Abstract
Mobile and slow-moving operations, such as striping, sweeping, bridge flushing, and pothole patching, are critical for efficient and safe operation of a highway transportation system. However, reducing hazards for roadway workers and achieving a safer environment for both roadway maintenance operators and the public is a challenging problem. In 2017 alone, a total of 158,000 vehicle crashes occurred in work zones in the U.S.A., accounting for 61,000 injuries. The autonomous truck-mounted attenuator (ATMA) vehicle, sometimes referred to as an autonomous impact protection vehicle (AIPV), offers a promising solution to eliminate injuries to roadway maintenance workers and the public. This paper presents the evaluation methodology for the ATMA system, as well as the outcomes of field testing in Sedalia, Missouri. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first academic research to focus on ATMA. The ATMA system is first reviewed, followed by an introduction to the field testing procedures that includes descriptions of test cases and data collected, and their format. An analysis methodology is then proposed to quantitatively evaluate the system’s performance, and statistical models and hypothesis testing procedures are developed and presented. The numerical analysis results from real-world field testing under a controlled environment are presented, and the ATMA system’s performance is summarized. This paper can serve as a reference for transportation agencies that are interested in deploying similar technologies or for academic researchers to assess characteristics of autonomous vehicles and to apply knowledge gained in transportation modeling and simulation practices.
Mobile and slow-moving operations (M&SMO), such as striping, sweeping, bridge flushing, and pothole patching, are critical for efficient and safe operation of a highway transportation system. Performing the maintenance required for a roadway infrastructure, however, could involve risks. In 2017 alone, a total of 158,000 vehicle crashes occurred in work zones in the U.S.A., accounting for 61,000 injuries. Many of these involved state Department of Transportation (DOT) employees. In the State of Missouri, slow-moving operations vehicles have been crashed into more than 80 times since 2013, resulting in many injuries to DOT employees ( 1 ). Methods for reducing these hazards to roadway workers and to achieve a safer environment, for both roadway maintenance workers and the public, has been a challenging problem.
Statistics on work zone safety show that rear-end crashes, where a vehicle runs into the rear of a slow-moving or stopped vehicle, are the most common type of crash in a work zone. Additionally, a majority of fatal work zone crashes have occurred on roads with speed limits greater than 50 mph ( 2 ). Unfortunately, these two key facts precisely describe the working environment of M&SMO workers. When performing M&SMO on freeways or highways, traffic generally travels at speeds that are higher than 50 mph (or even 70 mph), while M&SMO vehicles are operated at speeds between 5 mph and 15 mph. This dramatic speed difference requires that drivers of conventional vehicles constantly assess the changing driving environment, to rapidly perceive and respond to potential danger by switching to a different lane or slowing to avoid a crash. However, as research shows, aggressive driving and distracted attention happen very often and are the primary factors in causing work zone crashes ( 3 ). Additionally, driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or both ( 4 ), performance of heavy vehicles ( 5 ), work zone length, traffic volume ( 6 ), speeding ( 7 ), dynamic traffic conditions ( 8 , 9 ), environmental conditions ( 10 ), and many other factors also contribute to work zone crashes, which further cause travelers to detour, with increased traveling cost ( 11 ).
The autonomous truck-mounted attenuator (ATMA) vehicle, sometimes referred to as autonomous impact protection vehicle (AIPV), is a quickly emerging technology that offers a promising solution to eliminate injuries to DOT employees. It is anticipated that there is considerable potential for improving transportation infrastructure maintenance by removing drivers from risk. The system includes a leader truck (LT), a follower truck (FT), a truck-mounted attenuator (TMA) installed on the FT, and a leader-follower system that enables the FT to drive autonomously and follow the LT. The leader-follower autonomous driving system includes actuators, software, electronics, and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication equipment that can be installed on TMA-equipped LT and FT. While the LT is performing maintenance work, the FT is designed to serve as a buffer, so if a rear-end crash is inevitable, the property damage can be minimized by the TMA hardware installed on the FT. The ultimate goal of this ATMA system design is to remove DOT employees from the FT and eliminate injuries while performing slow-moving operations.
A test event was organized by the Missouri DOT (MoDOT) to characterize and demonstrate the ATMA system’s performance. The purpose of the event was to test whether the system elements (including hardware and software components) could meet predefined accuracy and functional requirements for a minimum of 32 consecutive hours of operation over several days, without the need for a MoDOT operator to take control because of poor performance of the leader-follower system. The testing was performed in a controlled environment, that is, the roadway was closed to traffic. The tests were conducted from March 26, 2019 through March 30, 2019, at Fort Walton Beach, Florida, and from April 22, 2019 through April 25, 2019, at Sedalia, Missouri.
The objective of this paper is to present the evaluation methodology for ATMA system testing, as well as the outcomes of field testing. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first academic research to focus on ATMA. It aims to promote the reliability of ATMAs at an early stage, and the authors hope this paper can serve as a reference for transportation agencies that are interested in deploying similar technologies. After the literature review, the developed ATMA system is briefly described in the third section, followed by an introduction to the field testing procedures, including definition of the test cases, the data collected, and their format. The analysis methodology is then proposed to evaluate the system’s performance quantitatively. Statistical models and hypothesis testing that were developed are presented here. The sixth section presents numerical analysis results from real-world field testing under a controlled environment and the ATMA system’s performance is summarized. The final section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Because of its importance, the safety of mobile operations in work zones has received significant attention over the last few decades, and many technologies have already been developed. For example, a speed trailer was evaluated in Texas, in which speed profiles were obtained for passenger cars and trucks as they approached and traversed work zones on rural high-speed roads. The results showed that speed trailers and radar drones were effective in reducing the mean speed and percentage of speeding vehicles in work zones ( 12 ). Ullman et al. documented the development of a field guide for portable changeable message sign, which played an important role in traffic control in work zones ( 13 ). Different visual enhancement systems were used in conjunction with TMAs to attract the attention of the approaching drivers and direct them into an adjacent lane. The experimental results presented significant difference in performance between the different visual enhancement systems ( 14 ). The best performer was then compared with a new visual enhancement system that incorporated a mobile advance warning system ( 15 ). The results showed that the mobile advance warning system had a significant influence on the performance and reduced the number of vehicles entering the critical zone. The traffic calming effect of a set of variable message signs (VMS), mounted on a slow-moving caravan of road-marking vehicles, was evaluated ( 16 ). The results showed that both the average and top speeds were very high without activating the VMS, while the average speed was reduced by 22 km/h when the VMS was activated. Mobile work zone alarm systems, including an alarm device and a directional audio system, were tested to estimate sound levels, merging distances and speeds, and driving behavior ( 17 ). The results illustrated that this alarm system had the potential to improve the safety in work zones. The evaluation tests of the influence of truck-mounted radar speed signs (RSSs) on vehicle speed were conducted for mobile maintenance operations in two multilane maintenance work zones in Oregon ( 18 ). The results indicated that vehicle speeds were typically lower and that the variation in speeds between adjacent vehicles was less with the RSS turned on, indicating RSSs were promising devices for making work zones safer.
TMAs are energy-absorbing devices attached to the rear of the trucks which are used as protective vehicles, thus protecting the motorist and the protective vehicle’s driver upon impact ( 19 ). TMAs have been in use by transportation agencies for many years, and are usually installed on relatively heavy vehicles. For example, MoDOT requires the host vehicle to be at least 16,000 lbs ( 19 ), Texas DOT requires 20,000 lbs ( 20 ), and in Sweden the weight is 9,000 kg (or 19,842 lbs) ( 21 ). While most transportation agencies are very familiar with TMAs, trailer-mounted attenuators are increasing in popularity. Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI) performed a systematic comparison between TMAs and trailer-mounted attenuators, from the perspectives of structural adequacy, risk to occupants of the impacting vehicle, and post-impact vehicular response. The researchers found that concerns about trailer-mounted attenuators swinging around may not be justified, given that post-impact trajectories of the impacting vehicles were similar to those reported during TMA impact testing ( 20 ). Additionally, three tests were performed and compared, with attentuators mounted on a tractor, on an articulated front-end loader, and on a trailer ( 21 ). The research outcome recommended that certain types of alternative carrier vehicles could be used for TMAs, under the condition that the vehicle weight limits were still met. In a review of the application of TMAs in work zones, five states were visited to solicit information in relation to support for, and extent of use of, TMAs, and the results were summarized as the guidelines for the use of the TMA in work zones ( 22 ).
ATMA is a quickly emerging technology that combines the usage of TMAs and connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) in work zones. CAV has great potential for changing our daily life and has attracted significant research attention recently ( 23 ). Because of the complex roadway environment and other challenging issues, however, the question of when an autonomous vehicle could become fully functional in a real situation remains unanswered ( 24 ). On the other hand, the application of CAV in a narrowly defined and simplified environment, such as a work zone location with the leader-follower ATMA concept, becomes more realistic. Since its debut, ATMA has received a significant amount of attention from state DOTs with the hope of reducing fatalities and injuries to DOT employees in work zones.
On the state of the practice of ATMA, in 2017 Colorado DOT (CDOT) launched the first ATMA program in the U.S.A., with the goal of testing and deploying self-driving vehicles to increase work zone safety by removing the driver from a truck that is designed to be hit ( 25 ). After that, CDOT started to lead an autonomous maintenance technology pool fund, which currently has 12 paid state DOT members ( 26 ). In 2018, MoDOT awarded a contract to purchase two ATMA vehicles for work zone maintenance, with the goal of fully testing and deploying ATMA technology in Missouri ( 1 ). In 2019, the University of Tennessee Center for Transportation Research announced a pilot demonstration to test and evaluate the potential for an autonomous system to improve work zone safety ( 27 ). Aside from Colorado and Missouri, the states that have purchased AMTA vehicles include California and Minnesota, and the number is increasing fast. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, however, this paper is the first academic research to focus on ATMA technology testing. It aims to promote the reliability of ATMAs at an early stage, and the authors hope that this paper can serve as a reference for transportation agencies that are interested in deploying similar technologies.
ATMA System Overview
The ATMA system operates in a “leader-follower” configuration, where the unmanned ATMA vehicle follows behind a human-driven LT that is performing a maintenance operation. The ATMA leader-follower system enables manned and unmanned vehicles to perform cooperatively in a multi-vehicle configuration. During the ATMA leader-follower operation, the system uses velocity, heading, and position information of the human-driven LT (collected by a navigation computer) and transmits that information in packets of data called “crumbs” to the unmanned ATMA vehicle (i.e., the FT) over a V2V communications link. The transmitted crumbs enable the unmanned ATMA FT to follow the precise position, speed, and direction of the LT as it travels along the intended route.
The ATMA system is shown in Figure 1. It is based on an existing automation kit, originally developed for the U.S. military, which is the “bolt-on” ATMA leader-follower hardware that includes components installed in the LT and driverless FT. The ATMA software control algorithms are optimized for work zone applications and leveraged from countless hours of testing and lessons learned. Similar ATMA systems have successfully supported TMA operations of CDOT, and Colas United Kingdom, a transportation infrastructure firm. The LT and FT are retrofitted with the components necessary to enable an unmanned operation (with advanced features) that includes: redundancy to eliminate single-point failures, an active safety system, high accuracy global positioning system (GPS)/GPS-denied navigation, encrypted frequency hopping V2V communications, forward-view multi-modal obstacle detect/avoid, side-view obstacle detect/warn, and a robust user interface providing system feedback, situational awareness, multi-camera view, and operator controls for vehicle gap adjustment, ATMA pause, a start-up checklist, and offset alignment adjustment.

Leader-follower autonomous truck-mounted attenuator (ATMA) vehicle system: (a) front view and (b) rear view.
Field Testing Overview
Times and Locations of Tests
The tests were conducted from March 26, 2019 through March 30, 2019 at Fort Walton Beach, Florida, and from April 22, 2019 through April 25, 2019 at Sedalia, Missouri.
Test Cases
A total of 31 cases were planned to test the system’s performance. Among them, 23 of the test cases were quantifiable and are documented, including five tests on communication loss, seven on following distance and accuracy, three on obstacle detection, and eight on emergency situations. Each test was repeated three times to assure statistical accuracy. The other eight test cases were simple yes/no testing, such as visual inspection of the system and the trucks, data logging, turn signals, and the functionality of the user interface, and are thus not documented in this paper.
Vehicle Operating Mode
The transition of each vehicle operating mode, from the beginning of a test scenario to the end, was recorded in a log. The log files included three modes for each ATMA vehicle: IDLE, ROLLOUT, and RUN. IDLE mode is when the safety operator of an ATMA vehicle is in control of the vehicle (instead of the autonomous system having control), and it is the mode in which the ATMA vehicle starts. The FT will transition to the ROLLOUT mode and then to the RUN mode. ROLLOUT mode describes the initial state of the ATMA system when operations begin. The initial state is the distance the ATMA vehicle travels toward the LT before transitioning to the eCrumb navigation method. The travel distance needed to transition to an eCrumb path ranges between 20 ft and 30 ft. ROLLOUT mode should be performed at an approximate speed of 4–8 mph. RUN mode is where the FT is operating autonomously.
Log File Format
The FT log file is formatted as a comma separated value (CSV) file format. Figure 2 shows a sample of the LT and FT log files.

Screenshot of autonomous truck-mounted attenuator (ATMA) vehicles’ log files: (a) leader truck and (b) follower truck.
LT Log Messages
LT log message (see Figure 2a) columns are described by the header.
1st column TIMESTAMP indicates the time in the format hour: minute: second.
2nd column LCB indicates that it is a LT message.
3rd column CRUMB indicates the message type as an eCrumb message.
4th column STAMP indicates the GPS time stamp data for that eCrumb.
5th column LAT indicates the position in latitude.
6th column LON indicates the position in longitude.
7th column ALT indicates the altitude.
8th column HEADING indicates the heading.
9th column VELOCITY indicates the velocity of the LT at the eCrumb position in miles per hour.
FT Log Messages
FT log message (see Figure 2b) columns are described by the header.
1st column is the log timestamp.
2nd column VEH is the FT message type indicator.
3rd column CRUMB indicates the eCrumb ID of the eCrumb that the FT is heading towards.
4th column STAMP indicates the GPS timestamp for the FT message.
5th column LAT indicates the FT’s position in latitude.
6th column LON indicates the FT’s position in longitude.
7th column ALT indicates the FT’s altitude.
8th column HEADING indicates the FT’s current heading.
9th column HDG(Desired) indicates the FT’s desired heading.
10th column VELOCITY indicates the FT’s current velocity.
11th column VEL(Desired) indicates the FT’s desired velocity.
12th column GAP indicates the FT’s current gap.
13th column GAP(Desired) indicates the FT’s desired gap.
14th column #SATS indicates the number of GPS satellites the FT is using.
15th column VALID indicates if GPS is valid.
16th column CTE indicates the FT’s cross track error (CTE), which is the horizontal deviation from its intended path and can be obtained from the log files.
17th column ACCEL indicates the current brake command.
18th column STEER indicates the current steering command.
19th column STATE indicates the FT’s state (IDLE, ROLLOUT, or RUN).
Data Processing Procedure
The log files generated by the ATMA system were collected for each test scenario and, during testing, the logged data were exported from the ATMA system once every 24 h. The vehicle log file was formatted in a CSV format. In some cases, the test data were converted to Keyhole Markup Language (KML) for optional plotting with Google Earth. The log file can be analyzed to gain insights into the performance and behavior of the system, especially in relation to the FT. Data were plotted in Excel, and the statistical characteristics and hypothesis testing were analyzed in Python.
Analysis Methodology
Based on the data collected, the ATMA system performance was evaluated from three aspects. As each test case was repeated three times, the collected data made it possible to conduct detailed statistical analyses to draw statistically meaningful conclusions.
System performance statistical characteristics. For each test, the overall statistical characteristics of the system that provided an overview of its performance were presented. Additionally, the system’s performance was compared with predefined criteria from MoDOT to assure that the system meets requirements.
System performance probability distribution. For each test, an analysis was made of probability distribution to determine the probability of system error within a certain range.
System performance in maintaining consistency. While it was expected that the developed ATMA system would function reliably, each time the same test was performed, the consistency of its function needed to be tested. A hypothesis testing was defined and performed to achieve this goal.
System Performance Statistical Characteristics
Among the 31 defined test cases, some results could be directly observed, such as visual inspection and emergency stops, so that it could be determined if the test had been passed. However, some test results could not be directly observed, such as lane accuracy, so that further analyses were needed to determine whether that test was passed.
General statistical characteristics of a CTE were analyzed and presented to illustrate the system’s overall performance. CTE is the horizontal deviation from intended path and could be positive or negative. The mean value indicated the center of distribution, and standard deviation and quantiles (including minimum value, 25th percentiles, 50th percentiles, 75th percentiles, and maximum value) illustrated the dispersion of the distribution. Together, they provided an overview of the data statistics for the system’s performance that was tested. Thus, by comparing the statistical characteristics of three repetitive test results with predefined criteria from MoDOT, it could be determined whether the system met requirements.
System Performance Probability Distribution
Based on the data collected for each test case, the probability distribution of CTE frequency was analyzed to determine the probability that the CTE fell within a certain range. This was done by dividing the CTE into several groups, and the frequency of each group was counted. Based on these data, the probability distribution of the system performance could be obtained. The derived probability distribution can help engineers give a simple “pass” or “fail” answer and, more important, learn more about the system so that a more quantified understanding of its performance can be obtained.
Hypothesis Testing
While it was expected that the developed ATMA system could function reliably each time the same test was performed, its function consistency needed to be tested. A hypothesis test was defined and performed to achieve this goal.
The Friedman test is a nonparametric statistical procedure for comparing more than two samples that are related. It is commonly used to detect differences in treatments across multiple test attempts ( 28 ). Assumptions of the Friedman test include:
The data is ordinal or at an interval scale;
The data is paired and not normally distributed.
The Friedman test statistic is determined by Equation 1
where N is the number of rows, or subjects, k is the number of columns, or conditions, and Ri is the sum of the ranks from columns, or condition,
The degree of freedom for the Friedman test is determined by Equation 2
In the field tests, each test case was repeated three times. So, for each test case, three sets of data were obtained (e.g., simulated radio frequency loss test) and, sometimes, there were even six sets of data (e.g., the following accuracy test was performed on both tangents and curves). The CTE was extracted from repeated tests in which no condition was changed, so the data were related. The three (or six) sets of data were grouped, with the same interval between them, and the frequency was counted. The Friedman test was then used to verify that those three (or six) sets of the CTE had no statistically significant difference, which meant the results were stable and the system had performed consistently.
For testing purposes, the following null and alternative hypotheses were used:
H0: The CTE in three (or six) sets comes from the same population, that is, the system had consistent performance for the three tests performed.
H1: At least one set of the CTE does not belong to the same population.
The confidence level was set at
Test Result Interpretations
Communication Loss
A total of five test cases were designed to test the system’s performance when communication is lost:
Simulated radio frequency (RF) loss. This test was conducted to secure no-line-of-sight communication by inserting attenuation (35 dB) into the antenna path to simulate RF loss. After activating LT and FT, the LT drove on curves with a radius of 100 ft at 5 mph. The expected result was that the additional path loss would not cause the lateral tracking accuracy to exceed the specified limit of ±6 in.
Loss of communication (single V2V radio). The test was conducted to examine the worst-case lane accuracy in the event of loss of a single communications channel. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 10 mph, and the technician cut the communications link between them (one V2V radio) three times. The expected result was that the FT would continue to follow the path of the LT, without interruption, and notify the user of the bad communication channel.
Loss of communication (both V2V radios). This test was conducted to determine if the FT would initiate an automatic stop (A-Stop) with the loss of both V2V radio communications. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 10 mph, and the technician cut the communications link between them (both V2V radios) three times.
Loss of sensor (radar, LiDAR, front facing ultrasonic). This test was conducted to determine if the FT initiated an A-Stop when the sensor was disconnected. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 10 mph, and then the radar, LiDAR, and ultrasonic were disconnected, one at a time.
GPS-denied environment. This test case was conducted to test the ability to operate in a GPS-denied driverless mode with a redundant navigation system. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy for a minimum of 45 s after GPS was lost, and the FT would initiate A-Stop in under 1 min.
Table 1 demonstrates the general statistical characteristics of CTE for RF loss and single V2V radio loss tests. It was found that, for each test, the number of valid data points ranged from 200 to over 1,000, thus ensuring sufficient data size to draw statistically significant conclusions. Another observation was that the CTE was mostly very low, when compared with the defined criteria of
Statistical Characteristics of Cross Track Error in Communication Loss Tests (Inches)
Note: RF = radio frequency; SD = standard deviation; Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum.
Next, probability distribution and hypothesis tests were conducted to evaluate the system’s performance more quantitatively. Figure 3 demonstrates the probability distribution. For RF loss,

Frequency distribution histogram of cross track error in communication loss tests: (a) simulation radio frequency (RF) loss test and (b) single vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) radio loss test.
In relation to hypothesis testing, for RF loss, the result showed that the p-value was 0.843 (>0.05), which meant that the null hypothesis should be accepted. For the single V2V radio loss test, the result showed that the p-value was 0.230 (>0.05), which meant that the null hypothesis should also be accepted. This meant that the CTEs for both the RF loss test and single V2V radio loss test were verified as belonging to the same population, which indicated that the system’s performance in different tests runs was stable.
For the other three communication loss tests (both V2V radios, loss of sensors, and GPS-denied environment), the results showed that the FTs all came to an A-Stop after communication was lost. When both V2V radio communications were lost, the time from loss of communications until an A-Stop was initiated was 1.9 s for three repetitive tests, and the distances from the points of communication loss until the FT stopped were 55.2 ft, 48.8 ft, and 56.2 ft. When the loss of sensors happened, the average and maximum times to stop were 6.0 s and 7.7 s, and the average and maximum distances to stop were 34.3 ft and 37.5 ft. In the case of a GPS-denied environment, the dead reckoning assembly (DRA) accuracies were ± 4.5 in., ± 5.1 in., and ± 4.7 in. on tangents, and ± 3.0 in., ± 3.4 in., and ± 5.3 in. on curves. All DRA accuracies were within ± 6 in. The DRA timeout was 45 s for three tests. These data indicated that the system performance in all three tests was satisfactory. Since the last three cases were yes/no tests, analysis of probability distribution and hypothesis testing was not necessary and thus was not performed.
Following Distance and Accuracy
A total of seven cases were designed to test the system’s performance in following distance and accuracy:
Following accuracy on tangents and curves. These two tests were conducted to examine the following accuracy on tangents and curves, respectively. The FT drove on tangents and curves at a speed of 5 mph three times for each. Each curve, consisting of a 100 ft radius, was set up with cones. The expected result was that the FT would maintain a lateral accuracy of ± 6 in. from the LT’s path.
Lane changing. This test was to examine accuracy during lane changes. Two adjacent lanes, marked by cones, were 12 ft wide and 600 ft long. After activating the LT and FT, the right-side lane was closed and the FT changed lanes three times, from left to right, at 5 mph. Then, the FT changed lanes three times, from right to left, at 5 mph. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy during lane changes.
Bump test. This test was to examine lane accuracy over minor obstructions in the roadway. An existing pothole was used as a bump for MoDOT and the FT drove over it three times at a speed of 5 mph. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy over a minor obstruction in the roadway.
Roundabout. This test was to determine accuracy during tight turns (roundabout). A roundabout with a 65 ft radius was set up using cones, and the LT and FT drove around it three times each, at a speed of 5 mph. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy during the tight turns.
Minimum turn radius. This test was to determine accuracy during a 90-degree turn. A 90-degree corner with a 100 ft radius was set up using cones, and the FT turned left and turned right at a speed of 5 mph for three times, respectively. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy in the turns.
U-turn. This test was to determine accuracy during a U-turn. A U-turn path, consisting of a 100 ft straight line and a 65 ft radius, was set up using cones, and the FT made a U-turn from the left and from the right, at a speed of 5 mph for three times each. The expected result was that the FT would maintain lane accuracy around the turns.
Table 2 demonstrates the general statistical characteristics of the following distance for CTE in the seven tests performed. It was found that, for each test, the number of valid data points ranged from a few hundred to over 1,000, thereby sufficient data size was guaranteed to allow statistically significant conclusions to be drawn. Another observation was that the following distance error was mostly very low, when compared with defined criteria.
Statistical Characteristics of the Cross Track Error in Following Distance and Accuracy Tests (Inches)
Note: SD = standard deviation; Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum.
Figure 4, a–f, show the CTE probability distribution. Figure 4, a, b, e, and
f
, illustrate that all of the CTE were within

Frequency distribution histogram of the cross track error in following distance and accuracy tests: (a) following accuracy test, (b) lane changing test, (c) bump test, (d) roundabout test, (e) minimum turn radius test, (f) U-turn test.
In relation to hypothesis testing, the p-values of the six tests were 0.753, 0.535, 0.808, 0.746, 0.484, and 0.612. All were higher than 0.05, which means the null hypothesis should be accepted for all seven tests. In other words, the CTE in all tests was verified as belonging to the same population, which indicates that the system performed consistently in following accuracy in all tests performed.
Obstacle Detection
The obstacle detection test was conducted to determine if a FT could detect an obstacle that had been placed in its path, and execute an A-Stop in time, after the LT passed. Each test was repeated three times for statistical accuracy. A total of three cases were designed and tests were conducted.
Front-view collision avoidance—obstacle detection. This test case was designed to test avoidance of a redundant front-view collision. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 7.5 mph with a gap set at 200 ft. Once the rear of the LT passed the marker barrel at the front of the gap, a technician moved the traffic barrel with a rope. The expected result was that the FT detected the traffic barrel and executed an A-Stop.
Front-view collision avoidance—side obstacle detection. This test case was designed to test avoidance and of a redundant side-view collision. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 7 mph with a gap set at 100 ft. A technician pulled a traffic barrel with a rope, which would be detected at the outside corner of the lane by ultrasonic sensors of the FT. The expected result was that the FT detected the traffic barrel and executed an A-Stop.
Side-view obstacle detection—object recognition. This case was designed to test redundant side-view collision avoidance. In this obstacle detection test case, the LT and FT drove in a straight line at 7 mph. A technician parked a vehicle in the adjacent lane on the left side of the FT. The expected result was that the object was displayed on the user interface.
The results showed that, in all repeated tests, the radar/LiDAR of the FT detected the barrel in the center of the lane, or the vehicle in the adjacent lane, and executed an A-Stop. Since this was a yes/no test, analysis of probability distribution and hypothesis testing was unnecessary and thus not performed. This test was successfully passed in all three test cases.
Emergency Situations
Tests of emergency situations were designed to determine the system’s performance under emergency conditions, where special operations were needed. A total of eight test cases were defined and conducted.
Temporarily “drop” the ATMA vehicle. This test case was designed to test the ability to temporarily “drop” the FT and if the FT would catch up with the LT when the FT initiated a pause command on the user interface system. LT and FT drove in a straight line at 10 mph. A technician initiated a pause command on the user interface system, to bring the FT to a temporary stop, while the LT kept driving at the same speed in a gap distance of 200 ft three times. The expected result was that the FT would catch up to the LT in the set gap distance at a catch-up speed that would not exceed 20 mph.
Emergency stop. Four tests were conducted to determine the ability to make an emergency stop for the FT from the LT when executing a stop button, including LT internal button, ATMA internal button, ATMA external button, and LT independent E-stop button. In each test, the FT was expected to stop, and the technician would record the stop time and distance shown.
Braking leader vehicle. This test was conducted to measure the gap delta between the actual gap and the gap after stopping, when the driver instantly engaged the brake. The gap distance was set to be greater than, or equal to 100 ft. A driver drove the LT at 10 mph and instantly engaged the brake once the LT passed a limit line marked by cones.
ATMA operated by a human driver. This test was conducted to determine the take-over capability of an operator in the driver’s seat of a FT and the emergency disengagement of an autonomous system. The LT and FT drove in a straight line at 10 mph, and a human driver took control of the FT, after releasing it to the IDLE mode.
Simulated rear impact. This test case was designed to determine the brake and hazard light functions upon impact. Radar was used three times to simulate a rear impact. The G-forces were set at 17.79
When the LT temporarily dropped the ATMA vehicle, the FT caught up to the LT and stabilized at 100 ft in the end. The maximum speed did not exceed 12 mph. The gap distance dropped from 200 ft to 100 ft while the speed increased to 12 mph. The final stabilized gap distances were 109.45 ft, 113.68 ft, and 109.45 ft. Compared with the desired gap distance (100 ft), actual distance errors were within ± 15 ft. The test was successfully passed.
The system also performed well in the other four tests. During all four emergency stop tests, the FT successfully stopped and the tests were successfully passed. When the LT initiated use of the brake, the recorded data showed that, for the three repetitive tests, the actual gap distances were 72 ft, 72 ft, and 80 ft, and the gap distances after stopping were 68 ft, 67 ft, and 76 ft. The gap deltas were 4 ft, 5 ft, and 4 ft, all within ± 15 ft allowable range. In the test when a human driver took control of the FT, the FT quickly disengaged from the system and allowed the human driver to take control when the FT was released from the autonomous system to idle. Finally, when a rear impact took place, the FT released the throttle, applied full brakes, and turned on hazard lights. These tests were all successfully passed.
Conclusion
This paper documents the methodology for evaluation of a developed ATMA system and the outcomes of field tests performed in April 2019 in Sedalia, Missouri. The ATMA system is reviewed first, followed by an introduction to the field testing procedures, which included defined test cases, data that were collected, and their format. An analysis methodology was proposed to evaluate the system’s performance quantitatively. Statistical models and hypothesis tests were developed and are presented in this paper. The numeric analysis results from real-world field testing, in a controlled environment, are presented, and the ATMA system’s performance is summarized.
Statistical analysis results suggested that the ATMA system was able to function as expected, and its performance was acceptable when compared with predefined criteria. The hypothesis test results suggested that the system was able to function consistently when the testing was repeated, indicating that the system’s performance was stable and repeatable. This paper could serve as a reference for transportation agencies interested in employing similar technologies, or academic researchers for assessing characteristics of autonomous vehicles and applying them in transportation modeling and simulation practices.
Footnotes
Author Contributions
The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: Q. Tang, Y. Cheng, X. Hu; data collection: Q. Tang, Y. Cheng, C. Chen, Y. Song; analysis and interpretation of results: Q. Tang, Y. Cheng; draft manuscript preparation: Q. Tang, X. Hu; editing and responses to reviewer comments: Q. Tang, X. Hu, and R. Qin. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research is sponsored by Missouri Department of Transportation project titled “Leader-Follower TMA System”, contract number TR201813, and Mid-America Transportation Center project titled “MATC: MoDOT Autonomous Leader-Follower TMA System: Development of Autonomous Trucks”, contract number 69A3551747107.
