Abstract
Most studies of household decision making focus on the factors associated with women’s ability to make decisions autonomously. This paper is concerned with egalitarian decision making, defined as where both men and women consider that they themselves make decisions jointly, and where they agree that their spouses participate in decisions in a similar fashion. We offer evidence that in Ecuador women’s command over resources is associated with egalitarian decision making among couples. Women’s share of couples’ wealth is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of joint decision making regarding their decision to work and to spend income.
1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that the empowerment of women requires an increase in women’s agency, their “ability to define one’s goals and act upon them” (Kabeer 1999: 438). Agency is often measured in terms of women’s participation in household decision making, particularly women’s ability to make decisions autonomously.
But in the case of dual-headed households (those constituted by a husband and wife), is autonomy the appropriate measure of agency? Or is it when women are able to negotiate as equals with their partners, to reach truly joint decisions as a couple? This paper draws on the framework developed by Coleman and Strauss (1990) regarding marital decision-making power, and focuses on egalitarian households, as opposed to households being male dominated (where most of the decisions are made by the man), female dominated (where most are made by the woman), or characterized by divided power (where the man makes some decisions, and the woman makes others).
Most studies of decision making focus only on how women themselves perceive the decision-making process, for example the Demographic and Health Surveys (Kishor and Subaiya 2008). There is growing recognition that it is also important to ask men about their perceptions of women’s participation in decisions since men and women do not always agree on whether women participate or not (Jejeebhoy 2002; Ghuman et al. 2006; Becker et al. 2008).
Little attention has been given thus far to men’s role in household decision making. But to properly understand household decision-making processes requires a gender analysis based on the participation and perceptions of both husband and wife. For if women’s empowerment is about change, “the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such an ability” (Kabeer 1999: 437), then an increase in women’s agency may involve changes in how men make decisions within households. Hence, we focus on both men’s and women’s role in decision making. We define egalitarian decision making as joint decision-making practices which are characterized by symmetry and agreement, where both men and women consider that they themselves make decisions jointly, and where they agree that their spouses participate in decisions in a similar fashion.
In Kabeer’s (1999) framework, women’s empowerment requires not only agency, but command over resources to achieve different outcomes. Following the collective bargaining model framework, women’s ownership of major assets such as the primary residence, land, and other real estate is associated with a stronger fall-back position, and hence greater bargaining power than women who do not own these. Our main hypothesis is that women’s access to real estate is associated with egalitarian decision making.
Ecuador is a particularly appropriate case to study this relationship, since joint ownership of major assets among couples is quite common, and in the case of homeownership, more frequent in Ecuador than in other Latin American countries with similar marital and inheritance regimes (Deere, Alvarado, and Twyman 2010). To what extent then is this associated with egalitarian gender relations within households?
2. Data
This study is based on the 2010 Ecuador Household Asset Survey (EAFF), a nationally representative survey carried out as part of the Gender Asset Project, a comparative study of Ecuador, Ghana, and the state of Karnataka in India. 1 The survey employed two instruments: a household and an individual questionnaire. The household questionnaire consisted of a household registry with the basic socio-economic information on each household member, an assets inventory (including detailed information on individual ownership, valuation, and form of acquisition), and several other modules on household-level characteristics. It was administered to the principal couple, defined as the adult pair (married or in a consensual union) who had the most knowledge about the household’s assets, ideally together, or in the case of unpartnered adult men or women, to the principal adult, similarly defined. Each member of the principal couple and the unpartnered male or female head were then each administered an individual questionnaire which solicited information on the person’s participation in major household and farm decisions, in addition to other information.
The subsequent analysis is based on 1,776 households with couples or 3,552 adult men and women, aged 18 and over. It focuses on two of the questions in the decision-making module: i) Do (or did) you make the decision on whether or not to work?, and ii) If you earn or receive income do you make the decision on how to spend this money? Each respondent was also asked their perspective on how his/her partner made these decisions. The potential responses included: i)yes, alone; ii)yes, jointly with…; iii) yes, with permission from…; iv) no, another person makes the decision…; and v) not applicable.
First, consider the degree of symmetry in household decision making. In 41 percent of these households both spouses report making the decision jointly on how one’s own income is spent; only 35 percent do so with regard to the decision to work. Second, do they agree on whether their spouse makes the decision jointly with them? With respect to the decision on whether or not to work, the degree of disagreement among men and women was similar, 35 percent (i.e.,whether considering the husband’s perception of the wife’s decision, or the wife’s perception of the husband’s decision). There was much greater disagreement with respect to the decision regarding how one’s income is spent, and particularly, how the husband views his wife’s decision. In 57 percent of the households husbands had a different perception than their wives. There was less disagreement in terms of wives’ perceptions of their husbands’ decisions on spending their own income, with only 34 percent of these couples disagreeing on this issue.
For the total sample of 1,776 couples, this means that in 27.5 percent the decision to work is egalitarian, both symmetrical and in agreement. Only in 17.4 percent is the decision on spending one’s own income both symmetrical and in agreement. These measures of egalitarian decision making constitute our dependent variables in the subsequent analysis.
3. Models and Results
Our central hypothesis is that egalitarian decision making is positively associated with women’s ownership of property, specifically real estate. We explore whether it matters whether only one of the spouses owns real estate compared to when both of them own some real estate (either individually or jointly). As Table 1 shows, in Ecuador it is most frequent that both members of the couple own some real estate (46 percent), as compared to only one of them.
Descriptive statistics for categorical variables, composition of sample of couples, Ecuador (n = 1,776)
Source: EAFF 2010
Alternatively, it might not be just women’s ownership of key assets per se that influences whether decisions are made jointly, but rather the wife’s wealth relative to her husband’s. We expect more equal shares of couple wealth to be positively associated with egalitarian decision making. On average, women in the sample hold 46 percent of the couples’ wealth (Table 2).
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables of sample of couples, Ecuador
Source: EAFF 2010.
Egalitarian decision making among couples is also expected to be associated with a range of other individual and household characteristics. The descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in tables 1 and 2.
We modeled egalitarian decision making for the decision to work and for the decision about spending one’s income using logistic binary dependent variable models. The models for the decision to work are reported in Table 3. We have reported the coefficients of the models; the odds ratios can be calculated by taking the exponent of the coefficient (exp(β)). Model I includes whether only the wife, husband, or both are asset owners and model II includes the wife’s share of the couple’s wealth. 2
Logistic regression results for models of egalitarian decision making for the decision to work, Ecuador
Source: EAFF 2010
Model I shows that the wife’s age, being rural, both spouses earning the same, and the wife only owning real estate are statistically significant predictors of the likelihood of making the decision to work in an egalitarian fashion. The impact of wife’s age on the likelihood of egalitarian decision making is significant but quite small (0.003). 3 Rural households have 1.3 times the odds (exp(0.298)) compared to their urban counterparts of making the decision to work in an egalitarian fashion. Households in which both partners earn the same have 1.6 times the odds of making an egalitarian decision as do households in which the husband earns the most. Furthermore, couples in which the wife is an owner of real estate are less likely to make the decision to work in an egalitarian fashion than couples where the wife is not an owner. This could be because wives who are sole owners are more likely to make decisions on their own; or their husbands may not agree that they make the decision jointly.
Model II considers the intra-household distribution of wealth in terms of the female share of the couple’s wealth. The results for this model are nearly identical to model I. We also find that the wife’s share of the couple’s wealth is associated with an increased likelihood of an egalitarian decision up to a share of 0.42 4 ; it then declines. This means that the greatest likelihood of egalitarian decision making for the decision to work is when women own 42 percent of the couple’s wealth.
Table 4 reports the results for the model regarding the decision about spending one’s own income. In model I, we find similar results as with the decision to work with a few additional variables becoming significant. The wife’s age is still slightly positively correlated with the likelihood of an egalitarian decision-making process regarding the decision to spend one’s own money. Rural couples have 1.5 times the odds of making the decision in an egalitarian fashion as urban women. When the couple lives on the coast, the wife is less likely to make an egalitarian decision (0.7 times the odds) than those living in the highlands. However, if only the wife is employed or both spouses are employed, then they are more likely to make egalitarian decisions about spending than if only the husband is employed. If only the wife is employed, they have 2.5 times the odds of making egalitarian decisions as when only the husband is employed. If they are both employed, then they have 6.5 times the odds. Also, if the couple earns about the same amount, then they have 2.2 times the odds of making egalitarian spending decisions as when the husband makes the most income.
Logistic regression results for models of egalitarian decision making for the decision to spend, Ecuador
Source: EAFF 2010
We also find that when only the wife owns real estate they are less likely to make egalitarian spending decisions (with 0.56 times the odds) as compared to when neither owns real estate. If both spouses own real estate (either jointly or individually) then there is a greater likelihood of an egalitarian decision (1.5 times the odds) compared to when neither owns real estate.
Finally, model II presents the results of how the wife’s share of the couple’s wealth is associated with egalitarian decision making about spending. Again, the same variables are significant as before with similar magnitudes. The likelihood of egalitarian decision making increases (at a decreasing rate) as the wife’s share of wealth increases, until the wife’s share is 45 percent, at which point the likelihood begins to decrease.
4. Conclusions
This study offers evidence that women’s command over resources in dual-headed households is associated with egalitarian decision making among couples. We found that women’s share of couples’ wealth is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of symmetry and agreement in joint decision making among couples regarding their decision to work and to spend income. Also, both owning real estate is positively associated with the likelihood of egalitarian decision making for the spending decision. The level of earnings of each spouse, specifically where this is roughly equal, and employment in the case of the spending decision are also important indicators of egalitarian decision making.
The likelihood of egalitarian decision making is lower for couples in which the woman alone owns real estate than when neither owns real estate. This is possibly because these women are more likely to make their decisions alone (without consulting their husbands) or because it increases disagreement over how decisions are made.
Finally, we hope to have demonstrated the usefulness of approaching household decision making from a gender perspective, one that takes into account both men’s and women’s perspectives on how they themselves as well as their spouses make decisions. Symmetry and agreement are restrictive conditions; nonetheless, they capture well the content of egalitarian gender relations within dual-headed households.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by a grant from the MDG3 Fund of the Dutch Foreign Ministry and the Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program for the comparative project In Her Name: Measuring the Gender Asset Gap in Ecuador, Ghana, and India.
1
2
Results from a “control model,” which did not include asset or wealth variables, are not included here but were similar to the results presented.
3
Age difference = man’s age – woman’s age, so to find the overall impact of wife’s age one must use the formula from the first derivatives:β f -age -β age- diff .
4
This is found using the formula -β f share /2β f share^2