From labour–capital conflict to social dialogue? A critical review of social-dialogue discourse in Turkey

Abstract

In itself, the term ‘social dialogue’ signifies that the historical conflict between social classes has been replaced with ‘compromise’. In this paper, compromise discourse is first hesitantly approached, and then critically evaluated. In the first instance, it is clear that contrary to what the term ‘social dialogue’ might imply, in reality it is used as a curtain with which to cover hegemonic power relations. Secondly, the question as to whether the term ‘social dialogue’ can describe Turkish industrial relations is raised. As a result, it is argued that social dialogue is not a suitable word with which to discuss the current industrial relations climate in Turkey.

Keywords

Class conflict hegemonic labour relations labour relations social dialogue Turkish industrial relations

Introduction

Social scientists observe, investigate and examine phenomena becoming manifest in society, and eventually reach concepts that represent these phenomena in their mind. It is only natural that one cannot speak of a single concept relating to a given phenomenon: social scientists working on the same object of investigation may conceptualise what they observe differently. The reason for this is that there is no reality fully independent of the subject. ‘Interests, rules, dogmas and misconceptions of circles that dominate the society largely influence scientific efforts and outcomes; this may be openly and consciously or implicitly and unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally’ (Bulutay 1986: 2). Such a situation may arise not only from different perspectives adopted by social scientists or their use of different methods, but also from their extra scientific engagements. Neuman describes this second case as ‘pseudoscience’, referring to the abuse of science to support specific political or social values. Neuman also draws attention to the fact that the methodology used by pseudoscience disguised as science is designed in such a way as to present works that often contain personal views or political ideologies as ‘real’ social science texts (Neuman 2011: 10).

Observing social studies carried out in Turkey, it is clear that the adoption of western literature without question stands out as a serious problem. In cases that can be examined in this context, it is accepted that the ‘object of examination’ has its background and connection with some other phenomena, but without fully considering that the very same ‘object’ is actually a process with past and possible future forms, and that its connection with other phenomena is a part of what that object actually is. This approach makes it easier to analyse parts that are broken apart from the whole while blurring the perception related to each part. Another problem is that of discussing and writing about a phenomenon that does not actually exist – a situation we are currently facing. Talking about phenomena that do not exist (i.e. not looking at an observed phenomenon from a different perspective, but trying to give existence linguistically to something that does not exist) is the outcome of the efforts of those who dominate to legitimise the existing order, whose ultimate aim is to oppress the historical discourse of social opposition. Moreover, the use of terminology constructed by following this path without paying necessary attention to the clarity in social debate ‘may distort our perception about the real world, in which we are living, and divert our research agenda from its course’ (Boratav 2010: 26; 2012).

The discourse of ‘social dialogue’ that is widely used in the literature on industrial relations is an example of the distortion and diversion mentioned above. What the discourse implies is that ‘social’ parties (i.e. workers and employers) are in dialogue, and that this so-called dialogue takes place under the observation and supervision of the state – to such an extent that social dialogue presented as a panacea is exported and even imposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union (EU).¹

As a result, at preparatory stages of the introduction of legislative arrangements, there is frequent reference to the importance of ‘social dialogue’ in all kinds of meetings bringing the social parties together. On one hand, social dialogue is portrayed as an ideal instrument in social policy discussions, while on the other, it covers a significant space in the imagining of an ideal society by some political ideologies. For the latter, it stereotypes the roles to be played in confrontations of social sections with opposing interests under what should be considered as ‘ideal’. So have we come to the end of the historical and social struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed, which may take open and hidden forms, as stated in the early lines of the Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels 1969)? From now on, shall we see cooperation, compromise and dialogue instead of conflict? Are we really facing such a situation now?

In Turkey, a critical look at discourses and/or research projects that take social dialogues as their focal point will show that they have some limitations. It can be observed that the discourse developed within the discipline of social policy merely consists of descriptions idealising social dialogue and some varnishing of benefits expected from this idealisation. There is no mention of the holistic meaning, context and historical background of the structure to which the term (social dialogue) is meant to refer, and there is also avoidance of critical discussion of whether there is such structure in Turkey, and whether the steps taken in this direction are actually useful.

Işığıçok, a proponent of the mainstream approach, argues that the transformation commenced by the process of globalisation has led to the replacement of the contentious structure that has dominated the industrial relations sphere since the Industrial Revolution, with the relations based on common benefits to the parties, dialogue, and cooperation. She states that the international economic competition, intensified with globalisation, entails a peaceful and reconciliatory industrial relations system for stable economic and social development, and that the social dialogue is used in parallel with this purpose. She posits that the increasing demands of social partners for social dialogue and concrete steps taken in this context are emerging as a common feature of new industrial relations systems in both developed and developing countries (Işığıçok 2007).

Şenkal claims that reconciliation has been one of the most important transformations in industrial relations system for two decades. He believes that the rapid decline of strikes and lockouts all over the world, especially in developed countries, has resulted from compromise and cooperation in industrial relations. He also believes that the decline in strikes in Turkey from the beginning of the 1990s indicates that the Turkish industrial relations system has been moving towards a more cooperative and reconciliatory structure (Şenkal 1999: 36–37, 272). Yıldırım and Çalış criticise the state’s domination and the lack of a social dialogue culture in the industrial relations system in Turkey, and state that social dialogue does not work efficiently because of state interventionism. According to them, the government basically ignores social partners and does not allow them to take part in the decision-making process. As a result, ‘social partners feel that they are simply consulted rather than actually taking part in the decision-making process’ (Yıldırım & Çalış 2006).

This paper is devoted to a critical evaluation of the discourse of social dialogue, with specific reference to industrial relations in Turkey. Ollman stresses, from the point of Marxism, that if the majority does not see the capitalist system and how it works, then it is as important to simply reveal its existence and what kind of a system it is as it is to explain it. He further says that the latter is not possible without the former (Ollman 2003: 4). In reference to Ollman, this study may be seen as an effort to reveal it as well. Along this line, let’s begin by taking a closer look at the content of the discourse of ‘social dialogue’, and then examine its course in Turkey.

Social dialogue: Grounds for dialogue, or an instrument for keeping workers under control?

During the early phase of capitalism, the relation between labour and capital is expressed by the concept ‘despotism’, or more correctly, the relation is conceptualised as such. The concept ‘despotism’ refers to capital, backed up by the state, driving large working masses from other areas of production including agriculture to factories by using force, and again resorting to force, when necessary, to make them work in order to obtain surplus value. Over the course of time, the changing form of capitalism and the development of the organised labour movement brought a transition from ‘despotism’ to ‘hegemony’, if we use the concept as defined by Gramsci.² This new form of capital–labour relations is termed ‘social dialogue’ by the mainstream approach.

The term ‘social dialogue’ implies that in the process of globalisation, where neoliberal ideology has established its dominance, social struggles have moved away from the context of the contradiction between labour and capital to find a new platform of class compromise and cooperation. Yet it is debatable as to whether this idea of a shift has objective grounds or not. There is a need to go back a little in order to correctly read recent transformations in industrial relations. This will make it possible to clarify how the aforementioned discourse emerged, together with its context.

The phenomenon of corporatism and debates around it left their imprint on the period after the First World War. The establishment of the ILO in the same period should also be seen as the outcome of these debates. The concept of corporatism which was widely used in the 1920s was brought back from dusty shelves, as stated by Cizre, upon the economic crisis of the early 1970s (Cizre 1992: 30). The entry of capitalism into an accumulation crisis in this period places the concept of corporatism and associated practices into the focus of discussion. Corporatist practices, regarded in advanced western countries as a way out of crisis, were then referred to as ‘neo-corporatism’. In the same period, another type of corporatist practices was mentioned, and the term ‘state corporatism’ was used to distinguish these practices from neo-corporatism. The term ‘state corporatism’ is now used for corporatist practices in underdeveloped countries.

The essence of corporatist cooperation is the ‘acceptance of capitalistic organisation of production, private proprietorship of means of production and the authority of employers to control labour processes’ (Wahl 2004: 40).

Neo-corporatist practices geared to establishing and institutionalising cooperation between labour and capital at the national level first started in Nordic countries, and spread to western European countries after the Second World War. The basic aim of these practices is to keep under control the labour side of labour–capital conflict, which poses a risk to macro-economic balance in the context of Keynesian economic policies. One edition bringing together articles on the development of these practices at national and regional levels exposed the fact that this objective can be found as part of the backdrop of Euro-wide discourse on consensus and cooperation (Trebilcock 1994). Examining the impact of these practices on the history of labour in Europe, Wahl argues that this development, bringing along the depoliticisation and moderation of labour movement as well as the bureaucratisation of the trade union movement, is a strategy consciously adopted by employers. This strategy was developed against the labour movement, which gained radical dimensions in the face of adverse circumstances following economic crisis and war, and was successful. Meanwhile, it may be added that the existence of a rival economic system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was also a factor leading to the adoption of this strategy (Wahl 2004: 39–40).

Class cooperation that emerged following the Second World War started to dissolve after the economic crisis of the 1970s, and, paradoxically, the right-wing parties taking office in this period eliminated the mechanism of cooperation. For example, in the UK the Thatcher government abandoned corporatist practices (Goodman 1994: 274). In fact, cooperation was not entirely dropped: it was dissolved and reconstructed to meet the requirements of neoliberal restructuring. The qualitative change experienced after this process of deconstruction and reconstruction is explanatory of this paradox. While the essence of cooperation emerging after the Second World War was ‘participation to management’,³ it was transformed into ‘advisory’ statements of opinion following deconstruction and reconstruction.

Corporatist efforts geared to transferring the contradiction between labour and capital from a milieu of conflict to the milieu of reconciliation take the form of ‘social dialogue’ these days. Discourse on social dialogue is cherished at both national and international levels, and intensive efforts are being made to institutionalise this discourse. The term ‘tripartite cooperation’ is used to describe efforts waged to bring the parties, workers, employers and governments together to ensure social dialogue among various sections of the society. The social dialogue discourse is, in fact, a production coalition based on profit and the competitive priorities of capital (Özuğurlu 2007: 294). In fact, this coalition is nothing but an instrument of hegemonic domination as a sophisticated form of despotism. While talking about partnership between workers and employers, this form of domination also threatens by presenting the sustenance of production as a precondition for the very existence of workers (i.e. ‘if there are no jobs, there are no workers!’).

The term ‘social dialogue’ is a euphemism of a type that Scott describes in reference to Bourdieu. Scott says that euphemisms are inserted into the public transcript⁴ to mask or present as harmless or sterile many unpleasant phenomena deriving from domination. He also stresses that euphemisms are designed to hide the use of force, as in the case in which the term ‘pacification’ is used instead of ‘armed attack’ (Scott 1990: 52–53).

Social dialogue in Turkey

The first initiative in Turkey to establish a social dialogue was the Social Agreement made between the government then in office and the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), in 1978. This agreement remained in effect for only 14 months. After that, the Social Agreement was thrown into the garbage, and efforts to establish social dialogue were abandoned. After a long period of time, social dialogue was again included in the agenda upon the establishment of the Economic and Social Council in 1995. In 2001, Law no. 4641 on the Establishment and Working Principles of the Economic and Social Council was passed. While developments experienced up until the enactment of this legislation were associated with internal dynamics, the processes that took place afterwards are associated with the process of negotiation with the EU and the EU’s requests of Turkey.

The remaining part of this paper deals initially with the social dialogue envisaged by the Social Agreement that was made in 1978. Following that is a treatment of the events behind the initiative for a Economic and Social Council in 1995, and the content of the discourse on dialogue mainly moulded by EU requests to develop a critical stance vis-á-vis the discourse on social dialogue. Finally, an evaluation of trade unions from a critical perspective is included.

The Social Agreement of 1978

The agreement⁵ was made by the government of the time with TÜRK-İŞ, on 20 July 1978. Other trade unions and employers’ organisations were not involved in this agreement. The agreement mainly targeted public-sector employees, rather than private. It coincided with a period in which the Turkish economy was in deep crisis. It would be incorrect to see this as a simple temporal coincidence. Hence, there is a need for a brief explanation of the issue, and of why the agreement was made in such a period.

The world economy was facing a crisis in the first half of the 1970s, as a result of an increase in oil prices. In that period, Turkey was pursuing an import-substitution industrialisation strategy characterised by populist policies for the working classes. Populist practices were maintained without any concession even after the crisis, and this made it possible to postpone the crisis for some time. Starting from 1997, however, it was no longer possible to continue with import-substitution industrialisation based on populism (Boratav 1983: 16; Boratav 2005a: 140; Yeldan 2006: 38).

The main reason leading to the emergence of the Social Agreement, as stressed by Talas (1982: 14), was the aforementioned economic crisis. Boratav’s analysis of the basis of distinction between countries where conservatives are in power and others governed by social democratic parties in regard to developing a strategy against the crisis is extremely illuminating:

From 1974 on, bourgeois democracies started to develop adaptation policies in the face of the crisis. In countries where conservative parties were in power, working classes who were required to undertake the large part of the cost of these policies started a type of bargaining with ruling classes by waging a struggle through their economic and political organisations. In countries where social-democrat or leftist parties were in power, working classes acceded to sharing the cost of the crisis.⁶ (Boratav 1983: 15–16)

According to Boratav (1983: 16), in Turkey there was no mechanism to call on working classes for an accord. Hence, the classic stability programme of international capital against the crisis was the only alternative, and this could be translated into life only by imposing it on working classes from above.

There was change in government during the crisis period, and the new government that took office on 5 January 1978 had to inherit the circumstances of crisis. Also deriving from its social-democrat line, the new government sought ways to reconciliate with the working class first. The social agreement must be seen as an outcome of this approach. The content of the agreement suggests that the working people are regarded as a power and a counterpart. But the counterpart is actually a part of the working people: organised workers in the public sector. The Social Agreement also takes account of other segments of society, including rural people in the first place, and talks about ensuring justice in income distribution. Yet however this agreement may give the impression of sensitivity to class demands at first glance, we have strong evidence to believe that this is illusionary. What the agreement actually aims at is not restoring the distorted division of income as a whole, but changing the relations of division of income between the working people. It considers that organised public-sector workers are relatively better paid due to their power in collective bargaining, and it intends to eliminate this status. Indeed, the most critical part of the Social Agreement is related to this aim:

The Government and TÜRK-İŞ agree that unless there is an economic leap forward to quickly reduce unemployment and to ensure fair sharing of the benefits of development by all people including peasants, material benefits accorded only to workers through collective agreements would not bring happiness even to workers themselves.

The kind of trade unionism that assigns weight only to economic struggle is rapidly heading towards a dead end with respect to the economic and social circumstances of the country and it is also observed that this dead end has started to have its negative effects on the public at large given the rights of the labour that exist today.

As can be seen clearly in the section of the Agreement quoted above, the real purpose is to prevent the movement of working people for higher wages from intervening in the overall functioning of the economy. Besides the aim of stopping the movement of organised workers in the public sector for higher wages, the Social Agreement also includes a very important detail that can be considered as ‘against labour’. By provisions intended to bar workers’ participation to decision-making processes in their workplaces, the Agreement tends to keep this section of workers under control to the extent that is possible.

Collective agreements shall include no articles that impede efficiency and production increase in public institutions and enterprises as well as efficient working of management and articles of this nature existing in earlier agreements shall not be given effect (Articles referred to in this part are not those containing monetary provisions but others particularly related to the use of labour and employment). Commissions within establishment composed of representatives of workers and employers shall identify such articles and develop suggestions for their replacement. On the condition that this rule is observed, there shall be a joint work to arrange for and ensure the participation of workers to management and share responsibility in a manner boosting efficiency and profit and add a new dimension to our democracy.

This quotation from the Social Agreement reveals another fact besides efforts to prevent workers’ participation in management: the Social Agreement seeks to increase productivity and profits: in other words, the rate of surplus value; or to be clearer, the rate of exploitation of labour. After 14 months, the Agreement ceased to be in effect, because efforts to push wages down through the Social Agreement had failed. Wage levels tended to keep rising in general during the crisis. For example, while the share of wages in the sectoral value added in industry was 28 per cent in 1975, it increased to 37 per cent in 1979 (Yeldan 2006: 43). This was possible as a result of the effective use of the right to collective bargaining and strike by workers.

Shortly after the abandonment of the Agreement, the government changed, and the new government showed no tendency for social dialogue or reconciliation. In fact there was no such need, since an alternative (military intervention) phased in. Neoliberal economic policies were adopted upon the decisions of January 24 (1980), but could not be implemented easily. They found their way in following the military coup of September 12 (1980), and a tough environment was created in industrial relations.

The need of neoliberal policies to place workers under control, and the phasing out of social dialogue

Starting from 1980, Turkey was engaged in radical changes in its economic policies to integrate with the global economy, and started to pursue neoliberal policies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were the leading actors in this process, through which Turkey ‘opened out’. While the IMF and WB’s patented policies placed Turkey in an unreserved process of opening out and liberalisation, social policies were grossly neglected in the same process. For the smooth working of the process of opening and implementation of neoliberal policies, there was a need to take workers fully under control. However, social dialogue was not seen as an ideal instrument for this at the beginning, and so military intervention came in. With the military intervention, first the Constitution and legislation relating to workers’ associations were changed. With the new Constitution in 1982 and the enactment of new legislation on trade unions, collective bargaining and strikes in 1983, the rights and means of workers to organise and pursue their interests were largely limited in comparison to the earlier period.

The essence of neoliberal economic policies implemented by using force against working classes was a strategy that envisaged opening out by keeping wages under pressure. Since the means of struggle were taken away from workers by new legislative arrangements, this strategy worked smoothly during the course of the 1980s, and wage levels were significantly pressed down. Indeed, in the period 1977–1987, wage levels fell by 20–30 per cent (Boratav 2005b: 42–44). Yeldan draws attention to the fact that this was a breaking point in the tendency of real wages to rise for a period of 30 years since 1950 (Yeldan 2006: 72). Since workers were deprived of the means of struggle, they could not resist. Hence, there was no need for a social dialogue in this period.

The strategy of growth based on opening out by keeping wages down worked without a problem until 1988, but turned unsustainable latter. The status of working people severely worsened, and eventually led to a wave of strikes. In the face of activated workers, the government of the time again turned to populist policies which resulted in a significant rise in wages. Boratav (2005a: 176) shows that there was a 42 per cent increase in the wages of public-sector workers in 1989, followed by salary increases among civil servants, and that the collective agreements in the private sector too brought along wage increases, though not as high as the former two. Yeldan (2006: 75) calculates, for example, that there was annual average increase of 10.2 per cent in the wage share of total costs in the private manufacturing industry in the period 1989–1993. Koç (1998: 164) adds that wage increases in this period were the highest real wage increases in the history of Turkey.

The tide in favour of workers was reverted starting from 1993, with the counterattack of capital. But a different method was in use this time. Instead of military intervention, as in 1980, this time it was the market policies of neoliberalism. With practices such as privatisation, layoffs, sub-contracting, informalisation and, most important of all, de-unionisation, the working class was pushed back, and the aforementioned policies and practices were further deepened when needed. Developments that took place after 1980 were to the detriment of the working classes in an irreparable manner, with the exception of the period 1989–1993.

As a result of financial liberalisation in 1989 and the Customs Union agreement signed with the EU in 1995, Turkey’s economy has become very vulnerable to fluctuations in capital flows, and been threatened by repeated financial crises. Subsequently, GDP decreased 6–9.5 per cent over the period 1994–2001 (Boratav 2005a: 172). ‘The crisis of 1994 drastically changed the balance of power relations at the expense of labor again, showing that the gains in terms of the organizational power of unions could easily be wiped away if they did not correspond to a rise in the political power of labor’ (Onaran 2002: 188).

Some quantitative data will be helpful in better understanding the situation of working people in this new period. In that vein, it must first be stressed that with the exception of the period 1989–1993, distribution indicators have developed against labour, starting in 1980 and leading up to the present day (Boratav 2005a: 192–195). ‘The post-1989 (real) gains in wages eroded completely after the 1994 stabilization program. The implication for workers in private manufacturing industry was a 23.5 per cent decrease in real wages in 1994’ (Onaran 2002: 183).

The rate of unionisation has consistently fallen as a result of limits put on the right to associate, and layoffs that followed privatisations. In fact, the rate of unionisation fell below 20 per cent after 1980 (PETROL-İŞ 2000: 713; Çelik & Lordoğlu 2006: 27). According to official sources, this rate is even under 10 per cent.⁷ The proportion of workers benefiting from collective agreements is as low as 3 per cent (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 63). This unorganised and dispersed state of workers inevitably affected their action-orientation as well. In the period after 1980, the number of strikes was very low, with the exception of the period 1987–91 and the year 1995. Given the negative circumstances surrounding them, it might even be said that workers were somehow made unresponsive. While 220 strikes were officially recorded in 1980, there was no strike at all in the period 1981–1983, since strikes were banned after the military intervention. But there was a boom in strikes in the period 1987–1991. In this period, there were 307 strikes in 1987, 156 in 1988, 171 in 1989, 458 in 1990, and 368 in 1991. Apart from this specific period, we see 120 strikes in 1995. After 1995, strikes were largely brought under control, and thereafter the number of strikes in a year remained under 50 (ÇSGB 2009: 69–71). The fall in the number of strikes continued, and there were only nine strikes in 2011.⁸ Yet however these might suggest that everything is all right in working life, the truth is quite different.

We have many reasons to think that workers could be taken under control and made subject to the capitalist class after 1980 without any use of social dialogue. After 1980, informal employment expanded continuously. According to official data from June 2013, 37.8 per cent of the total 26,319,000 people in employment are informally employed. Employment data shows that 20.9 per cent of the 16,702,000 waged and salaried workers are informally employed (TÜİK 2013).

Such a large pool of informal workers means a source of unorganised and cheap labour ready to be used by capital at any moment. Given this picture, social dialogue itself as a way of persuading workers to compromise may be regarded as a concession to the class.

Economic and Social Council

One of the most common means of translating social dialogue discourse into life are the Economic and Social Councils (ESCs). Discussions around having ESCs in Turkey started in the early 1970s, at the request of business circles. This request of employers gave fruit, and there was an attempt to insert ESC into the Constitution of 1982. While it was in the early draft stage, this provision was dropped – perhaps since it was thought that there would be no need for such an institution. The abandonment of requests for ESC must be linked to the deep destruction that post-1980 economic policies brought to working people, including their wages, in the first instance. As stated by Koç (1999: 11), the main motivation for employers’ requesting ESC was to check the strength of trade unions, which had gained significant rights and made achievements through collective bargaining unionism.

While the dark clouds falling upon workers in 1980 had started to dissipate in the period 1989–1993, the economic crisis of 1994 halted the process. Starting from 1994, devising instruments geared to keeping working people permanently under control became the main item of the agenda of politics. ESC, which had been tried earlier, was the first instrument resorted to in this search. Eventually, after a long period in which the idea was first introduced, the ESC was established officially in 1995 upon a Prime Ministerial Circular. In this arrangement, the TÜRK-İŞ was to be represented with two members in the ESC, while the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK) and Confederation of Fair Trade Unions (HAK-İŞ) were excluded. Although it had a place in the Council, TÜRK-İŞ too rejected its composition together with DİSK and HAK-İŞ, and was not present in its first meeting.

Following its establishment, the ESC was restructured by every government taking office (therefore, six times in the period 1995–1999). Yet it has not gained any functionality in a real sense, and mainly remained on paper. It later became clear that the real motive behind it, when it was first established, was to exert pressure on TÜRK-İŞ (Çetik & Akkaya 1999: 221). In 1999, there was an attempt to present a written text on social security reform prepared earlier as an outcome declaration, as if it had been discussed and agreed on in the ESC meeting (Alkan 2000: 72).

Developments turning against workers, together with the economic crisis of 1994, were further consolidated with privatisations that gained pace after that year as a result of which social dialogue lost its functionality.⁹

The social dialogue agenda in the EU negotiation process

The EU is an important external actor playing a determinative role in Turkey’s economic and social policies. It requires Turkey, which wants full membership, to implement certain social policies running parallel to its liberal economic policies. Hence, social dialogue comes in once more in this context. The EU wants Turkey to promote social dialogue too, in the context of pre-accession negotiations. Given this, in the final annual progress report prepared by the EU, it stressed that there had been no remarkable progress in this area, complaining that the ESC has not even been called for a meeting since 2009 (European Commission 2012: 65). The chapter ‘Social policies and employment’, which also includes social dialogue, is now fully closed to negotiation.

As a result of the requests of the EU for the promotion of social dialogue, the ESC was re-established in 2001, this time on the basis of a new law. This act consists of a step to fulfil one of the obligations towards the EU. Turkey was accorded the status of candidate member to the EU in 1999. This status of Turkey became official upon the approval of the Accession Partnership Document by the authorised organs of the EU in 2001. The Accession Partnership Document (2001) sets some short and medium-term targets for Turkey, and requires the attainment of short-term targets by the end of 2001. Among short-term targets related to employment and social issues, we see trade union rights and the promotion of social dialogue (Council Decision of 8 March 2001). To fulfil this obligation, in 2001 Turkey passed laws on ESC¹⁰ and Trade Unions of Public Employees.¹¹

The ESC was made a constitutional institution in 2010.¹² However, it is difficult to say that the institution has any function now, clearly demonstrating that it was adopted merely to respond to a formality. Indeed, though its legislation requires ordinary gatherings on a quarterly basis, there have been no such gatherings until now. Even leaving this aside, neither it can be said that the ESC is functional in qualitative terms. In its institutional law, it is stated that the ESC is established for formulating economic and social policies on the basis of consensus and cooperation. Since the establishment of ESC, many policies that profoundly affect the working classes and take away their rights have been implemented. For example, it would be absolutely absurd to claim that changes in labour legislation and the social security system that were introduced as ‘reforms’ are based on any social agreement or consensus.

In 2008, the social security system was considerably ‘reformed’ by the government, but trade union confederations declared that they did not agree with the government, and were against the changes in the social security system (DİSK 2004; TÜRK-İŞ 2008). Trade union confederations also declared that they had not taken part in the decision-making process, and that the decisions had been made by government and employers. Here are some examples of the reactions of trade union confederations:

Our suggestions regarding the minimum wage were simply ignored by the [Minimum Wage] Commission during the meetings. Considering the cost of living in the country, the rate of minimum wage decided by the Commission is insufficient and cannot guarantee a subsistence level compatible with human dignity. … The private sector is claimed not to be able to afford a higher rate and therefore minimum wage workers are forced to compromise. In any country, minimum wage level is an essential indicator of economy policy and social policies. It is also a reflection of how political power and the employers approach working class. We, as labour side, do not agree and oppose the rate of minimum wage decided by Minimum Wage Commission dominated by the government-employer coalition. (TÜRK-İŞ 2012a)

DİSK has voiced its own recommendations on minimum wage levels which could ensure for workers and their families an existence worth of human dignity since the day on which the Minimum Wage Commission held its first meeting, but DİSK’s suggestions have simply been ignored. DİSK thinks that the decision on the minimum wage level reached by the government–employer coalition is against the law, and therefore has applied to the court of appeal to cancel the decision on the minimum wage level made by Minimum Wage Commission. (DİSK 2009)

The government has projected a plan entitled the National Employment Strategy (NES), consisting of employment policies for the period of 2012–2023. NES also includes policies about unemployment, private employment agencies, severance pay and some other aspects of working life. The government states that the NES has been prepared with the contributions of all social partners, and that this is the first time all of the social partners have taken part in the decision-making process in the history of the Turkish Republic.¹³ However, TURK-İŞ declared that it did not participate in the preparation of the NES (TÜRK-İŞ 2012b).¹⁴ DİSK and HAK-İŞ stated that their suggestions were not included in the NES. Additionally, according to DİSK, the NES reflects only the expectations of the employers’ side (DİSK 2012; HAK-İŞ 2012). The president of the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK), Tuğrul Kudatgobilig, in contrast to workers’ representatives, stressed that the NES had been prepared by all social partners, and that it is a significant attempt to improve social dialogue in Turkey (Kudatgobilik 2012).

Trade union crisis and the representation issue

Trade unions are in deep crisis, and have experienced a sharp fall in membership in both developed and underdeveloped countries in the era of globalisation. Based among male manual workers in full-time employment during the Fordist era of capitalist production, trade unions seem to have been unsuccessful in attracting new entrants to the labour force in the post-Fordist period of capitalism (Hyman 2007: 196). Accompanied by some other crucial problems such as neoliberal attacks on trade unionism, structural unemployment and rising identity politics, the trade union crisis has been inevitably deepening. As a result of this, the number of workers in unions fell dramatically, and trade unions have reached at a stage at which they are about to lose their functions in the industrial relations sphere (Özuğurlu 2000).

Apparently, a parallel process can be observed in terms of trade unions in Turkey. It is hard to speak of an independent trade union movement in Turkey from the beginning. Özuğurlu argues that the dominant tradition seen in trade union movements in Turkey is the dependant unionism model, which is a kind of identical unionism in underdeveloped countries. The unique aspect of Turkish trade unions is that they have a protectionist structure. In this context, it is possible to notice that both the union–state relationship and the union–member relationship have a protectionist character. Another problem observed is the turning of unionism into a career, and its concomitant bureaucratisation. In short, Özuğurlu claims that the roles played by trade unions on the political platform are to keep the working class under control by suppressing labour struggle, and to eliminate the influence of socialist thinking on the labour movement (Özuğurlu 2007).

On the other hand, on the basis of the criteria of representation too, it is impossible to talk about the existence of any ground for social dialogue. Those present at the table of social dialogue as representatives of workers have the capacity to represent no more than 10 per cent of workers.

As stated above, Turkish trade unions, like other unions internationally, have been unsuccessful in attracting new entrants into the labour force in the post-Fordist period. This is also true of the female labour force in Turkey. Toksöz and Erdoğdu show that women workers are not represented by trade unions in Turkey at all. They attribute that to a handful of specific reasons: the first is that trade unions have not had any particular strategy to attract female workers; second is that the labour force participation rate is always lower among females than males; and finally, that the proportion of female workers to male workers is low among wage and salary workers (Toksöz & Erdoğdu 1998: 68–70).

The process that started after 1980 with the implementation of neoliberal policies is going on as it had started: by imposing on workers. With regard to the discourse on social dialogue, this has no meaning beyond its existence before the EU. The fact that labour legislation against labour is still in effect, the dispersed and unorganised state of workers, and their failure to develop any stance beyond random and passing acts of resistance are the factors that render even social dialogue unnecessary.

Conclusion

The post-Second World War reconciliation between labour and capital in Europe was disturbed by the neoliberal offensive. As a result, the working class lost a large part of its advantages gained during the period of the welfare state, and labour’s remuneration and working conditions deteriorated. Workers are invited to the social dialogue process for reconciliation and cooperation after being deprived of many of their earlier social rights. Organised workers are given a seat in the social dialogue table, and forced to make further concessions silently, while being kept under control. The EU now wants this method of ‘bargaining for concessions’ that it uses effectively to be institutionalised in Turkey as well.

The signing of the Social Agreement in 1978 was an effort geared to transferring employment relations from the context of conflict to that of dialogue, which was short-lived. With the implementation of neoliberal economic policies starting from 1980, the search for dialogue with working people was abandoned, and the strategy of ‘imposition’ became the dominant mode. Early in this period, working people were kept under strict control on the basis of the military regime, and their right to associate was largely restricted. Capital does not take a step back from the strategy it has been pursuing for 30 years, with the state on its side.

The social dialogue discourse that again entered the agenda in 1995 with the establishment of the ESC is now flying in the air like a balloon, just for show, and is far from actually arranging labour-capital relations. Hence, though it emerged as a reality first with the Social Agreement of 1978 and then with the establishment of ESC in 1995, discourse on social dialogue has presently no such content.

Marx and Engels (1998: 67) emphasise the following in their German Ideology:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.

This quotation once more reminds researchers of the need to take caution with the mostly fictive terms of the ruling classes, which export their policies and thus their imaginations to society through some global actors. The question of whether social dialogue is a valid concept for the case in Turkey finds its clear answer when the concept is addressed in its totality, including the development of associated policy in the country. If one of the parties finds the other party organised and equipped with instruments of struggle, in other words, when it is necessary to extract some concessions from it, the search for dialogue comes in and is immediately abandoned when there is no such necessity. It would therefore not be incorrect to say that social dialogue which does not go beyond being an instrument for counselling even in places where it is implemented best, takes the form of an instrument in Turkey, called in when it is needed to keep working people under control. Given this, it is necessary to keep a distance from discussions focusing on social dialogue and its benefits.

Footnotes

Notes

Author biographies

Taner Akpınar has a Ph.D. in labour economics and industrial relations. He is currently teaching at Akdeniz University, Turkey. He is interested in social class, social policy, child labour and international labour migration.

İlker İnan Akçay is currently teaching at Cumhuriyet University, Turkey. He is a Ph.D. candidate and interested in labour history and critical social policy. He has recently been working on labour relations during the early republican period in Turkey.

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