The benefits and limitations of populism for radical-left parties

Abstract

The 2008 economic crisis created an opportunity for radical-left parties, the most consistent critics of neoliberalism. While some populist parties break through, other left parties did not take advantage of the opportunities created. There are two main arguments in this article. First, left-wing populists were more successful since they adjusted to the dynamics of the class struggle and to the requirements of mobilizing diffused frustrations. The class struggle is split between a union-based struggle, and a non-union-based one, the latter becoming more central in recent decades. It is composed of spontaneous bursts of protest not leading to the building of organized power, making it much harder to stably harness by left parties compared with past union-based struggles. Non-union-based class struggles open a cycle that can be taken advantage of by left parties that conform to its logic and are in a strong enough party system position, as did Syriza and Podemos. Second, left-wing populists nevertheless reached an impasse, since they could unite the left voters’ bloc only under unique conditions. Labor market ‘outsiders’, more precarious, educated and urban youth were at the core of last decades’ protest movements and radical-left parties’ electoral surges. Labor market ‘insiders’, non-precarious and relatively economically secure left voters who opted for the left-wing populist option only as a last resort. Populist radical-left parties could not unite the popular bloc entirely, as significant parts of the working class were less accessible to them. Furthermore, populist radical-left parties did not contribute to the building of mass subaltern organizations, leaving little organized heritage. Since populism is more in tune with the dominant form of class struggle, radical-left parties should embrace it, but due to its limitations, it has to be complemented with ‘class-for-itself’ political methods.

Keywords

comparative politics Marxism neoliberalism populism radical politics

Introduction

The 2008 economic crisis created an opportunity to rebuild the radical-left and push back neoliberalism. The 2011 protest wave, a series of general strikes, and a radical-left electoral surge during 2015–2017 appeared to be potential steps in that direction. Left-wing populists were most successful in taking advantage of the opportunities created by the crisis and austerity, but their electoral surge was exhausted, with no real threat to the social-economic order.

In recent decades, left politics have become disconnected from a stable, organized, and mass social base, becoming more ‘class-focused’ than ‘class-rooted’ (Panitch & Gindin 2017). For radical-left parties (RLPs) not to be class-rooted is disadvantageous in at least two ways. First, most big trade unions are co-opted by the capitalist order, distancing them from serious challenges to the status-quo and from radical-left politics. Consequently, RLPs have little influence over the actions of the most powerful and organized parts of the subaltern classes. Second, the subaltern classes are mostly atomized and unorganized, meaning RLPs do not have stable means of mobilizing them (if they can mobilize them at all).

The rootlessness of RLPs could change if subaltern classes were to become more organized as a result of class struggle. However, a non-union-based class struggle (NUBCS) became a more central form of class struggle (Clover 2019), composed of spontaneous bursts of struggle that did not lead to the building of mass subaltern organizations.

Populist RLPs adjusted to NUBCS and developed conscious class-focused politics, enabling them to take advantage of opportunities created after 2008. However, they had no solution to the class rootlessness of radical-left politics, if they saw it as a problem at all. Furthermore, populist RLPs had limited potential for mobilization. They were only able to unite the bloc of left voters under unique conditions (e.g. in the United Kingdom) and were in all cases unable to unite the ‘popular bloc’. Failing to reach power (or, in Greece, reaching power in a weak international position and unwilling to move beyond a certain limit) and without supporting the building of mass subaltern organizations, left-wing populists lost momentum and tended to wane or even collapse.

This article tracks the experience of populist RLPs over the last decade, focusing on Podemos, LFI, and Labour’s left-wing,¹ using 40 interviews with party leaders and activists and post-election surveys. The goal is not only to reflect on left-wing populism, but mainly on the prospects of RLPs in advanced capitalist countries and the paths open for them to advance. For that purpose, the sections of this article will focus on the conditions and actions that have facilitated the surge of populist RLPs, the reasons for its exhaustion, the possible ways of avoiding such exhaustion in the future, and the paths available for RLPs to break away from their usual marginal position.

RLPs, populism, and NUBCS

I define parties such as Podemos, IU, KKE, Syriza, LFI, and the Labour Party’s left-wing as RLPs.² They are not defined by their class base, since RLPs have a diverse social base (Rooduijn et al. 2017), and – bar some connections to the radical margins of the labor movement – they are not rooted in the working class. They are defined ideologically and by their party system position. Not all RLPs are socialist. It is a broad family, ideologically speaking, the main trait of which is criticism of neoliberalism (Chiocchetti 2016; March 2012). RLPs are to the left of the SDPs, trying to fill the space left by the latter’s move to the right (Chiocchetti 2016: 10).

Populism can be defined discursively as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that distinguishes the pure people from the corrupt elite (Mudde 2004); as a political style (Moffitt & Tormey 2014); and as a discourse with a specific structure that aggregates demands and splits society into two antagonistic camps (Laclau 2005). Populism thus conceived might be a discursive solution for RLPs to the heterogeneity of social demands and diminishing class identities (Bray 2015; Damiani 2020) and is one of several ways ‘in which a leftist programmatic package can be articulated’ (Venizelos & Stavrakakis 2022: 4).

The discursive definition has merit.³ However, the concept of ‘populism’ refers to an important phenomenon, but primarily not because of the use of a certain discourse. The more significant phenomenon ‘populism’ seems to point to is a situation in which ‘anti-establishment’ forces rapidly grow by mobilizing support from hitherto unorganized or unrepresented groups, creating new rebellious socio-political subjects in the process. The Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) has been described as populist based on a discursive-ideational definition (March 2012), but this small party represents a different phenomenon compared with Podemos, for example. While both used populist discourse, the SSP had little bearing on the formation of new mass socio-political subjects.

The concept of a populist project can be useful here. According to Jansen (2011: 82), a populist project is ‘a concerted and sustained set of political activities’ that includes ‘the mobilization of ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action’, while using ‘populist rhetoric’ (‘popular projects’ do the same but without using populist rhetoric). Populist projects are methods of non-class-rooted politics. As Weyland (2017: 50) emphasizes, populism is a way to mobilize ‘large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ by a direct appeal from the party leadership to atomized supporters, using mostly mass communication channels, with few intermediating structures. The goal is to grow rapidly and significantly by mobilizing neglected and scattered social frustrations. When successful, one result is the creation of new rebellious socio-political subjects.

Populist projects are possible as a result of what Prentoulis (2021) calls the ‘dislocation’ of voters from ‘establishment’ parties (or from mainstream leaderships inside such parties), or what Laclau (2005) calls a ‘populist moment’ – the accumulation of unsatisfied demands. These are preconditions for populist projects, since they create the opportunity for the rearrangement of political loyalties, expectations, and subjectivities.

Such populist moments might open the gate to more class-rooted politics if they were to lead to the building of mass subaltern organizations. However, this has not been the case in recent decades, when the class struggle has been split between a defensive, interest-group-like union-based struggle and spontaneous outbursts of struggle led by the young and educated middle-class (like Occupy, Los Indignados, and Nuit Debout); riots led by the poor, mostly racial minority youth; and blue-collar workers’ protests, such as the Yellow Vests movement in France. The NUBCS is becoming increasingly important relative to union-based class struggle (Clover 2019). Furthermore, as the latter has become more defensive, attacks on the status-quo have mostly came from NUBCS.

Mostly not unionized, the participants of NUBCS are not organized as a class, if they are organized at all. They are usually too atomized to tackle capital directly in the workplace. It is nevertheless a form of class struggle since, like union-based class struggles, it is a reaction of the subaltern classes to the interruption of social reproduction by capitalism (Clover 2019). As Poulantzas emphasizes, ‘there is no need for there to be “class consciousness” or autonomous political organizations for the class struggle to take place’ (Poulantzas 1978: 17). Participants might be already organized or distinguished by non-class criteria that dictate their form of struggle, for example, as students protesting a rise in tuition fees or minorities suffering police brutality and high levels of poverty and unemployment. Since participants might already be organized or distinguished according to non-class principles, these are not class movements in form. However, as Taylor (2016) demonstrates, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement has a strong class character, as more affluent blacks have tended to push for different politics to try to contain the movement. Occupy Wall Street and Los Indignados were not class movements in form, but were nevertheless a revolt of the ‘knowledge class’ (Dean 2016), protesting mass unemployment and narrowing opportunities following the 2008 economic crisis and austerity policies. Furthermore, some forms of class struggle are being directed toward the state and not directly at capital, organizing participants as citizens or as a category of state administration (as recipients of benefits, for example).

NUBCS has some distinct features.

It is being conducted in spontaneous bursts of protest that do not lead to the building of mass organized power and thus do not enhance class capabilities in the long run, although it can push significant numbers into more sustained activism. Callinicos (2014) also points out: ‘As we have seen since Seattle, political radicalization can take place in the absence of mass workers’ struggles. But it tends to be less robust, and more diffuse, and such movements leave little behind them in the way of lasting organization’. Its spontaneity also means NUBCS is usually a reactive form of struggle. Its demands might not be defensive, but it usually takes a ‘spark’ to ignite it (a tax rise; austerity policies; a police killing; rising consumer prices). NUBCS transcends individualization by spontaneously using collective power (rioting; occupying). But transcendence is temporary as it does not lead to the building of mass organizations, and after the movement subsides interests are once again pursued individually. Even if spontaneous struggles spark feelings of solidarity and commonality, they do not create stable means of pursuing interests collectively, and they do not reduce competition between participants for jobs, houses, and so on. As a result, any solidarity created is potentially unstable. Consequently, NUBCS do not by themselves crystallize their participants and supporters into a stable ‘subject’. Nevertheless, NUBCS might increase subaltern confidence and expectations, encouraging unionization or bolder union action.

NUBCS is carried out on the terrain of capitalist ideology, the result of the atomized state of its participants and the fact that it is usually directed at the state, on the ideological terrain of equality under the law and the role of the people. This is in contrast to union-based class struggle, which contains the nucleus of an anti-capitalist point of view since it organizes the participants as a class against capital. Civic and consumeristic identities are the main ones available to atomized groups for political use after the neoliberal onslaught on collective identities (except for national-ethnic identities) (Bray 2015). A commonsensical mixture of civic-democratic rationalities was at the heart of last decade’s youth and anti-austerity movements (Della Porta et al. 2017; Gerbaudo 2017). The focus of NUBCS is not the price of labor, but other burdens – tuition costs, housing, nondurable goods, taxes, etc. NUBCS nonetheless uses such points of view for its own needs, harnessing their promise for democracy, participation, freedom, and rising standards of living to legitimize subaltern demands.

The avant-garde of NUBCS is not the most powerful part of the workforce, but the more atomized and less organized parts of the subaltern classes (urban youth movements; tax revolts by workers from former industrial areas; riots by minorities and inner-city poor). The more powerful parts of the workforce have other means of advancing their interests (union power; defensive support for SDPs; getting by individually), although they could be attracted by powerful NUBCS. NUBCS is usually a result of group weakness and history of passivity, an atomized group saying ‘enough is enough’.

NUBCS throws atomized individuals into collective action, creating the possibility of stabilizing a collective identity that has been temporarily created by the struggle (Dean 2016). But since NUBCS does not crystallize subaltern classes as stable subjects in the social field, the political-representative field is the main area in which subaltern classes can achieve durable subjectivity as a result of NUBCS. For subaltern classes that lack organized force at the socioeconomic level, voting is not a way of confirming and using existing power, but of transcending atomization by delegating authority to representatives. Hence, the charisma and enthusiasm related to the last decade’s radical-left surges: they were not an expression of political subjectivity, but created (or elaborated) new political subjectivity. They were not extensions of pre-existing power, but through them people became empowered. Voting became an avenue through which atomized groups could sustain and expand collective subjectivity developed by NUBCS (Podemos) or attain such subjectivity in the first place (Labour under Corbyn; LFI). In the political-representative field, once the participants and supporters of NUBCS are mobilized by RLPs, they are no longer a collection of individuals. But this non-atomized existence depends on the representatives. When the link between the represented and representatives is broken, the assemblage disintegrates, since the represented do not have other means of organizing themselves. For example, when Corbyn lost the party leadership, the coalition he had assembled ceased to exist as an anti-neoliberal subject. This does not mean that NUBCS participants and supporters are passive, since they are actively seeking new forms of political representation, creating a reciprocal relationship with their representatives. However, as they are not organized in non-political fields, their capabilities for agency are limited.

Populist projects

With a weak working class and weak class roots, RLPs have three main political projects available. First, they might try to organize subaltern classes in the social field, sink roots into them, and use the political field mainly to support this effort (‘class-for-itself’ project). Second, with no class struggle blowing wind in their sails to enable them to challenge the dominance of SDPs in the bloc of left voters, RLPs can try to maintain their (usually weak) parliamentary position by criticizing SDPs without appearing unpragmatic, or collaborate with them without appearing unprincipled, with very little margin of error (for example the collapse of PCF and the PRC after joining the government) (‘maintenance-maneuver’ project).⁴ Third, they can try to reach power by mobilizing diffused frustrations during ‘populist moments’ (populist projects).

Given that last decade’s movements did not stably organize the subaltern classes or shift trade unions into a counter-hegemonic path, they did not create conditions for RLP politics to become class-rooted, marginalizing ‘class-for-itself’ projects (one of the only attempts to develop such a project, by the French NPA, was quickly sidelined once Mélenchon and PCF formed the Left-Front). After 2008, NUBCS and rising frustrations created new opportunities that could not be taken advantage of by ‘maintenance-maneuver’ projects, but which could be harnessed by ‘populist projects’.

Reacting to the opportunities created by the 2008 financial crisis by developing populist projects was what distinguished RLPs such as the IU in Spain, the PCF or the NPA in France, and Left-Unity in the United Kingdom from Podemos, LFI, and the Labour-left (other populist projects were developed by Syriza and Bernie Sanders). When RLPs did not develop populist projects, NUBCS and social frustrations did not receive significant left-wing political expression (e.g. Spain 2011–2014; the United Kingdom 2010–2015; France 2015–2017, and again 2018–2022, and in other countries as well). This meant populist projects were required for NUBCS and social frustrations to crystallize into potentially lasting political subjectivities.

Spain was among the countries hardest hit by the 2008 crisis, with unemployment of more than 26% at the height of the crisis. Following the crisis, the PSOE and PP governments implemented severe austerity measures and labor laws, which were devastating for large parts of society. After significant strike action, in May 2011 the Indignados movement broke out in response to the economic crisis, the PSOE-led austerity, and frustrations with Spanish democracy. However, in spite of significant public outcry at corruption and the economic situation, the main RLP (the IU) proved too dogmatic to break through electorally (Ramiro 2016). Consequently, a few left academics decided a new left project was required to take advantage of the opportunities created by the crisis, and initiated Podemos. Not being constrained by other left ideological and organizational traditions, Podemos’ leaders, influenced by the populist theories of Laclau and Mouffe, developed a party strategy and structure as an ‘electoral war machine’. Using populist discourse and trying to distance the party from a left-wing image, Podemos breakthrough in the 2014 EU election and was able to obtain more than 20% of the votes in the 2015 election, far more than the 6.9% the IU won in 2011.

In France, the economic crisis was not as severe as in Spain, but it nevertheless hit particularly hard at the working class and youth (Askenazy & Palier 2018). President Hollande’s austerity measures, in particular the El-Khomri labor law, were extremely unpopular, causing a significant drop in support for Hollande and PS and leading to the outbreak of the Nuit Debout movement in 2016 (Evans & Ivaldi 2017; Pickard & Bessant 2018). While Le Pen benefited from the crisis, the unpopularity of PS and the mobilization of youth by Nuit Debout also created an opportunity for the left. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a former PS minister who in 2008 left to form the Left Party, established an alliance with PCF that was able to concentrate the fragmented radical-left vote in the 2012 elections and obtain 11%. The alliance collapsed over disputes regarding collaboration with PS, leaving Mélenchon free to initiate a new party in 2016: LFI. Learning from Laclau and Mouffe and the experience of Podemos and south-American left-wing populists, LFI also developed a populist project, using populist appeal and distancing the party from traditional left images that had been tarnished by PS (Evans & Ivaldi 2017; Marlière 2019). Consequently, Mélenchon won 19% of the votes in the first round of the 2017 presidential election, coming close to reaching the second round.

In the United Kingdom, the Conservative government embarked on a severe austerity campaign from 2010 that lasted most of the decade, with devastating social results. During 2010–2012, there was significant trade union action, a student movement against rising tuition, and inner-city rioting, but other than that the social response was somewhat weak. While Labour did not stand firmly against austerity, it was mostly anti-immigration sentiments that were receiving political expression by other forces, with the rise of UKIP and with Brexit. The left outside Labour tried to take initiatives, but had little impact (Maiguashca et al. 2016). The Labour-left was in a marginal position inside the party, causing its leaders to consider not participating in the 2015 Labour leadership contest (Panitch & Leys 2020). However, once Corbyn entered the contest, Labour’s and other left activists, all frustrated with the party’s stance on austerity, turned en-masse toward him (Nunns 2018). After winning the party leadership, the Corbyn project did not take off until the 2017 election, when it could take advantage of the more direct and somewhat less biased media access offered by the election rules. Using populist discourse more sporadically than LFI and Podemos (Maiguashca & Dean 2019), Labour tried to portray itself as the champion of the ‘many, not the few’, and obtained 40% of the votes.

Populist projects adjusted to NUBCS and the requirements of mobilizing diffused and unorganized frustrations in several ways.

While ‘class-for-itself’ politics tries to organize the working class, populist projects embraced a more class-focused approach, enabling RLPs to advance while not being class-rooted. The ‘class-for-itself’ outlook sees political power as a reflection of social power, but populist RLPs abandoned this outlook and only tried to unite atomized groups on the political field. For example, Podemos’ leader, Pablo Iglesias, said that a political movement did not need to be created gradually from the bottom up and ‘can be constructed in a Blitz’ from above (cited in Booth & Baert 2018: 15); according to another main leader, Iñigo Errejón, Podemos broke the ‘taboo’ that the left should start from social movements and only then advance to political institutions (Agustín & Briziarelli 2018: 15). One member of the Mélenchon team told me the connections LFI had with trade unions were mainly used to reach new voters. Podemos and the Labour-left’s leaders believed that, upon reaching power, they could encourage new working-class collective capabilities, but they did not prioritize it (Errejón 2018; Panitch & Leys 2020: 141–142), while as IU and NPA leaders told me, they believed political change had to be a result of pre-existing social power.

The ‘class-for-itself’ political outlook entails a more ‘educative’ stance, while left-wing populists were more adaptive, having ‘one leg in existing common-sense’ (Errejón 2016). This meant being vague or less principled on divisive issues in order to capture as many voters as possible. For example, Labour’s Brexit stance tried to appease both sides of the debate. In addition, Corbyn restrained his potentially divisive criticism of the monarchy while party leader (Jones 2021). In 2017, LFI took a vaguer stance toward immigration since, according to one party leader I talked to, ‘if we say “immigrants are welcome”, half of society won’t listen to us’. Podemos and LFI also tried to shed a left-wing image in order to appeal to the ‘people’ and not just to a narrow radical-left base. And after dropping in opinion polls, Podemos moderated its manifesto (Domenech et al. 2015).

Appealing directly to the core participants of NUBCS. Activists and leaders from the IU and the NPA I talked to claimed the parties did not see the Indignados, Nuit Debout and even the Yellow Vests movement as genuine workers’ movements (but, as the movements developed, they took them more seriously, especially younger party members). The IU alienated youth movements, while Podemos was much more open to such NUBCS (Della Porta et al. 2017; Ramiro 2016). Podemos and LFI used populist and civic discourse that was also used by the Indignados and Nuit Debout movements and demanded more participatory democratic institutions (demands that had also been raised by those movements) (Gerbaudo 2017; Pickard & Bessant 2018).

Podemos, LFI, and Labour’s Momentum developed party structures that enhanced leadership power at the expense of the rank-and-file (Dennis 2020; Gerbaudo 2019), pursuing vote maximization at the expense of grassroots initiatives and open discussion. However, the plebiscitarian nature of those structures (of Podemos and LFI in particular) made these parties appear democratic, probably contributing to their initial success. For Seferiades (2019), populism (equated with reformism) abolishes intermediating institutions that enable mass or activist participation, since populists/reformists are not advancing the interests of those they claim to represent, creating the need to block participation. However, while last decade’s populist RLPs were indeed reformist, the drive to abolish intermediating structures (or not to create them in the first place) was also a result of the class rootlessness of RLPs and the desire to mobilize scattered grievances, making party communication the most important instrument for party leaders.

In order for RLPs to take advantage of NUBCS or of diffused frustrations, they had to be well enough positioned in the party system to inspire and convince voters that change was possible. What ‘enough’ means depends on the circumstances. In a two-party system like the United Kingdom, a stronger starting position is needed than in a more proportionally representative system. The left in the United Kingdom was unable to take advantage of a mixture of union-based struggles, non-union-based struggles, and rising social frustrations between 2010 and 2015 (Maiguashca et al. 2012; Panitch & Leys 2020). The marginalized position inside the Labour Party made the Labour-left irrelevant and the two-party system made the radical-left outside Labour ineffective, despite an accumulation of grievances that crystallized quickly in 2015 once the Corbyn project was underway. In the French presidential system, as we will see, Mélenchon had to become the best-placed left candidate to reach the second round in order to break through.

Uniting the left voters’ bloc

Under unique conditions populist projects did manage to unite the left voters’ bloc, achieving a shot at power, but in other cases they had more limited mobilizing potential. In Greece, which experienced the most severe austerity, and after PASOK formed a coalition with ND in support of the troyka’s austerity (Sotiropoulos 2014), Syriza became the only viable option for left voters. In the United Kingdom, the Labour-left could take advantage of its strong party system position to become the only option for left voters. However, with a weaker position or with the SDPs keeping some distinction from the right, Podemos and LFI were more constrained. They were limited mostly to left voters (Marlière 2019; Rendueles & Sola 2018), contrary to their expectation of overcoming the left–right divide, and they also faced problems attracting relatively economically secure left voters.⁵

The populist projects of RLPs appeal particularly to people with no existing institutionalized channels to pursue their interests (Padoan 2020). In recent decades, SDPs had pushed away working-class voters with their right-wing economic policies (Arndt 2013), eradicating such channels. However, SDPs had other voters tied to them, by trade union links and low socioeconomic expectations (Chiocchetti 2016: 16) or by non-economic considerations (feminism; green issues; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights; etc.). In southern Europe, some SDPs pursued neoliberal policies but also built modern welfare states since the 1980s, strengthening their ties with the working class (Ross et al. 2016).

Another main group tied to SDPs were the more economically secure left voters. The left voters’ bloc is composed of both labor market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, the former enjoying a more secure and rewarding labor market position with greater social protection, and the latter having a more precarious position (Rueda 2005). ‘Outsiders’ tend to provide above-average support for RLPs (Marx & Picot 2014; Rovny & Rovny 2017) and ‘insiders’, having existing (even if diminishing) social rights to protect, might be more supportive of SDPs, who are ready to protect their rights while sacrificing others (Rueda 2005).

However, RLPs’ and SDPs’ bases were not neatly structured according to an ‘outsiders’/‘insiders’ dichotomy. While enjoying more social protection and rights, unionized workers or public employees (considered ‘insiders’) had reasons to be displeased with neoliberal economic policies directed at their rights. Especially in southern Europe, ‘insiders’ were also suffering from austerity measures that were particularly aimed at weakening their labor market protections after 2008 (Moreira et al. 2015). ‘Insiders’, such as socio-cultural professionals and radical trade unionists, were among the strongest supporters of RLPs (Connolly & Darlington 2012; Rooduijn et al. 2017).

Populist RLPs, seeking to reach power, not only courted ‘outsiders’, but also ‘insiders’ and moderate SDPs’ voters. Leïla Chaibi, an LFI MEP I talked to, emphasized that ‘we have two types of voters, the “degagists” who want to kick the system, and the middle-class’. Similar tensions were present in Podemos, at the center of the Iglesias–Errejón rift: the latter wished to moderate the party’s image in order to attract PSOE voters (Chazel & Fernández Vázquez 2020). And Labour’s 2017 strategy, while appealing to young ‘outsiders’, was consciously developed not to scare away more affluent voters (Howell 2018).

Nevertheless, while ‘outsiders’ were at the core of the social movements of the last decade and of populist RLPs electoral advances (Alexandre et al. 2021; Rendueles & Sola 2018; Sloam & Ehsan 2017), ‘insiders’ were less supportive of the two populist projects that did not enjoy a dominating party system position (Podemos and LFI) and were less inclined to switch from the SDPs to RLPs.

In Spain’s 2015 elections, Podemos made some significant inroads into the PSOE’s base, obtaining about 19% of the former’s 2011 voters (CIS 2016). Podemos did much better among less economically protected voters, who were mainly young, urban, and educated (Rendueles & Sola 2018: 39–45). Furthermore, PSOE voters were less likely than those of Podemos to be fired or experience a salary cut/freeze in their household in the 4 years prior to the 2015 election (about 36% compared with 48%–49%, respectively) (CIS 2016). Of the 2011 PSOE voters who came from less economically protected households that had lost a job or experienced a salary cut/freeze in the 4 years prior to the election, 27.9%–26% voted for Podemos, compared with 19.3%–19.6% of those who did not come from such a household (CIS 2016).

In the 2017 presidential election in France, while Mélenchon had ‘insider’ support (for example, from managers), the groups which were most highly supportive of him were precarious and alienated workers and youth (Ifop 2017; Marlière 2019). Macron mobilized what Palombarin and Amable (2021) called a ‘bourgeoisie bloc’, which included PS voters to whom Mélenchon had less access; while PS’s ‘insider’ base opted mostly for Macron, ‘outsiders’ were more inclined to support Mélenchon. Of the 2012 Hollande voters who worked on permanent contracts, in 2017 25.2% voted for Mélenchon and 45.4% for Macron, but of those with limited contracts, 40% voted for Mélenchon and only 22.2% for Macron (CSES 2017).

Furthermore, the cases of Podemos and LFI demonstrate that, for significant sections of SDPs voters, switching to RLPs was only considered as a last resort when SDPs could no longer credibly protect them or prevent a right-wing government, and when RLPs had convinced of their credibility. In other words, penetrating more deeply into the SDPs’ base was made possible only once populist RLPs were better positioned compared with SDPs to protect left voters from right-wing governments.

In Greece, PASOK formed a pro-austerity government with the right-wing ND, making it an unviable option for left voters, but PSOE’s leader Pedro Sanchez learned from this experience and refused to support a PP government. Interestingly, during 2016–2017, when Sanchez was temporarily ousted as party leader and the PSOE enabled the formation of a PP government, Podemos overtook the PSOE in opinion polls (Politico 2021). This meant PSOE voters who had been more reluctant to support Podemos in 2015 were ready to defend themselves against an untrustworthy PSOE. At that point, half of PSOE voters claimed they would not vote for the party in the next election (Cadena Ser 2016), but only 14% of them said they would vote for Podemos – perhaps because of media attacks that portrayed Podemos as an extreme party, which had a real impact.

In France, Mélenchon’s penetration into the PS base was made possible only after he became the best-placed left candidate to reach the second round and after he had convinced left voters he was a reliable candidate. The election was held on April 23, but by mid-March Mélenchon only received 11% in opinion polls. However, after mid-March, he soared, and PS candidate Benoît Hamon crashed (Ipsos 2017b). Since winning the PS primaries in early 2017, Hamon had been above Mélenchon in the polls. However, in early March, Hamon began to lose support, mainly to Macron (Ipsos 2017c). Hamon’s deteriorating ratings canceled his ‘vote utile’ (‘effective vote’) argument, creating an opening for Mélenchon. In the debate between the presidential candidates on March 20, Mélenchon tried to develop a ‘presidential’ and ‘responsible’ image (in line with his general campaign strategy, according to prominent LFI leaders I talked to). It seemed to work, as voters started to see Mélenchon as a reliable candidate, more so than Macron in some aspects (Ipsos 2017d). Furthermore, 47% of Hamon’s supporters were reassured by Mélenchon’s program, and most of them saw him as a reliable candidate (Ipsos 2017d).

Uniting the ‘popular bloc’

RLPs were unable to unite the ‘popular bloc’ because they faced problems gaining support from workers who had been politicized by right-wing parties or withdrawn from political engagement.

Decades of social fragmentation had left the working class much weaker. High unemployment, lower bargaining power, neoliberal economic policies, and the destruction of big industry had left workers atomized and discouraged. The conditions of work themselves had changed since the Fordist era, as workers were ‘Often working in smaller firms that are integrated into complex supply chains, in which they rub shoulders with their boss and feel under constant threat of being laid off’ (Gerbaudo 2021: 138). Those conditions contributed to lower expectations, individualization, political disengagement, and the disintegration of collective identities (Croteau 1995; Gest 2016; Palombarin & Amable 2021; Silva 2013).

Working-class frustrations were diverted by populist-right parties against immigrants and ‘cosmopolitan elites’, who are accused of supporting immigration and preferring minority rights over those of native workers. The working class was lacking its own ‘organic intellectuals’ as it became less unionized, and left activists increasingly tended to be middle-class in origin (Kosiara-Pedersen 2015: 77; Wirries 2011: 152). Since right-wing newspapers, TV stations, and parties were responsive to some working-class experiences, they gained more influence among workers (Eribon 2009; Gest 2016; Winlow et al. 2017), politicizing one aspect of their common-sense (suspicion toward immigrants). It is not surprising, then, that blue-collar and to a lesser extent also service workers became among the strongest supporters of radical-right parties (Oesch & Rennwald 2018).

In Britain, in 2017, Labour’s support among skilled and unskilled workers increased from 32% and 40% in 2015 to 41% and 47%, respectively (Ipsos-Mori 2015, 2017). In France, in 2017, Mélenchon’s support among blue- and white-collar workers increased to 24% and 25%, respectively, compared with 11% and 18% in 2012 (Ifop 2012, 2017).

However, while populist RLPs mobilized heterogenous coalitions that included working-class voters, those previously attracted by the right were much less accessible to them. Contrary to Mouffe’s (2018) claim that left-wing populism is the answer to right-wing populism, Mélenchon and Podemos hardly got any support from workers who had previously voted for right-wing parties. In 2017, Labour obtained about 17% of UKIP’s 2015 voters, higher than the negligible 3% Mélenchon got from Le Pen in 2017 and the proportion Podemos got from right-wing parties, but the party still benefited much less than the Conservatives (Dorey 2017; Ipsos 2017a; Sola & Rendueles 2018). However, in 2019, when workers faced a direct choice between Brexit and left-wing economic policies, their support for Labour fell to 2015 levels (Ipsos-Mori 2019).

Working-class political abstention has also been on the rise in recent decades, as SDPs seem to have deserted them (Arndt 2013; Palombarin & Amable 2021). Populist RLPs did not significantly reverse this trend. Corbyn’s Labour inspired young ‘outsiders’, whose participation rate and support for Labour increased significantly (Sloam & Ehsan 2017). However, he was unable to inspire workers in the same way, and their participation rate dropped in 2017 compared with the 2016 referendum (Ipsos-Mori 2016, 2017). Even among young voters, who turned to Labour en-masse, middle-class voters aged 18–34 had a 61%–64% participation rate, compared with 49%–35% of working-class voters at that age (Sloam & Ehsan 2017: 100). Mélenchon also had problems inspiring alienated workers. In spite of some success in gaining the support of workers who had abstained in 2012 (Marlière 2019), 13% of Mélenchon’s 2012 voters abstained in 2017 (Ifop 2017). Overall, workers’ participation rates did not increase in 2017 compared with 2012 (Ifop 2017; Muxel 2013), suggesting no significant ‘awakening’ had taken place among the working class. Spanish CIS data seem to underestimate abstention rates significantly. Nevertheless, there was no meaningful difference in working-class participation in 2015 compared with 2011 (CIS 2011, 2016).

The instability of populist projects

The effects of NUBCS and of frustrations accumulated by the crisis were temporary, leading to growing expectations of change and the fixing of public attention on issues that were convenient for the left. Populist RLPs could strengthen and prolong those trends, but by failing to reach power by uniting the left bloc or the ‘popular bloc’ (or both), or failing to support the building of mass subaltern organizations, populist projects lost momentum. Podemos bled support to the PSOE; LFI lost impetus, only to regain it again during a new election cycle because no other left party was able to fill the void; and the Labour-left collapsed.

Podemos obtained significant support in 2015 and also in the 2016 election after joining forces with IU. However, once it had peaked, it started losing momentum due to the Catalonian question (Gillespie 2019). More important cause for its impasse was the impregnability of the PSOE’s core. Iglesias and Errejón had a heated debate around the issue, the latter intending to gain PSOE’s voter support by moderating the image of Podemos (Chazel & Fernández Vázquez 2020). This dispute led to a split when Errejón left Podemos, further weakening the party. The PSOE increased its credibility for left voters once Sanchez regained PSOE’s leadership and overthrew the PP government; in the 2019 elections, the PSOE strengthened at the expense of Podemos, which dropped from 21% in 2016 to 14%–12% (CIS 2019). After the PSOE had re-established prominence, Podemos found itself in a ‘normal’ RLP position with only ‘maintenance-maneuver’ projects available to it; it entered the PSOE government in a relatively weak position, causing the party to deteriorate further in polls (Politico 2021). Podemos managed to politicize new groups and quantitatively strengthen the position of the radical-left in Spain, but with the PSOE solidifying its position, there was no permanent ‘dislocation’ of voters Podemos could further utilize. While many frustrations have been left unaddressed, Podemos is in no position to politicize them, and any significant advances are now dependent on a new protest cycle.

Incapable of uniting the left in the 2017 parliamentary election, LFI did not enjoy the same level of support as Mélenchon had obtained in the presidential election of that year and, after the 2017 election, public support for Mélenchon dropped (Valeurs Actuelles 2020). LFI was unable to regain support by politicizing the Yellow Vest movement or the movement against the rise in pension age. Thus, Mélenchon started the 2022 presidential campaign at the same (relatively low) level at which he had started the 2017 campaign, with the radical-right dictating the tone and galvanizing frustrations as election loomed. However, from preliminary observation it seems that, similar to 2017, Mélenchon took advantage of weak competition on the left to gain tactical votes that enabled him to obtain significant support (22%) once it became clear he was the only left candidate capable of reaching the second round. Having united other left parties under LFI’s leadership and obtaining good results in the parliamentary election, LFI’s momentum might continue. This momentum is dependent for now on parliamentary maneuvers and so it remains unstable. However, unlike the Spanish case, PS’s collapse creates a more permanent ‘dislocation’ of voters that LFI can take advantage of to establish its domination in the left voters’ bloc.

After obtaining 40% of the votes in 2017, Labour remained at that level in opinion polls until 2019. However, as the Brexit issue became more important, it split Labour’s base in the 2019 election (Cooper & Cooper 2020). Corbyn aggravated the situation with an unprincipled and incomprehensible Brexit stance (Jones 2021). The Labour-left had been able to maintain the party leadership between 2015 and 2019 by gathering significant support from Labour and left activists and from trade unions (especially Unite). Such support was needed to shield a radical-left leadership inside a center-left party, but these protective circles split around the Brexit issue (Jones 2021), making the Corbyn project more vulnerable. Indeed, after the bad results of the 2019 election (receiving 32% of the votes), the Labour-left lost party leadership, causing its project to disintegrate. Opportunities to rebuild a mass anti-neoliberal social-political subject are still open if the Labour-left could resume its strong position, but with the left in disarray, new party leader Starmer cracked down on its members and leaders and weakened its chances of resuming party leadership by increasing support from the (mostly right-wing) Labour MPs required to contest party leadership (Hollinshead 2022).

Overcoming the impasse?

What can the last decade’s experience teach us about the prospects of overcoming the impasse that has been reached by populist RLPs? To my understanding, overcoming the impasse would require at least one of the following conditions.

A durable weakening is required of institutionalized channels that differentiate ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ and provide greater security to the former (public employment; welfare access), or a temporary weakening that would create enough momentum for RLPs to reach power (together with SDP maneuvers that make them less useful to left voters). In power, RLPs could break institutional separations between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The experience of the last decade shows the first step – reaching power – is possible under unique conditions that only materialized in Greece. The second step – reorganizing subaltern interests – was not achieved in that case, but is not impossible.⁶

Embracing the economic interests of the working class is only one necessary condition to win it for radical-left politics, as tapping into working-class economic frustrations had little impact in energizing alienated workers and gaining support from right-leaning workers. Under some favorable political conditions (a weak radical-right party; low importance of the immigration issue), that might have more influence (e.g. Labour faring better among workers in 2017 compared with 2019, when the Brexit issue was less prominent). Another condition is for the working class to turn to a sustained class struggle that would more stably crystallize it around new politics (Gough 2010). Spontaneous NUBCS will probably not be enough to stably shift this group to the left, even though it might create more favorable conditions for RLPs. The Yellow Vest movement, for example, was not enough to change the political course of the working class. Alternatively, a credible and successive RLP onslaught on power might arouse alienated workers to be more politically engaged.

RLPs enjoying a strong party system position could overcome splits in their potential base. This would mostly be possible within SDPs, or when they collapse (as in France), making RLPs the only viable option for left voters. The nature of NUBCS and the level of working-class atomization mean that, in countries with a two-party system (like the United States and the United Kingdom), radical campaigns from inside center-left parties could better advance the radical-left for the foreseeable future. Since the main field in which atomized groups can be organized is the representative-political field, finding a strong focal point from which to excite and politicize them and inspire their confidence is a pressing political challenge. This requires media access and a reliable route for change that could only be obtained from inside the Labour and Democratic Parties. Small RLPs in these countries will lack both significant class roots and the means of forming a mass focal point unless enough organized power can rally behind them, or unless they are formed as a result of splits in the center-left parties after the radical-left elements within them have gained significant support.⁷

Trade unions have played a counter-hegemonic role, laying the ground for uniting the left voters’ bloc under RLP leadership and inspiring alienated workers. There are examples of small radical parts of the union movement supporting fringe radical parties, such as the support given by the British RMT to RLPs outside Labour (Panitch & Leys 2020). A more important example is the split in the SPD and union movement that led to the establishment of Die Linke in Germany (Chiocchetti 2016). The experience of the last decade, when extensive austerity and right-wing labor market reforms have not led unions to embrace more radical politics, means there is probably little chance of large parts of the labor movement splitting in support of RLPs. Such splits are more likely if radical-left actors achieve a strong party system position, giving the radical parts of the labor movement a viable political option to collaborate with, and put pressure on more right-wing union leaders. Indeed, Corbyn was in a position to re-route the labor movement in a way no other radical-left force came close to in the last decade.

Conclusion

The changing social structure and nature of class struggle has changed the terrain of radical-left politics. As RLPs are not class-rooted and with no significant trends to rebuild mass subaltern organization, ‘class-for-itself’ politics is caricature of its former self. The experience of the last decade has made it clear that a powerful assault on the status-quo requires developing populist projects, either by taking advantage of bursts of class struggle (Podemos) or by reaching a strong party system position from which to give expression to mainly latent frustrations (LFI; the Labour-left).

Populist projects have had their limitations. First, they did not create conditions for radical-left politics to become class-rooted. Second, they could not unite the left bloc (unless under unique conditions) or the ‘popular bloc’. Unable to reach power, populist projects lost momentum and were unable to keep open the cracks created by NUBCS or by the party system position they reached.

With no mass organized movement building, and since populist projects tend to wane, the main challenge for RLPs is not only to develop such projects but to utilize them to organize subaltern classes and sink roots into them, preferably from a position of power. This requires, first, taking advantage of the expectations and confidence created by NUBCS or populist projects in order to encourage unionization and other forms of subaltern organization – for example, the US teacher’s movement, in part influenced by the Sanders campaign and Occupy Wall Street (Blanc 2019). Second, it requires using political power gained by populist projects to redirect the labor movement into a counter-hegemonic path (the Labour-left was positioned to do this). Third, it requires taking advantage of populist projects to reach power and using it to rearrange subaltern interests in a more solidatistic and collective way. Populist projects enhanced leadership power at the expense of the rank-and-file, but (at least theoretically) there is no reason why the mobilization of diffused frustrations cannot be combined with the encouragement of subaltern activeness and organization.

Callinicos (2014) has identified the phenomenon I have termed ‘NUBCS’, but sees it as a temporary form to be transcended by union-based struggles. Panitch and Gindin (2017) believe class rootlessness could best be overcome by traditional workers’ movements. While waves of unionization that might reinvigorate the radical-left cannot be discounted, last decade’s experience raises the opposite possibility: not of building social power that can assert itself in the political field, but of creating new subjects in the political field without a matching power in the social field, and stabilizing those subjects by translating populist-induced power or enthusiasm into social power.⁸

Populist projects do not have a discursive magic formula that enables them to unite the ‘popular’ or the left bloc, as implied by Mouffe and Errejón (Errejón et al. 2016; Mouffe 2018). However, populist projects do hold a key to uniting those blocs, not directly by creating ‘equivalences chains’ and ‘empty signifiers’, but indirectly by increasing working-class confidences, pressuring trade unions to change course, or lifting RLPs to a position in which they become the only alternative for left voters.

Thus, embracing populism as an important tool in the radical-left arsenal is a conclusion of a class analysis and not a rejection of ‘class-essentialism’ as suggested by Laclau and Mouffe (2014). RLPs have lost their class roots in recent decades, as a result of working-class weakness and trade union conservatism. Both might be challenged by populist projects combined with ‘class-for-itself’ methods.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Or Dar

Notes

Author biography

Or Dar finishes his PhD in Tel Aviv University, writing about the mobilization strategies of radical-left parties in Europe after the 2008 economic crisis.

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