Homo Clausus,Homo Sacer,Homines Aperti: Challenges for Group Analysis in the 21st-Century. A Response to Haim Weinberg’s 40th Foulkes Lecture

Abstract

In this response I will bring the historical roots of the modern individualism and Norbert Elias conceptualizations on Homo Clausus and Homines Aperti—also introducing as Agamben’s discussion on Homo Sacer and other forms of human and societal prejudice and exclusion—to criticize contemporary individualism and discuss the challenges for group analysis in the 21st-century. I build on Haim Weinberg’s concerns on ‘Impossible groups that Flourish in Leaking Containers’ to highlight the importance of ‘total situations’ and ‘applied’ group analysis, since 1948 Foulkes tenets until the current group analytic new challenges.

Keywords

individualism Elias contemporaneity struggles group analytic challenges

Introduction

It is a great honour and a great pleasure as a Brazilian group analyst to comment Haim Weinberg’s presentation on the 40th Foulkes Lecture: ‘Impossible Groups that Flourish in Leaking Containers. Challenging Group Analytic Theory’ (2016).

The Homo Clausus: the Closed-off Individual

According to Moscovici (1981) the individual was the most important creation of modernity. Replacing the ancient traditions and the medieval dogmatism, the modern individual was nursed in the cradle of the enlightenment and was influenced by the humanistic traditions as well by romanticism (Elias, 1987). Therefore, individualism as ideology became the paradigm of the social organization from the 16th-century onwards. However, its conceptualization was not linear, as the German sociologist, Georg Simmel—who was an important influence for Elias process sociology (Penna, 2014a)—described through the two individualistic revolutions, the ‘individualism of singleness’ and the ‘individualism of uniqueness’ (Simmel, 1902 [1957]). The former dates back to the Social Contract (1789) and to the 18th-century, being inspired by the enlightenment and by the French Revolution ideals. On the ‘individualism of singleness’, individuals were considered as equivalent unities in the face of the social as a whole. The individual had his singularity and freedom, but his individuality represented the archetype of the human race. On the contrary the ‘individualism of uniqueness’, was characteristic of the 19th-century, and valued the singularity and the uniqueness of the individual. It was shaped by the economic liberalism as well by the German romanticism (Simmel, 1902[1957]). The second individualistic revolution cherishes affinities with the contemporary visions of individuals and its assumptions contributed to the creation of the idea of subjectivity as well to the emergence of psychoanalysis and psychotherapies (Figueiredo, 1996).

In interdependence (Elias, 1970) with the individualistic ideology—which contributed to the development of Elias’s idea of Homo Clausus or ‘the I deprived of the us’ (Elias, 1987: 98) —as well under the influence of secularism and capitalism, different contours between the private and the public realm have been reshaping the social organization of modernity. These shifts influenced the contemporary world and were captured by Hannah Arendt (1958) and Richard Sennett (1974), who pointed to the deflation of the public life, revealing the lack of interest regarding issues of citizenship and political engagement.

Hanna Arendt (1958) introduced the concept of vita activa to explore the elementary manifestations of the human condition—labour, work and action—aiming to understand the alienation and the isolation in the contemporary public sphere. She revealed how in the polis of Ancient Greece the balance between the different spheres of the vita activa, as well the divisions between the public and the private space were responsible for a grounded political thinking. However, modernity brought us a ‘loss of the world’, a world conceived as a koinon (Arendt, 1958: 64), this is, as something common to all that will transcend human mortality. In the contemporaneity, the ‘labour’—based on the biological and on the natural needs of the animal laborans—as well as the ‘work’ realms—related to the homo faber abilities of manufacturing prevailed, emptying the manifestations of collectivity, plurality, dialogue and ‘action’ (zoon politikon). The absence of ‘action’—the only activity for Arendt, which depended on the presence of others—ended up impoverishing the political sphere. Thus, without signs of transcendence, the political, the public sphere and the koinon as ‘a shared common world, became impossible’ (Arendt, 1958: 33).

On the other hand, Sennett (1974) investigated the decline of the public life of modernity pointing to the concomitant overestimation of the intimacy and the exacerbation of the values of private life. Due to this imbalance the cult of the personality, the ‘narcissistic culture’ (Lasch, 1979) and the individualistic ideology played a fundamental role. Nowadays, the imbalances criticized by Elias, Arendt and Sennett have increased and it is possible to observe the exacerbation of the individualism. The relationships and interactions, or non-interactions, of Me-Ness generations were well portrayed by Lawrence, Bain and Gould’s fifth basic assumption (1996). Indeed, freed from the shackles of modernity, which in the past guaranteed protection, individuals became unique, however, uncertain, ‘permanently precarious’ (Bourdieu, 1999), ‘liquid’ (Bauman, 2000).

One of the consequences of modernity was the disappearance of the pre-industrial, currently idealized, experience of communities—Gemeinschaft (Tönnies, 1963). Far from the idea of ‘tightly woven communities’ (Bauman, 2001), in which biographies and bonds were continually and historically shared in the past, the current communities tend to its destructive features—to a ‘destructive Gemeinschaft’ (Sennett, 1974: 274). The fear of annihilation (Hopper, 2003) observed in the frightened individuals of the globalized world, hurled them to groupings, tribes (Maffesoli, 1995), gangs (Hopper, 2015; Mojovic, 2015) or groups in which homogeneity, tendency to fuse/merge, negative social psychic retreats (Mojovic, 2011), adhesive identifications (Meltzer, 1975), Oneness phenomena (Turquet, 1975) and incohesion processes, mainly massification (Hopper, 2003) prevail.

So, the impossibility of a shared common life referred the homo clausus, or at least a huge number of helpless individuals to the ‘weariness of their selves’ (Ehrenberg, 2010). Their failure to cope with the high demands of the contemporary individualistic society is mirrored on the increase of diagnosis of depression and other disabling disorders (Ehrenberg, 2010) as well on the growing of a huge contingent of unemployed, ‘precariats’ (Standing, 2011) and other categories of ‘worthless persons’ (Scanlon and Adlam, 2010; Scanlon, 2015).

The Homo Sacer and the Necropolitics

The 20th-century has left a legacy of great wars, totalitarian regimes and atrocities that bled the world on an unprecedented scale (Adorno, 1947; Arendt, 1948). Therefore, in the 21st-century unmourned traumas as well as the figurations of transgenerational psychic transmissions are being revealed through the constraints and restraints of the social unconscious in persons, groups and societies (Hopper and Weinberg, 2011; 2016). In addition, lately media have been presenting to the world the painful reality of masses of war refugees, homeless, unemployed and people living below the poverty-line, not only in the so-called ‘third world’, but also in the heart of Europe. As citizens of the world and group analysts we are affected by the dreadful destiny of these human beings.

Foucault’s (1979) contributions on disciplinary society, biopower and biopolitics shaped some of the best western contemporary critical thinking. One of his contributions revealed that the ultimate expression of sovereignty resided in ‘the power (biopower) to dictate who may live and who must die’ (Foucault, 1997: 227). However, as the philosophers Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Achille Mbembe (2003) poignantly unveil, this analysis in the 21st-century needs to go further because we are witnessing the creation of ‘zones of anomie’, ‘zones of exclusion’ (Agamben, 1998; Amitrano, 2013), beyond human rights in which death prevails over the right to live (Mbembe, 2003). These contributions are closely related to the augmentation in the current political arena of ‘States of Exception’ (Schmitt, 1934; Benjamin, 1940; Agamben, 2003), which challenged the lócus of human beings in the contemporary life. We are facing the proliferation of countless ‘worthless’ individuals: the homo sacer. The homo sacer—in Latin, the sacred man or the accursed man—is an obscure figure from ancient Roman law, who was convicted of a crime, and because of that, was not considered pure and may not be offered in sacrifice. But if murdered, his killer would not be deemed a murderer.

Homo sacer’s life is, hence, a worthless life and although sacred (in the negative), is valueless (Agamben, 1998). Agamben’s concept of the homo sacer rests on a crucial distinction in Greek between the organic, natural life or ‘bare life’—zoe —and a ‘qualified life’—bios (Agamben, 1998). The paradox embedded in the status of the dehumanized ‘bare life’ of the homo sacer; his sacredness as well his availability to be killed, is clear. Life should never be dispensable, but the horrors experienced in concentration camps or recently in Guantánamo Bay prison reveal that life can be disposable according to sovereigns’ or nation states’ will.

Building on Foucault and Agamben, but moving further through the observation of the destruction that recent wars and terror inflicted on the populations, Mbembe (2003) affirms that the figurations of contemporary forms of subjugation of life are no longer related to the sovereign right to decide who may live and who must die—the biopower. Contemporary cruelty is indeed promoting the maximum destruction of people, creating ‘death-worlds’ and horrendous forms of social coexistence. Mbembe points to the substitution of the biopolitics by the necropolitics, i.e., the necropower. Hence, within the scenario of the necropower the contemporary life has changed and figurations between ‘resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom shifted and were definitively blurred’ (Mbembe, 2003: 39).

Homines Aperti and Groups that Flourish in Leaking Containers

The panorama seems apocalyptical and we are witnessing, through the helpless figures of Homo Clausus and Homo Sacer, the rottenness of the individualistic paradigm in a deflated public space. Something might have happened with the discourse engendered by modernity which valued inclusion, citizenship and justice because throughout the centuries individualism brought isolation, narcissism, exclusion and hopelessness. Elias (1987) noticed that shift, affirming that if in the 18th-century the concept of individual used to describe the singularity of each unity referred to the whole, with time the notion ended up designating the singularity of one unique person.

Fortunately Foulkes, Elias and group analysis offered another possibility of coexistence in society. The social nature of persons, the importance of interpersonal and transpersonal phenomena (Foulkes, 1964 [1984]) as well as the co-constructed destinies (Hopper and Weinberg, 2011: xvii) allowed not only new forms of belonging, but permitted a shift from a closed-off individual, homo clausus, to an homines aperti, open and mutually interdependent persons. Nevertheless, this paradigmatic shift was not easy, and over the years group analysis evolved overcoming theoretical and clinical barriers (Pines, 1983; 1988) as well as producing self-reflection (Dalal, 1998) and new lines of investigations (Cortesão, 1969; Kreeger, 1975; Turquet, 1975; de Maré, Piper snf Thompson, 1991; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Ahlin, 1996; Nitsun, 1996; Dalal, 1998; Hopper, 2003; 2012; Hopper and Weinberg, 2011; 2016; Weinberg, 2014; Ormay, 2012; Tubert-Oklander, 2013; Scholz, 2014; Friedman, 2015).

Indeed, group work has always been connected to the social context and found development in times of crisis and war (Harrison, 2000)—times when matrices were disrupted (Mojovic, 2015), individuals were hopeless and social containers were leaking—times in which incohesion processes (Hopper, 2003) lead to a longing for protection against threats of annihilation (Hopper, 2003) as well for cohesion in groups (Penna, 2014a). It was not by chance that group analysis developed during the 20th-century, a century in which mass movements prevailed (Ortega Y. Gasset, 1926 [1994]; Canetti, 1960; Moscovici, 1981). Thereby, even being a product of a ‘leaking’ century—struggling with traumatic large groups processes—the small groups flourished, perhaps because they worked as pièce de resistance, as ‘antidotes against the social massification’ (Anzieu, 1984: 207). In this regard Foulkes’ (1948 [1983]; 1964 [1984], 1975 [1986]) ideas of belonging to a small group conveyed the ideal that it was possible not only to treat individuals in groups but also reinforce the human bonds affected by totalitarianisms. Hence, for decades through conscious, unconscious and social unconscious interdependences the work with ‘therapeutic group analytic stranger groups’ (Nitzgen, 2008) developed.

However, since the 1970s, research of large groups has been pointing to additional challenges in group analytic theory and technique. Nevertheless, it was necessary to arrive to the end of the Cold War—to face the theoretical shift from cohesion to incohesion in groups (Hopper, 2003) —to understand that it was necessary to explore other realms. The fourth basic assumption theory ushered group analysis into the 21st-century, breaking the chains of illusion and the islands of safety that belonging to therapeutic small groups represented, describing the cornerstones for the socio psychodynamic understanding of groups. Therefore, to pay attention to incohesion processes is not only to realize the ubiquity of traumatic experiences in unconscious life of groups, but it is also to understand that to coexist in contemporary times, means to belong to almost impossible groups, groups with leaking containers.

The relevance of group analysis for the 21st-century is undeniable. However the so-called ‘pure work’ conveyed in group analytic groups seems not to be enough to cope with the sources of suffering (Akhtar, 2014) co-created in the current turbulent world. In fact, the considerations addressed by incohesion processes in groups (Hopper, 2003) as well by de Maré’s (1991) Koinonian plea demand new forms of group analytic engagement—‘a radical, a social group analysis’ (Rohr, 2014; Blackwell, 2014)—in the current depleted public sphere. They require action in Arendt’s terms. These would be psycho-social interventions in groups, projects such as Reflective Citizens (Mojovic, 2015; Penna, 2014b), community groups (Rohr, 2014), neighbourhoods group interventions (Freidman, 2016)—all fundamental to act and to resist in Arendt’s (1948; 1958) terms. As ‘peaceful guerillas’ (Mojovic, 2015) or as new forms of ‘active pacifism’ (Bobbio, 1979), ‘applied’ group analysis can contribute to situations on which homo clausus and homo sacer figurations present their ugly face. It means that group analysis is essential to promote and restore citizenship to deprived citizens, living in the emptied public space.

However, group analytic interventions outside the traditional settings suffer from criticism and require reflection and methodological adaptations that make complex the tenets Foulkes (1975) postulated for the group-analytic ‘total situation’. In this direction, Nitzgen’s discussions on the ‘total situation’, as ‘the social situation in its total dynamic . . . [which] could serve as a key to unlock the problems of applied group analysis’ (Nitzgen, 2008: 240) are relevant. His considerations point to an important dialogue between the ‘classic and the radical group analysis’ (Blackwell, 2014) providing for both a common foundation matrix. In fact, what Nitzgen observed was that for Foulkes the ‘group analytic situation cannot be standardized, but is fairly well defined’ (Foulkes, 1948 [1983]: 26). So what Foulkes was advocating for was an adaptive, pragmatic handling of the group setting. In his ‘Goldesteinian’ reading of group analysis, Nitzgen affirms that the ‘group analytic situation itself would appear to have developed by its very adaptation to various social situations in which the setting of the stranger group would be but one’ (Nitzgen, 2008: 247). Therefore, total situations are the basic epistemological principle that directs all group analytic thinking.

The flexibility of Foulkesian considerations on the ‘total situation’ opened the door for unexplored fields on group analysis. Thereby, impossible groups are groups on which the vicissitudes of contemporaneity are co-constructing unpredictable and complex ‘total situations’. In parallel with the group analytic debate on ‘total situation’, psychoanalysis has been discussing, as well, the displacements that occurred in the classic psychoanalytic situation (Ogden, 1994). Contributions from the field theory (Baranger and Baranger, 1962 [2008]) as well Bleger’s (1967) notion of encuadre—frame—became important for discussions on total situations and dynamic matrices (Tubert-Oklander, 2007; 2016).

Weinberg’s inspiring presentation displayed a myriad of examples—of a creative and courageous group analyst who successfully experiment on unknown (group) analytic fields (Weinberg, 2014) —in which complex ‘total situations’ interfered in the group processes. He is intrigued by the idea that in spite of leaking containers and sometimes unbounded settings, as for example in the Brazilian slum, groups can flourish. He pointed to the importance of the role of the group conductor in the creation of a ‘safe presence’ (transferences) in a ‘safe enough environment’ for the group, concluding that ‘the success of these groups’ lies in the construction of a ‘co-created fantasy in the mind of the group including the conductor’. His assertion could be translated as the importance of the internalization of the encuadre / frame (Bleger, 1967) by the conductor and by the participants of the (group) analytic situation. Bleger’s notion of frame goes beyond the Winnicottian setting describing the totality of the phenomena included in the therapeutic relationship. It comprises the analyst’s role, the set of space (atmosphere) and time factors, and part of the technique (fees, interruptions). It involves the variables of the therapeutic process, but also the constants, the frame, conceived as a ‘non-process’. Depending on the analytic process, the frame changes from the mere background of a Gestalt into a figure, that is to say, changes into a process (Bleger, 1967: 511). So, it is through the ruptures and discontinuities of the frame that becomes possible to trigger processes that could have remained silenced, unnoticed in traditional analytic situations. Therefore, through Weinberg’s impossible groups it was possible to observe the relevance of the internalization of the ‘internal frame’ (Alizade, 2002) that allowed the blossoming of groups matrices in spite of difficult total situations. This internalization is central for the holding and the handling of groups with leaking containers, with leaking boundaries and is paramount for contemporary ‘group analytic total situations’ as well for the so-called ‘applied’ group analysis.

Indeed, experiences of ‘applied’ group analysis are challenging the classic theory, to discover new forms of coping with overwhelming contents that are pushing usual containers and blurring the traditional interplay between them. So, contemporary ‘total situations’ are pointing to complexifying dynamic matrices, observed as fields (Tubert-Oklander, 2007; 2016) in enlarged frames (Bleger, 1967) as presented by Weinberg. In this sense the focus is moving beyond the fundamental socio-historical and binocular visions of here-and-now and there-and-them to three-dimensional figurations which are akin to Pichon-Rivière’s (1971) formulations about group processes as dialectic spirals. These perspectives promote interactions in an amplified, spiraling field—as a spiraling matrix—that could not be constricted, contained, ‘enveloped’ (Anzieu, 1984) on a more traditional thinking. The classic two-dimensional movement of the ‘group psychic envelope’—once described by Anzieu (1984; 1995 [2016]) as a metaphor for the group skin/boundary—is becoming too fragile to contain the multiple dimensions in action in the dynamic field/ matrix of the contemporary ‘applied’ group-analysis. The novel ‘group envelope’ needs to acquire flexibility in its movements of containing and releasing interactions/contents, as ‘hinges’ (Gil, 1997; Penna, 2007) and ‘folds’ (Deleuze, 1993). So, instead of focusing on relevance of safe, but rigid boundaries, that might crack and leak, it is important to create group analytic situations with novel boundaries/envelopes constituted of foldings and hinges. They will allow, little by little, in a paradoxical relationship of continuity/discontinuity, on the frontier of the private and public spheres renewed figurations in groups and in the society.

Within this perspective, initiatives out of the scope of the institutionalized group analysis (Nitzgen, 2008)—but with internalized group analytic frames—will find theoretical inputs to create new methodologies to provide group work for communities, neighbourhoods and organizations (Mojovic, Scanlon, Penna and Tjelta, 2016). That is to create in the confluence of inner-outer spaces new fields-matrices in which koinonian interactions (de Maré, Piper and Thompson, 1991), action (zoon politikon) of homines aperti could be housed. These initiatives will blur and perhaps, with time, break the barriers established during modernity between private and public spheres revealing social unconscious dynamics that does not allow the establishment of relationships based on a more ‘relational ethics’ (Frosh, 2011). The group will reconnect citizens and their different voices becoming antidotes against the proliferation of groups or groupings which convey homo clausus constellations and massification processes (Hopper, 2003; 2015) on which the exclusion of homo sacers and the denial of the uncanny ( Freud, 1919), of the otherness prevail (Frosh, 2002).

The challenges for the homo clausus, the homo sacers and for the homines aperti of the 21st-century is enormous, but for us as group analysts it is impossible to ignore the otherness face, the ethical commitment, the face’s epiphany inherited from Levinas’ (1961) philosophy. It is perhaps an almost impossible task, but it might rejoin us with some of the individualism postulated by the Social Contract, which used to value the singularity of the individuals as archetypes of the human race. It will allow a dialogue in which the face of the other will reassure the importance of the acknowledgement, of the recognition (Butler, 2005; Frosh, 2011), of the otherness in a co-constructed life in collectivity. In the company of so many known and unknown faces, I give the word back to our chair, Sue Einhorn.

Footnotes

Carla Penna, PhD, is a psychoanalyst and group analyst in private practice in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She is Chair of the Training Institute and the Management Committee of the Psychoanalytic Circle of Rio de Janeiro, affiliated to International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies, Former President of Brazilian Association of Group Psychotherapy and a former President of the Group Analytic Psychotherapy Society of the State of Rio de Janeiro. She published the book Inconsciente Social [Social Unconscious] in Portuguese. Address: Avenue Visconde de Albuquerque, 694, apt 402, Leblon cep 22450-000, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Email: drcarlapenna@gmail.com

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