Abstract
Many women eschew the feminist label despite believing in gender equality. In order to effectively promote feminist change, it is important to understand the factors involved in feminist attitudes, identification, and behavior. In the present research, we helped clarify the relations among these factors. In a survey of 428 U.S. women, we found that participants with stronger attitudes toward gender equality and more favorable explicit and implicit attitudes toward feminist prototypes were more likely to claim a feminist label. And those who did so reported greater willingness to intervene when confronted with everyday sexist behavior, particularly if they perceived that they personally were vulnerable to the effects of sexism. We suggest that improving attitudes toward feminist prototypes may help promote feminist identification, and informing women about the pervasiveness of sexism, including their personal vulnerability, may promote willingness to act after the feminist label has been adopted. Online slides for instructors who want to use this article for teaching are available on PWQ's website at http://journals.sagepub.com/page/pwq/suppl/index
Most people, both globally and in the United States, endorse gender equality beliefs (Zainulbhai, 2016). However, despite feminist efforts to achieve equality, anti-feminist backlash persists (Anderson, 2015). In 2014, the social media campaign, Women Against Feminism, featured photos of women holding up pieces of notebook paper declaring their reasons for rejecting feminism (Burleigh, 2014). Many of the women’s photos cited a lack of fit between their identity and values, and those they perceived to be held by feminists. Women asserted they don’t need feminism because “fems are Liars and Hypocrites [sic],” because “I am a strong, independent woman!” and because “I believe in modesty and respectability.” Some rejected a feminist identity because they rejected group membership per se: “I don’t need to define myself as part of a group.” For researchers, the value of Women Against Feminism is that it is a powerful manifestation of why women fail to identify as feminists—that they may do so because aspects of their personal identity diverge from what they perceive to be that of the typical feminist.
We investigated whether people’s attitudes toward the prototypical feminist are related to their willingness to identify as feminist. We examined whether implicit and explicit attitudes toward the prototypical feminist are associated with feminist identity and whether feminist identity is in turn associated with people’s willingness to intervene when they encounter everyday sexist events. We examined these questions by testing a model that also included feminist beliefs and perceived vulnerability to sexism.
Why Is Feminist Identity Important?
Feminist identity is associated with important psychological and behavioral outcomes. People who identify as feminists display lower levels of heterosexism (Szymanski, 2004) and greater psychological well-being (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; though see Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 2011, for contradictory findings), and lower body surveillance and shame (Hurt et al., 2007). Feminist identity is also associated with behaviors that can promote feminism, boosting self-efficacy to achieve goals (Eisele & Stake, 2008), and predicting increased willingness to engage in feminist activism (Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011), as well as willingness to engage in a range of feminist behaviors such as donating more to feminist charities and bringing up feminist topics in conversation (Redford, Howell, Meijs, & Ratliff, 2018). These findings show both protective and empowering factors associated with feminist identity.
Moreover, feminist identity cannot be replaced by, or reduced to, feminist beliefs (i.e., beliefs about gender equality). Although feminist identity has been conflated with feminist beliefs (Enns, 1997), equality beliefs alone do not necessarily result in willingness to call oneself a feminist (Fitz, Zucker, & Bay-Cheng, 2012; Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Furthermore, consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identity confers benefits independent of beliefs; feminist identity is associated with outcomes such as charity donations and body satisfaction over and above, or better than, beliefs in accord with feminism (Murnen & Smolak, 2009; Redford et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011). Thus, the benefits of feminist identity are not derived from one’s beliefs; people must actually view themselves as feminists.
Feminist identity is associated with myriad positive outcomes, but to establish whether it actually contributes to efforts to achieve gender equality, feminist behaviors are of the greatest interest. Feminist behavioral outcomes have been studied in previous research—most often in formal, sporadic, and potentially burdensome forms (requiring money or time commitments)—such as participating in marches and donating to charities. However, this approach could overlook experiences of feminist behavior, which may be better reflected in reactions to everyday sexist events in interpersonal interactions. In addition to being understudied, such interactions are more frequent, accessible, and naturalistic than formal activism and feminist identity could be the key to such confrontation. One study of bystander reactions found feminist women were more likely to confront perpetrators of gender prejudice (Brinkman, Dean, Simpson, McGinley, & Rosén, 2015). In addition, perceptions of sexism as harmful promotes behavioral intentions to discuss and seek information about gender inequity (Cundiff, Zawadzki, Danube, & Shields, 2014), suggesting a potential role of perceived vulnerability to sexism in willingness to intervene. Thus, it could be that perceived vulnerability to sexism relates to willingness to act via feminist identity—the prediction we tested—or that vulnerability has a more direct link to willingness to intervene following instances of gender bias.
Feminist Identity and Feminist Prototypes
People who identify as feminists are willing to claim the label publicly (Aronson, 2003; Zucker, 2004). This personal identity becomes integrated with a social identity (Turner & Oakes, 1986), in which they see themselves as part of a group made up of other self-identified feminists (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Leaper & Arias, 2011). Because people strive for positive identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), seeing prototypical members of a group (e.g., feminists) as positive can relate to greater identification with that group. Thus, in the current research, we examined how much people identify as feminist in a model that incorporated their attitudes toward prototypical feminists, among other variables.
A prototype of a group is the most central, representative group member, the one who most easily and frequently comes to mind when thinking of the group (Rosch, 1973). Prototypes are rated on a variety of characteristics (Gerrard, Gibbons, Stock, Vande Lune, & Cleveland, 2005); for example, a person may think of the prototypical feminist as cool and fun or as uncool and boring. These traits can be positive or negative, resulting in a positive or negative attitude toward the prototype of a group. According to the prototype-willingness model of behavior (PWM; Gerrard, Gibbons, Houlihan, Stock, & Pomery, 2008), when opportunities arise to behave in group-relevant ways, people with more positive attitudes toward the group prototype are more willing to engage in those behaviors. For example, more positive attitudes toward “smoker” prototypes are associated with greater willingness to smoke (Gerrard et al., 2008), and positive prototypes of healthy eaters are associated with healthy eating (Gerrits, De Ridder, De Wit, & Kuijer, 2009). Prototypes of political groups work in the same way. For example, negative stereotypes of the “typical environmentalist” lead people to avoid affiliating with them and to have less motivation to adopt pro-environmental behaviors (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013).
Most prototype studies have only examined explicit attitudes, directly asking participants about how they see prototypes (e.g., “how smart is the prototypical healthy eater?”). Measures of explicit attitudes require that people are able and willing to report all aspects of their attitudes. However, people may be unable or unwilling to fully report their attitudes toward stigmatized or marginalized groups. For example, research has often shown that in studies involving race, self-reported explicit attitudes have significantly lower predictive validity than do implicit attitude measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Because feminists are often the target of stereotypes, backlash, and rejection (Anastosopoulos & Desmarais, 2015; Robnett, Anderson, & Hunter, 2012; Yeung, Kay, & Peach, 2013), explicit measures about feminists may not capture a full range of attitudes people hold.
Alternatively, measures of implicit attitudes can overcome some of the limitations of measures of explicit attitudes. They may access more gut-level responses, and either do not alert participants to what is being measured, or reduce participants’ control over their responses (De Houwer, 2006). Implicit attitudes have been found to have greater predictive power than explicit ones across a range of outcomes in socially sensitive domains including employment discrimination, administration of medical treatment, and nonverbal behavior in interpersonal interactions (Greenwald et al., 2009). Implicit attitudes (defined here as the outcomes of implicit measures) toward prototypes outperform explicit ones at predicting risky sun-exposure behavior (Ratliff & Howell, 2015), and implicit attitudes toward the prototypical environmentalist predicted environmentally-friendly behavior (Ratliff, Howell, & Redford, 2017). This power has only very recently been harnessed in research on prototypes of feminism, but findings are promising. One study found that implicit attitudes significantly related to feminist identification, controlling for both explicit feminist prototypes and egalitarian gender beliefs (Redford et al., 2018).
Implicit measures are especially appropriate for testing the PWM (Gerrard et al., 2008). The PWM focuses on willingness to engage in behaviors when opportunities arise rather than on a priori behavioral intentions. Such spontaneous, unplanned behavior (e.g., friendliness; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002) tends to be better predicted by implicit than explicit measures. Thus, including implicit measures not only enhances predictive power but is theoretically consistent with the types of behavior examined in PWM studies.
We were also interested in perceived vulnerability, another aspect of the PWM. Vulnerability in many health behavior models refers to a person’s perception of individual vulnerability to risks associated with a behavior (Gerrard et al., 2008) and, as such, is associated with behavioral willingness (Lewis, King, Litt, Swanson, & Lee, 2016). Although vulnerability typically reflects consequences associated with health behavior, we hypothesized that perceived vulnerability to sexism was important in our theorized model as well (see Figure 1). Similar constructs have been associated with feminism; for instance, in the previous research, women who perceived sexism to be pervasive were more likely to support confronting sexist behavior (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2009; Kahn, Barreto, Kaiser, & Rego, 2015). In addition, experiences of sexism have been associated with collective action (Nelson et al., 2008) and with feminist identity (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1997; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Zucker, 2004), although there is some debate about the direction of the relation between sexism and these other constructs. Moreover, general awareness of sexism is associated with feminist identity (Leaper & Arias, 2011). Given that all of these constructs reflect people’s awareness of sexism in some way, we expected that perceived vulnerability to sexism would be relevant both to feminist identity and to participants’ willingness to intervene.

Model 1—hypothesized model.
We expected that self-reported perceived vulnerability would also reflect the interplay of identity and systemic oppression. Some people who reject the feminist label likely do so in part because of their lived experiences with such oppression. Historically, activists who occupy multiple marginalized positions have been alienated from the mainstream women’s movement, particularly in the United States (e.g., see Combahee River Collective, 1977/2015). As a result, some people may reject or reconfigure “White feminism” or feminism that they believe does not adequately address the intersectional, multifaceted, situated, and structural nature of identity. A recent study (Hoskin, Jenson, & Blair, 2017) found that people who defined feminism using intersectional principles were more likely to identify as feminists. And some individuals with egalitarian beliefs reject feminism for the opposite reason: Non-labelers who endorse neoliberal beliefs of individualism, competition, and meritocracy may find that feminism focuses too much on structural forces and collective identity (Fitz et al., 2012). Thus, while feminist identity appears deeply rooted in a complex social system, this complexity is not often explored in research on feminist identity.
The current research was designed to advance understanding of how implicit and explicit prototypes relate to feminist identity, in a model that also includes other important constructs associated with feminist identity, such as gender equality beliefs (i.e., feminist beliefs) and perceived vulnerability to sexism. We included gender equality beliefs in the model to assess the utility of prototypes over and above those beliefs, as demonstrated in previous studies (Murnen & Smolak, 2009; Redford et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011). We also included perceived vulnerability to sexism, which is associated with both PWM and feminist identity research, but which we conceptualized uniquely in this study (i.e., we created a new measure, described below). By including both gender equality beliefs and perceived vulnerability to sexism, we sought to examine their effects and also to test whether feminist identity is reducible to these other variables.
The Present Research
The purpose of the present research was to explore the role of implicit and explicit attitudes toward prototypes of feminists—the central, representative feminist that comes to mind when someone thinks of feminists as a group—in relation to feminist identity, and whether feminist identity in turn relates to people’s willingness to intervene when they encounter everyday sexist events. We examined these questions in a model that included other potentially important constructs: feminist beliefs and perceived vulnerability to sexism (see Figure 1). Because we conceptualized vulnerability uniquely in this study—that is, a new measure of feminist behaviors, as opposed to health behavior models which situate vulnerability as perceived conditional consequences of behavior (Gerrard et al., 2008)—we could not use the extant literature to situate the variable with total confidence. However, because we acknowledge the role of structural factors in feminist labeling, we decided to place vulnerability alongside other precursors of feminist identity (see Figure 1).
Method
Participants and Procedure
This study was approved by our university’s institutional review board. We recruited participants through Prolific (http://www.prolific.ac), a crowdsourcing website focusing specifically on academic research. Prolific was ideal for our purposes for several reasons: The website prevents users from participating in the same study more than once; the site mandates a “minimum wage” consistent with our ethical principles; and the website collects broad demographic data about its participant pool, meaning that we could recruit by age, gender, and location without developing and administering a pre-screening survey. Because of its mandatory minimum payments, Prolific can be costlier than other tools (such as Amazon Mechanical Turk): at least £5/hour ($6.61/hour) for participants plus commission costs of 12.5% on each reward and 10 p ($0.13) per participant. Prolific is based at the University of Oxford, but because initial recruitment takes place primarily on social media or through university flyer campaigns, the participant pool boasts a high percentage of participants from the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, though anyone may join the website. Volunteers fill out extensive demographic questionnaires to qualify or disqualify them from available studies. Participant demographics can be explored through graphs on the website (https://www.prolific.ac/demographics); the pool is not particularly diverse in terms of race or ethnicity (with ∼70% identifying as Caucasian), but it does offer a wider age range than a typical university setting (18–80, with the average age in our sample at about 32 years old). A recent study (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017) found that Prolific was more diverse than other crowdsourcing sites in terms of ethnicity and geographic location, although this was not the case in our study.
Peer and colleagues (2017) found that Prolific participants reported higher naiveté and lower degrees of dishonest behavior as compared to Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. In addition to Prolific’s protections against repeat submissions, we administered a two-step attention check adapted from Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, and Cranor’s (2010) study: Participants read a short email, ostensibly as a formality, followed by two questions of differing complexity about the information in the email, designed to ensure that participants were attending to the content of the survey.
Participants who met our eligibility criteria (women in the United States over the age of 18) chose to answer our survey after reading a short description: “In this research study, you will be asked to answer some questions about your attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors relating to gender and feminism. We will also ask you to do a sorting task on your computer.” They were compensated approximately $2.50 for their time. Data were collected from 440 adult U.S. women. We eliminated some participants for data trimming purposes (n = 4: one participant who identified as a trans man, one participant who was under 18, and two participants who failed the attention check) and removed incomplete submissions for a final sample of 428 (Mage = 32.39 years, standard deviation [SD] = 11.85). On a political orientation scale ranging from strongly conservative (1) to strongly liberal (7), participants reported somewhat more liberal than conservative beliefs (M = 5.4, SD = 1.55). For additional demographic characteristics, refer to Table 1.
Demographic Characteristics of Participants.
Materials
Gender equality attitudes
We assessed gender equality attitudes using The Social Roles Questionnaire (SRQ; Baber & Tucker, 2006), a 13-item measure chosen for its relative brevity and applicability to a modern sample, as compared to older measures of gender equality attitudes, such as The Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972), which may have a “ceiling effect” for contemporary populations (McHugh & Frieze, 1997). The SRQ contains two subscales: the Gender Transcendent subscale and the Gender Linked subscale. Sample items from the Gender Transcendent subscale include “Tasks around the house should not be assigned by sex” and “People should be treated the same regardless of their sex.” Sample items from the Gender Linked subscale include “Girls should be protected and watched over more than boys” and “Only some types of work are appropriate for both men and women.” Consistent with the measure’s original intent, participants responded using a percentage scale from 0% (strongly disagree) to 100% (strongly agree). We reversed the direction of some items such that the computed scale’s valence would be consistent with the other measures in the study, that is, higher scores correspond with more gender-equal attitudes. We averaged the items to create a single gender equality attitudinal score. In the previous samples, Baber and Tucker (2006) reported adequate internal consistency for both subscales (Gender Transcendent: α = .65; Gender Linked: α = .77) as well as good face, content, convergent, and discriminant validity, supported by correlational comparisons with other gender role measures. Internal consistency reliabilities for the current sample were .87 (entire scale), .78 (Gender Transcendent subscale), and .83 (Gender Linked subscale).
Implicit attitudes toward feminist prototypes
A Single-Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), previously used by Redford and colleagues (2018), measured implicit evaluations of feminists. A computer screen displayed stimuli from two representational categories: feminists and evaluations. We used four pictures related to feminism (e.g., the feminist symbol that incorporates a female symbol and a fist) to represent the feminists category. We used the words “good” and “bad” as well as four positive and four negative images (e.g., a smiling or frowning face) from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) to represent the evaluative categories. Participants sorted the feminist images into categories good and bad as quickly as possible using the E and I keys on their keyboards.
The SC-IAT consisted of six blocks of 10 trials. After each block, the category labels switched sides. We conducted analysis as follows: response latencies <400 ms and >10,000 ms were removed, and trial latencies were calculated from the beginning of the trial until the time of a correct response (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). A greater positive D score indicates a stronger association between feminist + good. The SC-IAT split-half reliability was .60. We did not include data from one participant because of high error rates (greater than 40% in a single block or greater than 30% overall).
Explicit attitudes toward feminist prototypes
Participants reported their explicit attitudes toward feminist prototypes on four traits (Redford et al., 2018): (1) “How uncool or cool are feminists?” (2) “How unattractive or attractive are feminists?” (3) “How unintelligent or intelligent are feminists?” and (4) “How boring or fun are feminists?” Each item was assessed with a 7-point response scale, with 1 representing very unfavorable attitudes and 7 representing very favorable attitudes. The 4 items were collapsed into a single score of explicit attitudes, with higher scores representing more favorable attitudes. In the previous samples, Redford and colleagues (2018) reported good internal consistency reliability (Sample A: α = .86; Sample B: α = .82). Internal consistency for the current sample was .89.
Identification with feminism
Participants completed 4 items regarding feminist identification (Self-Identification as a Feminist scale; Szymanski, 2004), including (1) “I consider myself a feminist,” (2) “I identify myself as a feminist to other people,” (3) “Feminist values and principles are important to me,” and (4) “I support the goals of the feminist movement.” Response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We averaged the items to create a single feminist identification score. In a previous sample, Szymanski (2004) reported good internal consistency for the measure (α = .93) as well as structural validity supported by factor analysis (loadings between .81 and .89) and convergent validity supported by correlational comparisons with other feminist scales. Internal consistency reliability for the current sample was .94.
Perceived vulnerability
In order to assess participants’ perceived vulnerability to sexism, we developed 3 items: (1) “In terms of your career, what are the chances that you would be affected by sexism?” (2) “In terms of your personal relationships, what are the chances that you would be affected by sexism?” and (3) “In terms of your romantic relationships, what are the chances that you would be affected by sexism?” Responses ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). We averaged these 3 items to create a single score of perceived vulnerability. Internal consistency reliability for the current sample was .81.
Willingness to intervene in situations of everyday sexism
In order to assess willingness to engage in everyday feminist behaviors, we developed 6 items exemplifying hostile or benevolent sexist situations. We based our measure on benevolent and hostile sexism items that Glick and Fiske (1996) included in the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (see Table 2 for item list). Participants rated their willingness to intervene in given situations on a response scale from 1 (very unwilling) to 7 (very willing). We averaged the items to create a single score of behavioral willingness. Internal consistency reliability for the current sample was α = .69.
Items in the Willingness to Intervene in Situations of Everyday Sexism Measure.
Note. In future iterations of this measure, we plan to use the phrase “male friend” instead of “male date/partner” in Items 5 and 6.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
All variables were moderately to highly correlated (correlations and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3). Participants reported generally egalitarian attitudes about gender roles (M = 77.59, SD = 14.33) and moderately high identification with feminism (M = 5.03, SD = 1.76). We conducted all other analyses using path analysis in SPSS AMOS (Version 12). We also analyzed patterns of missing data for each variable. Less than 0.3% of all items in all cases were missing. About 91.6% of participants had no missing data whatsoever, and 63.6% of items had no missing data across all cases. No item had more than 1% missing values. Missing data were managed on the scale level with prorated mean imputation.
Zero-Order Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Indicator Variables.
Note. *p ≤ .01. **p ≤ .001.
Testing Models
We first tested a model logically derived from our theory (Model 1, pictured in Figure 1), as discussed in the Introduction section. The χ2 of this model was significant, χ2(4) = 33.58, p < .001, indicating poor fit. However, this statistic is sensitive to large sample sizes and assumes perfect multivariate normality; as a result, we examined additional fit statistics. We followed Byrne’s (2009) recommendations and looked to the comparative fit index (CFI; .96) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; .13, with a 90% confidence interval [CI] between .09 and .17, p of close fit [PCLOSE] < .001), as well as the non-normed fit index (NNFI; .83) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; .05), for clarification; these results suggested mixed fit. Thus, we respecified the model according to the modification indices. We made two changes based on the modification indices and the standardized residual covariances, which were significant only for the relation between willingness to intervene and our measure of vulnerability (standardized residual covariance value of 2.81) and between willingness and gender role beliefs (standardized residual covariance value of 2.61). Drawing a direct path from gender role beliefs to behavioral willingness (M.I. = 8.90) and from perceived vulnerability to behavioral willingness (M.I. = 10.24) yielded Model 2, χ2(2) 5.83, p = .05, CFI = .99, NNFI = .96, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .07, RMSEA 90% CI between <.001 and .13 with PCLOSE = .25; these changes improved the model, but the fit was still somewhat mixed. However, there were no useful modification indices.
We returned to the literature to assess the relations between the constructs. Given that our inclusion of perceived vulnerability is unique in this subject area, we focused on the possibility that it might need to be restructured. Although our original expectations constructed vulnerability as a precursor to feminist identity, we also acknowledged that vulnerability may directly relate to willingness rather than indirectly through feminist identity. The modification indices of Model 2 did support a direct link from vulnerability to willingness. Thus, we decided to reconceptualize vulnerability’s role somewhat: We eliminated the indirect path from vulnerability through feminist identity. This retained the direct paths from gender role beliefs and vulnerability to behavioral willingness in Model 2 but relocated the vulnerability construct such that a direct path ran from feminist identity to vulnerability (Model 3; see Figure 2). Model 3 fits the data well, χ2(5) = 7.93, p = .16, CFI = .99, NNFI = .99, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .04. Although the RMSEA 90% CI is somewhat wide for this model (lower bound < .001 and upper bound = .08), it falls roughly within the values suggested by Browne and Cudeck (1993) for and in conjunction with the associated probability value (p = .62) and other fit indices; we believe that this fit is acceptable. In terms of local fit, none of the standardized residual covariances were large enough to cause concern: Values are listed in Table 4. Standardized total and indirect effects are listed in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Because of the small effects of the implicit measure relative to other variables, we tested a version of this well-fitting model without the IAT included; the resulting model, Model 4: χ2(3) = 6.79, p = .08, CFI = .99, NNFI = .98, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .05, fits no better. As a result, we chose to retain implicit attitudes, as in Model 3.

Standardized coefficients for Model 3—adjusted final model, χ2(5) = 7.93, p = .16, CFI = .99, NNFI = .99, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .04. e1, e2, and e3 represent error terms. *p < .05. ***p ≤ .001.
Standardized Residual Covariances for Model 3.
Standardized Total Effects for Model 3.
Standardized Indirect Effects for Model 3.
Discussion
We examined the role of gender role beliefs and implicit and explicit attitudes toward prototypes of feminists in relation to feminist identity, and whether feminist identity in turn relates to people’s self-reported willingness to intervene when they encounter everyday sexist events. Our hypothesized model did not exhibit excellent fit; however, Model 2 had mixed but nearly acceptable fit. Although analyses revealed a different model configuration fits better than the model originally hypothesized, the overall results were consistent with the extant literature and clarified relations between relevant constructs. We hope that researchers will replicate and cross-validate Model 3.
Feminist identity was associated with gender role beliefs, explicit feminist prototypes, and implicit feminist prototypes (see Figure 2). Willingness to intervene when confronted with a sexist event (i.e., behavioral willingness) was associated with gender role beliefs directly, and by feminist identity directly and indirectly, through vulnerability to sexism. Put simply, participants with more favorable attitudes toward prototypical feminists were more likely to identify as feminists and those more likely to identify as feminists were then more likely to endorse feminist behaviors, especially if they felt that they were personally vulnerable to sexism. Gender equality beliefs were important, but left variance unexplained, in relation to both feminist identity and behavioral willingness.
Consistent with the hypothesized model, implicit feminist prototypes were associated with and contributed to feminist identity, along with the influence of explicit prototypes and gender role beliefs. Divergent from the hypothesized model, vulnerability to sexism related to behavioral willingness directly rather than through feminist identity. Of note, this implies that vulnerability to sexism may not actually be a precursor to feminist identity, as we originally hypothesized. Instead, it is possible that feminist consciousness heightens women’s awareness of sexism. However, because the measure of perceived vulnerability included the term “sexism,” which may be inherently tied to feminism for some participants, the correlation between this measure and feminist identity could be inflated and should be interpreted with care. In this model, it seems that awareness of vulnerability contributes to feminists’ willingness to take action in their everyday lives. Thus, we believe vulnerability may be seen as an activating factor: When calling oneself a feminist is not enough to promote action, awareness of personal risk may bridge the gap.
Conceptualizing vulnerability to sexism as an activating factor has theoretical and practical implications for feminist identity as a construct. Indeed, women in the United States today may call themselves feminists without perceiving risks from sexism in their daily lives. Our results suggest that feminists who see themselves as vulnerable to the effects of sexism are a separate group meriting further study. This finding also may be related to the concept of denial of personal disadvantage (Crosby, 1984); even women who are aware of the existence of sexist discrimination may not act to change it if they do not perceive themselves to be at risk personally. Thus, everyday feminist actions may be contingent on perceptions of personal risk. Future researchers may want to consider vulnerability when examining feminist behaviors and activism.
Though our model demonstrates the importance of feminist identity, it also displays its limitations. Given the direct effect of gender equality beliefs on the measure of willingness to intervene, our results support the idea that a feminist label is not always necessary for someone to engage in everyday feminist behaviors. Thus, feminist identity is important, but we should continue to consider the reasons that it may be rejected and how we can promote its value to egalitarian thinkers.
Our study is only the second we know of to examine implicit feminist prototypes in relation to feminist identity (see Redford et al., 2018) and the first to apply several constructs analogous to components of the prototype willingness model (PWM; Gerrard et al., 2008). The PWM has been applied primarily to health behaviors; researchers report that low perceived vulnerability predicts greater willingness to engage in negative health behaviors (Gerrard et al., 2008). Because we measured positive activist behaviors as an outcome, we found the inverse relation. And, consistent with the PWM literature, we found that both prototypes and vulnerability related to self-reported behavioral willingness beyond attitudes alone. Thus, our research not only adds to our understanding of feminist identity and feminist behaviors, it also expands the usefulness of the PWM by moving its application beyond health behaviors.
Limitations
The primary limitation in the current research is demographic: Our sample consisted primarily of heterosexual White women whose average political orientation was fairly liberal. Because women with diverse racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds often have different feminist values, definitions, and identities (Harnois, 2005; Moradi, Subich, & Phillips, 2002; Robnett & Anderson, 2017), a complete model of feminist identity and behaviors would likely account for these factors. Unfortunately, our sample did not allow for statistical comparisons by race or ethnicity, and tests of mean differences comparing economic groups yielded no significant results; such nuance might be more evident in a more diverse sample. We specifically targeted women for this study because two of our variables of interest (behavioral willingness and vulnerability to sexism) would need significant restructuring to be applicable to men; however, in future studies, researchers may try to validate our results among men and people with non-binary gender identities.
In addition, not all constructs contributed substantially to the model, the contribution of implicit attitudes was relatively small compared to those of explicit attitudes and gender equality attitudes. It is possible that, because our participants primarily self-identified as liberal, generally positive opinions of feminists minimized the potential disparity between explicit and implicit attitudes, thus reducing the usefulness of the IAT. Our implicit measure of feminist prototypes has only been used in one other study (Redford et al., 2018), and we hope that in the future researchers will refine and validate it. However, the model without implicit attitudes fits no better than the model that included implicit attitudes. Therefore, this study highlights a novel piece that is missing in other conceptualizations of feminist identity; although it is a small contribution, it is potentially an integral one. In short, we can better understand feminist identity—and relevant behavior—by understanding how women feel about feminists.
There are other limitations regarding our model. When the hypothesized model yielded a mixed fit, we needed to identify a model that fit the data better; our model configuration is novel and requires replication. Although we acknowledge that the changes made in Model 3 are consistent with existing literature, the fact that the initial model required respecification necessitates caution. Because modifications in Model 3 were made in response to analyses with the current data set, it is possible that the results may represent spurious patterns particular to our sample (Bollen & Noble, 2011). There are undoubtedly also variables missing from the model. For example, Kaysen and Stake (2001) predicted activism in part through agentic self-esteem, although it is possible that such a relation would be complicated by our use of everyday feminist behaviors instead of formal activism. We also acknowledge that the two measures designed for this study (perceived vulnerability to sexism and willingness to intervene in everyday sexist situations) are limited by a lack of replication and validation. Reliability for the vulnerability measure was good (α = .81), but not excellent, and may yield biased results because of its direct use of the term “sexism.” Reliability for the measure of willingness to intervene was low but acceptable (α = .69). Reliability was not improved by separating hostile sexism and benevolent sexism subscales, nor did an item-by-item analysis reveal any one item explaining the level of internal consistency. We chose these 6 items to reflect a range of sexist events that might occur to a participant in everyday life, but the items may not be measuring the same construct. Finally, because our study involved self-report, we are limited in our ability to extend our results to behavioral outcomes.
Future Directions for Research
Researchers may consider replicating our findings in a more diverse sample; a replication may also resolve concerns about model respecification. We also hope that other researchers will consider incorporating the variables we included into their own feminist identity models: The willingness to intervene construct, though in need of psychometric refinement, reflects the everyday sexist interactions that feminists regularly face (rather than focusing on activist work, as in past research), the vulnerability construct includes assessment of women’s personal and individual relation with systemic oppression, and the feminist prototypes measures can add nuance to investigations of feminist identity by considering an additional layer of attitudinal motivation. The measure we used in the present research to assess willingness to intervene in a sexist situation could be improved by qualitative research that expands and clarifies the specific sexist scenarios that elicit intervention behaviors. We also think that there is potential to investigate differences in feminist identity and behavior in privileged or disadvantaged groups. For example, does privilege make White, cisgender, heterosexual, middle- or upper-class feminists perceive less personal risk? Does that perception inspire fewer feminist behaviors? Alternatively, does it reduce the risk associated with confrontations of sexism, thereby increasing feminist behaviors? Such privilege might allow some feminists to survive, or ignore the risk of, job loss resulting from interpersonal confrontations at work. Is this differentially effective for everyday interactions compared to activist organizing? In a diverse sample, we believe our model could help characterize the increasing visibility of risk of marginalized populations.
Practice Implications
By intervening when faced with sexism, feminists may help achieve greater gender equity. Such interventions may reduce subsequent bias (for a similar study related to racism, see Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006) and increase men’s attempts to compensate for their sexism in later interactions (Mallett & Wagner, 2011). However, the social costs of intervening, such as being evaluated negatively or punished, often prevent women from doing so (Nicole & Stewart, 2004; Swim, Eyssell, Murdoch, & Ferguson, 2010; Swim & Hyers, 1999). Despite the possible benefits, researchers rarely study confrontations of sexist behaviors (Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014).
Our results suggest that consciousness-raising may be effective in promoting feminist action. For example, educators or interventionists hoping to promote change may want to promote a more favorable “prototypical feminist” (thereby increasing feminist identification) and also may provide information about vulnerability to sexism (in order to motivate women to engage in feminist behaviors). Women’s Studies courses could be an ideal venue for interventions involving prototypes and targeted consciousness-raising, as students enrolled in those courses display increases in both feminist consciousness and feminist identification (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999), and Women’s Studies students who are more aware of sexism demonstrate greater activist intentions (Stake, 2007). Our research speaks to one pathway through which this may occur.
Conclusions
The current research illustrates how favorable attitudes toward prototypical feminists relate to feminist identity, which in turn relates to willingness to engage in feminist behaviors, especially for women who feel that they are personally vulnerable to sexism. Our findings show the importance of awareness of sexism, attitudes toward feminists, and feminist identity for reducing sexist interactions. To live in a world with fewer gendered constraints on their ambitions, outcomes, and opportunities, yes, women do need feminism.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental Material, PWQ_42_3_Weis_Teaching_Slides - Feminist Identity, Attitudes Toward Feminist Prototypes, and Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexist Events
Supplemental Material, PWQ_42_3_Weis_Teaching_Slides for Feminist Identity, Attitudes Toward Feminist Prototypes, and Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexist Events by Alexandra S. Weis, Liz Redford, Alyssa N. Zucker, and Kate A. Ratliff in Psychology of Women Quarterly
Footnotes
Authors’ Note
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported financially by the Vada Allen Yeomans endowment at the University of Florida Foundation and hosted by Project Implicit. The second and fourth authors are paid consultants of Project Implicit, Inc., a non-profit organization that includes in its mission “to develop and deliver methods for investigating and applying phenomena of implicit social cognition, including especially phenomena of implicit bias based on age, race, gender or other factors.”
References
Supplementary Material
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