big Issue seller who came to Britain from America, has a previous conviction for a public order offence. He lives on a sink estate in Collyhurst, north Manchester with a young woman, calls himself Brian and like Frank Gallagher has several children who don’t live with him. Moore begs every day in Manchester city centre and hangs around with drug addicts who take heroin and crack cocaine. Every night on his way back to his flat, he buys White Ace cider and Special Brew from a local off licence with loose change. (Narain 2012: 5)

Interdiscursively, there are a number of issues that surface in the account of this individual, including discourses of drugs and alcohol; family breakdown; unemployment (implicitly relating to social welfare and benefits); and crime and immigration (with a direct link between these two discursive aspects depicting an immigrant with a record of a ‘previous conviction’). This is exemplary of a discourse that concentrated on symptoms rather than causes of social issues. Despite the class complexities that surround it in discourses transcending social class on the same page, it reverts to a common stereotype, aimed to identify (or construct) a common problem. It is also an example of the discursive elements that informed proposed legislative responses to the riots, as we see below in discourses of social welfare.

Redefining the mob: Punishing the poor through Conservative social policy

The complexities and inconsistencies of discursive elements considered thus far should be kept in mind when considering the legislative responses (and discursive support) that developed for Conservative measures on welfare and judicial punishments over the days concerned. The discourses considered in this section demonstrate the contradictory mechanisms that I began to highlight above. Responses that sought to deal with (or punish) rioters and ‘cure’ a sick society reverted from the discursive positions covered in the previous section; subsequently contradicting previous constructions of a moral underclass that transcended the social spectrum. The Daily Mail’s own opinion piece, in a closing comment, said: ‘Indeed, if anything, it was Labour’s nurturing of a benefits culture, in which youngsters believe there is no need to work to have a comfortable lifestyle, which sowed the seeds of the riots – not any ‘Coalition cuts’’ (9 August 2011: 12). Whilst there is a distinct effort to suppress the blame aimed at austerity and deprivation, a comment like this brings political responsibility back into play; it argues that government policy is significant and that the riots could be linked to issues of social welfare, but only in support of a Conservative policy agenda. Similarly, the Daily Mail’s comment piece on August 11 praised Cameron’s response and recognition of a ‘sick society’ whilst defining what this society consisted of:

Meanwhile, the doling out of ever more benefits to the jobless has instilled a something-for-nothing entitlement culture which culminated in children as young as 11 this week looting shops. David Cameron, in a robust performance yesterday, finally indicated that he understands the crisis facing Britain, parts of which he correctly identified as being ‘sick’, rife with family breakdown and in need of urgent social repair. The bitter irony, after the mayhem of the past few days, is that if he were to boldly seize the opportunity to fix Britain’s broken welfare state, law and order system, immigration controls and parlous family structures, would find an electorate devastated by what it has witnessed fully behind him. (August 11 2011: 14) ⁵

Delivered within the context of unemployment and welfare, these references to a ‘something-for-nothing entitlement culture’ and ‘family breakdown’ demonstrate that cases like Laura Johnson were only mentioned as exceptions to the rule, or to serve a temporary purpose. ⁶ Also, and in line with conventional Conservative ideals, the interdiscursive mechanisms above bound together right-wing perspectives on welfare, justice, immigration and family values. As the following examples show, the depoliticised actions of rioters were eventually redefined as a politicised problem; a problem responsible for a sick society, to be cured by Conservative policy.

For example, two articles in the Sun on August 11 – either side of the ‘Mansion gates to magistrates’ article mentioned earlier – featured a link between the riots and welfare culture through Cameron’s response. Their positioning and layout is significant, since they provide contradictions on either side of an article that constructs a moral underclass transcending the social spectrum. Headlined, ‘PM Vow: I will cure sick society’, one article said: ‘In his emergency statement to the Commons today Mr Cameron will say we must restore discipline and end the something-for-nothing culture’ (2011: 4). Another article, on the same two-page spread, headlined, ‘New law will evict riot thugs’ said, ‘Rioters and looters will be booted out of their council homes, the Government said yesterday. Housing minister Grant Shapps plans to extend powers to evict “neighbours from hell” to include riot yobs’ (2011: 5). The issue of social welfare recurred in the Sun’s 12 August comment piece. Under the headline, ‘Stop benefits’, it projected a tenuous construction of public consensus on the issue of suspending benefits for rioters: ‘MORE than 100,000 people last night demanded a Commons debate on axing benefits for convicted rioters. The No. 10 website crashed as angry Brits tried to sign an e-petition calling for tough sanctions’ (Sun 2011: 9).

However, it is worth noting that the Sun’s tone was not always completely supportive of Cameron if it did not feel his response to crime was hard enough. Its comment piece on 12 August said, ‘Mr Cameron also vowed to tackle the gang culture in our cities. We’ve heard that before. To stamp out gangs we need less of the PM’s Big Society guff and more action against criminals, together with extra jails and proper sentences with no early release’ (p. 8). Whilst Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ is already a controversial issue, the Sun’s position is clear; interdiscursively, this argument concentrates less on community relations and more on harder approaches to justice, law and order. But this reflects a problematic, presupposed notion of extensive gang involvement in the riots. As Bridges points out:

It was reported that, during the riots, ‘gangs suspended any ordinary hostilities between each other to focus on other targets’ thus enabling young people to gather to protest against the police in different localities. However, it is also clear from both arrest and survey data that the involvement of gangs in co-ordinating the riots was greatly exaggerated at the time. (2012: 5)

Nonetheless, gangs in this instance were projected as another sick element of society that could be reformed through harder, Conservative policy. In a similar occurrence on 12 August, the front page of the Daily Telegraph provided more direct criticism of Cameron. Under the headline ‘Back on the streets’, it said, ‘Despite tough action promised by Cameron, child looters are freed by the courts … and they even keep their anonymity’ (2011: 1). Clearly implying that judicial procedures were not harsh enough, this suggests that laws around youth and anonymity should be compromised due to the severity of crimes committed. In the Daily Mail on 12 August, youth worker Winston Smith wrote a piece criticising the justice system and what he saw as Cameron’s pseudo-tough approach to punishment. Under the headline ‘Tough sentences? Forget it. These teen yobs will be treated as if they are the victims’, he wrote:

David Cameron may have sounded tough this promising night curfews, tougher sentencing and new police powers …. But the Prime Minister is sorely mistaken if he thinks the rioters will punished and made to pay for what they’ve done. Why? Because the criminal justice system in this country is broken. (2011: 14) ⁷

Interdiscursive mechanisms in Smith’s article connected various policy issues through the perception of interrelated problems; criticisms of sentencing powers, a ‘laughable’ penal system, and criminal activity were bound up with criticisms of social welfare and immigration policy:

I have escorted a 16-year-old, unemployed, criminal teenager by taxi from his home to the benefits office so he could sign on for the dole, even though he lived only ten minutes away by foot. He was from a large Albanian family of Romany gypsies who had come to Britain seeking asylum, but each had ended up involved in criminal activities, including violent muggings and burglary. (2011: 14)

This also contributed to another dismissal and criticism of ‘bleeding heart liberals’:

Despite his criminal conduct — because of it, in fact — the local youth offending team was desperate for him to claim as many benefits as possible, even laying on transport. The bizarre logic, as it was put to me, was that poverty was the cause of his illegal actions (a trite and misguided argument trotted out this week by bleeding heart liberals in defence of the looters). (2011: 14)

These criticisms (in all three newspapers) of Cameron, and the judicial legislation in place at the time, demonstrated that this was not a simple case of supporting the current, Conservative government. Rather, this discursive position indicates that, ideologically, the government needed to follow traditional Conservative values and a harder approach to social and legal policy in order to ‘cure’ a ‘sick society’.

A Telegraph article on August 11 echoed Cameron’s response on welfare policy, implying that he needed to convince the public that his response would be hard enough. Headlined, ‘We will make rioters suffer, says MP’, it explained, ‘David Cameron will announce a range of measures today aimed at convincing the public that rioters will face serious jail sentences and the loss of council homes and benefits’ (Kirkup & Porter 2011: 4). The idea of ‘convincing the public’ that these measures would be carried out presupposed that there was a public consensus calling for them already. The discursive mechanisms that sought to condone a conservative review of social welfare policy through legislative punishments relied on this juxtaposition of a moral public consensus against a dishonourable, moral underclass. Despite the social complexities that were clearly acknowledged across some vast, discursive ground (above), right-wing discourses still blamed and punished those whom, in other cases, it claimed were not centrally responsible for the riots. These discursive nuances and paradoxical mechanisms maintain a connection and consistency through their ideological support for the socio-economic and ‘moral’ agenda of Conservative approaches to social welfare and penal policy.