From CSR to RSC

2.1. Reductionism: Instrumentalizing the social

A first possible way of theorizing the relation between the corporate and the social is to reduce CSR to a means for advancing corporate profit goals. Such approaches stress that CSR is beneficial for businesses through opening up new markets, preventing government regulation, attracting employees, or improving relationships with stakeholders and creating public trust in the corporation. Advocates of a reductionist approach do not question the assumption that the purpose of a corporation is to make as much profit as possible. However they argue that maximizing profit does not contradict engaging in CSR activities, as long as social issues are addressed in a profitable way. The goal of reductionist CSR approaches thus is to find ways of capitalizing on CSR activities.

One way in which CSR is perceived as beneficial for business goals is through preventing government regulation. Almeder (1980) for example argues that for reaching business goals refraining from dealing with social issues is counterproductive. Quite on the contrary, companies would have to make sure that they behave in a way that renders government intervention obsolete (Almeder 1980: 13). Almeder therefore radically criticizes what he calls “Friedman doctrine” and emphasizes that it “will most likely undermine capitalism and motivate an economic socialism by assuring an erosive regulatory climate in a society that expects the business community to be socially responsible in ways that go beyond just making legal profits” (Almeder 1980: 13).

Other representatives of a reductionist approach further exaggerate this argument. They highlight that engaging in CSR activities is not only helpful for preventing further regulation but for fostering deregulation and privatization. According to this view social problems should be regarded as “business opportunities” and thus as potential spheres for capital accumulation. Peter Drucker (1984) for example argues that the social problems of the future “can be solved only if seen and treated as opportunities. And the economic realities ahead are such that ‘social needs’ can be financed increasingly only if their solution generates capital, i.e. generates a profit” (Drucker 1984: 55). The task would be to privatize domains of social needs, with which governments can, according to Drucker, not deal adequately. He suggests that governments should make sure to identify social problems and provide the financial resources for dealing with them, while the actual task is performed by businesses on a competitive basis (Drucker 1984: 58). This means that companies should deal with social issues and the necessary money should be provided by the public. This in fact means that government is funding private initiatives that primarily aim at maximizing profits. Public money is thus turned into private profit.

Similar to Drucker, Davis stresses that dealing with social issues can be beneficial for a company’s primary task of generating profit. He for example highlights that social problems such as high prices for HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries, or increasing obesity due to unhealthy food, and environmental devastation have created profit opportunities through generic drugs, healthy meals, and cleaner fuels (Davis 2005: 107).

Cogman and Oppenheim (2002) have advanced a similar reductionist approach to CSR that regards social issues as potentially profitable spheres of investment: “many of today’s most exciting opportunities lie in controversial areas such as gene therapy, the private provision of pensions, and products and services targeted at low-income consumers in poor countries” (Cogman and Oppenheim 2002: 57).

The described reductionist understandings of CSR recommend dealing with social issues not because they consider it as a moral obligation or social necessity, but because they regard them as potential areas for profit accumulation. Instead of incorporating aspects of social well-being into business operations, this perspective argues for extending the logic of business to all further domains of social life such as education, health care, and the pension system. Within the framework of the welfare state, these domains of social welfare were, due to their fundamental importance for social security and inclusion, consciously protected from the competitive logic of the market. The logic of the market always means that on the one hand profit is generated through the appropriation of surplus value and on the other hand that access to products and services is restricted to those who have enough money to afford them and thus is inherently exclusive. Privatization, which means the extension of the market logic to areas that were until then regulated through other mechanisms, thus means an extension of the already existing unequal access to means of economic, social, and cultural life. Privatizing in the domain of education and health care thus means that basic social welfare is not guaranteed to every member of society, but only to those who can afford it. In the case of health care, exclusion can literally be a matter of life and death. A private health care system that works according to market principles is a system in which winning means profit and loosing can mean death. The idea of solving social problems by imposing on them the competitive logic of markets thus seems paradoxical and cynical.

Other arguments of why engaging in CSR activities is in the self-interest of corporations are related to creating competitive advantages through establishing stakeholder trust and good corporate reputation. One example is Thomas M. Jones’s (1995) “instrumental theory of stakeholder management.” He argues that taking into account social issues from a business perspective at first sight might seem irrational, but in the long run lies in the self-interest of a company as it is “quite compatible with economic success” (Jones 1995: 429).

In this context Falck and Heblich (2007) point out that “companies have an opportunity to do well by doing good” (Falck and Heblich 2007: 252). Burke and Logsdon (1996) term such an approach strategic corporate social responsibility (S-CSR) as it focuses on “substantial business-related benefits to the firm, in particular by supporting core business activities and thus contributing to the firm’s effectiveness in accomplishing its mission” (Burke and Logsdon 1996: 496).

Following such a strategic orientation, many CSR consulting books for managers are based on reductionist arguments. The consulting literature includes titles such as “When principles pay: Corporate social responsibility and the bottom line” (Heal 2008); “Just good business: The strategic guide to aligning corporate social responsibility and brand” (McElhaney 2008); “CSR strategies: Corporate social responsibility for a competitive edge in emerging markets” (Urip 2010); “The HIP investor: Make bigger profits by building a better world” (Herman 2010); “Green to gold: How smart companies use environmental strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantage” (Esty and Winston 2009); “Stirring it up: How to make money and save the world” (Hirshberg 2008). These titles try to establish a connection between profit and CSR that creates the impression of maximizing the former by means of the latter; these titles promise to achieve “bigger profits by building a better world,” explain how to use “corporate social responsibility for a competitive edge,” of how “smart companies” should “use environmental strategy” for creating a competitive advantage. A common motif for the instrumental view of social responsibility is also incorporated in the ambiguous meaning of the phrase “good business,” which contains the idea of the good as the profitable business. Furthermore, the fact that books that supposedly are about social responsibility in their titles all use buzzwords for economic success and profit, such as “bottom line,” “competitive edge,” “competitive advantage,” “bigger profits,” “make money,” highlights their instrumental approach.

Based on this logic it is most likely that companies which follow an instrumental reductionist approach will drop the idea of CSR as soon as cost outweigh benefits, that is as soon as CSR can only be pursued at the expense of profit. Thus, this way of thinking about CSR might successfully contribute to sustainable economic growth, but not to achieving a sustainable society.

For reductionists, CSR is not an end in itself but a means for maximizing profit. CSR is thus conceived as a mere instrument, the use of which is subject to strategic considerations under the primacy of the bottom line. It thus incorporates what Max Horkheimer ([1947]2004) called “instrumental reason” as the reduction of reason from a means for defining ends, to the “mere regulation of the relation between means and ends” (Horkheimer [1947]2004: 7), to an “executive agency concerned with the how rather than with the what” (Horkheimer [1947]2004: 38). In a similar way, reductionist CSR does not engage in a discussion on whether ethical and socially responsible behavior is desirable; it just uses it as an instrument for achieving a given end: profit. The idea of social responsibility is degraded to “a tool, for it derives its meaning only through its connection with other ends” (Horkheimer [1947]2004: 25).

The reductionist approach feeds on the ideological argument that markets are more effective than governments and that their unregulated operation guarantees best possible outcomes not only for business, but for society as a whole. The reductionist version of CSR serves as an ideological underpinning for the neoliberal desire for the expansion of markets and the search for new spheres of profit accumulation. The reductionist view of CSR thus perverts the idea of social responsibility. Instead of increasing social justice it reinforces inequality and injustice.

2.2. Projectionism: Idealizing the corporate

Another way of thinking about CSR is to regard the corporation as an organization that should contribute to the common good. This projectionist view is based on the assumption that profit can be generated in a socially responsible way. Representatives of this approach do not question the profit motive, but want to tame it through imposing on it certain values and a concern for society and the environment. Corporations should act and generate profit in a way that is beneficial for society in general and not just for the interests of its shareholders.

Such an orientation characterizes early accounts of CSR. Howard Bowen, whom Carroll called “the father of corporate responsibility” (Carroll 1999: 270), argued that the decisions taken by businessmen have far-reaching consequences and that they therefore are obligated to consider social issues and responsibilities (Bowen 1953). He defined the social responsibility of the businessman as follows: “It refers to the obligations of the businessman to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” (Bowen 1953: 6).

Other early theorists of CSR followed Bowen’s approach. Frederick (1960: 60) stressed that businessmen should ensure that their activities meet “the expectations of the public”; Davis and Bloomstrom (1966: 12) argued that companies have obligations towards “the whole social system”; Keith Davis highlighted that social responsibility means considering the affects of business activities on “the whole social system” (Davis, K. 1967: 46); and Carroll pointed out that “[t]he social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point of time” (Carroll 1979: 500). Caroll describes a pyramid of corporate social responsibility which starts with economic responsibilities, followed by legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and the responsibility to be a good corporate citizen (philanthropic responsibility) (Carroll 1991: 8). He argues that the intention of this pyramid is to show that “the total CSR of business comprises distinct components that, taken together, constitute the whole” (Carroll 1991: 8). Carroll’s approach to CSR can be described as projectionist as they subsume profit generation under the “unified whole” of social responsibility.

Another example for a projectionist approach is Edward Freeman’s stakeholder approach (1984) and in particular his idea of “stakeholder capitalism” (Freeman and Phillips 2002). It proposes a transformation of capitalism towards the equal recognition of all stakeholders (Freeman 1994; Freeman and Phillips 2002). Freeman and Phillips (2002) stress that the model of stakeholder capitalism is about “the possibility that business becomes a fully human institution” that creates “value for all stakeholders” (Freeman and Phillips 2002: 345). This equal recognition of all stakeholders would abolish the separation between business and ethics (Freeman and Phillips 1994, 1999, 2002). The model of stakeholder capitalism embraces this idea of blending together business and ethics: “we can reorient capitalism toward an ethics of freedom and responsibility – one that inherently marries business and ethics” (Freeman and Phillips 2002: 345).

Freeman highlights that every management decision and operation at the same time has business-related and ethical implications. The idea of turning business into a “fully human institution” and of abolishing the distinction between business and ethics is similar to Carroll’s approach of subsuming financial goals under the concept of social responsibilities. Both approaches are projectionist as they impose ethics and social responsibility on corporate profit goals.

One important characteristic of Freeman’s version of stakeholder theory is the principle of voluntarism: “Voluntarism means that an organization must on its own undertake to satisfy its key stakeholders. A situation where a solution to a stakeholder problem is imposed by a government agency or the courts must be seen as a managerial failure” (Freeman 1984: 74). Freeman’s stakeholder model aims at overcoming the separation between business and ethics, and at achieving a more responsible capitalism, by suggesting to managers to voluntarily integrate the demands of all stakeholder into their decisions. While Freeman advocates pure voluntarism, other representatives of a projectionist approach stress that imposing ethics and social compatibleness on profit generation requires going beyond purely voluntary initiatives. Epstein (1987, 2007) for example argues that voluntary self-regulation is insufficient. He emphasizes that additional instruments are needed such as law, affinity group regulation, ethical precepts, vigilant and responsible media and civil society. Epstein notes that for achieving a “better capitalism” it is indispensable to have both responsible companies and effective laws (Epstein 2007: 222).

Similarly McInerney stresses that voluntary CSR is insufficient and that government regulation is necessary (McInerney 2007: 172). He argues that fiscal policy “with its ability directly to effect corporate profits, can potentially be much more powerful than CSR, which depends on reputational damage, and any subsequent indirect effects on corporate profits, as its incentive mechanism” (McInerney 2007: 190).

In this context Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo (2007) advocate a shift towards a more political approach to CSR (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1,111). Based on Habermas’s concept of “deliberative democracy” they propose that rather than demanding an alternative to capitalism, the aim should be to “(re)establish a political order where economic rationality is circumscribed by democratic institutions and procedures” (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1,097). The projectionist orientation of this approach is illustrated by the fact that it does not dismiss the profit principle as such but wants to subordinate it under the common good. Scherer and Palazzo aim at developing a normative approach to CSR that is based on political analysis instead of philosophical principles (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1,098). In their view this requires exerting democratic control over corporate decisions (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1,109). Measures they suggest for implementing this deliberate concept of CSR include: “developing corporate codes of behavior in collaboration with critical NGOs, exposing corporate CSR performance to third party control, linking corporate decision making to civil society discourses, and shifting corporate attention and money to societal challenges beyond immediate stakeholder pressure” (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1,115).

Representatives of a projectionist approach put forward the idea that corporate social responsibility is a means for reforming capitalism and reducing its negative social and environmental effects. While some argue that this can be achieved based on voluntary corporate initiatives (Freeman), others argue for stronger public control over corporations (Epstein, Scherer and Palazzo).

Projectionism assumes that it is possible to tame the profit motive by imposing ethical norms or social pressure on it. It points at the importance of pursuing non-profit goals but fails to problematize their relation to profit interests. Thus it overlooks existing power structures and problems that result from profit generation; it overlooks injustices that arise from the fact that capitalism is always based on the separation of individuals into owners and non-owners of means of production; that every profit rests on exploitation in the form of appropriating surplus value produced by workers; that as a competitive system capitalism necessarily has to produce winners and losers; that capitalism always has to follow an expansive logic because for its preservation capital has to be constantly accumulated and thus capitalism has to expand, to strive for growth, and to permanently find new spheres of accumulation; that those who are not willing to follow the capitalist logic are most likely to lose in the competition and thus will be excluded; etc.

Projectionist approaches to CSR see a necessity to reform capitalism. They aim at establishing a more “just,” “sustainable,” or “better” capitalism through the help of business ethics and CSR. Such approaches challenge the growth-based and profit-maximizing logic of capitalism without questioning private property and capital accumulation. The desired changes in the way the economy operates are thus always constrained by the framework of capitalism. This means that projectionists want to reform capitalism, but not transcend it.

According to this view it is possible to resolve the relation between profit and social responsibility through making profit socially responsible by subjecting it to public expectations (Bowen, Davis, Frederick, Carroll), a concern for society as a whole (K. Davis and Blomstrom), ethical consideration (Freeman), ethics and law (Epstein), or democratic control (Scherer and Palazzo). Following this perspective companies should equally respect the needs and interests of all stakeholders ranking from shareholders to employees to local communities to society in general. However different stakeholders are likely to have opposing interests. Thus when deciding about corporate strategies, conflicts between different stakeholder groups are likely. Within the framework of a corporation decision power is not equally distributed among the various stakeholders. Owners of a corporation have much more power than for example local communities and are thus more likely to influence corporate decision in a way that satisfies their interests. The projectionist idea of realizing equal respect for stakeholder interests and stakeholder democracy while questioning the framework of a privately-owned corperation is idealistic because it ignores actual existing power structures.

In particular, arguments for voluntary CSR fail to take into account material foundations of capitalist social relations and their effects and thus run the risk of reducing problems of capitalism to a lack of morality and social responsibility. The idea that problems of capitalism can be resolved by introducing business ethics and CSR overlooks and mystifies the structural immorality of the capitalist system. Representatives of a projectionist approach that argue for a voluntary CSR contribute to a moralizing ideology, which has been a central argument in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. Žižek (2009) highlights the ideological dimension of this moralizing argument: “Over the last several months, public figures from the pope downwards have bombarded us with injunctions to fight against the culture of excessive greed and consumption. This disgusting spectacle of cheap moralization is an ideological operation if there ever was one: the compulsion (to expand) inscribed into a system itself is translated into a matter of personal sin, a private psychological propensity” (Žižek 2009: 37).

2.3. Dualism: Separating the corporate and the social

Dualist CSR approaches argue that corporations should do both: maximize private profit and do good for society. These two goals remain however unrelated. The profit goal and the goal to contribute to the common good are regarded as two separate aims of the corporation. Doing good for society is addressed as an additional goal beyond the primary goal of profit maximization. This means that dualist approaches do not consider interrelations between the process of maximizing profit and the common good. The concept of philanthropy best exemplifies this approach. 19^th century industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie in a paper known as “The Gospel of Wealth” (1889) argued that capitalist accumulation has brought about great wealth and progress alongside great inequality: “We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the race” (Carnegie 1889: 655).

Based on this observation Carnegie concludes that instead of changing the social relations that bring about inequality, the wealthy should use their wealth in the best interest of society. Carnegie argued that it is the “duty of the man of Wealth” to use his wealth leading a modest life, to provide for those dependent on him, and use all further income for the benefit of the community (Carnegie 1889: 661f). According to Carnegie the solution to “the problem of the Rich and the Poor” is that “the millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor; intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself” (Carnegie 1889: 664).

Carnegie’s perception is still present in the views of contemporary philanthropists. George Soros for example stressed: “When I had made more money than I needed for myself and my family, I set up a foundation to promote the values and principles of a free and open society.” ² Philanthropy is based on the idea to generate profit first and then devote parts of it to promoting the common good. This perspective accepts that the way profit is generated might have negative effects on the common good, as long as parts of the profit are afterwards used to do good.

Bill Gates addressed this dualism in the first talk he gave about the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. He said that one might find the “idea of mixing the mentality of making money and giving money […] schizophrenic.” Gates continued with stressing that, in order not to mess up both, it is important to keep making profit and doing good separate from each other: “I admit, you’ve got to be careful not to bring one approach to one thing. If you mix them up you’re going to get it all messed up so I try to keep those two things separate” (Gates 2000). Separating between generating profits and contributing to the common good leads to a strategy of taking with the one hand while giving with the other hand.

The main characteristic of dualist approaches to CSR is that they postpone the socially responsible behavior to a point after profit goals have already been reached. How these profit goals are reached and whether reaching them has negative affects on society or the environment is secondary. Žižek (2006) described this reasoning as the ethics of “liberal communists”: the CEOs of Google, IBM, eBay, etc.: “According to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity: charity is part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation” (Žižek 2006). In “hiding the underlying exploitation,” charity and philanthropic giving portray the wealthy as generous benefactors while hiding how the creation of their fortune might have meant other people’s misery. Dualist approaches are based on the logic of giving back with one hand what had before been taken with the other hand.

2.4. Dialectics: Problematizing the relation between the corporate and the social

Dialectical approaches to CSR problematize the relation between economic goals of the corporation and its social responsibilities. Based on a critical analysis of capitalism they argue that profit generation inherently creates social and environmental problems. From this perspective the structural irresponsibility of profit generation can neither be resolved through turning social problems into business opportunities (reductionist CSR), or through imposing ethical norms or a social consciousness on profit generation (projectionist CSR), nor be balanced through charitable giving (dualist CSR approaches). According to this view a more fundamental societal alternative is inevitable in order to create a socially responsible economy and society.

The insight that profit goals conflict with social goals is based on Karl Marx’s critique of the political economy of capitalism. Marx described capitalism as a system that is based on the division between owners and non-owners of means of production, whereby those who possess means of production exploit the labor power of those without property in order to accumulate profit (Marx [1867]1990). This relation of capital and labor lays the foundation for fundamental injustice: “Political economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, and to private property everything” (Marx [1844]2007: 81).

A defining feature of capitalism is its constant drive for accumulation, which Marx described in the general formula of capital M-C-M’ (money–commodity–money plus surplus). What is crucial is that the production of surplus that later is turned into capital depends on the value creating qualities of human labor power (Marx [1867]1990: 270). Thus, all accumulation of capital is based on the exploitation of labor power. Increasing accumulation therefore also means to increase exploitation. According to Marx the driving force of capitalist production is “the greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labour power by the capitalist” (Marx [1867]1990: 499). Capital’s desire to accumulate thus can only be satisfied at the cost of workers. Increasing surplus value is either possible through extending the total time of work, which means an absolute prolongation of surplus-labor time (absolute surplus-value), or through increasing intensity and productivity of labor so that more value can be produced during the same time (relative surplus-value) (Marx [1867]1990: 645). As the only way to increase the accumulation of capital consists in increasing the rate of exploitation, the relationship between capital and labor can be described as fundamentally antagonistic: the more capital is accumulated the more labor-power is exploited.

While the relation between capital and labor is based on exploitation, the relation between capitalists is structured through competition. Competition forces the individual capitalist, by threat of loosing his/her business, to join the continuous pursuit of increasing profits and accumulating capital. Marx therefore described competition as an coercive force external to the individual capitalist: “But looking at the things as a whole it is evident that this does not depend on the will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him” (Marx [1867]1990: 286).

Based on Marx’s analysis contemporary political economists point out that due to its competitive character, exploitation and accumulation are necessary qualities of capitalism (Callinicos 2003: 36; Harvey 2010: 43; Holloway 2003: 231): for avoiding to lose in the competition every corporation is forced to follow the logic of increasing productivity and reducing production cost in order to sustain high level profits that can partly be reinvested in order to ensure further accumulation. Capitalist competition would make it almost impossible for the individual corporation to resist the logic of exploitation: “A benevolent capitalist who paid his workers wages that broadly correspond to the amount of value that they created would soon find himself out of business” (Callinicos 2003: 37). Similarly David Harvey (2010) argues: “If I, as a capitalist, do not reinvest in expansion and a rival does, then after a while I am likely to be driven out of business. I need to protect and expand my market share. I have to reinvest to stay a capitalist” (Harvey 2010: 43).

Trapped within the forces of competition, individual corporations engage in socially irresponsible practices that create problems in all domains of social life. Callinicos for example stresses: “The major problems facing humankind – poverty, social injustices, economic instability, environmental destruction, and war – have the same source, in the capitalist system: the solution to these problems must, accordingly, be a radical one” (Callinicos 2003: 66). Saad-Filho (2003) argues that some contemporary problems of capitalism such as a lack of corporate responsibility and absolute poverty can be solved from within the system, while others are rooted in the way capitalism operates as an economic system (Saad-Filho 2003: 21). Among the latter problems are “unemployment, exploitation of the workforce, economic inequality, the encroachment of work upon free time, systematic environmental degradation, the lack of economic democracy, and production for profit rather than need” (Saad-Filho 2003: 21). Wright in his book Envisioning Real Utopias (2010) shows in great detail that a number of contemporary problems are structural problems of capitalism, generated by “capitalism as a system of production with class relations defined by private ownership and propertyless workers, and economic coordination organized through decentralized market exchanges” (Wright 2010: 38).

Capitalist economies, despite CSR, cannot overcome social injustice as matters of distribution and participation are necessarily shaped by questions of class (Marx [1844]2007: 81).

From a dialectical perspective CSR approaches that do not critically question the profit motive are ideological, because they hide how it inherently creates social and environmental problems. According to this view a fundamental shortcoming of the concept of CSR is that it never challenges the primacy of profit and the interests of capital (Sklair and Miller 2010: 475). CSR has thus been described as “a deliberate strategy to mystify and obscure the reality of capitalist globalization” (Sklair and Miller 2010: 492), that it functions as “an ideological ‘smoke screen’ designed to either soften the image of firms engrossed in the rampant pursuit of profit (at any cost) or a way to deflect attention away from an unsavoury core business model” (Hanlon and Fleming 2009: 938). Similarly Shamir highlights that “corporations transform the idea of social responsibility into a marketing device and into a commodity that conceals the power relations that underlie the relationship between global capitalism and social inequality, social harm, and social wrongs” (Shamir 2004: 684). In this context Banerjee stresses that the discourse on sustainability has been “hijacked by corporate interests” (Banerjee 2008: 64). Fleming and Jones (2013: 94) point out that apart from being propaganda CSR furthermore is a “parasitical instrument of commodification.”

The same points of criticism have been raised regarding business ethics in general. Roberts fears “that all this talk of ethics is just that – talk” (Roberts 2003: 250); Boje stresses that it “serves as a shield to hide unethical practice” (Boje 2008: 8), that it forms “ideologies imposed upon the oppressed” (Boje 2008: 19), and constitutes “ideological masks to cover up dirty business and market forces with ethics plaques” (Boje 2008: 19). Roberts in this context talks of an “ethics of narcissus,” which means that CSR is used for creating an image of “corporate goodness,” while “operational practices remain entirely untouched” (Roberts 2003: 257) and thus a “corporate response serves only to facilitate ‘business as usual’” (Roberts 2003: 257).

Taking into consideration this integration of CSR in profit-maximizing pursuit of business, it has been criticized as being part of the problem instead of the solution to social and environmental problems (Sklair and Miller 2010: 483). Sklair and Miller for example stress that CSR “can be seen as a set of globalizing practices carried out by the four fractions of the TCC [transnational capitalist class] in the interest of capitalist globalization” (Sklair and Miller 2010: 484). Regarding CSR, Roberts stresses that “the prime beneficiary of this manufacture of appearance is the corporation itself” (Roberts 2003: 257). Similarly Hanlon emphasizes that “CSR will help to make money from the problems businesses have helped to create, thereby improving shareholder value” (Hanlon 2008: 169). Fleming and Jones stress that “CSR must be viewed as an obstruction to genuine progressive change rather than its harbinger” (Fleming and Jones 2013: 6). According to these criticisms, CSR functions as a strategy of resistance against all solutions to these problems that might negatively affect corporate profit interests.

Dialectical approaches to CSR thus highlight the necessity of a fundamental critique of the profit motive and capitalism; Corlett for example takes a dialectical perspective when arguing that “fundamental moral problems with capitalism” exist (Corlett 1998: 103). He highlights: “In other words, the private ownership of the means of production is morally wrong because it enables capitalists to extract value from what workers alone produce” (Corlett 1998: 102). Boje stresses that “It is not enough to try to be good and ethical as individuals when it is the systemic processes that must be dealt with” (Boje 2008: 22). Showing how corporate practices systematically undermine social responsibility is thus an important task for critical CSR research. This needs to include both the theoretical reflection about capitalism and the role of the corporation, as well as concrete empirical examples that expose corporate social irresponsibility.

Apart from exposing corporate social irresponsibility, critical CSR research needs to identify alternative pathways that seem more promising for realizing a socially responsible economy. Banerjee stresses that for critically approaching CSR “new questions need to be raised not only about the ecological and social sustainability but of the political economy itself” (Banerjee 2008: 73).

Thus far, critics remain rather unclear in regard to the question what possible alternatives to CSR could look like. Critical CSR research gives a pessimistic outlook regarding the potentials of reconciling profit goals and social responsibility. Fleming and Jones for example stress: “CSR scholarship needs to abandon the idea that business and ethics might someday be married” (Fleming and Jones 2013: 99). However, a lack of clarity regarding the conclusion that needs to be drawn from this analysis is one shortcoming of most critical CSR research.

It seems evident that rethinking political economy in a way that resolves the contradiction between profit and social responsibility requires thinking towards a fundamental social alternative. In the following section I propose a counter-concept to CSR that looks beyond capitalism.