This paper examines the relation between acquirer (abnormal) returns and governance characteristics of the board of directors of the acquiring firm. The central question is: Are higher (acquirer) abnormal returns associated with ‘better’ board governance, having controlled for other factors that can affect returns? As acquisitions represent a significant change in the acquirer’s corporate structure and operations, the determinants of a successful acquisition are of considerable importance. We examine the relation between returns and governance variables using a sample of 80 Australian acquisitions that occurred between 1999 and 2005. We use both short-run and long-run (abnormal) returns to capture the wealth effects of the acquisitions. We find very limited evidence of a connection between our governance variables and acquirer returns.
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