Abstract
This article studies the Ming-Qing period (1368–1911), examining the differences in the poverty risks of Chinese women in various social positions after their husbands or fathers had died based on historical records and archives. We argue that women's poverty risks depended not only on their family's wealth but also on their social positions, which regulated their eligibility for various income sources such as dowry, family property, and assistance from their lineage or the government. Unlike most studies, we focus on the combination of various income sources for which women were eligible, via which they evaded poverty to different degrees.
Introduction
During the Ming and Qing period (1368–1911), Chinese women did not actually have independent sources of income; their main income source before marriage was bound to their father's income and, after marriage, to their husband's. What happened, though, after the male head of the household died, and to what extent did women face poverty risks in this type of situation?
Several studies have shown that during this period, women were particularly exposed to absolute poverty, unable to obtain sufficient food to survive, 1 and their eligibility for income sources differed over their lifetimes along with their changes in social position. 2 Prior research has analyzed changes in women's income sources after the male head of the household died, mainly with regard to inheritance rights; 3 only a few studies have systematically examined the extent to which this was linked to women's risk of falling into poverty. Furthermore, little is known about the role played by the differences in women's social positions regarding their access to different income sources besides their husbands’ property, such as assistance from their lineage 4 or government. For example, widows with small sons could not directly inherit their husband's property because their sons were the main heirs, but they could receive assistance from their lineage or the government. 5 Therefore, it is important to analyze the poverty risk of women in the Chinese Ming-Qing period in relation to their social position and access to different income schemes.
Against this background, this study analyzes the extent of women's poverty risks in relation to their social position by examining the extent to which women's social positions influenced their eligibility for income and whether they could combine different income sources to prevent them from poverty risk.
This study introduces a new analytical framework to examine the poverty risks of women of different social positions with regard to their eligibility for different income sources. We differentiate between income from the “family scheme,” the “lineage scheme,” and the “government assistance scheme.” Therefore, the focus of this study is on women's hypothetical poverty risk, as we examine women's access to various income sources based on the analysis of the institutional regulations during the Ming-Qing period. We conduct a content analysis 6 using historical records and archived legal regulations, lawsuits, and chorography.
Our findings support the argument that during this period, women's poverty risks varied clearly according to their social positions, and that combinations of different income schemes had a great impact on their risks of falling into poverty. This gives us new insight into the social recognition of specific social positions during this period, which to this day affects the institutional regulations and risk of poverty for women in contemporary Chinese society. In many modern welfare states, women's access to social security rights and social benefits still depends on their social positions and family ties; in particular, widows’ pensions are still highly related to their deceased husband's income, as widows may inherit part of their husband's pension. 7 Furthermore, many women are still prone to income insecurity due to financial dependency on their husbands, especially in old age, since their pensions are often smaller because of career interruptions due to family care responsibilities. 8
The next section consists of a short literature review concerning women's poverty risks and access to income sources in the Ming-Qing period. The third section introduces our analytical framework. The fourth section presents our findings on women's eligibility for various income sources based on their social position, as well as the consequences of their poverty risks, ultimately drawing several conclusions in section five.
Overview of the Literature
Women's Risk of Falling into Poverty in Ancient China
During the Ming-Qing period, nearly 90% of the Chinese population suffered at least once in their lifetime from poverty. 9 There are different explanations for this. One is that the population grew faster than agricultural productivity due to technical limitations, 10 and natural disasters and regional variations have also been mentioned as causative factors. 11 As a result, household income decreased on average, especially among “lower class” citizens without political power. 12 Since women's income and wealth depended extensively on the male head of their household, their poverty risks were closely linked to the household's poverty condition. 13 However, women usually faced higher poverty risks due to their weaker social positions within their households than their husbands or fathers, especially after the male head of the household died. 14 For instance, from the eighteenth century on, widows had to pay land taxes regardless of whether the land was inherited or from their lineage, and whether they had the labor force to cultivate that land. 15 As a result, taxes could have been a main reason for widows’ higher poverty risk, as could spiritual worship 16 since citizens usually contributed twice a year in terms of food or money for spiritual ceremonies in spring and autumn. 17 Another cause lies in changes in family size; smaller families easily suffered poverty risks due to labor force deficits. 18
Although these factors help to explain the poverty risks of Chinese families during the Ming-Qing period, they do not systematically account for the situation of women whose fathers or husbands had died, which is what we discuss in the next section.
Women's Access to Income After the Head of Their Household Died
Women's poverty risks after the death of a father or husband have mainly been analyzed with regard to their heritage rights. 19 Early research on women's property rights focused mostly on the rights of their male children as only they could directly inherit property from their father under the Ming and Qing dynasty, 20 even though approximately 20% of families did not have adult sons. Therefore, it is important to evaluate Chinese women's heritage rights and access to income directly from their viewpoint, since differences in women's social positions could have had a crucial impact on their income levels. 21 Previous scholarship indicates that as long as widows held a position of “social motherhood,” they had more power to access inheritance property, whether as legal widows or widowed concubines, which could have reinforced their financial power because it included the right to supervise the property for their sons as legal heirs. 22 Therefore, while a widow's heritage property would officially have belonged to her son, she would have legally managed it for him without legally owning it. 23
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that heritage was just one source of women's income during the Ming-Qing period; another was their dowry, which depended on their birth family's financial background and social class. 24 One of the traditional rules for women in ancient China was to rely financially on their fathers before marriage, and on their husbands after marriage, being bound to their social position as wife or as concubine, and then dependent on their sons after their husband's death. 25 Therefore, the son's financial support based on his career and social status was another crucial income source for widows, which might have significantly influenced their poverty risk.
Furthermore, since women could have already participated to some extent in agricultural and manufacturing production, they would have been able to save a small part of their income for themselves; 26 for instance, a large number of women worked in the cotton production and textile industry after marriage. 27 Nevertheless, this income might not have been enough to prevent them from falling into poverty, though it does prove that women had multiple income sources in ancient China. 28 Here, we need some information about access to lineage schemes and the assistance scheme which represented additional income sources.
Research gap
The literature shows a link between access to income sources, in particular women's heritage rights and poverty risks. 29 While it has been indicated that different social positions of women, for example as legal widows or widowed concubines, regulated their access to family income sources and thereby their poverty risks, 30 this perspective is too restricted. It neglects the fact that different social positions of women could influence their eligibility for various income sources, which could interact to prevent their poverty risks. So far, theorizing and research on women's poverty risks in ancient China does not often sufficiently differentiate between these different income sources beyond inheritance and analyze in which ways they could interact to alleviate the poverty of women of different social positions. There is also little research examining women's poverty risks by systematically analyzing their eligibility for income sources based on institutional regulations within a variety of original historical documents.
Analytical Framework
In this section we introduce an analytical approach to analyze the poverty risk of women during the Ming-Qing period in China. Our study focuses mainly on the poverty risks of women whose main head of household (father or husband) had died, since these women, who usually lacked an income from their own employment, were particularly vulnerable to poverty risks during that period. We argue that in order to investigate the poverty risk of women, we have to consider their various social positions, which would have influenced their eligibility for and access to different income sources. The following section first specifies the different income schemes that women would have been entitled to and their different social positions. Subsequently, we introduce a methodological framework to measure women's hypothetical poverty risks. 31
The study analytically differentiates between three main income schemes:
The “family scheme” includes income a) from the widow's heritage, b) from the earnings of adult sons who were legally obliged to support their widowed mothers, and c) income from their dowry. The dowry was paid by women's parents, family, or lineage when they married and could take multiple formats: in-kind, such as land, stores, cash, or jewelry. The “lineage scheme” refers to support from the shared property and financial sources of the lineage, the “Yi Tian,” land cultivated by lineage members for free. The land's revenue was collected by the lineage leader to support members in the form of cash and in-kind, for instance, educational support for poor women's male children to gain access to educational resources or a basic living assistance. When this benefit was comprehensively available and generous, it could prevent them from poverty risk. The “government assistance scheme” was organized by the royal central government and financed by the state and municipalities to prevent women from falling into poverty especially after disasters such as war, pandemic, and famine. It was a means-tested and short-term subsidy with a low benefit level that included, for instance, food, small plots of farmland, shelters or short-term tax-reliefs.
While our study focuses on these three income sources, in empirical cases, Chinese women would have had more income sources, such as social networks, charities, or donations.
According to our argument, once their husbands had died, women's access to different income sources and thereby their hypothetical poverty risk would have depended strongly on their social position. 32 Figure 1 displays the relevant social positions of lower- and middle-class women that are considered to have had the strongest impact on their poverty risk after the male head of the household died.
Social positions of women after the male head of the household died. Source: authors own research.
We discern three main dimensions to women's social positions: (1) unmarried daughters, (2) legal widows, and (3) widowed concubines whose families sold them to a middle-class family. An important factor for the social position of the legal widow was whether she had a biological son (2a) or an adopted one (2b), and in each case, whether the son was a child or an adult, or whether she had no male children and was unable to adopt a son from the same lineage (2c). Likewise, the social position “widowed concubine” (3) can be differentiated with regard to whether the woman in question had a biological young or adult son (3a), or no son (3b).
To analyze the poverty risks of women of different social positions, their access to various income schemes is examined. Poverty risk is defined as higher if women were not eligible for family schemes and if access to other income schemes was limited. Poverty risk is considered medium to high if women were eligible for at least one source of the family schemes, while access to other income schemes was limited. Poverty risk is considered medium if women were eligible for at least two of the family schemes, while access to other income schemes was limited. Poverty risk is defined as low to medium if access to two of the family schemes and other income schemes was guaranteed. Poverty risk is considered low if access to all family schemes and other income schemes was granted.
To examine poverty risks, this empirical study focuses on institutional regulations that restricted the access of women to diverse income sources. According to historical institutionalism, institutional regulations, or institutions in general, are defined as formal and informal norms, routines, rules, or procedures that structure the behavior of actors by providing guidance and constraints to action that may be enforced on the basis of sanctions. 33 Therefore, this study concentrates on the hypothetical poverty risks of women, as it analyzes the specific institutional regulations that would have regulated women's access to income sources in contrast to the actual poverty of women, which would have been subject to more intervening factors, particularly the family's wealth and the family relations between mother and son. It focuses on the Ming and Qing periods since the institutional regulations between both periods, which were characterized by a peaceful and stable socioeconomic environment, were quite similar. The empirical basis of the study comprises historical documents and archive material from chorography, legal regulations, and lawsuits from the Ming-Qing period, which were analyzed using content analysis. 34 These historical examples are representative of typical cases.
Findings: the Eligibility and Combination of Different Income Schemes and Women's Poverty Risks
Social Position 1: Unmarried Daughters
Unmarried daughters were allowed to own property from their birth family after their father died, but this was restricted to the “dowry;” therefore, they could only access part of their fortune when they married. 35 Nevertheless, this kind of income was regarded as a significant property that women brought into their marriage. 36 In the absence of a dowry, almost all women would have faced financial loss and higher risk of poverty.
Unmarried daughters were denied educational support from the lineage but could have received basic assistance for food and shelter if they suffered from starvation. Whether unmarried daughters could access the means-tested government assistance depended largely on their mothers’ social position. For example, if their mother was a widowed concubine, they could barely access this income scheme. Therefore, unmarried daughters had a medium to high level of poverty risk, since they were eligible for at least one of the family schemes, while their access to other income schemes was clearly limited.
Social Position 2: Legal Widows
Theoretically, owning dowry was an essential precondition for women to marry. The dowry belonged to the woman who could take full charge of it in her lifetime for daily costs, for example: “雍正六年(1728),刘连俸的祖父君辅将业一份附与姑爷张九安以作奁业。议明世守业不问, 倘有典卖, 业仍还刘姓。” (Caption: In the Yong Zheng era, 1728, Mr. Jun Fu gave an asset to his daughter as a dowry. This dowry belonged to the daughter and her family. When her husband wanted to sell this asset, the daughter and daughter's birth family had the right to take it back).
37
Social Position 2a (i): Legal Widow with a Biological Adult son
In addition to the dowry, other income sources from the family scheme were relevant, particularly their access to their husbands’ inheritance, even though this would legally have been inherited by their adult sons. However, some records indicate that mothers still had some custodial rights to property after their sons grew up, since they needed their mothers’ consent when selling family property.
38
In some cases, adult children could only possess the fortune when their mother was too old to manage it.
39
Nevertheless, the adult son could manage all the inheritance by himself, but he was obliged to take care of his mother and at least to protect her from starving, as the following example demonstrates: “黔南七都许村立单人胡阿，本邑八都汪氏配夫胡子钦不幸早丧，遗有三男，长曰期光、次曰期大、三曰期忠，颇以成人，家道不幸，因夫前程京债销费，产业浮薄，阿思年老不能尽事，呼儿谓曰：吾今老矣，命男各爨安业。除前变过，仍在田地山塘基业，逐一注簿头段，照依各阄字号管业，本年月日前所欠他人钱债门役等务，俱作三分认还，母亲膳食，期光、大二人管办。” (Caption: Mrs. Hu's husband died but he had debts, which Mrs. Hu had to pay from parts of his property after his death. As Mrs. Hu got older, she was unable to manage the property at all; therefore, she wanted her sons to inherit her husband's property. The three adult sons inherited their father's property, while the oldest and the second oldest were put in charge of taking care of their mother by at least guaranteeing her food).
40
In addition to inheritance, an adult son's working income could have served as another indirect source of income for widows. In cases where the son was well educated and became a civil servant, his mother would have been able to improve her living conditions and social status, while she would be likely to face poverty risks if her son hardly managed his own life. The historical records show that a widow with (an) adult son(s) had a better chance of decreased poverty risks due to her children's support and a greater probability of accessing family schemes. Furthermore, she could have received support from her lineage scheme, which would have compensated for some poverty gaps through basic living support or educational support for her sons, especially when they participated in the imperial examination:
41
“康熙十四年，减省程子谦捐修，复捐银一千两，置学田，取租为诸生科举费” (Caption: The lineage gave donations for buying land property and paying rent in order to support poor male adult members with their education fees and participate in imperial examinations).
42
Another example proves that some lineages introduced regulations so that male members had to participate in the imperial examination, while poor members had to be supported by the lineage for their education fee: “子姓十五以上，资质颖敏，苦志读书者，应加奖励，量佐其笔札膏火之费。另议义学，以教宗党贫乏子弟。” (Caption: The Huang lineage regulated that male members over 15 should work hard in their education and participate in the imperial exam, while the lineage supported them with educational supplies and fees. Poor male members could get free education in the lineage's school and benefit from participating in the imperial exam).
43
Moreover, government assistance schemes would have helped to decrease poverty risks, but at the lowest level. Overall, the poverty risk of widows with an adult son was low, since they had access to all family schemes, including the working income of their son, as well as to the lineage and government assistance schemes.
Social Position 2b (i): Legal Widow with Adopted Adult son
Legal widows without a biological son could not access inheritance from the family scheme unless they adopted a son from the same lineage in order to receive the same amount of inheritance according to the Great Ming and Great Qing Code. Hence, whether they adopted a son from the lineage had a significant impact on their income sources. However, one of the preconditions for adopting a son or to receive any kind of assistance from the lineage was to maintain their chastity, which was extremely significant for widows, as the following example shows. “有族孙妇年少寡居，及孙女出嫁，夫亡无依而归守节者，资给之特厚。” (Caption: There was a young woman from the Sun lineage whose husband died and her daughter married. She was alone, but kept her chastity. Then, the lineage offered her different kinds of generous assistance to keep her secure from poverty risk).
44
Consequently, legal widows who adopted an adult son may have suffered lower poverty risks than widows with biological young sons. However, it is likely that their poverty risks were higher than those of widows with biological adult sons, since it can be expected that adopted children may have had a relatively weak emotional relationship with the widow, which may have led to lower financial support and worse living conditions. Nevertheless, other family schemes including dowry and inheritance from marriage could be accessed, as could lineage support and means-tested government assistance. Therefore, their poverty risk was at a low to medium level, since they would have been able to access at least two of the family schemes and other income schemes with limitations.
Social Positions 2a (ii) and 2b (ii): Legal Widow with Biological Young son and with an Adopted Young son, Respectively
Dowry and inheritance from marriage were available to both widows with biological or adopted young sons similar to those available to widows with adult biological sons. However, they had to pay for their son's education or try to get support from the lineage. The eligibility to inherit property from their deceased husbands was indirect, as they could inherit the property only on behalf of their son and manage it until the boy grew up.
45
They were also not allowed to sell inherited properties unless in the name of the boy and for justifiable reasons, such as tax payments. Exceptions were, for instance, when the boy died prematurely, as the following example indicates: “今因夫死, 长男喜德继故, 遗阿孤寡, 日食无度。” (Caption: Which means the legal widow Zhu Ahu sold her inherited land by herself because she could not make a living after the death of her husband and son).
46
However, one important restriction to accessing the inheritance was the widow's chastity, so that they had to choose between remaining a widow and inheriting their husband's property while raising their children alone, or remarrying while giving up their heritage rights, according to the Great Ming Code: “其改嫁者,夫家财产及原有妆奁, 并听前夫之家为主.” (Caption: A legal widow must return all inheritance of her deceased husband and her dowry to the deceased husband's other family members when she remarries).
47
Nevertheless, sometimes the inheritance was not generous enough to ensure a basic living, which led to poverty even when widows preserved their chastity. In such cases, there existed an exceptional option for legal widows with young sons that allowed them to remain officially un-remarried and to retain their chastity status,
48
while “hiring a husband” (“Jie Jiao Fu”), who was usually from a very poor background, and should take up the former husband's family work and help with the agricultural work, raising the children, and protecting them from starving,
49
for example: “立招赘应主文书仆人陈学寿，原名胡天得，系本都西坑人，年卅三岁。因家贫，不能续娶，自与母计议，今情愿凭媒空身赘到渠口家主汪承恩堂名下地仆陈六郎媳七俚为夫妇。当从家主暨房长更名陈学寿。自招赘之后，百凡悉遵家主法度，应主供役，支撑陈姓门户，永承陈姓宗脉。今恐无凭，立此文书存照。” (Caption: Mr. Hu Tian De, 33 years old; he volunteered to be a “Jie Jiao Fu” of Mrs. Chen, who had been Mr. Chen Liu Lang's legal wife, and his mother agreed. Mr. Hu Tian De changed his name to Mr. Chen Xue Shou since he became the “Jie Jiao Fu”, and he promised to make his contribution to Mr. Chen Liu Lang's family. He must serve Mrs. Chen as her master and change his family name forever. His next generation must use “Chen” as their family name. He was not allowed to support his birth mother at all by Mrs. Chen's property; instead, he must serve and support Mr. Chen Liu Lang's birth mother or mother-in-law).
50
A “Jie Jiao Fu” could receive no savings because what he earned had to be given to the family, and he had to adopt the last name of the legal widow's former husband. 51
Overall, we rank the poverty risk of widows with young biological or adopted sons as medium since they would have had access to two of the family schemes and other income schemes. In contrast to widows with an adult son, this position was associated with a higher risk of falling into poverty, but greater autonomy regarding the financial means of the widow.
Social Position 2c: Legal Widow Without son (Unable to Adopt one)
Eligibility for income schemes was totally different for legal widows without a son since they had neither access to any inheritance nor to support from the working income of a son; they could only access their dowry from the family income scheme. This social position left gaps for poverty risks, as these widows could only access support from the lineage scheme if they maintained their chastity or received low-level government assistance, as seen in the following examples: “凡族人之老而无子者，幼而孤者，妇之寡而守节者，以及丧葬婚娶有给。” (Caption: The lineage scheme in principle helped poor widows without children, orphans, or poor widows who kept chastity with financial support from the lineage's public property benefit).
52
“凡鳏寡孤独及笃疾之人，贫穷无亲属依倚不能自存，所在官司应收养.” (Caption: When legal widows without sons or other relatives suffered from poverty and could not help themselves, the government in principle had the responsibility to take care of their basic living, such as offering them food). 53
Historical documents indicate that there were multiple reasons why a legal widow without a biological son could not adopt one from the lineage. Usually, these women were poor because they were unable to inherit their husbands’ wealth in the context of the traditional Chinese patriarchal society. In some cases, they may have received only a small share of their deceased husband's property to prevent them from starving when they did not remarry, for example: “子女俱无者，量留上地二顷以为衣食之资。果守志终身者，原产听其变卖度日，亲戚往来，任其与借，不许宗人拦阻。” (Caption: When a widow without children was poor, she could possess two “qing”
54
of her deceased husband's land to cover her food and clothing costs. If she kept chastity, she could sell the land under her name, and she would have had the right to get help from relatives in the lineage. Lineage members were not allowed to refuse requests for help if the widowed individual suffered from poverty).
55
The social position of a legal widow without a biological son who could not adopt one from the lineage made her eligible for support from the local government as long as she did not remarry. However, her eligibility for inheritance from her deceased husband was restricted. Therefore, her poverty risk was at a medium to high level, because only one of the family schemes applied and other income schemes would have been accessible with limitations.
Social Position 3: Widowed Concubine
In ancient Chinese society, the distinction between wives and concubines was absolute according to the Great Ming and the Great Qing Code. The social position of a “concubine” was typical for relatively rich families, while poor families usually could not afford one. Wealthy married men would have a concubine to indicate their wealth, to have more sons, or for entertainment:
56
“至于姬妾婢媵，又与正室不同。娶妻如买田庄，非五谷不殖，非桑麻不树，稍涉游观之物，即拔而去之，以其为衣食所出，地力有限，不能旁及其他也。买姬妾如治园圃，结子之花亦种，不结子之花亦种；成荫之树亦栽，不成荫之树亦栽，以其原为娱情而设，所重在耳目，则口腹有时而轻，不能顾名兼顾实也。” (Caption: When a man intended to establish a family and spawn the next generation, he needed to marry a legal wife; when a man sought entertainment or to have more sons, he needed to acquire a concubine, whose children, in contrast to those of a female servant, were also legally accepted as his).
57
Therefore, a concubine who gave her husband more children and served him for entertainment was considered more like a minor wife, while a childless concubine was considered more like property, similar to a female servant.
As a result, a childless widowed concubine's social position was not only lower than that of the legal wife, but also lower than that of other women, because they could be sold to a new family by the legal wife based on a contract. 58 In contrast, the social position of a widowed concubine with children was only lower than that of the legal wife because of her motherhood especially when she had a son, in which case she might have a chance at upward mobility when she moved into her adult son's household after the household division. 59 Moreover, since wives and daughters were no longer allowed to inherit property directly from their husbands and fathers after the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), a widowed concubine did not have any dowry, since her relationship with her birth family was completely cut off, and she could not directly inherit anything from her husband during the Ming-Qing period (1368–1911). 60
Therefore, whether widowed concubines would have suffered poverty risks after their husbands died depended extensively on their motherhood, which served as the most significant way to access the family income scheme. What is debatable is how far widowed concubines were able to supervise their son's use of inherited property and how far the legal widow held this right.
Social Position 3a (i): Widowed Concubine with Biological Adult son
It is true that the legal rights of a widowed concubine with an adult son to inherit property of the deceased husband were restricted compared to that of a legal wife. However, this does not mean that she was completely deprived of her son's inheritance or upward mobility.
61
Having an adult son enabled her to be better integrated into her husband's household and to achieve inheritance rights after his death. The concubine's position would be further promoted after her son became the legal head of a new household after the household was divided after his father's death.
62
In that case, his concubine-mother lived with him and enjoyed significant freedom and authority in his new household, such that her social position improved. 洪武二十四年，兵部尚书茹瑺上奏道：“庶子袭武职，例止封嫡母，所生庶母无封赠。”翰林学士刘三吾奏言：“宋制：母以子贵，庶母亦依所生子之秩封赠。”为此，朱元璋下诏,庶母也按照宋代之制加以封赠. (Caption: In the Ming dynasty, in the year of 1392, the emperor Zhu Yuan-Zhang signed an imperial decree which regulated that concubine-mothers were entitled to share their son's honor as birth mothers when the son made contributions to his country as a civil servant by achieving an honorable document, “Gao Ming,” instead of the legal wife or legal widow).
63
Normally, all legitimate sons should inherit an equal share of their father's estate, 64 but there were exceptions in the empirical cases in which a widowed concubine's son received less property than that of the legal widow. 65 The son was responsible for taking care of his mother in the new household. How far widowed concubines suffered poverty risks also depended highly on their children's careers.
Therefore, the widowed concubine could access two family schemes indirectly, the inheritance and support from her son's income, while she was usually not eligible for the lineage scheme, except for educational support if her son participated in the imperial examination. She would also have been eligible for means-tested government assistance at the basic level. Overall, we evaluate her poverty risk as medium, which is higher than that of a legal widow with an adult son.
Social Position 3a (ii): Widowed Concubine with a Biological Young son
If the widowed concubine's son was still young when the head of the household died, her son could get a share of the inheritance alongside the other sons of his father, but this share had to be managed by the legal widow until the young son grew up,
66
and the widowed concubine-mother and her son had to live with the legal widow together as the following example demonstrates: “妾为家属, 于夫亡后, 故以与妻同居, 受妻之监督为原则。” (Caption: A widowed concubine's financial income and living conditions depended on the legal widow, who had the direct responsibility of caring for widowed concubines upon the death of the head of the household and until the widowed concubine's son grew up, if she had one).
67
Therefore, the widowed concubine and her young son did not inherit. In a better condition, the legal widow guaranteed the widowed concubine a basic living by offering her a place to live and food, but sometimes their living conditions were worse. This would have been because legal widows and widowed concubines usually had not had a harmonious relationship when they “shared” the husband when he was alive, which often led to horrible living conditions for concubines after the husband died. 68
As a result, a widowed concubine with a young son may have faced a high poverty risk: she could access the family scheme and the lineage scheme only for their son's educational support. 69 Furthermore, government assistance was at a low level and lasted only a short time. Hence, the extent to which these women suffered poverty risks depended highly on their children's future careers, their relationship with the legal wife or on government assistance.
Social Position 3b: Widowed Concubine without Son/with Girls
Childless widowed concubines and those who had only girls immediately belonged to the legal widow after the head of the household died and there was no inheritance income available for them. It has been proven that there was a high chance that they could either be sold to another family, while the legal widow got a bride-price, 70 or just “thrown” out of the property by the legal widow or her son. 71 This illustrates a lack of social recognition for daughters in contrast to sons when it comes to their mother's rights to access income schemes. Furthermore, widowed concubines were not allowed to adopt a son from the lineage according to institutional regulations. One exceptional case was where a widowed concubine had a son (either adult or young) who died, in which case she could adopt one from the lineage, so that her poverty risk would be the same as that of a concubine with an adult or young son. 72
Therefore, widowed concubines without sons could not access any of the family schemes and neither was there support from the lineage scheme. They could only rely on legal widows or receive government assistance and were exposed to high poverty risks.
Nevertheless, a special condition existed for widowed concubines when their “husband” had loved them and offered them gifts. 73 In these instances, the widowed concubine could save some property in the form of money, jewelry, stores, or land, 74 in which case she might have had a better chance of securing a basic living after the head of household had died, since she would have had no obligation to hand these possessions over to the legal wife.
The Relationship Between Women's Income Sources, Their Social Position and Their Hypothetical Poverty Risks
We have demonstrated that the relationship between women's access to a combination of income schemes and their social positions had differing impacts on their poverty risks. Women in comparatively weak social positions, such as widowed concubines, were exposed to higher poverty risks. Table 1 displays the hypothetical poverty risk for women in different social positions.
Poverty risk of women of different social positions with multiple income schemes
Source: Authors own analysis based on Chinese institutional regulations about women's income sources during Ming-Qing period (1368–1911).
Notes: (x = not eligible) The hypothetical poverty risks (4) result from access to different income schemes (1) (2) (3). This table is for middle-class women, since poverty was the condition of all women of lower class and higher, the only exception being when their adult sons earned good incomes [2a (i)/ 2b (i)].
The table shows that during the Ming-Qing period, the overall poverty risk for women varied strongly with regard to their social position and the income schemes they could access. In some social positions, several income schemes could be combined to decrease poverty risks, but gaps remained, especially for women in weak social positions.
Poverty risks would increase in cases where access to family income schemes was limited, but support from lineage schemes could help to alleviate the poverty risk of women. However, this also depended on the lineage's financial power and whether the lineage leader wanted to help the poor. For instance, the lineage offered educational support for the imperial examination only to the sons of legal widows who kept chastity. 75
Nevertheless, as the analysis shows, with regard to the position of a widowed concubine, the motherhood and adult sons’ job biographies also secured a concubine-mother's financial security rather than her chastity, while the lineage supported this group of women less often than it did legal widows. However, the lineage scheme had a strong impact on women's poverty risks during the Ming-Qing period when lineage development was of the greatest prosperity in Chinese history.
The government assistance scheme could also help prevent poverty risks, especially when disasters or accidents occurred, but its size was small and it was usually insufficient to prevent starvation.
Our findings show that women's eligibility for income schemes varied with their different social positions, which also reflects the dissimilarities in the social recognition of specific social positions in ancient Chinese society. It also indicates that more income schemes than just heritage rights were important to protect women from poverty, such as lineage and government assistance, by offering them multiple choices in line with institutional regulations. However, it is also evident that women's protection from poverty is essentially dependent on their connection to their fathers, husbands and, after their death, sons. Without male relatives or a husband, women had higher poverty risks. This lack of social recognition of women is shown early on by the fact that widows only had indirect access to their husband's inheritance through their sons, while no inheritance rights could be derived from just having daughters.
Conclusions
This study introduces a new analytical framework to explore the extent to which the poverty risk of women differed with regard to their different social positions and their eligibility for diverse income sources during the Ming-Qing period in China.
Past research generally assumed that women's living conditions in this historical period depended on their heritage rights, tax payments, or motherhood status, while financial support from their respective lineage would have helped to prevent women's poverty risks. 76 However, our article argues that these approaches are not adequate, since this research does not systematically consider the role played by women's social positions. Our findings clarify the extent to which women's social positions restricted their access to diverse income schemes, and the combination of different income schemes had a greater impact on the prevention of women's poverty risks.
First, our findings indicate that the widow's inheritance alone could not protect them from poverty risks, nor could the lineage scheme. Their eligibility for inheritance and its size depended on their social position. However, the poverty risk resulting from their lack of access to the family income scheme could be compensated for to some extent by lineage and government schemes.
Second, our findings show that the government tried to control women's social behavior on the basis of institutional regulations regarding eligibility for different kinds of income schemes. Instead of pursuing only marriage loyalty and chastity, the government took further steps to offer women protection, such as regulating motherhood security by law or encouraging the relevant lineage to support their male members with educational investment in order to ensure more income sources to fight poverty risks.
Our article provides new insights into the ways in which social positions shaped the poverty risks of women during the Ming-Qing period by analyzing the institutional regulations concerning women's access to multiple income sources on the basis of content analysis of historical documents. This can also inspire our analytical lens on women's poverty risks today. In contemporary welfare states, women's access to social benefits still depends to some extent on their social position, e.g., as mothers, wives or widows. As women are still more likely to experience income insecurity because of career interruption to provide family care they often have to rely on their husband's income. However, in order not to be solely dependent on their husband's income, especially in old age, it is crucial that women have access to different income sources. In recent years, several welfare states have therefore introduced basic pension rights or pension credits for taking on family care tasks to offer different sources to prevent women from falling into poverty.
Future research ought to investigate a wider range of Chinese historical periods and should add comparative research on the relationship between social positions and women's poverty risks. It would also be fruitful to analyze historical changes in the generosity of women's income schemes.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editing company SAGE for their working of copy-editing for this paper. This paper is financially supported by Social Science Research Project for Universities in Anhui Province (Project Nr. SK2019A0264).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Social Science Research Project for Universities in Anhui Province, China, (grant number SK2019A0264)
