The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted economic and social activities worldwide, exposing and exacerbating inherent flaws in the capitalist system. The pandemic’s devastating impact highlights the need for the state and its institutional agencies to actively intervene in public health crises and mitigate the economic damage they cause. This article situates the effectiveness and contribution of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the context of the COVID crisis in China. It first examines how SOEs successfully mobilized their productive capacity at the beginning of the pandemic. Using empirical evidence from publicly listed companies, we then demonstrate how SOEs engaged in countercyclical investment when private investment collapsed. The evidence suggests that SOEs served as a crucial instrument in strengthening social and economic stability, which helped China ride out the COVID storm. We conclude that SOEs are vital for achieving stable social and economic performance in a neoliberal global economy.
AndrewJaneBakerMaxGuthrieJamesMartin-SardesaiAnn. 2020. Australia’s COVID-19 public budgeting response: The straitjacket of neoliberalism. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management32 (5): 759–70.
2.
BaiChong-EnLiDavid D.TaoZhigangWangYijiang. 2000. A multitask theory of state enterprise reform. Journal of Comparative Economics28 (4): 716–738.
3.
BernankeBen S.1983. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics98 (1): 85–106.
4.
BloomNickBondStephenVan ReenenJohn. 2007. Uncertainty and investment dynamics. Review of Economic Studies74 (2): 391–415.
5.
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 2024. CSMAR website. Accessed at: https://data.csmar.com/
6.
CohenJennifervan der Meulen RodgersYana. 2020. Contributing factors to personal protective equipment shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Preventive Medicine141: 106263.
7.
CookPaulUchidaYuichiro. 2003. Privatization and economic growth in developing countries. The Journal of Development Studies39 (6): 121–54.
8.
DanglThomasWuYouchang. 2016. Corporate investment over the business cycle. Review of Finance20 (1): 337–71.
9.
DavisLeila E.2018. Financialization and the non-financial corporation: An investigation of firm-level investment behavior in the United States. Metroeconomica69 (1): 270–307.
10.
DoamekporFrancois K.1998. Contributions of state-owned enterprises to the growth of total output. International Economic Journal12 (4): 65–77.
11.
FanLinkaiWuWanzongYuDianfanSuTing. 2019. Measurement, comparison, and dynamic evolution of industrial capacity utilization rate in China: An empirical study based on firm-level data [范林凯,吴万宗,余典范,苏婷. 中国工业产能利用率的测度、比较及动态演化—基于企业层面数据的经验研究.管理世界]. Management World35 (8): 84–96.
12.
FangHongshengHuWenquanShiRuhuaZhangXufei. 2023. The Chinese-style macroeconomic control: The role of state-owned enterprises. The World Economy46 (3): 702–725.
13.
FelipeJesusFullwilerScott. 2020. ADB COVID-19 policy database: A guide. Asian Development Review37 (2): 1–20.
14.
GuoJingMaGuangrong. 2019. Macroeconomic stability and state-owned economic investment: Mechanism and evidence [郭婧,马光荣.宏观经济稳定与国有经济投资:作用机理与实证检验.管理世界]. Management World35 (9): 49–64.
15.
HodrickRobert JPrescottEdward C.1997. Postwar US business cycles: An empirical investigation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking29 (1): 1–16.
16.
HsiehChang-TaiMichael SongZheng. 2015. Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China. NBER Working Paper Series no. w21006. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economics Research. Accessed at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21006.
17.
HuangXianfengLiPingLotspeichRichard. 2010. Economic growth and multi-tasking by state-owned enterprises: An analytic framework and empirical study based on Chinese provincial data. Economic Systems34 (2): 160–77.
JonesLeeHameiriShahar. 2022. COVID-19 and the failure of the neoliberal regulatory state. Review of International Political Economy29 (4): 1027–1052.
20.
KaleckiMichał. 1937. The principle of increasing risk. Economica4 (16): 440–47.
21.
Kaliya-PerumalArun-KumarKharlukhiJacquilyneOmarUsama Farghaly. 2020. The second wave of COVID-19: Time to think of strategic stockpiles. Canadian Journal of Public Health111: 486–87.
22.
KeynesJohn M.1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Macmillan.
23.
KornaiJanos. 1979. Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained systems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society47 (4): 801–819.
24.
KotzDavid M.McDonoughTerrenceReichMichael. 1994. Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25.
LazonickWilliamHopkinsMatt. 2020. How “Maximizing Shareholder Value” Minimized the Strategic National Stockpile: The $5.3 Trillion Question for Pandemic Preparedness Raised by the Ventilator Fiasco. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series no. 127. Rochester: Elsevier. Accessed at: doi:10.36687/inetwp127.
26.
LinYifuLiuMingxingZhangQi. 2004. Policy burden and enterprise’s soft budgetary binding: A case study from China [林毅夫, 刘明兴, 章奇. 政策性负担与企业的预算软约束: 来自中国的实证研究. 管理世界]. Management World8: 81–89+127–56.
27.
LoDicLiGuicai. 2011. China’s economic growth, 1978–2007: Structural-institutional changes and efficiency attributes. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics34 (1): 59–84.
28.
MazzucatoMarianaKattelRainer. 2020. COVID-19 and public sector capacity. Oxford Review of Economic Policy36 (1): 256–69.
29.
MazzucatoMarianaQoboMzukisiKattelRainer. 2021. Building State Capacities and Dynamic Capabilities to Drive Social and Economic Development: The Case of South Africa. UCL IIPP Working Paper Series no. WP 2021/09. London: UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Accessed at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/wp2021-09.
30.
McDonoughTerrenceReichMichaelKotzDavid M.2010. Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31.
MichieJonathan. 2020. The Covid-19 crisis—and the future of the economy and economics. International Review of Applied Economics34 (3): 301–303.
32.
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 2020. China Statistical Yearbook 2020. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
33.
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 2023. China Statistical Yearbook 2023. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
NavarroVicente. 2020. The consequences of neoliberalism in the current pandemic. International Journal of Health Services50 (3): 271–75.
38.
QiHaoKotzDavid M.2020. The impact of state-owned enterprises on China’s economic growth. Review of Radical Political Economics52 (1): 96–114.
39.
SparkeMatthewDavid WilliamsOwain. 2022. Neoliberal disease: COVID-19, co-pathogenesis, and global health insecurities. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space54 (1): 15–32.
40.
State Council Information Office (SCIO). 2020. The State Council Information Office holds a press conference on the work of the Central Guidance Group sent to Hubei to organize epidemic prevention and control efforts [国新办举行中央赴湖北指导组组织开展疫情防控工作情况新闻发布会]. Updated February 20. Accessed at: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-02/20/content_5481357.htm#1.
41.
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 2020a. SASAC led central enterprises to provide the strongest material support for combating the epidemic [国资委带领中央企业为抗击疫情提供最坚强物资保障]. Updated March 27. Accessed at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2588072/n23746822/n23746853/c14171613/content.html.
42.
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 2020b. Sinopec: China’s rapid pace in establishing meltblown fabric production bases [中国石化：熔喷布生产基地建设的中国速度]. Updated August 15. Accessed at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c15372653/content.html.
43.
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 2021. China State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Yearbook 2020 [中国国有资产监督管理年鉴2020]. Beijing: Economic Press China.
44.
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 2023a. The 2023 Fortune Global 500 list was released, with 85 enterprises regulated by the SASAC making the list [2023年《财富》世界500强揭晓 国资监管系统85家企业榜上有名]. Updated August 3. Accessed at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877938/n2879597/n30275940/c28539548/content.htm.
45.
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 2023b. Deeply implement the state-owned enterprise reform and enhancement action [深入实施国有企业改革深化提升行动]. Update October 1. Accessed at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2023-10/01/c_1129890485.htm.
WangYongqingLiuZihanLiChangDuJulan. 2015. Identifying shadow banking activities of Chinese nonfinancial corporate―Evidence from consolidated balance sheets [王永钦,刘紫寒,李嫦,杜巨澜.识别中国非金融企业的影子银行活动—来自合并资产负债表的证据.管理世界]. Management World12: 24–40.
48.
WangXuWuWenhuiSongPeipeiHeJiangjiang. 2020. An international comparison analysis of reserve and supply system for emergency medical supplies between China, the United States, Australia, and Canada. BioScience Trends14 (4): 231–40.
49.
WeissLindaThurbonElizabeth. 2022. Explaining divergent national responses to Covid-19: An enhanced state capacity framework. New Political Economy27 (4): 697–712.
WHO Health Emergencies Programme. 2023. Situation by Region, Country, Territory & Area. Geneva: World Health Organization. Accessed at: https://covid19.who.int/table.
53.
Xinhua News Agency. 2020. Proposal of the central committee of the Communist Party of China on formulating the fourteenth five-year plan for national economic and social development and the long-range objectives through the year 2035 [中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议]. Updated October 3. Accessed at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-11/03/content_5556991.htm.
ZengCengTangSong. 2023. The role of state-owned enterprises as economic stabilizer during COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from supply chain support [曾嶒,唐松.新冠疫情下国有企业的经济稳定器作用—基于供应链扶持的视角.经济研究]. Economic Research Journal58 (3): 78–96.
