Discovering the ‘Macedonian diaspora’: a Web cartography of actors,interactions and influences

Abstract

French

While the 20th century saw the emergence of a modern Macedonian nation and the establishment of an internationally recognized Macedonian state, in the 21st century ‘Macedonia’ remains a focus of struggle not only in today’s Republic of Macedonia, but also abroad, and not least among émigrés. Within this framework, our main interest is both how the diasporization (understood as a process rather than diaspora as a category) impacts national identity (re)constructions and their relation to the state, and how the struggles around nation-building and state-building impact diasporization. We therefore seek to define in this article an existing Bourdieusian ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field, its main actors, linkages and interactions, through the establishment and analysis of a web cartography. By means of this cartography we aim to establish several hypotheses about the interactions and the relative positioning of the different actors engaged in the process of ‘Macedonian diasporization’ within the framework of nation- and state -building.

Keywords

diaspora identity Internet Macedonia nation Web

1 Macedonia – an ongoing object of contestation

The famous ‘Macedonian question’, much present at the beginning of the 20th century during the Balkan Wars and at the end of the First World War, is not set to disappear. While the 20th century saw the emergence of a Macedonian nation and the establishment of an internationally recognized Macedonian state, in the 21st century ‘Macedonia’ remains a name that inspires interest, puzzlement and questions. Where is it? What is it exactly? What does it mean?

‘Macedonia’ remains a focus for struggle in today’s Republic of Macedonia, but it is also a focus for struggle abroad, not least transnationally among émigré communities, which adds to a complexity of interventions in defining what is Macedonia and what it means to be Macedonian. Macedonia, in terms of national identity, a nation and even a state, remains an object of contestation in its very being, its very composition and, for some, its very existence; which is what makes it an almost unique object of study.

First, it is an object of contestation in terms of national identit(ies). What the Macedonian identity or the Macedonian nation is, today remains open to discussion and contestation, both at home and abroad. Is being Macedonian related only to the Republic of Macedonia? Are other communities, who have never lived in a Macedonian republic but who consider themselves Macedonian, also to be considered as Macedonian? Is it totally different or perhaps the same as being Greek or Bulgarian or Serb? Who has the right to call him- or herself Macedonian and to use this name?

Macedonia also remains an object of contestation in terms of the structuring of the state and its institutions. Despite the establishment of the Republic in 1991 as a result of the break-up of federal Yugoslavia, the state’s constitutional make-up is still an object of discussion, particularly in view of the population’s multi-ethnic character. Constitutional changes after an internal conflict in 2001, which opposed Albanian paramilitaries to government structures and challenged what was conceived then as a national state of the (‘ethnic’) Macedonian people, are still subject to discussion as to their legitimacy or fulfilment. Macedonian institutions are thus in a particular kind of flux and subject to questioning.

Finally, Macedonia is an object of contestation with regard to the state’s positioning on the international scene, namely the Republic’s relations with its neighbours as well as its membership of international and regional structures, most importantly the EU and NATO.

The word ‘Macedonia’ thus continues to evoke questions related to ethnicity, identity, state, citizenship, and is, as such, a true puzzle. These and other questions are still part of not only the Macedonian public scene today, but also among other actors outside the Republic, namely among Macedonian émigrés neighbouring states as well as their citizens or their émigrés.

According to Tölölyan, ‘[w]here once were dispersions … there now is diaspora’ (Tölölyan, 1996: 3). This is also true with regard to the Macedonian context. A search undertaken in June 2011 using a Macedonian Internet engine¹ gives 2397 results for the word ‘diaspora’. In contrast, there are only 425 pages of results for the original Macedonian word iselenistvo, a noun denoting émigrés as a group, despite this being the original Macedonian word that is still used to a degree in the official names of some government or other institutions dealing with émigrés, such as formerly the Ministerstvo za iselenistvo (Ministry of Emigration), the Agencija za iselenistvo (Emigration Agency) or the Matica na iselenicite od Makedonija (House of Immigrants of Macedonia), or by some authors having written on the subject (Kosturski, 1994; Nikolovski-Katin, 1996; Vrazinovski, 2000). On this basis, one can claim that the word ‘diaspora’ is still very much in evidence today on the Macedonian public scene, leading one to ask why. Is ‘Macedonian diaspora’ perhaps an accident, a trend à la mode, something that a relatively young nation wishes and needs to have since today, with the proliferation of ‘diasporas’, one may even claim that each nation has its own diaspora? But the word is also used increasingly in the media and on the Internet, by political actors and associations. According to Brubaker, while “diaspora” yields a million Google hits; a sampling suggests that the large majority are not academic’ (Brubaker, 2005: 1). Thus, perhaps the ‘diaspora’ word is present due to its use by different actors, both at home and abroad, for particular political purposes. For, is it a coincidence that ‘diaspora’ is present more forcefully on the Macedonian scene in the context of a strong questioning of Macedonian identity, development or even existence, which has been paradoxically on-going and is perhaps even stronger since the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign state? New and relatively less-developed states in particular often think of ‘their diasporas’ when engaged in processes of nation- and state-building. Werbner, for instance, mentions that it has been said that ‘many diasporas are deeply implicated both ideologically and materially in the nationalist projects of their homelands’ (Werbner, 2000: 6). But if so, we ask the question: how do the different actors struggle to be implicated in such projects, to what ends, and how does this interplay with the efforts of home-government actors and bureaucracies to implicate them.

It is thus of particular interest to us to understand how the above-elaborated objects of contestation are played out in relation to ‘diaspora’ processes. In other words, our interest lies in how ‘diaspora’ as a category but also émigré populations as social objects are politicized, played out and thus shaped in the context of such contestations. We thus see ‘diaspora’ as a Bourdieusian field of struggle around the Macedonian objects of contestation.

When, how and why does diasporization take place or, to put it differently, when, how and why does the fact of emigration become a political issue that needs to be addressed and ‘diaspora’ is created so that diaspora becomes a political subject, a social category? In answering this question, we seek to explore the relation between diaspora and the territorial nation-state, namely the question of how diaspora and its construction relates to nation- and state-building and the construction of national identity, from the point of view of a small and relatively fragile nation, Macedonia, whose need for integration within the international community is particularly emphatic.

More specifically, on the one hand, how does diasporization impact national identity (re)constructions and their relation to the state; and, vice versa, how do the settings of nation- and state-building impact diasporization? Indeed, can diaspora be constructed, by whom and how, to assist in a process of nation- and state-building? Is there any negotiation of the Macedonian nation that includes ‘Macedonian diaspora’? If this is so, how is Macedonian national identity being reconstructed outside of the Macedonian state (based on which content, symbols, myths, ideologies)? How far is the conception of the Macedonian nation the same at home and abroad? How do homeland–émigré relations reflect the conceptions of national identities in the country of origin?As a first step in answering these questions, which are central to our on-going doctoral research, we seek to define in this paper an existent ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field, its main actors, linkages and interactions, through the establishment and analysis of a Web cartography providing a snapshot, at a particular moment in time, of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’ and Macedonian diaspora actors’ interactions. Although we are able to argue the existence of a Macedonian diaspora field, ‘Macedonian diaspora’, however, as we shall see, has no one centre, no one dominant actor, and is thus in a process of definition and negotiation.

2 Identifying the actors of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’

Who then are the Macedonian diaspora actors? Macedonian emigration is characterized by a multiplicity of actors, and we claim that this multiplicity is particularly interesting here and even more so than in other cases, since, as argued above, Macedonian national identity is an object of struggle and contestation, including in the transnational field, namely with and between émigré communities. We thus start from the assumption, which we seek to confirm by means of the current mapping exercise, that speaking of or even in the name of ‘Macedonian diaspora’ are not only ‘ethnic’ Macedonian émigré actors or actors from the present Macedonian republic, but also actors of neighbouring countries, and of other ‘diasporas’ who may claim to be part of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’. The bottom line is that who and what is ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’, and by extension ‘Macedonian diaspora’, is an object of struggle within the Republic itself, in neighbouring countries and also in the transnational field between émigrés.

When speaking of a multiplicity of actors shaping a diaspora field, we do not forget that it is not all migrants who are involved. As affirmed by Guarnizo et al., ‘[t]ransnational political action … is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially bounded across national borders, occurs in quite specific territorial jurisdictions…’ (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003: 1211). We also understand that their involvement cannot be static. Actors change with time, and some are involved only at particular points: ‘…while core transnationals stay involved in their home country policies via electoral or non-electoral means, others become more active only at special junctures such as highly contested elections or national disasters’ (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003: 1238). In our work, we focus primarily on institutional actors with a certain continuity in their activity and presence on the public scene in their home country, while recognizing that our cartography represents a snapshot at a particular point in time.

For our cartography,² therefore, we selected the following actors:

– Republic of Macedonia official institutions: e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidency of the Republic, National Assembly, Emigration Agency, Embassies in main host countries.

– Official institutions of host states: e.g. Governments of Australia, Canada and the USA, Presidency of the USA.

– Official institutions of neighbouring states: e.g. Governments, embassies and official state institutions dealing with nationals abroad of Greece, Bulgaria and Albania.

– Republic of Macedonia political parties: e.g. Governing right-wing VMRO-DPMNE;³ governing Albanian DUI;⁴ opposition left-wing SDSM;⁵ opposition Albanian DPA;⁶ and opposition Albanian New Democracy.

– Macedonian political parties in neighbouring countries: e.g. Rainbow in Greece; OMO Ilinden-Pirin in Bulgaria; Macedonian Alliance in Albania.

– Emigré NGOs and associations based in the Republic of Macedonia: e.g. World Macedonian Congress; Matica.

– Emigré NGOs and associations based in the EU and overseas countries: e.g. (a) Macedonian – United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD, USA), the United Macedonians Organization (Canada), Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee (AMHRC, Australia), Macedonian Human Rights Committee International (MHRMI, Canada), as well as other smaller or less visible organizations;⁷ (b) Bulgarian-Macedonian – Macedonian Political Organization (MPO, USA); (c) Greek or Greek-Macedonian – Pan-Macedonian Association (USA), World Council for Hellenes Abroad, Australian–Macedonian Advisory Council; and (d) Albanian – National Albanian American Council, Albanian Canadian League.

– Macedonian émigré NGOs and associations based in neighbouring countries: e.g. Ilinden (Tirana, Albania).

– Media: e.g. those based in the Republic of Macedonia (including Macedonian-and Albanian-language media), in neighbouring countries and abroad.

Why have we selected these actors? Each of them, we argue, may have a vested interest in ‘diaspora’ and may potentially benefit from its use as a political symbol, since we find them to be: (1) actors who see themselves or are identified by others as part of the Macedonian diaspora; (2) actors who speak in the name of the Macedonian diaspora; or (3) actors who speak of Macedonian diaspora.⁸

2.1 Actors who see themselves or are identified by others as part of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’

Such actors include émigré organizations, most notably in the USA, Canada and Australia, as well as in European countries, but also political parties and associations of Macedonian national minorities in the neighbouring countries, Greece, Bulgaria and Albania, together with some émigré organizations abroad associated with other states, most notably Greece and Bulgaria, which nevertheless use the adjective ‘Macedonian’.

To illustrate this wider use of the adjective Macedonian when referring to different émigré communities, a keyword search with the name ‘Macedonia’ in the publication The Australian People: an Encyclopedia of the Nation, Its People and Their Origins leads to entries on Greek, Macedonian and Bulgarian immigrants and communities in Australia.

2.2 Actors who speak in the name of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’

These actors include émigré organizations abroad, but also organizations based in Macedonia, which thus do not belong to the first group, such as the World Macedonian Congress or the historical House of Immigrants of Macedonia.⁹

We argue that those speaking in the name of a Macedonian diaspora do so to give legitimacy to the speaker both vis-a-vis local authorities in the host state and also the home state, thus allowing in both cases for specific and ‘legitimate’ requests to be made or pressures exerted in the name of diaspora. It is therefore not infrequent that émigré organizations abroad speak as spokespersons of ‘the Macedonian diaspora’:

UMD [the United Macedonian Diaspora organization] hopes that the future of Macedonia will not be put into question to win political points and votes. The émigrés also call upon the government and the opposition to discipline their ranks, to refrain from thoughtless moves and to give the people what they deserve: a country that will be socio-economically stable standing as a model in Southeast Europe and a country whose place is in the Euro-Atlantic organizations such as NATO and the EU. (Utrinski vesnik, 2011; our translation, emphasis added)

Another example shows that the UMD, for instance, may see itself as a unifier of all Macedonians abroad. ‘This unity can only be achieved when we [the United Macedonian Diaspora – UMD] reach out to all Macedonian groups wherever they may live, building partnerships and sharing our work’ (Branov, 2010: 26).

Yet another illustration comes from the Community of Macedonian Associations in Switzerland, speaking in the name of the entire Macedonian community in that country after a meeting at the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘In the name of the Macedonian diaspora in Switzerland, [the Community] expressed its dissatisfaction with the boycott by its southern neighbor of Macedonia’s entry into the EU and NATO. It appeals to the Government of Switzerland to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name and to extend its support for its membership in the EU.’¹⁰

2.3 Actors who speak of or to a ‘Macedonian diaspora’

These actors may have the characteristics of the other two criteria above, but in addition see themselves as authorized to speak ‘objectively’ and ‘knowledgeably’ of Macedonian diaspora. They do so often when justifying or defending a particular policy or a position. For instance, during the discussions at the National Assembly on the new state symbols of independent Macedonia in 1992, it was argued:

Why do we not respect our Macedonian who, defending his existence in overseas countries and in Europe, sends numerous telegrams and who in all public gatherings in Australia, Canada, the USA, Germany and Sweden waves the flag with the sun and the emblem. Why do we not respect the will of the Macedonian people…? (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1992: 8–9; our translation)

It will be necessary for this Parliament to consciously satisfy the desire for justice of the Macedonian people who have for centuries held on to these symbols … And this will be saluted by our people with great acclamation, including all our émigrés in the diaspora in overseas countries. That is when our people will be fully recognized both here and there, and their requests will be satisfied. We cannot ignore the demands of the people (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1992: VI/1–SP/ML; our translation).

Do you wish to see where Macedonia is? It is over there, in Australia, in Canada, in the US. Have you seen, have you seen, gentlemen from the Government, from the Presidency, Mr President of the Republic … Do you know which flags they wave? They are far from this country and they are free. And they carry the emblem and flag with the lion and the sun. (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1992: VII/5–VII/6; our translation)

In addition, there may also be those institutions that work with/for émigrés, and as such may claim a certain expertise/knowledge/experience of and with Macedonian émigrés. These actors include political parties based in Macedonia, media, the Macedonian Orthodox Church, government bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Emigration Agency, but may also be government bodies and media from the neighbouring countries of Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.

Claiming a specific connection to a ‘Macedonian diaspora’, each of these actors may thus have a vested interest in ‘diaspora’ and potentially benefit from its use as a symbol. All of them can thus be seen as spokespersons as defined by Latour, namely who ‘“speak for” the group existence’ (Latour, 2005: 31) and thus delineate it. They make up the ‘millions of contradictory voices about what is a group’ (Latour, 2005: 31). They define what the group is, what it should be and what it has been. And, not least, they differentiate the group from other ‘anti-groups’ (Latour, 2005: 32), thus at the same time delineating its boundaries.

3 Drawing the cartography of Web interactions among the ‘Macedonian diaspora’

Following the methodology of Medialab at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and that of the Programme d’études sur l’usage des TIC dans les migrations (TIC-Migrations) at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris, the cartography has been established on the basis of a group of core websites that we have identified based on the criteria established above. These were websites that we judged related to ‘Macedonian’ emigration and the Republic of Macedonia in general, and that in many cases carry the name Macedonia or the adjective Macedonian within their http address, even if they are Greek-language or Bulgarian-language sites.¹¹ Beginning with no more than 50 websites before the first crawl, our final maps contain 323 websites.

In what follows, we provide some conclusions on the basis of the cartography that we produced in July 2011 on the basis of the following categorizations: (1) Geographic location, (2) Types of actors; and (3) Use of language.¹²

3.1 Geographic location

The first map we produced (Graph Macedonians-1. Web interactions of the ‘Macedonian diaspora’ actors, by geographic location, July 2011, in the colour section of this Issue),¹³ illustrating the geographic location of Macedonian diaspora actors, indicates that, while many actors are based in the Republic of Macedonia (39.01% – in red clustering in the upper and left-hand areas of the graph), the majority of actors are in overseas countries (50.46% – in blue in the right-hand and lower areas), and, not least, in neighbouring countries (in green, on the right and at the foot). While many authority nodes are in the Republic of Macedonia, there is also a significant number in overseas and neighbouring countries, indicating that, although the Republic of Macedonia may be considered a primary Macedonian diaspora centre, it is not the only one. Another indicator pointing in this direction is the fact that the internal edges of the actors in Europe and overseas number about the same as the outbound ones (1002 and 1232 respectively) going towards the Republic of Macedonia, meaning that there is as much interaction between actors overseas as there is with the Republic. This may lead us to ask why the Republic of Macedonia is not an obvious centre and, by extension, where the referent homeland may lie in the diaspora actors’ imaginary and in their consequent actions, thus blurring even further the inside/outside distinction often made when referring to migrants: for when we speak of inside and outside, what is it we are really speaking about?

Another observation that can be made from this graph is the spatial proximity between actors based overseas and those based in neighbouring countries. This implies greater direct and indirect interaction between émigré organizations overseas and actors (organizations and political parties) based in neighbouring countries, whose activities focus predominantly on fighting for the cultural human rights of Macedonians in neighbouring Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. Their spatial distinction from institutions in the Republic of Macedonia indicates that, on the contrary, there is relatively less interaction with Macedonian institutions, including government institutions and bureaucracies. The issue of Macedonian National Minority (MNM) protection thus can be seen to be the bonding tissue between Macedonian émigré and MNM organizations, whereas this connection is less evident with the Republic of Macedonia, which in this area cannot be seen as the clear and unambiguous state-protector of ‘its’ minorities abroad. Diaspora links are thus stronger horizontally, namely between émigré organizations overseas and MNM organizations in neighbouring countries, than vertically, namely between these two groupings and Republic of Macedonia government institutions and bureaucracies. This shows a weak positioning of the home state in terms of so-called protection of the rights of Macedonian minorities, despite greater efforts in this direction on the part of the current government, and despite a new state definition of ‘Macedonian diaspora’ that includes all these groups.

3.2 Types of actors

The second map (Graph Macedonians-2. Web interactions of Macedonian ‘diaspora’ actors, by type of actor, July 2011, in the colour section of this Issue), shows interactions according to types of actors. Judging from the density of these links, the relatively concentrated aspect of the map with no presence of separate islands of a particular type of actor, we can conclude that there is such a thing as Macedonian diasporization and a ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field.

The map has, in addition, a somewhat typical disposition when it comes to cartographies of different diasporas, namely having the media (in red in the upper centre) and portals (in fuchsia spread out in the centre) as intermediaries through which interaction occurs between government institutions and bureaucracies (in purple on the left side), on the one hand, and émigré organizations (in light blue on the right side) plus blogs and forums (in light green) on the other. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the largest authorities in the map are the media. The media, indeed always as expected, have more inbound (being cited) than outbound edges (citing others). Nevertheless, it is interesting that, while the media are the ones who most often cite government institutions and bureaucracies (24% of all outbound edges), they are also very much interested in diaspora organizations (with 19% of all outbound edges), thus showing a relatively strong interest by the public in the Republic of Macedonia’s ‘diaspora’ activities and positions.

Government institutions and bureaucracies are also significant authorities, but no more so than some émigré organizations, political parties or even international organizations. In consequence, these actors should not automatically be considered as necessarily the principal and central actors when speaking of diaspora–home country relations and interactions. The respective clusters for these groups are also easily identifiable on the map, meaning that they form relatively compact groups. We analyze them in what follows:

3.2.1 Government institutions and bureaucracies

As expected these all cluster together, forming a distinct grouping. A focus on the Macedonian government’s main website (see Graph Macedonians-2, in the colour section) shows that the edges are principally incoming from the media, but also that there are edges with almost none of the émigré or MNM organizations. One exception is an edge incoming from the Rainbow political party of the Macedonian minority in Greece (large pale-purple node on the right). Indeed, the present government has stated that, unlike previous governments, it would do more to protect the interests of MNM in neighbouring countries, and it appears from the graph that there is such an, albeit limited, attempt. Upon his election in 2006, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, for instance, ‘promised the expelled Macedonians that he would initiate a dialogue with Greece on their repatriation in Aegean Macedonia’ (UMD, 2006). We thus detect here an ambiguous line between a government wishing to assist Macedonian minorities in neighbouring countries, and one that does not wish to be charged with irredentism by neighbouring states.

The Emigration Agency is the only one of the government and state institutions whose node is in the centre of the graph. This is to be expected, bearing in mind that its primary role is to coordinate communication with émigré organizations. What is striking, however, is that it is not an authority, although it is the only state agency whose primary role is related to Macedonian émigrés abroad, established to replace an earlier Emigration Ministry (1998–2000) and, further back in time, the historical Matica. It is also noteworthy that there are few links with the main émigré organizations that are referred to in the following section, and which are also important authorities. Finally, there are also weak links with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which until recently had a Sector for Diaspora through which it ‘monitored the work of the Agency’.¹⁴ The Agency, on the other hand, has argued a complete separation in its mandate from that of the Ministry (the Ministry being responsible only for citizens abroad, whereas the Agency is responsible for all émigrés with or without citizenship), and even a relative lack of interest on the part of the Ministry in the work of the Agency.¹⁵

3.2.2 Diaspora organizations

Judging from the relatively large nodes in the map, several émigré organizations that are quite visible in the media and which themselves claim to be among the most active are the United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD), the Macedonian Human Rights Movement International (MHRMI), the Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee (AMHRC) and the United Macedonians organization (UM). While the UMD, based in Washington DC, USA, is a young organization, established in 2005, but one which has ambitious objectives¹⁶ and has gained considerable visibility,¹⁷ the MHRMI and AMHRC are older organizations, established in the second half of the 1980s and based respectively in Toronto, Canada and Melbourne, Australia, with the principal objective of protecting the human rights of Macedonian communities everywhere, most notably of MNM in neighbouring countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Albania). Finally, the United Macedonians organization of Canada is historically the oldest among them; although the organizer since 1958 of the largest Macedonian mass gathering abroad, the Ilinden picnic,¹⁸ it has not been very visible of late. This mix of historical importance and lost visibility seems to be confirmed by the UM’s relative authority but marginal position in the map.

It is interesting that, while the other three organizations are clearly on the left side of the map, UMD is more central, spatially closer to the media, to international organizations and foreign governments and also to Macedonian government and state institutions: it has one outgoing edge with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Graph Macedonians-2). This seems to confirm its media visibility, the relative lead it has taken as a major lobbying organization in the USA, and also tentatively in Brussels, for Macedonia’s entry into the EU and NATO, and Macedonia’s recognition under its constitutional name, as well as numerous contacts with representatives of the Macedonian government.

Another interesting point is the position of the Matica, one of the few émigré organizations positioned more centrally (see Graph Macedonians-2). It has numerous edges, but most of them signify that it is a hub rather than an authority. It is interesting that a significant portion of its edges link it to Macedonian state and government institutions, which is a reflection of its historic positioning as a formerly state-established institution that used to be, during Yugoslav Macedonia (1944–1991), the exclusive intermediary, together with Yugoslav consulates, between the then-socialist republic and émigrés abroad.¹⁹ The Matica’s apparent lack of authority in the graph, however, illustrates its lost position today, where it now has the status of an NGO, being one among several, despite efforts to maintain its historic position as illustrated by its outgoing edges.

3.2.3 Political parties

It is interesting to note that, despite its claims and a general belief in its being close to émigré communities abroad,²⁰ the governing right-wing party VMRO-DPMNE is a considerable hub but not an authority, and is expectedly close to the government institutions and bureaucracies (see Graph Macedonians-2 in the issue Appendix). It would have been expected to be a considerable authority. Indeed, this party was founded abroad inter alia by émigrés, has extra-border committees and is believed to be much more popular among émigrés than other major parties, particularly the opposition left-wing SDSM, often dismissed in émigré circles as a successor to the former communist Yugoslav regime. VMRO-DPMNE potentially draws support abroad because of its carefully selected name, the historic VMRO having been an organization that fought at the turn of the 20th century against Ottoman occupation and for an independent Macedonia, in other words, a significant element of the national myths.²¹ In addition, since it came to power in 2006, there has been a more visible effort on the part of state and government institutions to tie émigrés more closely to the Republic. The VMRO-DPMNE also won all three seats in the June 2011 Parliamentary elections when, for the first time, Macedonian citizens residing abroad were able to vote.

VMRO’s relative lack of authority in the map, however, may signify that despite its efforts the party is not so very much trusted among diaspora actors. Indeed, the validity of the election of three additional MPs voted for by citizens abroad in June 2011 has been widely questioned both in the Macedonian media and by émigrés themselves:

For a long time some of those activists lobbied forcefully for this decision [the opportunity to vote from abroad], because they thought the outcome would be a strengthening of the links between the diaspora and the Republic of Macedonia. However, the large majority of the Macedonian diaspora was caught offguard and unprepared for this undertaking, surprised by the speedy decision of the government to implement the decision of the overseas vote at the early Parliamentary elections [in June 2011] …

[K]nowing the political support of the diaspora to the DPMNE, this quick and uncritically brought decision can only be interpreted as a political calculation on the part of the DPMNE thus expecting to win 2–3 additional MP seats in Parliament … It is true that the decision that émigrés may vote at the early Parliamentary elections has opened a new page between the diaspora and the Republic of Macedonia, but the decision has not raised relations to a higher level. (Sinadinovski, 2011)

Another interesting observation concerning the parties is the noticeable presence of several important political party authorities (in pale purple) among the émigré organizations and blogs on the right-hand side of the map. These are the parties of Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring countries Albania, Greece and Bulgaria, that, judging from the map, interact much more with overseas diaspora organizations than with Republic of Macedonia institutions, or, for that matter, the government institutions in their own countries (which are lower down the map) (see Graph Macedonians-2). There is thus no doubt that a Macedonian diaspora field involves in practice also the MNM actors in neighbouring countries.

3.2.4 Religious organizations

The Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) has often in the past been cited, in the literature on Macedonian emigration, as a central actor in maintaining émigrés’ connection with their homeland and in reinforcing their Macedonian national identity.²² This central role seems to be maintained even today, since MOC is a relatively significant authority and hub in the middle of the graph (see Graph Macedonians-2), indicating that it holds a key political position within the field of Macedonian diaspora actors. Nevertheless, a marginal cluster of the MOC church communities abroad in the upper right-hand corner (in purple) may point to a weakened role, which it can be argued results from the detachment of younger generations, a lack of transparency in the management of funds in church communities,²³ as well as a long property-related dispute between the central MOC and independent Macedonian-established churches in Australia.

3.3 Use of language

In our final map (Graph Macedonians-3. Web interactions of Macedonian diaspora actors, by use of language, in the colour section of this Issue) we categorize actors according to dominant use of language, which, although an essentialist criterion, we can argue represents a claim to affiliation with or belonging to a particular community, or, a contrario, an attempt to construct a new definition of the community.²⁴

3.3.1 Albanian and Macedonian languages

We find the language aspect important for exploring the approach to a Macedonian diaspora as an ‘ethnic diaspora’, or one associated more closely with the Republic of Macedonia, whose reality and political system since the internal conflict of 2001 recognizes and promotes a civic conception of citizenship giving particular rights to the Albanian community. Albanians constitute an important proportion of the population of the Republic (namely 25.2%)²⁵ and after the post-2001 conflict constitutional changes, as a result of which they have become the second community in the country, with particular political rights and participation; it was only to be expected that efforts would be made to ensure that the ‘Macedonian diaspora’ was not formed solely around a single ‘ethnic Macedonian’ basis. In this respect, the Emigration Agency has indeed claimed that among its priorities is that of reaching out to Albanian émigrés from the Republic.²⁶ We have thus made a distinction in the present map between ‘Macedonian’, ‘Albanian’ and ‘Macedonian and Albanian’ categories, according to the dominant language used by the websites, respectively denoting actors that address themselves only to a Macedonian or to an Albanian public, or actors that do not make such an obvious distinction and use both languages, thus showing a nascent civic or multiethnic understanding of the Macedonian state and nation.

Despite the said claims of the Emigration Agency, the Graph Macedonians-3 shows that Albanian ‘diaspora’ organizations are in the very bottom section of the map, closer to international organizations and foreign-state institutions than to Macedonian government institutions and bureaucracies. None of the Albanian-language actors in the graph are either large authorities or large hubs, meaning that they are somewhat marginal to the cartography of the ‘Macedonian diaspora’. In addition, most Albanian-language nodes, including Albanian parties in Macedonia, Albanian émigré organizations abroad and Republic of Albania government institutions, are relatively clustered, meaning that they maintain at least indirect connections between themselves. These observations may point to an ‘ethnic’-based connectedness of Albanian actors, with little links to ‘Macedonian diaspora’.

Nevertheless, this conclusion needs to be nuanced. First, some Albanian émigré organizations emerge in the cartography as relative authorities. Such is the case of the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), based in the USA, which is a second sub-graph authority (cited by other Albanian-language actors) and the eighth representative authority (cited by other than Albanian-language actors). The NAAC is not-for-profit organization dedicated to advocating for Albanians and promoting peace and economic development in the Balkans and sees itself as the Albanian voice in Washington. Second, Albanian coalitioning is not that straightforward. Edges, or direct interactions, are not numerous, contrary to what we may have expected of ‘ethnically’ organized diasporas.²⁷ It is interesting that, despite some claims to the contrary, namely that Albanian émigrés from Macedonia interact more with the Albanian parties in the Republic than with the Macedonian government institutions,²⁸ the two main Albanian parties, DUI and DPA, although spatially relatively close in the map to ethnic Albanian émigré organizations, have direct edges only with international organizations and US institutions (see Graph Macedonians-3 in the colour section).

As a third way to nuance, the relative clustering of the Albanian-language actors in the lower left section of the map finds its exception with the Albanian-language media in Macedonia, which are not clustered with other Albanian-language actors, but with Macedonian-language media (see Graph Macedonians-3).

Thus, in this figure, one can see that the largest Albanian-language authority, ALSAT-M TV in Macedonia,²⁹ connects not only to other Albanian-language actors, but also to a variety of other actors, including Macedonian-language blogs, media, NGOs, as well as a government institution – the Ministry of Education. Interestingly, its node is connected to only one Albanian party from Macedonia, the New Democracy (Demokracia e Re, in Albanian), which is not itself in the same cluster with other Albanian-language actors, including other Albanian parties from Macedonia, which was shown in Graph Macedonians-3, cited above, but is instead spatially closer and thus more integrated with the general map, closer to Macedonian-language actors. In a way, this confirms the party’s intermittent image in the Republic of Macedonia, particularly during the 2009 Presidential elections, as the only ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia trying to appeal to an Albanian-speaking as well as to a Macedonian-speaking electorate.

These examples, combined with the fact that in our maps there are as many Albanian-language actors (20 nodes) as there are both Albanian and Macedonian (20 nodes), perhaps indicate that there is a movement in the negotiation of a civic or multiethnic vs. ethnic Macedonian nation. Nevertheless, significantly, the Macedonian and Albanian actors are all within the Republic, whereas the exclusively Macedonian and exclusively Albanian can be both inside the Republic and abroad.

From the above, we can conclude that a Macedonian diaspora is shaping largely as an ethnic diaspora, despite discourse and efforts of government institutions to include all émigrés originating from the territory of the Republic. Albanian-language actors are thus marginal in the cartography and even little connected between themselves, meaning a low degree of ‘Albanian’ coalitioning in the context of Macedonian diasporization. This confirms a mismatch in the conception of the Macedonian nation at home and abroad, a mismatch between a civic (or at least bi-ethnic) conception of the nation within the Republic, and an ethnic one (the Macedonian nation belonging to ‘ethnic’ Macedonians) abroad. This mismatch in the conception of the Macedonian nation at home (civic or at least bi-ethnic) and abroad (ethnic Macedonian) is also illustrated by the presence of actors in pale blue (‘Macedonian and Albanian’) in the left and centre of Graph Macedonians-3, representing mostly Macedonian state institutions and bureaucracies and some media, and the clustering of actors in pale purple (‘Macedonian’) at the top and mainly left-hand side of the graph, coinciding again with some media and more importantly with Macedonian émigré organizations. This general mismatch, we claim, reveals that (albeit nascent) national and state changes at home in the understanding of what is ‘Macedonian’ are not necessarily reflected in national identities abroad.

3.3.2 Greeks and Macedonians

By means of Graph Macedonians-3, focused on language, we also wish to look at the interactions between and with actors that claim a part of and a right to definition of the Macedonian identity, while also identifying themselves as Greek or Bulgarian, namely those for whom being ‘Macedonian’ may mean also being Greek or Bulgarian.³⁰ As in the Albanian case, Graph Macedonians-3 shows that Greek-language actors, including media, state actors, NGOs and émigré organizations, are relatively clustered on the margins of the map, in the lower left corner, showing once again a clear demarcation from a Macedonian-language diaspora linked to the Republic of Macedonia. However, it is interesting that there are relatively more direct interactions (edges) between some of the Greek actors and Macedonian actors than is the case for Albanians (as we argued above relative to this same Graph Macedonians-3). This is somewhat to be expected since we claim that a major part of the battle for the Macedonian name and therefore for the delimitation of the borders of what and who is Macedonian, and by extension whether émigrés from today’s Greek part of the wider Macedonia region are in fact Greek or Macedonian, goes on in the transnational political field, namely between Macedonian and Greek émigrés. In addition, this may also reflect the relative continued fluidity of Macedonian identity, with some battles still ongoing to attract and define émigrés from the wider Macedonia region as either Greek or Macedonian.

Several examples are illustrative here. One is the Pan-Macedonian Association, a large and visible organization of Greek émigrés in the USA who make a claim to Macedonian identity as being part of the Greek identity, since many of its members originate from the wider Macedonian region, which covers a part of present-day northern Greece (Graph Macedonians-3).³¹ As stated on the Association’s website:

The need to create the Pan-Macedonian Association of USA arose among the Macedonians of the Diaspora when they sensed that they had to protect the boundaries of their birthplace from the expansionistic view and greedy stance of their northern neighbors [the Republic of Macedonia] … The function of the Pan-Macedonian Association presently remains steadfast to the fact that the name ‘Macedonia’ was, is and will be Greek and it only belongs to Greece. This matter for the members of the Association does not incorporate any political convictions, but they strongly believe that the issue is cultural, linguistic, historical and ethnic. It is a matter of their identity that cannot be negotiated, and an issue of their heritage that cannot be disputed or spared. The FYROM desires to be called ‘Macedonia’ and by usurping the name, it appropriates the Greek history and many other elements that go with the name, such as identity, ancestry, culture, ethnicity, belonging, cohesiveness, texture, color, and many other qualities.³²

Tellingly, the edges of the Pan-Macedonian Association connect it directly not only to Greek-language sites, but also to Macedonian sites, including media, blogs and, most importantly, major Macedonian émigré organizations such as UMD and MHRMI, both of which are very vocal in the Greek–Macedonian dispute over the Macedonian name. These connections are illustrative of the transnational battles between émigrés claiming Macedonian or Greek identities, over the true nature of being Macedonian.

Another Greek-language actor that is closer to the centre of our map and is interestingly a more important authority than other Greek-language actors (Graph Macedonians-3), is the Greek Helsinki Committee, a human rights NGO based in Greece and part of the wider Helsinki Committee network, which has been vocal in denouncing the Greek state for violating the rights of the ethnic Macedonian national minority in Greece by not recognizing its existence. Its position of authority in our map and its numerous links with actors, including the political parties of the Macedonian minority in Greece, is therefore not surprising, bearing in mind that its human-rights position assists the objectives of Macedonian actors in their battle for the protection of the MNM in Greece.

Finally, an interesting relative counter-example of an almost total lack of connection to the map (despite its presence) is the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), established by the Greek state ‘to consult and advise [it] on issues concerning the Greeks abroad’.³³ It is thus a global Greek organization with relatively less focus on Macedonian as part of the Greek identity, which is illustrated in Graph Macedonians-3 by this organization’s spatial separation from the rest of the map.

3.3.3 Bulgarians and Macedonians

With regard to the positioning of the Bulgarian-language actors, they seem to be even more integrated in the ‘Macedonian diaspora field’ than the Greek and Albanian actors (152 outbound edges from Bulgarian to Macedonian sites; 18 from Greek to Macedonian and 22 from Albanian to Macedonian sites), thereby perhaps implying a more direct negotiation of ‘Macedonian-ness’, looking at it through a Macedonian-Bulgarian prism. In Graph Macedonians-3, therefore, the green (Bulgarian-language) nodes are well mingled with the pale purple (Macedonian-language) ones and, even more, they are positioned on the right-hand side of the graph, close to Macedonian émigré organizations, while interacting also with Macedonian media and Bulgarian state institutions.

An example is the Macedonian Tribune, a Bulgarian-language journal of the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), which is the oldest Macedonian émigré political organization but which is today considered by the majority of Macedonian actors to promote the Bulgarian nature of Macedonian identity. Although it is not an authority in our graph but only a hub, its edges connect it to Macedonian media, Bulgarian émigré organizations and Bulgarian émigré actors as well as to Bulgarian state institutions (see Graph Macedonians-3). It can be argued that this ambiguous position based on Bulgarian-Macedonian identity may thus allow actors to strategize between them, serving as a basis for some actors to denounce others and thus position themselves as authorities in delimiting the borders of the ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field, such as is often the case with the MPO. In addition, it may allow them to develop different positional strategies in order to build favourable coalitions with a wider palette of actors.

Similarly to what we saw in Graph Macedonians-2 (categorized by ‘Type of Actor’), in the section relative to the political parties, a significant authority is the website of OMO Ilinden-Pirin, the party of the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria, an actor using both the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages. Despite its partial use of Bulgarian, as the website of a party established in Bulgaria by Bulgarian citizens, the node is very much immersed in the general cluster of the Macedonian-language actors, with numerous connections to Macedonian actors, most significantly media and Macedonian émigré organizations, but also to Bulgarian government institutions.

Conclusion: Shaping a Macedonian diaspora field

By visually illustrating the relative positioning, linkages and interactions between its main actors, we hope to have shown that there indeed exists a ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field. On the basis of the above, we can conclude the following:

– There is an ongoing Macedonian diasporization through the shaping and actor interactions in a ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field.

– In this process, actors sometimes claim to have the relative position that they do not have and to make the efforts that they do not make or that do not have the intended results in the field.

– There is no one dominant actor that exercises a particular authority: perhaps expectedly, the media are the greatest authorities; but apart from Macedonian government and state institutions, several émigré organizations and political parties based in neighbouring countries are also significant authorities. State actors are thus not the only actors in a position of authority when one speaks of the ‘Macedonian diaspora’.

– Although the Republic of Macedonia can be considered a centre for the ‘Macedonian diaspora’, especially as some state and government institutions may attempt to position themselves as such, it is not the only centre, and competes with centres in both overseas and neighbouring countries. This is particularly the case when it comes to the issue of the position of Macedonian minorities in neighbouring countries.

– The relatively important presence of actors from neighbouring countries shows that ‘Macedonian diaspora’ includes not only émigrés and their organizations but also MNM in neighbouring countries, and their organizations.

– The struggle over a Macedonian diaspora is rendered more complex by Greek- and Bulgarian-language actors who take part in the process through their use of the name ‘Macedonia’ and the adjective ‘Macedonian’, and who are, albeit marginally, involved in Macedonian diasporization. They are thereby involved in a struggle over the Macedonian identity in a transnational political field.

– A contrario, despite efforts to include Albanian speakers from the Republic of Macedonia in a non-ethnic Macedonian diaspora, these remain relatively marginal actors, showing few links with Macedonian-language actors in the Republic or abroad. This, we claim, reveals a mismatch stemming from the national and state changes at home of what is deemed ‘Macedonian’, which is not necessarily reflected in national identities abroad. Thus, despite some government efforts to define a ‘diaspora of the Republic of Macedonia’ (instead of a ‘Macedonian diaspora’), namely one that would include not only ethnic Macedonians but also others originating from the territory of the Republic such as Albanian speakers, the ‘Macedonian diaspora’ sees and organizes itself on an ethnic basis. Therefore, while there is a weak ‘Albanian-Macedonian diaspora’ coalition within the Macedonian diaspora’ field, some Albanian émigré actors emerge in ‘Macedonian diaspora’ through Albanian-language actors of the Republic, as we saw for instance with the NAAC.

– As a consequence there are different competing conceptions of ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian-ness’: (a) at home and abroad (in the Republic and in the diaspora); (b) between Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians; and (c) between Macedonian, Bulgarian and Greek diaspora actors abroad.

These are the postulates arrived at on the basis of the interactions revealed and illustrated by our mapping exercise. Our cartography, however, does not allow us to analyse what crosses the interaction channels between the actors forming the ‘Macedonian diaspora’ field: how is Macedonian identity understood and what are the specific struggles around it; how is ‘diaspora’ understood and used in such a context; what concepts are associated with ‘diaspora’ by the different actors; how do the ‘diaspora’ actors behave with each other; and not the least, what are the stakes that lie in the middle of the actor interactions? This is why one needs to study the use of ‘diaspora’ as a political symbol in the Macedonian context, namely its understanding and use by the different actors, and the concepts with which it is most often associated, in order to reveal the issues and corresponding actor battles constituting the process of Macedonian diasporization.

Footnotes

Funding

This research, namely the costs of travelling in order to conduct the cited interviews, was partially funded by the Institut d’études politiques de Paris, through its assistance for mobility scheme.

Notes

Author biography

Kristina Balalovska is a PhD candidate in Political Science (International Relations) at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris and is affiliated to the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), as well as a Master of Arts in Nationalism Studies (Central European University, Budapest) and an MPhil in International Relations (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris). She has published several articles on inter-ethnic conflict, inter-ethnic power sharing, the construction and transformation of national identity and diaspora politics, with a particular focus on Macedonia.

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