From social bloc to historical bloc: Politics,social relations and ideology in political economy

Abstract

The way that the economy, politics and ideology interact to maintain stability or bring about change is a central concern for political economy. The social bloc perspective, as elaborated by Amable and Palombarini, provides a promising framework with which to address this question due to its attempt to combine an emphasis on the economic structure with a more central role for politics and ideology. This article argues, however, that the social bloc perspective still retains a rather functional understanding of these two concepts. We contend that a neo-Gramscian approach focusing on hegemonic struggles and adopting a complex conceptualisation of class can overcome these functionalist tendencies, because it perceives politics and ideology as crucial factors in the formation of social groups and the emergence and actions of social blocs. We further claim that a neo-Gramscian approach has broader applicability. To ground our claims empirically, we analyse a case which cannot be accounted for by the social bloc perspective. This is a case in which two social blocs composing different social groups with rivalling worldviews shared some meaningful ideological beliefs and cooperated politically to realise them.

Keywords

class hegemony historical bloc ideology Israel neo-Gramscian approach political economy

Introduction

The way that the economy, politics and ideology interact to maintain stability or bring about change is a central concern for the social sciences generally and for political economy specifically. Amable (2009, 2016, 2017) and Amable and Palombarini’s (2009, 2014) neo-realist social bloc perspective is an exciting attempt to address this broad question. It has contributed significantly to the study of political economy by recognising social conflict as inherent to capitalism, stressing the centrality of the state and expanding the conception of the political in political economy beyond institutions to include social relations. According to this perspective, social blocs emerge as an alliance of social groups with varying interests to attend to these interests through political compromise. As a social bloc becomes dominant, it is able to regulate social conflict effectively though not entirely (Amable 2017; Amable & Palombarini 2009).

This perspective retains, however, a rather functional understanding of politics and ideology. It views politics as secondary to the social relations that take place at the economic level, especially within the production process. Social groups emerge as an unmediated effect of these relations, while politics merely selects which of their competing interests will be satisfied and builds alliances to achieve them. Social blocs are therefore defined as political constructs whose role is to allow multiple social groups to fulfil their interests. Ideology, according to this approach, is an epiphenomenon of the emergence of social blocs. Politicians employ ‘political strategies’ (Amable 2018, 2019a) to consolidate social blocs, define what is a legitimate concern of public policy, and meet challenges from social groups outside the bloc.

We contend that a neo-Gramscian approach contributes to overcoming this functionalist understanding of politics and ideology and provides tools for understanding empirical cases that cannot be fully explained by the social bloc perspective. It conceptualises politics and ideology as relatively autonomous from the material dimension; accordingly, politics and ideology are not epiphenomena, but crucial factors in the emergence and actions of social blocs and the formation of social groups.¹

Rather than a functional political construct (i.e. a coalition of social groups for satisfying these groups’ interests), a social bloc is a political subject constituted by multiple social groups which acts according to a collective will to realise a defined social, political and economic project. Following Gramsci, we name this a historical bloc and the project it seeks to realise a hegemonic project. Social groups that comprise historical blocs are typically of a class nature (Galastri 2018). Here too, functionalist understandings should be substituted by a conceptualisation of class as both a social category and a social formation (Williams 1976), namely, as a cluster of social relations in a given social structure.

To substantiate our claims that a neo-Gramscian analysis is able to transcend the limitations of functionalist tendencies and has broader applicability, we analyse a case that cannot be accounted for through the social bloc perspective. In Israel, between 2009 and 2015 two rival historical blocs, the liberal-professional bloc and the lay-nativist bloc, gained prominence. Those two blocs differed in terms of the social groups composing them and the worldviews advocated, but, contrary to what the social bloc perspective would expect, they shared some meaningful ideological beliefs and cooperated politically to realise them.² Empirical support for our arguments derives from the analysis of a range of written texts from this time period: coalition agreements, party platforms of the prominent parties in the two competing historical blocs, news reports, official documents and texts from a prominent think tank of each bloc.³ We combine this analysis with data from the European Social Survey on the class characteristics of voters for the parties belonging to the two historical blocs.

Theoretical discussion

The social bloc perspective sees social groups as constituting themselves as the unmediated result of common locations in the production process. Class and sectoral divisions produce distinctive groups and give rise to divergent and conflicting interests between the groups.⁴ At the same time, they produce intra-group common interests and structure the group’s political conduct. In sum, the common class location constitutes the group as a collective political subject. Nonetheless, Amable (2019b), a central scholar of this perspective, recently pointed out the limitations of this view: ‘neither the social groups nor their interest are “given” neither by nature nor by technology, but . . . their construction is political, made under specific historical conditions’ (p. 435). We agree with this position and develop it further below.

As part of its understanding of capitalism as an unstable crisis-ridden system, the social bloc perspective argues that social groups have opposing interests that produce conflict between one another. Those social groups combine to form social blocs that can regulate and reduce social conflict (Amable et al. 2011). The social bloc is established on a compromise between social groups over their material interests – a compromise which takes into account the main demands of the different groups that form the bloc. Success in becoming a dominant social bloc means that a bloc has managed to reduce to a minimum the resistance of groups not belonging to the bloc, thus regulating social conflict throughout society. In other words, social blocs and dominant social blocs in particular are functional in the stabilisation of capitalism.

Social blocs advance different political strategies (especially, sets of economic policies, see Amable 2018, 2019a). These differences emerge from the specific characteristics of the social groups that compose each bloc, rendering ideology an epiphenomenon in the context of material conflict and compromise. Ideology plays the role of projecting the bloc’s worldview regarding, in particular, what is and what is not a legitimate issue for public policy. In other words, ideologies act as ‘instruments of domination’ (Amable & Palombarini 2009: 131) for stabilising the social bloc and countering challenges from without. This role inserts ideology into the policymaking process in a limited fashion, used as a means to soften differences in policy expectations that emerge as a result of class and sectoral differences, or to justify their hierarchical order of importance.

Politics thus remains a tool for social groups to realise their ‘socio-economic interests’ (Amable 2019a). This is particularly apparent in the role of politicians. While they retain some room for manoeuvring in terms of ideas and discourse, the cards in their hands are fixed; they must strike deals with groups whose demands and expectations emerge in an unmediated way from their locations in the production process and in the different sectors of the economy (Amable & Palombarini 2009; see also Baccaro & Pontusson 2019).⁵

Building on their propositions regarding group formation, social blocs and ideology and the assumption that social blocs compete for dominance, researchers within the social bloc perspective have concluded that social blocs will always have competing interests. We can therefore expect different blocs to advocate and implement distinctive sets of (socioeconomic) policies (Amable 2019a). However, as shown below, this expectation does not necessarily hold. Recently, Baccaro and Pontusson (2019) admitted that understandings between central political forces are both scholarly interesting and politically important. While we agree with this statement, we propose to infuse it with some Gramscian dialectics.

Amable and his colleagues have openly acknowledged Gramsci’s contribution to the development of their perspective. However, in our view, they ‘functionalise’ Gramsci instead of taking advantage of his more fundamental insights including: the primacy of politics, the understanding of ideologies not as the mere reflection of the economic level but as having a materiality of their own, and the centrality of agency. In the following, we propose an alternative neo-Gramscian theoretical framework which focuses on the concept of the historical bloc. Using Israel as a case study, we then show how this theorisation allows for a non-functional analysis of social blocs and has a wider applicability than the social bloc perspective.

Historical bloc

The historical bloc concept was developed by Gramsci to denote an alignment of social groups that seeks to organise the social structure around a hegemonic project which responds to the core interests of the dominant group(s) in the bloc (Filc 2006). The project takes into account, at least partially, the interests of all social groups in the bloc but mainly the core interests of the dominant group (Gramsci 2000). Contradictions within the capitalist economic structures and the conflicting demands of different social groups indeed influence the emergence and shaping of historical blocs. However, blocs do not emerge or dissolve as just the direct result of processes taking place at the economic level but as a much more complex political process.

The relative autonomy of the political from the ‘structural’ is connected to the concept of hegemonic projects. Through the constitution of hegemonic projects, a social bloc moves from being an aggregation of groups with ‘corporate-economic interests’ (Gramsci 1971: xiv) to forming a political subject where these interests, although still meaningful for the group, are integrated into a new collective will shared by the aligned groups, that is, a historical bloc. Ideologies and worldviews are a significant component of what Gramsci denominates ‘the national-popular will’ (Gramsci 2000).

It should be noted, however, that a hegemonic project is not a pre-existing tool that creates a historical bloc; rather, it is articulated during the process of the conformation of the bloc, shaping it and being shaped by it. Historical blocs and hegemonic projects are constituted during social conflict, which is inherent in capitalist societies. As such, historical blocs are collective subjects operating in an always conflictual situation rather than tools for stabilising capitalism, as the social bloc perspective conceives of social blocs.

Historical blocs are constructed by social forces which may be business organisations, unions, social movements, social networks and, most prominently, political parties. Political parties act to facilitate the hegemonic project promoted by the (emerging) bloc through ideological, organisational and distributive means by serving as its coordinators, educators and mediators. The state is central in the struggle between social forces promoting different hegemonic projects, since it controls regulatory (institutional), physical and legitimation powers that can be used to realise hegemonic projects and secure them.

Ideology

As mentioned above, ideology is central in the constitution of historical blocs (Mouffe 1981). The alignment of groups both results from and produces an ideological process in which the values, ideas, representations, stories and symbols they carry are woven together to produce an overarching worldview that turns the bloc into a political subject (Gramsci 1971: 9). Through this worldview, the world is interpreted (given meaning), reflected and acted on by the bloc’s agents and groups.

Such a viewpoint awards ideology a considerable degree of autonomy from economic processes and material interests. Various ideological perceptions may be adopted and reproduced by groups without any necessary or unmediated connections to their material conditions or locations. This is particularly apparent in the modifications of these perceptions over time which result from the complex interaction between changes in life experiences, transformations of material conditions, the development of ideas and the civil society institutions that generate them, or the result of becoming part of a certain historical bloc. Moreover, ideologies are central in guiding the political, social and economic conduct of historical blocs as political subjects. They ground policy programmes, the selection of policy tools and the development of public (or group) expectations of what public policies can and should achieve (cf. Amable & Palombarini 2009).

Classes

Following Gramsci’s insights, a neo-Gramscian approach to social groups views them in class terms, according to which shared locations in the production process are a crucial factor in their crystallisation (and deformation). However, this article adopts Williams (1976) more complex understanding of class as a cluster of social relations in a given social structure. Williams suggests that class is both a category and a formation. Category refers to Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieusian understandings of class as constituted by ‘objective’ factors of relations of production, life chances and positions allowing the appropriation of various types of capital. Formation refers to common perceptions, similar life patterns, common customs and social networks that allow group members to infuse meaning into their everyday and create common interpretations. The relationship between category and formation is contingent on the extent to which category structures the context in which formation takes place but does not determine it. As in the case of our understanding of ideology, this leaves room for political practices and processes to shape and reshape the identity and boundaries of class groups: classes and other social groups articulate identities and worldviews that give them awareness as collective political subjects.

An important implication of this view of social groups, especially classes, on the construction of historical blocs concerns relations between dominant and non-dominant groups. Following Gramsci, non-dominant groups should not be viewed as subordinate, that is, lacking political agency, but as subaltern (Galastri 2018). While they are less powerful than the dominant groups of the bloc, they nonetheless have a political voice which affects both the (re-)construction of the bloc to which they belong and the policies that the bloc advances through its agents.

Growing literature in recent years has suggested a novel division of contemporary societies into three classes: the upper class, the professional–managerial class, and the ‘popular classes’ (Amosse & Cartier 2019; Beroud et al. 2016; Schwartz 2011). We use this division in our analysis of the Israeli case below, where we also present a short definition of each class.

Two blocs with ideological similarities

Moving towards a neo-Gramscian perspective allows an improved analysis that translates into wider applicability. We focus here on one example that, from the social bloc perspective, would be considered impossible: namely, the existence of two historical blocs sharing significant ideological beliefs that translate into adhering to similar economic policies while remaining distinct one from the other. According to the neo-Gramscian approach, in any capitalist society at any given time multiple social groups attempt to build competing historical blocs in order to advance rival hegemonic projects. Conflict between the (emerging) blocs is real since it revolves around the distribution and redistribution of physical, symbolic and social capitals or access to them.

However, the autonomy of ideology discussed above and our theorisation of the constitution and political action of social groups open the way for two blocs that, though promoting rival hegemonic projects, share significant ideological similarities. Shared assumptions, principles, frames and so on translate, in turn, into similar – if not identical – economic policies (or policy proposals). Agreements among social forces, political actors, or historical blocs coexist with disagreements and conflict; both must be considered as two facets of a complete whole.

Empirical analysis

The two historical blocs in Israel

Following our theoretical exposition regarding social groups and classes, Israeli society can be regarded as composed of three main classes: the upper class, the professional–managerial class and the popular classes. The upper class comprises a narrow group of owners and CEOs of large corporations in central sectors of the economy. In Israel, these corporations operate in the fields of finance, hi-tech, real estate, entertainment, gambling and, less saliently, industry and retailing. The professional–managerial class is characterised by dominance of the workplace, the ability to translate one sort of capital (economic, cultural, social) into another, and good prospects for passing the three types of capital on to the next generation (Laurison & Friedman 2016). In Israel, this class comprises mainly managers in different sectors of the economy, engineers and other professionals working in the hi-tech sector, the liberal professions and high-level employees in the finance sector and the culture industry (Bar 2016; Yemini et al. 2019). The popular classes are defined by their subalternity vis-à-vis the other two classes (Amosse & Cartier 2019; Bernard et al. 2019; Beroud et al. 2016; Schwartz 2011). They have inferior positions at work, are more vulnerable and their status is less certain. They have different lifestyles as a result of both their exclusion from the dominant culture (passive stance) and their own cultural creation (active stance). The popular classes are plural and heterogeneous. This heterogeneity results from their plurality of occupations, different levels of job security, employment in either the private or the public sector, and levels of education.⁶ In Israel, the popular classes comprise the caring professions within the welfare state (nurses and other para-medical professions, teachers), mid-level employees in both the public and private sectors, the self-employed (excluding the liberal professions), small shopkeepers, low-level and non-commissioned officers in the army and the police, the traditional industrial working class and the precariat.

Class relations in Israel are highly ethnicised. The boundary between the professional–managerial class and the popular classes is marked by ‘whiteness’ (Haisraeli 2016; Schwartz 2014), since the former is composed predominantly of Jews from European and American origin. Among the latter, Jews who immigrated from Arab countries, Asian republics of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Ethiopia and their descendants are over-represented as well as Israeli Palestinian citizens and migrant workers.

These three main classes relate differently to the two competing historical blocs: the lay-nativist bloc and the liberal-professional bloc (see Table 1). We see the lay-nativist bloc as composed of a dominant group of the upper class and most of the Jewish popular classes. The upper-class groups forming this dominant group are owners of natural resources such as natural gas and phosphates, entertainment and gambling magnates and big retailers.⁷ These fractions of capital depend less on global insertion, and more on the benefits of place (natural resources) and mass consumption (big retailers, entertainment). During the period examined, the core position of these fractions of capital was evident in two major actions taken by the government. First, in 2015, following the discovery of large offshore gas reserves, the lay-nativist government implemented a scheme that greatly favoured the interests of the private gas firms involved in terms of taxation and regulation. As appeals were submitted to the Supreme Court against the scheme, the prime minister himself appeared in court to defend it. Likewise, the lay-nativist Likud party sided with the conglomerate exploiting the Dead Sea minerals on issues of regulation and taxation despite a governmental committee recommending a more stringent approach (Zinger & Milman 2015). Second, the government – either when the lay-nativist bloc controlled it or when the lay-nativist parties formed a crucial part of the coalition – implemented a consistent policy of encouraging the import of consumer goods, which favoured big retailers (Avigur-Eshel & Filc 2021).

Another evidence for the centrality of these fractions of capital in the lay-nativist bloc is the establishment, in 2008, of the Israel Hayom newspaper by gambling billionaire Sheldon Adelson. Israel Hayom openly promotes a nativist ideology as well as lay-nativist politicians, primarily Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, as a free daily newspaper, its balance sheet has been balanced by Adelson, a support amounting to tens of millions of dollars.

Apart from these fractions of capital, the lay-nativist historical bloc includes most of the Jewish popular classes. According to data from the 2016 European Social Survey, 60% of the popular classes vote for parties that belong to the lay-nativist bloc. Leaving out the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are over-represented among the popular classes and are not part of the lay-nativist bloc (see below), the figures are even higher, with 75% of the Jewish popular classes voting for parties of the bloc.⁸ Vote for the bloc is found to weaken among the upper echelon of the popular classes: 55% of those among the popular classes with an academic degree and 47% of those with income around the national average vote for parties of the bloc (the share of Jewish voters within these two groups is 80% and 49%, respectively). The Jewish popular classes’ integration into the lay-nativist bloc rests on three central pillars. First, a large segment of these classes – Jewish immigrants from Arab countries – has historically become an active collective subject through its relations with the Likud party and its inclusive efforts (Filc 2010). Second, these classes’ relative material deprivation can be aligned with interests of fractions of capital in the lay-nativist bloc to induce mass consumption, through the noted government policy of encouraging the import of consumer goods (Avigur-Eshel & Filc 2021). Third, nativism represented a defence for these groups from the perceived material and identity threats of cosmopolitism and globalisation.

The liberal-professional bloc is composed of other fractions within the upper class and most of the professional–managerial class. Within the upper class, the hi-tech fraction and significant portions of large traditional industry belong to this bloc. The core position of these fractions is apparent from their central role in supporting parties and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) identified with the liberal-professional bloc. For example, owners of large hi-tech firms, hi-tech venture capital investors and owners of traditional industry were prominent donors to the Blue and White party formed in 2019 to challenge Netanyahu’s prolonged term as prime minister, to the attempt by the former prime minister, Ehud Barak, to return to politics, and to the Movement for Quality Government in Israel (an NGO central to the liberal-professional bloc). Some members of these upper-class fractions have even made their ideological position public (e.g. Gilad 2012; Orbach 2019; Pasovsky 2017). Apart from the fact that the lay-nativist parties’ policy of encouraging imports undermined the economic interests of both hi-tech and traditional industry since it supports a strong currency – which raises prices of exported goods while facilitating imports to the detriment of local producers – these fractions of the upper class benefit from several facets of liberal ideology: individualism, meritocracy, openness, free choice, all of them linked to the characteristics of the hi-tech sector.

The professional–managerial class is mostly identified with the liberal-professional bloc. According to data from the 2016 European Social Survey, within this class, 66% voted for one of the three parties that represented this bloc in the 2015 elections (Hamahane Hatzioni, Yesh Atid and Meretz), while only around 30% voted for parties that formed part of the lay-nativist bloc (Likud, Israel Beitenu and Habait Hayehudi); there was no support at all for the two ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties. Moreover, when asked whether they consider themselves as rightists (a popular denominator of the lay-nativist bloc), leftist, or centrists, only 25.7% chose the first option.

At the two poles of the social structure, we find groups not affiliated with either of the two competing blocs. At the upper pole is the financial sector, which has links with fractions of capital in both blocs and whose interests were cared for by the 2009–2015 governments in which parties of both blocs were represented.⁹ At the lower pole are the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are not integrated in either bloc. Although over-represented in the popular classes, they are not part of the lay-nativist bloc which champions Jewish nativism. As for their integration into the liberal-professional bloc, class differences as well as the still central role of Jewish nationalism in this bloc (see below) mount significant obstacles. A vivid example was the refusal of parties of the liberal-professional bloc during the three election rounds of 2019–2020 to form a coalition with parties representing the majority of Palestinian citizens, even though such a coalition would have enjoyed a parliamentary majority. For the social bloc perspective, the external locations of these two groups would be unintelligible: the analytical importance of economic sectors in this perspective suggests that finance as an entire sector cannot ‘evade’ from integrating into some social bloc; the importance of locations in the production process for the formation of social groups suggests that other collective identities (national, religious) cannot override them.

Table 1.

Classes and historical blocs.

Class	Lay-nativist bloc	Liberal-professional bloc	Other
Upper class	Natural resources, gambling, retailing	Hi-tech, large traditional industry	Finance
Professional–managerial class		+	Some Palestinian citizens
Popular classes	+	Some support from upper echelon	Majority of Palestinian citizens

Ideology

The two blocs have deep ideological differences which create political rivalry and social tensions. Those differences are evident in party platforms, public speeches and parliamentary bills. They are even more pronounced in the opinions and views of the media outlets and NGOs of each bloc: for the liberal-professional bloc, these include the Israel Democracy Institute and the newspapers Haaretz and The Marker; for the lay-nativist bloc, these include the Kohelet Institute, the newspaper Israel Hayom and the journal Hashiloach.

The liberal-professional project views the desired political regime as what could be termed democratic liberalism (though many of its members do not challenge Israel’s ethno-national hierarchical citizenship). Such a regime emphasises individual and citizen rights, free individual choice and cosmopolitanism. It is a worldview that mistrusts majorities and considers politicians representing them as easily corruptible. Authority should, accordingly, be held by non-elected professional bureaucrats (who are sociologically and ideologically identified with this bloc). These professionals are considered more suited for making decisions in various spheres of public life such as law (courts and state attorney), education and national security (for making decisions on the economy, see below). The bloc thus seeks to preserve their autonomy and authority or grant them more.

The lay-nativist bloc believes that ruling powers should be concentrated in the hands of the government as representing the will of the people, understood as the will of the majority. The fact that governments are elected by a parliamentary majority justifies its almost unlimited authority to rule. Most professional bureaucrats are not trusted (usually with the exception of economic bureaucrats, see below) and are considered employees whose task is carrying out the policies that politicians in government propose. Moreover, the bloc holds that positions within the state bureaucracy should, ideally, be filled with loyalists, juridical review should be rejected and politicians should have more control of nominations to the Supreme Court. To sum up, in terms of the relations between the three branches of democratic regimes, one could say that while the liberal-professional project stresses separation of powers and seeks to empower the judiciary (and technocracy more broadly) over the other two, the lay-nativist project has a majoritarian conception of democracy and consequently seeks to empower the government and the legislative majority.

The liberal-professional project aspires to a mix of liberalism and republicanism, stressing individual liberties and freedom of choice, while prioritising ‘productive and working’ groups, those who ‘pay taxes and serve in the army’ (Yesh Atid 2015). From a liberal point of view, citizens are seen as free-choice consumers, entitled to receive good services from an efficient public sector, funded by citizens’ taxes. From an ethno-republican point of view, groups that are not productive and thus do not contribute to the common good are seen as increasing the burden on the productive groups, thus acting in a morally perverse manner. Moreover, ethno-republican ethics prioritise the Jewish collective over non-Jewish members of the community and praise those among the Jewish collective who have done military service under the legal framework of universal conscription. This ideological combination suits the character and interests of the professional–managerial class (mostly Jewish), since cosmopolitanism and individualism fit the character of their insertion within the productive process and the global character of their role, while the combination of meritocracy and ethno-republicanism both justifies and protects their privileged social status.

The ethics of the lay-nativist project are rooted in its version of Jewish national and religious heritage. Jewish identity, whether involving a religious orthodox approach or a more moderate, tradition-following approach, must, accordingly, be central in public life and Jewish collective rights include the right to the entire Land of Israel and the right to a nation-state with the formal exclusion of non-Jews (as expressed in the Basic Law: Israel the National State of the Jewish People passed in 2018). The Jewish collective in Israel and the Jewishness of state and society are seen as constantly threatened by migrant workers, asylum seekers, non-Jewish citizens and ‘unfaithful’ Jewish citizens, mainly the judicial, cultural and academic elites.

Despite these crucial differences, the lay-nativist and liberal-professional blocs share some neo-liberal premises (and even some assumptions concerning Israel’s identity which are beyond the scope of this article). They agree that the market should be given primacy as the mechanism for the generation and distribution of wealth and that the state’s role in this context is to ensure market operation using various means, such as regulation and the partial commodification of the welfare state.

Ideological similarities and policy implications

These similarities in the blocs’ basic approach provided the basis for mutually agreed on policies. The following overview of common ideological beliefs and agreements on policy initiatives illustrates the (relative) autonomy of politics and ideology from economic structures. But, unlike what the social bloc perspective would expect, similarities and political cooperation did not result in the construction of a single overarching social bloc, since conflict between the blocs remained (see next section). We focus our discussion on the 2009–2013 and 2013–2015 coalitions that included prominent parties from both blocs, and on the issues that were most prominent in our sources – the welfare state, budget and tax, economic experts and (de-)regulation.

The view of the welfare state common to both blocs is of a social investment state, namely, an apparatus seeking to invest in the skills or ‘human capital’ of both children and adults and encourage participation in the labour market (Aviram-Nitzan & Halperin 2017; Kadima 2009; Kulanu 2015; Likud 2009; Yakir & Sarel 2018; Yesh Atid 2015; Zeira 2009). This leads to the allocation of public funds to measures perceived as contributing to an increase in participation in the work force or improvement in the quality of labour (productivity) while restricting expenses on non-labour related schemes.

Policy initiatives deriving from this approach included the reduction of income support schemes and unemployment benefits, public underinvestment and low social investment. It also included the increasing and broadening of ‘negative income tax’ for low-income groups, the setting of goals for the participation in the labour market of ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens (two groups that, for different reasons, have relatively low participation rates), and a 5-year plan aimed to increase the employability of ultra-Orthodox Jews, which included subsidies for academic colleges and tracks specifically targeting ultra-Orthodox students (Gal et al. 2020; Gottlieb 2017; Government of Israel 2010; OECD 2018).

On budget and tax issues, both blocs support budgetary discipline. The government must, they believe, refrain from running high deficits and increasing the debt to GDP ratio and should, rather, aspire to decreasing that ratio as much as possible. Both blocs repeatedly referred to taxes as a burden whose reduction is expected to encourage growth, employment, net income and profits. Accordingly, the government maintained a policy of reducing the debt to GDP ratio and, in 2009, introduced a five-year tax cut plan for corporate tax and for the middle and high brackets of income tax (suspended following the 2011 mass protest that targeted socioeconomic issues, but later resumed).

As discussed above, the lay-nativist bloc has little trust in experts, particularly those serving in the state bureaucracy. Nonetheless, in the case of economic experts, its view aligns with the general pro-expert view of the liberal-professional bloc, according to which economic decision-making should be controlled by bureaucrats who are economic experts rather than politicians. Following the 2011 mass social justice protests, the government pushed for legislation that granted the Israel Antitrust Authority additional powers (i.e. the imposition of financial sanctions). It is also worth noting that in 2016, when the lay-nativist bloc controlled government alone, the Capital Division of the Ministry of Finance was turned into an independent regulatory agency.

The empowering of the Antitrust Authority touches on another position shared by the two blocs. Accordingly, state regulation should refrain from interrupting business action unless absolutely necessary but should assist in the creation and operation of markets where they are undermined by monopoly and the like. This position results from the view that private initiative and market mechanisms are the main factors in creating wealth and delivering fair prices to consumers.

Both blocs’ support for the pro-competition role of regulation was apparent in a variety of measures. These include the increasing of competition in cellular services in 2011 by easing the entry for (a few) more service providers, the repeated reduction since 2012 of tariffs on various imported consumer goods, particularly those bought on the Internet, and a long-negotiated agreement in 2013 with the EU which eased conditions for foreign airline companies, particularly low-cost companies, to compete in providing international flights.

However, when the logic of pro-competition regulation came into conflict with the logic of no-regulation and the interests of the dominant groups of both blocs were on the table, the effect of the pro-competition logic was relatively limited. In 2013, against a background of public sentiment against big business following the global financial crisis, the government passed the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration. The law affected the large business groups that are part of the dominant groups in both blocs since it banned simultaneous ownership of large real firms and large financial firms as well as the formation of complex pyramidal structures. Nonetheless, the law did not seek to undermine the actual existence of business groups, as was suggested in a private bill put forward by parliamentary backbenchers and members of the opposition. As a prominent figure in the expert committee that drafted the law remarked, ‘we must not kill the goose that lays the [golden] eggs’ (Knesset 2011).

Ideological differences and policy implications

Despite their agreement on neo-liberal beliefs and the socioeconomic policies deriving from them, ideological and policy differences between the blocs cannot be reduced to non-material domains and the two blocs clashed over a variety of socioeconomic issues and policies.¹⁰ We present briefly two prominent clashes in this realm: the regulations concerning the opening of malls and shops on the Sabbath (Saturday) and the provision of child allowance.

Commerce on the Sabbath

Social conflict over the opening of commerce on the Sabbath has been one of the most divisive issues between the blocs, as evident in the following case of opening supermarkets and businesses in Tel Aviv. Shopkeepers (belonging to the upper echelon of the popular classes) appealed to the Supreme Court against the fact that the Tel Aviv Municipality sanctioned businesses that opened illegally on Saturdays by fining them. The petitioners argued that big businesses were able to pay the fines and remain open while small businesses could not. In 2013 the court ruled in favour of the petitioners and ordered the municipality to either close commerce on Saturdays (with the exception of those selling food or cultural activities) or modify the municipal regulations (Sapir 2018). Subsequently, in 2014, the municipality modified the law, allowing for the opening of commerce in certain streets and defined areas. The modification was approved by a majority of 19 representatives of factions linked to the liberal-professional bloc against six representatives of the lay-nativist bloc and a local faction called A City for Everyone.

The arguments put forward by Tel Aviv Municipality Council members correlate with the ideological worldviews depicted above. One representative of a local liberal-professional faction said that the opening of commerce meant ‘the birth of a free market that brings what people want’.¹¹ A representative of another faction in the bloc saw the decision as an ‘equilibrium between the values of personal freedom and pluralism in which we believe and the principle of equality which is important for all’ and stressed the importance of Tel Aviv as a ‘free city’. Another saw the decision as a ‘historic day for free and pluralistic Tel Aviv’. Members of the lay-nativist bloc, who opposed the opening of shops and businesses, stressed the sanctity of Sabbath. One spoke about his ‘pain over the desacralisation of Sabbath’, while a religious representative said:

You don’t have to be religious to recognise the value of Sabbath. Anybody who has a real connection with the life of the [Jewish] nation through all its generations won’t be able to think of Israel without the sanctity of Sabbath. . . . What do you propose instead [of the sanctity of Sabbath]? To be the slaves of tycoons who spend Sabbath on their yachts? . . . We become their slaves.

The government coalition, then composed by parties of both blocs, was unable to reach an agreement over the Tel Aviv Municipality’s decision, and eventually the Supreme Court ruled that the decision was legal (Sapir 2018).

Child allowance

The centrality of child allowance for both blocs is evident in the changes implemented throughout the short period of 2009–2015. Although both blocs agree on the general premises of the welfare state as a social investment state, they differ in their approach to child allowance such that its amount has been a function of whoever has political power.

An increase in child allowance was one of the agreements that paved the way to the 2009 coalition, which integrated parties from both blocs but with lay-nativist parties dominating. The increase was demanded by Shas, an ultra-Orthodox party of the lay-nativist bloc, following significant cuts in 2003 as part of a government plan led by the then finance minister and now prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to combat an economic crisis (Avigur-Eshel & Filc 2018). Subsequently, in 2013, a newly-formed party of the liberal-professional bloc, Yesh Atid, made cuts in child allowance one of its election promises. As it entered the new coalition as the second largest party, rates were cut by 20%-47%. Upon approval of the cut, Yesh Atid leader, Yair Lapid, proclaimed,

This is a historical transition from a culture of allowances to a culture of work . . . When you give birth to children, you are the one responsible for them¹² . . . We have one principle that we will not give up: the Israeli middle class is not supposed to finance people who can work but don’t want to. (Efraim 2013)

Arie Deri, the leader of Shas, which after the 2013 elections remained in opposition, responded that ‘the cruelty and persecution [of ultra-Orthodox Jews] is so pronounced . . . the cut in child allowance will throw another 50 thousand children into poverty’ (Filute 2013).

In 2015 a new coalition was formed by parties of just the lay-nativist bloc. Shas and the second ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism, pushed for reversing the 2013 cuts. Eventually, child allowance was raised by 7% for the first child and 35% as of the second child. Another 35% increase was directed at a personal savings account for every child run by private financial institutions (Avigur-Eshel & Mandelkern 2021). An ex-director-general of the Ministry of Finance commented in a newspaper identified with the liberal-professional bloc that ‘increasing child allowance takes us backwards in terms of the labour market participation rates of the ultra-Orthodox and Arabs [Palestinian citizens] and represents a negative incentive to work’ (Zrachia 2015).

Conclusions

The social bloc perspective deems conflict inherent to all societies because of the contradictory interests stemming from different positions in the economy. Conflict, however, can be managed through politics and ideology (which are secondary to the processes taking place in the economic dimension) by the establishment of a dominant social bloc (Amable & Palombarini 2009). Baccaro and Pontusson (2019) even proposed the existence of a sole social bloc that expresses the interests of the leading capitalist fractions. Social blocs, thus, either completely differ in their interests, demands and policies, or are one.

However, our analysis of the Israeli case challenges both positions. We showed that despite differing in their class composition and on the ideological, political and policy levels, the two social blocs competing for power in Israel share basic neo-liberal beliefs and policies and significant political actors from both blocs have cooperated to promote these beliefs and policies.

We therefore argue the need for a non-functionalist view of social blocs. According to this viewpoint, social blocs are always established at the political level. While differentiation in the economic dimension is important, it is not the sole or determining factor in the establishment of social blocs (as can be seen, for example, from the fact that Palestinian citizens, most of them belonging to the popular classes, are not part of either bloc). Moreover, ideology is not an epiphenomenon; it is not merely the expression of interests arising from economic differentiation. The two competing blocs in Israel, while composed of different fractions of capital and different social groups (the professional–managerial class in one bloc and the Jewish popular classes in the other), share many neo-liberal beliefs. Neo-liberalism is not (only) the expression of the interests of a specific social group or a winning strategy to resolve a political crisis, but a set of ideas and values articulated within a (local) ideological terrain – a set that plays a central role in the way social conflict is played out and in its resulting policies.¹³

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Amit Avigur-Eshel

Notes

Author biographies

Amit Avigur-Eshel, PhD. Lecturer at the Department of Public Administration & Policy, Sapir College, Sderot, Israel. He studies the integration of the masses into contemporary political economies as well as the legitimisation of neoliberalism.

Dani Filc, MD, PhD. Full Professor at the Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel. Among his publications are the books Hegemony and Populism in Israel, Circles of Exclusion: The Politics of Health-Care in Israel and The Political Right in Israel.

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