Spread of misinformation during COVID-19: The case of Mauritius

Abstract

As COVID-19 continues to spread rapidly across the globe, it is imperative to regulate the content of information such that people have access to accurate information. Nevertheless, there is the fear that governments are abusing legislation to limit freedom of expression and that the pandemic is simply being used as an excuse to further obstruct free speech. As such, it is through the lens of human rights that this research critically examines the approaches undertaken by the Mauritian authorities to deal with misinformation during COVID-19. To achieve this research objective, the related laws on misinformation are critically assessed and a comparative analysis is caried out of international responses to misinformation during COVID-19. It has been noted that the law alone is not sufficient to deal with misinformation, and media literacy among citizens is also essential in this endeavour.

Keywords

Freedom of expression COVID-19 human rights freedom of the press misinformation fake news

Introduction

As COVID-19 continues to spread rapidly across the globe, it is imperative to regulate the content of the information being shared with a view to ensuring that governments, companies, the medical community and society in general have access to accurate and timely information (Agley and Xiao, 2021). In this regard, various international institutions, such as the World Wide Web Foundation, UNESCO, the Association for Progressive Communications and the World Health Organization, have raised serious concerns over the vast asymmetries in the information being circulated in society, which makes it difficult for civilians to rely on trustworthy sources.

Indeed, the purveyors of fake news are sharing information that has caused unnecessary panic among the public whilst simultaneously slowing the progress of the fight against the pandemic (Mian and Khan, 2020). For instance, there have been rumours spread by the press that drinking whisky can kill the coronavirus (Chen, 2020) or that the virus affects only black people (Collier, 2020), and even racist news that larceny is being committed with regard to Chinese shop-owners in Nigeria (Adebayo, 2020). As such, there is a dire need to take the appropriate measures to stop the spread of this incorrect information and, primarily, it is imperative to highlight the various types of inaccurate news, ranging from fake news, misinformation and disinformation to an infodemic. In this regard, in its book Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation: A Handbook for Journalism Education and Training, UNESCO (2018) has defined fake news as ‘non-factual information’, but most experts are against the use of this term since it does not consider the intentions of the purveyors of the information and is, rather, used to undermine journalists (Sharpe, 2020). In contrast, disinformation refers to the deliberate propaganda of misleading or biased information, and manipulated narratives or facts, while misinformation refers to the spread of false information but without necessarily involving the mens rea to mislead (Dictionary.com, 2022). On the other hand, an infodemic has been described by the World Health Organization (2020) as an overabundance of information, whether accurate or not, which makes it difficult for people to find trustworthy and reliable guidance when they need it.

Undoubtedly, the increase in disinformation, misinformation and infodemics adversely affects the reputation of a country and, more specifically, those targeted by such news. Moreover, it is dangerous to rely on such information to protect public interests. In addition, people’s health may be at stake due to an over-reliance on unverified or unreliable information that is made universally accessible via social media platforms and the Internet in general. Consequently, to address these information issues, which are a frequent source of frustration (Pan American Health Organization, 2020), governments across the world are adopting strict measures such as censorship and warning or arresting those who spread false news. In this context, Mauritius has not been spared and has also fallen prey to false news being shared on social media since 2020 when, immediately on the announcement of the closure of supermarkets and shops, a civilian falsely claimed that there were riots in one particular region of the island. The police force and special squad teams were mobilised to the area, whereupon it was found that the news was fake. Accordingly, to prevent the reoccurrence of such an event, the civilian was arrested under the Mauritius Information and Communications Technology Act of 2001 (Lovina Sophie, 2020).

Nevertheless, there is the fear that governments are abusing libel laws, defamation laws and Internet restrictions to limit the freedom of expression of citizens and the media, and that the pandemic is simply being used as an excuse to further obstruct freedom of expression (Tandoc et al., 2020). Hence, since the outbreak of COVID-19, some international agencies, such as the World Health Organization and Human Rights Watch, have established checklists to ensure the protection of human rights, including the protection of freedom of expression and the broadcasting or sharing of verified, scientific, fact-based news and analysis (Guterres, 2021). As such, it is through the lens of human rights that this research critically examines the approaches undertaken by the Mauritian authorities to deal with misinformation during COVID-19 in the context of domestic laws and international conventions on freedom of expression. To achieve this research objective, a content analysis of international responses – the ‘black letter’ research methodology – is adopted, which relates to a critical analysis of the corresponding laws on misinformation and human rights, and a comparative analysis is made between Mauritian responses and those of other countries to uphold freedom of expression in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

At present, there is little literature on the researched topic and this study will be amongst the first academic studies on the effectiveness of Mauritian laws concerning freedom of expression. The study has been carried out with the aim of combining a large amount of empirical, theoretical and factual information that will be of use to various stakeholders, not only academics. While the first part of this article has set out the context of the research, including the research objectives and methods, the second part will discuss some of the existing literature, highlighting the main sources of misinformation and its impact during COVID-19, as well as some governmental actions taken across the globe to counter the spread of misinformation. The main international conventions will then be analysed, as well as the laws of Mauritius on freedom of expression in the context of misinformation during COVID-19. The article continues by critically examining the the responses of other countries in dealing with misinformation and concludes by critically assessing the various approaches adopted by some countries.

Literature review

Sources of misinformation

Misinformation is not a new phenomenon, although, in today’s digitalised era, the spread of misinformation is accelerated by, firstly, social media and, secondly, the diversification of actors that produce and disseminate misinformation (Association for Progressive Communications, 2021). Initially, media operators were mostly responsible for sharing disinformation, but now a simple post or hashtag relating to the personal opinion of an individual on social media platforms may become the subject of information that may not be necessarily true or accurate. It is apposite to note that misinformation propagates without constraints, does not entail any curation or peer review, and does not require any professional verifications.

Indeed, in support of the statement that misinformation is gaining popularity due to social media, Brennen et al. (2020) assessed the main types, sources and claims of COVID-19 misinformation in the UK between January and March 2020 published by randomly chosen social media platforms and traditional media institutions. The findings reveal that 59% of the misinformation emanated from three well-known social media platforms – YouTube, Facebook and Twitter – and, in terms of the nature of the misinformation, it was found that misleading or false claims about the actions or policies of public authorities, such as the government, and international bodies, such as the United Nations or the World Health Organisation (WHO), were the largest category of misinformation. Along similar lines, Kouzy et al. (2020) sought to examine the extent of misinformation being spread on Twitter regarding COVID-19 on one particular day in February 2020. The study included 673 tweets and the results show that 153 tweets contained misinformation, while 107 shared unverifiable information. Furthermore, the researchers analysed the Twitter accounts by user category and the results reveal that the disseminators of misinformation were informal personal/group accounts (33.8%), followed by unverified Twitter accounts (31%); formal institutions like the government, press agencies and health-care providers had a lower rate of misinformation (6.1%). Moreover, Twitter has been accused by Pulido et al. (2020) of promulgating information that may hinder efforts in combatting COVID-19. A content analysis methodology was used by the researchers, and the results reveal that out of the 1000 tweets selected, 92% comprised false information, of which 63.3% were retweeted.

Undoubtedly, the ease of access to Internet facilities across the globe has turned online platforms into an accessible and easy tool of communication, but the lack of objective information shared on these platforms has resulted in an unprecedented surge of misinformation and unauthentic news. In this regard, Li et al. (2020) examined the sharing of misinformation during COVID-19 on YouTube on one particular day in March 2020. The researchers found that out of the 145 online videos, 64% contained misinformation elaborating on myths, the discovery of a vaccine and decontextualisation, while more than a quarter of the most viewed YouTube videos contained misinformation that represented millions of viewers worldwide. Consequently, the sharing of videos based on false or unauthentic information may delay the elimination of the coronavirus. As such, to deal with this issue, it becomes imperative to understand the reasons why there is the rising presence of misinformation on social media. Accordingly, a study conducted by Laato et al. (2020) reveals that sharing online information has become typical behaviour nowadays, and the 294 respondents in Bangladesh affirmed that although they were aware that the information was unverified, they still shared it without considering the adverse effects of their actions. In addition, to corroborate the findings of Laato et al. (2020), a study conducted by Pennycook et al. (2020) used a close-ended survey with 1600 American participants; the findings indicate that more than 50% of the respondents preferred to share information without validation since, for them, information sharing was essential to raise public awareness.

Impact of misinformation

As the WHO has warned in relation to misinformation, people are experiencing difficulties in finding trustworthy sources of information that they can rely on, which is also acting as a barrier to response efforts to mitigate the pandemic. Consequently, several researchers have analysed the potential impacts of misinformation, and Ali (2022) groups these effects in three categories – namely, xenophobia, the violation of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) health-care rights and psychological distress.

Primarily, rumours and misinformation have led people to believe that COVID-19 is a result of intentionality and the personal interests of one particular country, which, when riddled with hate speech and racism, has resulted in human societies witnessing unprecedented disruption (Ali, 2022). For instance, a study conducted by Rzymski and Nowicki (2020) suggests that Asian medical students living in Poland are facing discrimination and isolation due to their origins, which is affecting their career development. Likewise, xenophobia towards Chinese people is prevalent in the USA, as confirmed by Reny and Barreto’s (2020) research, which investigated some 4311 Americans’ perceptions of the Chinese. The results reveal a strong association between COVID-19 misinformation and xenophobia towards the Chinese. Their findings confirm that the hate and grudges that people held against people of a particular origin were further accentuated by rumours that the coronavirus emanated from China, and even if this were proven, it was still not substantial grounds to perpetrate xenophobia towards Chinese people. In addition to xenophobia, several international institutions, such as the World Health Organization and United Nations, have declared the LGBT community to be more vulnerable during COVID-19 due to the already prevailing stigmatisation and discrimination of these individuals (Lopez, 2020). Basically, the LGBT community is facing issues with accessing health-care services and they are falling prey to bullying at home and online, which is making it more difficult to move easily due to lockdowns and sanitisation restriction measures (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020).

Apart from xenophobia towards Chinese people and the increase in the vulnerability of the LGBT community, it is believed that misinformation plays a vital role in undermining people’s mental health by inducing fear, anxiety and stress (Ali, 2022). This is because people living in isolation or quarantine often mainly rely on the source of information that is readily available – that is, information shared on social media platforms. As mentioned earlier, these platforms contain the majority of misinformation, which may cause severe risks to the mental and physical health of vulnerable groups (Brennen et al., 2020). In this regard, Rajkumar (2020) conducted a study to assess the impacts of COVID-19 on people’s mental health. The findings show that anxiety, stress and depression were the main psychological problems encountered during COVID-19, and that the reduction or elimination of mental health issues could be achieved by counteracting misinformation and its potential sources. This psychological distress has a direct causal link to misinformation and it is therefore very important for the generators of information to ensure that they share true and accurate information that is verified by reliable sources, otherwise there will be more hatred and discrimination amongst communities across the globe.

Furthermore, and more alarmingly, a study conducted by Islam et al. (2021) and another carried out by the John Hopkins Center for Communication Programs (Desmon, 2020) have proven that relying on misinformation relating to health matters can be fatal. Their findings suggest that during the first three months of 2020, nearly 6000 people were hospitalised and at least 800 died due to reliance on COVID-19 misinformation. Spreading like wildfire alongside the pandemic, false information is the underlying principle for uncertainty and distrust, which in turn fuels an environment that is vulnerable to fear, anxiety and violent behaviour.

International instruments and Mauritian laws on freedom of expression

International conventions

Essentially, to narrow the spectrum of the negative impacts of misinformation during COVID-19, it is first and foremost imperative to control the sources of this inaccurate information. In this regard, governments across the world have implemented various strategies to tackle the issue of the distribution of false and misleading information, such as running sensitisation campaigns, holding press conferences, and strengthening existing, or establishing new, regulations on the matter. However, in these attempts, governments are having to negotiate the dichotomy between freedom of expression and people’s right to be safe from the adverse effects of misinformation (Rodrigues and Xu, 2020).

Fundamentally, freedom of expression is guaranteed by several international instruments. For instance, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights empowers every person to have the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and to receive and share information through any media channel, regardless of borders. This particular article is further replicated in Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; United Nations, 1966) but with a more elaborated explanation of the methods of communication and some restrictions on the exercising of these rights. In particular, Article 19(2) of the ICCPR adds to the corresponding article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by stating that communication channels may be either oral, in writing or in print, in the form of art or via any other media of the person’s choice. Indeed, Article 19(2) of the ICCPR differs from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by mentioning that the right to freedom of expression shall be exercised by respecting the rights and reputation of others, and for the protection of national security, public order, or public health and morals.

Furthermore, under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, any person is entitled to hold opinions and receive and disseminate ideas and information without interference. Essentially, the ‘ideas’ and ‘information’ referred to in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights not only encompass inoffensive or indifferent content, but also include things that may shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector of the population (see Müller and Ors v. Switzerland (1988)). Similarly, Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides for the right to receive information and express and disseminate opinions ‘within the law’. Nevertheless, this legal provision has been criticised by various scholars (see Fielden, 2012; Kas, 2021) on the grounds that it does not provide for freedom of expression as afforded by other international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights. This is because, firstly, there is no corresponding right to impart information and, secondly, the right of expression and dissemination has been curtailed with the proviso ‘within the law’.

Nevertheless, these rights are not absolute since Article 19(3) of the ICCPR outlines some permissible limitations on freedom of expression if required by law or necessary to respect the rights and reputation of others or to protect national security, public order, public health or public morals (United Nations, 1966). Accordingly, these limitations have to be clearly spelt out in terms of their scope, meaning and effect in order to regulate individuals’ behaviour and avoid violations. Also, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR highlights the necessity of domestic laws to the effect that any restriction on the exercise of free expression must be proportionate to the threat to national security, public order, public health or public morals. In other words, any restriction of freedom of expression has to be mandated by the exigencies of the situation and must meet the tests of necessity and proportionality with the view of achieving a legitimate objective whilst not undermining the right to expression itself (Pomeranz and Schwid, 2021).

Hence, from the above elaboration on international conventions, in the context of COVID-19, the common consensus is that the onus is on the government that is seeking to limit free expression to establish a direct and immediate link between freedom of expression and the threat, and any restrictions must be the ‘least intrusive instrument’ to protect national security and public health (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2011). However, there is a gap in the literature as to how countries have complied with their duties under the ICCPR during the pandemic in light of the rising amount of misinformation, especially in the Mauritian context.

Mauritian laws on freedom of expression

Primarily, Mauritius, being a sovereign democratic country, has embedded the fundamental right of expression in Section 12 of its constitution, which is the sovereign law of the island. This particular Section 12 has been inspired by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mauritius relies on judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights when considering disputes regarding freedom of expression.

However, Section 12 of the Mauritian constitution sets out some limitations on the enjoyment of freedom of expression. In particular, it is a limited right and there is the need to strike a balance between the right to freedom of expression and the rights of others. This reasoning has been applied rigorously in Mauritian courts for decades – for instance, in the cases of Cehl Meeah v. Commissioner of Police (2001), Armoogum v. La Sentinelle Ltée (2002) and Soornack v. Le Matinale (2013). Essentially, the Supreme Court of Mauritius highlighted in the landmark case of DPP v. Boodhoo (1992) that an abuse of freedom of expression can be a potential threat in a democratic society, which may lead to chaos.

Moreover, apart from respecting the rights of others when expressing an opinion, Mauritian laws have criminalised the publication, distribution or reproduction of false news that has the aim of defaming another person or will disturb public order or peace according to Section 299 of the Mauritian Criminal Code. For instance, a newspaper cannot publish inappropriate, malicious or illegal articles without the required facts or evidence, and this principle was supported in the Mauritian case of Joseph France Michel Favolle v. Advance Publications (Mauritius) Co. Ltd (2017). However, where the facts are true and relevant for public benefit, the court will not prohibit the publication of an article that is defamatory, and this reasoning was upheld in the case of Fraser v. Evans (1969).

Additionally, freedom of expression is limited on the grounds of avoiding a contempt of court. In fact, any person who impedes the fair administration of justice will be guilty of this offence, and this may even apply to journalists. For instance, in the case of DPP v. Ahnee (1992), the media was accused of making insulting remarks in respect of a judge by casting doubts on the latter’s independence and impartiality. The relevant media operator was thus sanctioned for having scandalised the court. Additionally, in the case of Procureur General v. Delaroche (1893), a media operator was found guilty of a contempt of court for having influenced a pending trial, which interfered with the administration of justice in this particular case. The rationale behind this conviction was to avoid ‘trial by media’, which would have negatively affected the right to a fair trial of the accused.

Misinformation in Mauritius during COVID-19

Mauritius has been successful in limiting the number of COVID-19 cases owing to the various action plans implemented by the Mauritian authorities, such as quarantine, isolation, contact tracing, mass testing and even restrictions on various points of entry into the country (Musango et al., 2021). Also, the COVID-19 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 was passed, which covers various areas to cater for the impact of the coronavirus, such as taxes, employment, insolvency, banking and tourism, among others, but nothing has been prescribed in respect of matters related to misinformation or human rights. Nevertheless, the Mauritian government took a proactive approach to discourage the spread of misinformation on COVID-19 at an early stage. This statement is evidenced by its response to the first attempt to mislead the general population through the sharing of a post on Facebook by a Mauritian citizen just after the prime minister of the country announced the first national lockdown in March 2020. The post read as follows: ‘Rioting right now around the capital Port-Louis, Abercombie and Roche Bois Police Station under attack,…Jumbo Riche Terre being looted as I write this’.

According to police officials, these words disturbed the public interest since this post was shared by 10,000 individuals, which in turn caused serious panic in civil society due to the fear of food shortages (Lovina Sophie, 2020). Additionally, the police force had to deploy special teams to reach the areas that were allegedly under attack, and this undoubtedly created unnecessary turmoil for those concerned. This particular act was sanctioned as an offence under Section 46(g)(a) of the Mauritius Information and Communications Technology Act of 2001 for having deliberately used telecommunications equipment or services to send, transmit, transfer, post, publish, deliver or show a message that was obscene, indecent, offensive, abusive, threatening, menacing, false or misleading, and was likely to cause harm or caused harm to a person. Consequently, the Mauritian purveyor of the false news was immediately imprisoned, which was a strong message from the Mauritian authorities that they would not tolerate such behaviour. If found guilty by a court of law, the offender will have to serve a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years and pay a fine not exceeding 1 million Mauritian rupees (US$22,900).

In addition to the immediate arrest of this purveyor of fake news in Mauritius as a corrective and preventive measure, the country has left no stone unturned in upholding the dissemination of true and accurate information. Accordingly, the Cybercrime Unit of the police force in Mauritius thoroughly scrutinises and monitors any instances of misconduct like the spreading of false information on social media platforms or live radio shows (UN News, 2020). Simultaneously, the government has formed a national communication committee on COVID-19, which has the mandate of addressing rumours, misinformation and fake news, and bringing forth clarifications. Moreover, this committee is the sole official authority recognised by the Mauritian government to communicate information regarding the prevalence of COVID-19 cases in the country, the number of deaths, shopping guidelines and precautionary measures, as well as medical treatment and advice. Laudably, during the early stages of the pandemic, the members of this national committee were present at 6 p.m. every day for a special communication that was broadcast by the national television station of Mauritius for around three months, and this regular and transparent communication proved to be highly effective. Essentially, a decrease in rumours and fake news was observed among the population and on social media, and no serious signs of panic were witnessed among the population, who reacted responsibly and in a disciplined manner, as evidenced by a study carried out by Musango et al. (2021), who collected data through participative observation of key stakeholders involved in the fight against COVID-19 in Mauritius, including the World Health Organization and Ministry of Health and Wellness.

Furthermore, together with these corrective and punitive actions, as well as clear and official communication channels, several media platforms were created to transmit information from decision-makers to the general public. In particular, a specific website; a Facebook page (http://www.COVID-19.mu); the Facebook page ‘Coronavirus Moris’, dedicated to COVID-19 in Mauritius; and a mobile application, beSafeMoris, all of which are still operational, were established. Undeniably, considerable efforts have been made by the Mauritian authorities to deal with misinformation during COVID-19. However, in one particular instance, the Mauritian government was accused of acting illegally by the Centre for Law and Democracy (2020) for having arrested a woman for having spread fake news regarding the prime minister.

In fact, the Mauritian woman was arrested under the Mauritius Information and Communications Technology Act of 2001 for having posted a humorous message, although fake, about the prime minister on Facebook to the effect that the latter would be holding a live interview with several world leaders regarding the success of Mauritius in dealing with COVID-19. Additionally, adding fuel to the fire, this woman’s barristers were charged with breaching a curfew while travelling to visit her without the appropriate work permit, and these actions led to severe criticism of the Mauritian authorities. Thereafter, the woman was granted bail upon payment of a sum of money. In particular, the Centre for Law and Democracy advocated that the charge against the woman in question was unconstitutional and that the sharing of fake news that had no consequence of defamation or fraud had no legitimacy, whilst highlighting simultaneously that the humorous message about the prime minister was not a statement of fact. Ultimately, in September 2021, the court of Mauritius withdrew the provisional charge, indicating that this charge was unconstitutional. To reiterate, international instruments like Article 19(2) of the ICCPR and the constitutional right of freedom of expression are subject to limitations if the rights or reputation of others are at stake or if there is a need to protect public order or interest. Accordingly, critical comments targeted towards political leaders or their positions regarding COVID-19 must not in all instances be the target of a breach of specific legislation on misinformation or the spread of fake news.

However, apart from these two cases, no one else has been incriminated during the period of COVID-19 in Mauritius for having spread misinformation, which is indeed a positive sign, and this success may largely be attributed to both the punitive and corrective actions by the Mauritian government and the vast range of communication campaigns undertaken by the latter to disseminate information on COVID-19. Nevertheless, it is still worth considering the approaches of other countries in dealing with misinformation with the view to compare the functioning of the Mauritian stakeholders’ initiatives with models, benchmarks and examples from outside Mauritius.

Government interventions across the world

From an evaluation of government responses to misinformation during COVID-19, four main categories of action can be noted: sensitisation initiatives; increasing access to accurate information; addressing commercial fraud; and criminalising expression. Primarily, being concerned with the gravity of the consequences of misinformation, a subtle approach was taken by the UK government, which, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, launched a series of sensitisation campaigns, one of which was the Stop the Spread television programme broadcast by BBC World. The programme aimed to shed light on the mass of misinformation surrounding COVID-19 and the negative impacts thereof. Moreover, this programme aimed to encourage people to check their sources of information and only share it if it was trustworthy. Additionally, as a corrective mechanism, the UK government, again alongside the World Health Organization, launched a digital series, Reporting Misinformation, to explain to people how to report any misinformation they come across. This information has been posted by the World Health Organization on its website and shared in five international languages. It is reported to be the second most viewed COVID-19-related page on the World Health Organization’s (2021) website, which implies that the caution surrounding the spread of false information is catching people’s attention in general.

Moreover, with the aim of attracting people’s attention to the dangers of spreading misinformation, especially the young generation, an innovative online game, Go Viral, was developed by the UK’s Cabinet Office and the University of Cambridge. This game highlights the importance of fact-checking and gives people an insight into the techniques used to share false information on social media. In particular, players are put in the shoes of a purveyor of misinformation and discover how real news gets distorted by the involvement of fake doctors, inaccurate remedies and false rumours. Indeed, according to a study conducted by Maertens et al. (2021), it was found that by playing the game just once the spread of false information could be reduced for at least three months. Essentially, the success of the UK government’s various initiatives has been applauded by Islam et al. (2021), who believe that the common misconceptions around vaccines have been eliminated and more people now understand the safety of approved COVID-19 vaccines in the UK.

In addition to sensitisation campaigns, governments have increased the general population’s access to accurate information by sharing facts on a continuous basis. For instance, like Mauritius, the government of Taiwan held daily press conferences and issued newsletters on matters related to COVID-19 whilst at the same time establishing the Taiwan FactCheck Center, which is a social media application that can verify the accuracy of information provided online within 60 minutes. Any false news detected is then clarified to the public. Moreover, in Ethiopia, the simple gesture by the governmental authorities of sending an automatic message on COVID-19 prevention when someone makes a phone call has helped to curb misinformation on the pandemic to a large extent. Similarly, stakeholders in South Africa and Nigeria worked with WhatsApp to provide users in these countries with information on the virus and ways of preventing its spread.

There is no doubt that misinformation about COVID-19 is also being spread through false advertisements and commercial fraud, especially regarding prevention and cures. Accordingly, some countries are enforcing their consumer protection laws so that the public is not defrauded in purchasing ineffective, unsafe or harmful products (World Health Organization, 2020). For example, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, Europol, has identified and taken down 2500 online links to COVID-19 websites, marketplaces and advertisements, and seized 4.4 million units of fake pharmaceuticals (Pomeranz and Schwid, 2021). Along the same lines, with the view of protecting the public, governments have adopted a strict approach by making use of cyber misuse laws, penal codes and defamation legislation to prosecute people who share incorrect information on COVID-19. In this context, officials in the Philippines arrested people for allegedly spreading false rumours about COVID-19 in their local neighbourhoods, and the Sri Lankan authorities arrested people for criticising public officials’ response to the pandemic. Journalists have been similarly sanctioned. The Cambodian authorities arrested the director of a news site for inaccurately reporting statements made by the prime minister during a press conference. Also, Iraq’s media regulator fined Reuters and suspended its license for reporting COVID-19 statistics in violation of its media broadcasting rules, while in Serbia police arrested a journalist for her article reporting a lack of personal protective equipment, sanitary materials and medicine in a hospital (Pomeranz and Schwid, 2021).

Furthermore, to their merit, some countries have taken strong measures to criminalise the dissemination of misinformation through emergency laws. For instance, in April 2020, Botswana issued the Emergency Powers (COVID-19) Regulations, criminalising the sharing of any information to the public about COVID-19 from a source other than the Director of Health Services, while in Hungary the prime minster has been given additional powers to rule by decree and sanction people who share fake news about the pandemic. Correspondingly, Zimbabwe passed a new regulation giving the government the power to prosecute any person who published or communicated false news about officials during lockdown. It is apposite to note that any breach of the new emergency laws may entail fines and imprisonment for up to 20 years.

Being aware of the gravity of the implications of misinformation, Recital 59 of the European Union’s 2018 Directive on audiovisual media services emphasises the need to educate citizens on their responsibly when using information (European Parliament and European Council, 2018). In particular, to achieve this objective, Recital 59 highlights that civil society needs to possess advanced media literacy skills, which is not only limited to tools and technologies, but should also aim to equip citizens with the critical thinking skills required to exercise judgment and recognise the distinction between opinion and fact. The Directive thus expects media service providers and video-sharing platform providers to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders to promote media literacy, and progress in this regard to be monitored continuously. In turn, this collaboration relies on an urgent need to improve critical thinking, which is an ever-changing process that requires constant reflection and adaptations. This raises the concern as to whether people are ready to adopt critical thinking skills, since sharing and disseminating information without verifying its source has now become the norm. Nevertheless, research conducted by Jones-Jang et al. (2021) reveals the importance and relevance of information literacy, which significantly increases the likelihood of identifying false or incorrect information. Similarly, Kahne and Bowyer (2017) sought to investigate the efficiency of media literacy in detecting fake news, and asked some young participants to rate the accuracy of evidence-based posts and those that contained misinformation. Their results show that those respondents who were media literate were more comfortable with categorising evidence-based posts as accurate than those that contained misinformation.

However, the European Commission is optimistic with regard to the desired change in mentality, which is demonstrated by its issuing of a code of practice on disinformation in May 2021. The code was signed by online platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, Microsoft and Mozilla, and some other marketing websites, and set out various commitments, ranging from transparency in political advertising to the closure of fake accounts and the demonetisation of purveyors of misinformation. To secure its efforts in dealing with misinformation, the European Commission further implemented an annual assessment of the signatories by investigating the efforts made by the latter in carrying out their commitments. The first assessment was published in 2020 and covered the COVID-19 crisis; the online platforms reported on their various endeavours, such as the development of tools to facilitate access to reliable information of public interest, the removal of false or misleading information that will cause physical damage, and the prohibition of advertisements that either exploit the crisis or promote anti-vaccine behaviours. In addition, to make a more robust framework, the European Union is aiming to transform the code of practice into a co-regulatory instrument within the Digital Services Act 2020 (European Commission, 2020).

Discussion and conclusion

All of the countries discussed in this research, including Mauritius, have either ratified or signed the ICCPR, which implies their commitment to protect freedom of expression. Undeniably, true and accurate information is a key principle in upholding the transparency and accountability of official authorities and those having control over a community. Nevertheless, if attempts are made to curb the reporting or investigation of true and correct information, this may have negative repercussions on the fundamental rights of freedom of expression. However, despite the existence of international conventions imposing the obligation on countries to guarantee freedom of expression, several countries have deviated from these commitments in the process of addressing COVID-19 misinformation. For instance, the use of existing or new laws to criminalise expression about the pandemic does not meet the requirements under Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, which is basically to protect the rights and reputation of others or to protect the public interest. Undeniably, governments are acting contrary to international law when they criminalise journalism or prosecute expression that is truthful or criticises the government (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2011). In fact, these approaches are not necessary to address the public health crisis and are not proportionate to the public health threat, which are two essential elements in seeking the restriction of free expression under Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.

From the research conducted, it is noted that accurate and regular reporting by governmental bodies plays an essential role in fostering public trust in accurate sources of information, which can, in turn, reduce misinformation. As already mentioned, the dissemination of true and accurate information is one method of upholding the fundamental human right of free expression, thereby guaranteeing democracy. Accordingly, one must not undermine the role and function of the press, which has the mandate to expose government malfeasance and share accurate information with the public. Consequently, establishing a law that gives the power to share information only to governmental authorities underestimates the role of the press and, accordingly, it is suggested that governments should avoid any action that interferes with the press’s obligations towards civil society.

Essentially, the number of cases surrounding misinformation on COVID-19 is relatively low in Mauritius compared to other countries. This is largely attributed to the dissemination of official information on the pandemic by the Mauritian authorities either through the media or via mobile applications or official websites, and also to the strict application of the information technology laws with regard to the purveyors of fake news that is likely to disturb public security. However, in one particular instance, it has been noted that the cyber misuse laws were used to restrict the freedom of expression of a woman who was humorously critical towards the government’s response to COVID-19 in Mauritius. Fortunately, the judiciary in the country is independent and this charge was struck off by the court.

Nevertheless, the dangers of spreading misinformation still loom large and this consequently calls for initiatives to sensitise civilians to media literacy. It is undisputable that people need to be equipped with the necessary critical thinking skills to use and create media content responsibly and safely, especially in complex situations like the COVID-19 pandemic. In such efforts, the role of academia, consumer associations, press bodies and social media platforms must be underpinned. For instance, the setting up of a new Media Education Chair at the Lille Graduate School of Journalism in collaboration with Facebook France has been seen as a laudable initiative to show Facebook’s commitment to promoting critical thinking and fighting against false information. In the context of Mauritius, it is noted that the majority of the efforts to combat misinformation surround a strict application of the law and the use of media by governmental authorities to share authentic news. Unfortunately, media literacy has not been given due attention by the Mauritian government, despite the fact that information and media education can help people adopt a critical mindset and differentiate between correct and incorrect information. At present, only journalism courses at the tertiary level include relevant modules pertaining to information and media literacy, but these are not taught at the primary or secondary levels or even in other undergraduate or postgraduate programmes at domestic universities. Although this is a long-term strategy that will take time to materialise and obtain the desired results, it is time for the Mauritian government to include formal information and media literacy modules or syllabi in the school curriculum at the fundamental levels of primary and secondary education.

On a concluding note, from the comparative study conducted in this article, it is imperative to highlight, first, that there is an urgent need for countries to abide strictly by the principles of necessity and proportionality to correspond to the threat being encountered by resorting to libel laws, defamation laws or cyber misuse laws to prosecute those who express their opinion. Second, although misinformation cannot be entirely eradicated, it can still be managed through campaigns and collaboration, especially by showing people how to recognise and report misinformation and improve their media literacy. As such, media literacy is a matter for each and every one of us, and through constant education and robust collaboration among various stakeholders, people’s mindsets are likely to be changed, which will help in eradicating the issue of misinformation. Moreover, the strategies adopted in other countries involve both the private sector, such as journalists and education providers, and public authorities, such as the government, in addressing the spread of misinformation. However, the sociocultural context of Mauritius has to be considered when assessing the extent to which the involvement of private institutions and governmental authorities is warranted. It follows that, in Mauritius, where the crime rate is relatively low, there is justified reason to believe that more subtle measures such as the sensitisation and education of the public will bring the desired result of curbing the generation and spread of misinformation.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Ambareen Beebeejaun

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