Abstract
This is a collection of articles, some published earlier, and revised subsequently, and a few new ones, dealing with two broad themes: the Indian tradition of public debate and its role in shaping the ‘conceptual structure and practice of Indian democracy’; the other one is woven around the Gandhian approach of conflict resolution based on non-violence, a much-beaten academic track.
Parekh writes on ‘Indian Tradition of Public Debate’, and neatly sums up the issues with appropriate examples and elaborate explanations. In writing that ‘The arrival of Islam and the consolidation from the thirteenth century onwards presented a powerful challenge to the Brahmanic hegemony’, Parekh misses out that it was not just the latter but also Buddhism and all other pagan/pluralistic traditions that got severe blows. In reiterating the age-old truth that ‘The Muslim manner of invasion and the violence associated with it aroused fear and hostility that were hardly conducive to a dialogue’ author rightly exposes the falsehood fabricated by India’s ‘eminent’ public sector historians inspired by the likes of M.N. Roy and Nehru. As for the Sufis, often projected in our official historiography and political–cultural discourse as liberal and tolerant seekers of spiritual enlightenment, Parekh correctly observes that they were indeed driven by the ‘desire to convert’ as had been observed among others by Rizvi, Eaton and Goel. There are interesting passages on Swami Dayanand, Narmad and Jadunath Maharaj but missing out is Rammohan Roy’s seminal Tuhfat-ul Muwahiddin (1804–05), a severe critic of prophetic belief systems.
There is much interesting discussion on ‘Choosing the National Symbols of India’, concepts of ‘India That is Bharat’, National Flag, which was first proposed in 1833, National Anthem, National Emblem and State Honours, commonly called Padma Awards. When Curzon in his convocation address at Calcutta University in 1905 claimed that truthfulness was basically a Western idea that was almost missing in the Indian moral code, an offended Gandhi promptly reminded him as to how the idea of Satyameva Jayate was part of Indic traditions. We may recall that Sister Nivedita also did not take Curzon’s calumny lying down, and she in turn revealed as to how Curzon himself was guilty of falsehood.
Parekh is unconvincing in saying that ‘Although the national symbols do not compromise Indian secularism, they reflect a strong Hindu-Buddhist cultural bias’. He fails to appreciate that the Hindu-Buddhist culture has grown in this land only, and nurtured by its people, while Islamic symbolism would be primarily Arabic-Turkic or Persian. He regrets that the ‘architects of modern India’ could have found a ‘space for Islam’. Parekh ignores a basic fault-line in India’s freedom struggle. The independence movement, including the militant/revolutionary wings, was led by non-partisan nationalists. Yet they were largely unacceptable to the Muslim community, exceptions apart. The stranglehold of Muslim separatists/communalists with extra-territorial loyalties was the stumbling block. And all this while Pakistan, including the latter day Bangladesh, got cleansed of its Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Christian population. He might have included the fate of Kashmir’s Hindus, rendered refugees in their own land, the real success story of Nehruvian ‘secularism’.
In saying that, the author overlooks the fact that the leadership of the independence movement, including the militant/revolutionary wing being predominantly Hindu, the Muslim influence had little impact, and this despite the Congress being led by outstanding nationalists, was never acceptable to the Muslim separatists and communalists. With strong foundations in separatism and communalism that blatantly espoused violence against ‘others’ even before the foundation of the Indian National Congress, by Wahabis, Faraizis, Sir Syed’s Aligarh Movement, subsequently backed by Pan Islamic Movement and people like Syed Ameer Ali, and since 1906 by the Muslim League, the Congress led by people of the stature of Dadabahi Naoroji, Womesh Bannerjee, Surendranath Banerjee, Ranade, Gokhale, Dutt had failed to draw any significant Muslim support. A desperate Gandhi eager to appeal to the Muslim community had to embrace the irredentist Khilafatists with disastrous consequences like the genocide perpetrated by the Moplahs.
Parekh is more balanced in his treatment of Ambedkar, surveying his career with objectivity, including what India’s national leaders thought of him and vice versa. Omission of Jagjivan Ram, Jogendranath Mandal, Meghnand Saha in India’s national life misses out much of Dalit presence and contribution. Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism had stemmed from his belief that both Islam and Christianity were foreign religions, and to ‘convert to them was to step out of not only the Hindu society but also the Indian nation’. This was almost as profound as what Swami Vivekananda had said on people opting out of Hinduism. On the mass conversion that Ambedkar organised (14 October 1956), Parekh observes, ‘It is arguable whether the Buddha himself would have been sympathetic to the idea of encouraging mass conversion and that too at a public meeting without the full knowledge of his doctrines’ (pp. 109–11). Parekh is right in saying that ‘Ambedkar was far more than the totality of his thoughts and actions and compliments him for his “intellectual and moral integrity” and “unshakable commitment to the cause of Dalits”’. One may note that Ambedkar had totally rejected the absurd Aryan invasion theory and supported an exchange of population when the movement for Pakistan began.
The article on ‘Gandhi–Tagore Debates’ examines non-cooperation, Bihar earthquake (1934), charkha, Ram Mohan Roy, etc., while pointing out that neither Tagore gave the honorific Mahatma to Gandhi, and nor did the latter called him Gurudev. Most of them are well known, but missing is Tagore’s public support for a democratically elected Subhas Chandra Bose after he was thrown out by Gandhi and his coterie. Thus was a dialogue aborted!
To understand Tagore, one needs to rely primarily on hundreds of articles—both short and large ones—written by him in Bengali, and not always the translated ones. This article has made use of some of the biographies of Tagore, among others, but that may not adequately reflect his views on nationalism, patriotism, Western and Indian value systems and the subtler aspects of human experience.
Parekh shows how Einstein held Gandhi in high esteem, admired the ‘great virtues’ of non-violence, but believed that it worked ‘only under certain conditions’, and would have failed against the Nazis. Einstein thus reflected ‘the familiar fascination of a man of thought for a man of action’. Gandhi used to go on fast on various issues, but never went on a fast against the Muslim separatists/communalists and Jinnah. Was it an enigma or something more!
On a chapter entitled ‘Gandhi and Osama Bin Laden: Is a Dialogue Possible’, one is almost sure of the winner, if there really was to be one, knowing what happened to the numerous Jinnah–Gandhi dialogues. One, however, wonders, if Osama or any of his followers would ever address a kafir as ‘Mahatma’ as Parekh makes him do (pp. 272, 274).
On the whole, it is an interesting book, providing nuggets of information and in-depth analyses on many issues, for which Lord Bhikhu Parekh is so well known!