‘(World) risk society’ or ‘new rationalities of risk’? A critical discussion of Ulrich Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity

Introduction

In terms of the environment, 1986 was, in many ways, an eventful year in the German Federal Republic. The mass media began to report about the hole in the ozone layer over the Antarctic; the nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl atomic power plant caused anxiety throughout Europe; the German Ministry of the Environment was founded;1 and the at that time relatively unknown German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, published his book Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne in which he introduced the notions of ‘risk society’ and ‘reflexive modernization’. At the time of its publication the book gave rise to a great deal of debate, and today it would hardly be an exaggeration to call it a ‘modern classic’ within social theory.

With his theory of the risk society, Beck (1992 [1986]) claims to present a new theoretical model for understanding our times – a model which emphasizes that contemporary society has changed radically compared to the ‘classic industrial society’ which was the object of Marx’s, Weber’s, and Durkheim’s analyses. At the same time, however, Beck repudiates the idea that this shift has led to a relativistic, postmodern cultural and social condition where all binding standards seem to disappear. Like Habermas (1981), Beck still – basically – seems to be committed to the ‘project of the Enlightenment’, although he stresses that it must be conceived in a new way, where ‘criticism, self-criticism, irony and humanity play a central role’ (Beck l999d: 152).

The basic idea in Beck’s (1992 [1986]) theory of the risk society seems to be quite simple. Today a new set of problems and conflicts, relating to the distribution of risks, tends to become more dominant than the traditional problems and conflicts relating to the distribution of welfare. In earlier times, risks originated from nature, whereas today they originate from ourselves. Risks, according to Beck (1992 [1986]: 19–20), are a product of industrial modernization; they are the unintended consequences of the rapid development of science and technology in late modern (capitalist) society.

According to Beck, these unintended consequences – in the form of pollution, environmental problems, etc. – have become so predominant that it seems to be justified to speak of the emergence of a new type of society – a risk society. In the risk society, modernity becomes reflexive in so far as it is increasingly confronted with its own results. The detraditionalization of late modern society leads to an increasing individualization in as much as individuals are liberated (Freigesetzt) from traditional communities and forms of life such as the church, social classes, the family, membership of political parties, etc.

Beck wants to elaborate on a critical theory of society, but today critique has to be undertaken in a way that is different to that of Marx in so far as society has changed radically since his time. The forces of production have turned into forces of destruction and progress has become negative. Therefore, it is no longer possible to point to a certain class as ‘bearer’ of a change for the better in as much as we are all affected by the destructive logics of the risk society. With his point of departure in critical social theory, Beck develops a, in many ways, mordant critique of society, rationality and science. In essence, it argues that the unintended consequences of industrial society today produce a new ‘context of alienation’ that we cannot escape individually and that affects almost every realm of society whether it be classes, the labour market, family, etc.

Since the publication of Risk Society, Beck in his – still more extensive – work has been concentrating upon an attempt to elaborate on his theory in relation to a wide range of problems and topics. Thus, he (Beck 1993, 1996, 1997, 1999a, 2000 [1998], 2000, 2005 [2002], 2007), among other things, has been theorizing about the transformation of politics, wage labour, the family, the welfare state and civil society in the emerging ‘world risk society’ (cf. Rasborg 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003b).

In his more recent writings, Beck seems to downplay his originally rather pessimistic diagnosis of our times (Zeitdiagnose) in favour of an emphasis on the possibilities of acting upon risk. Accordingly, greater emphasis seems to be put on the notion of reflexive modernization as the overriding diagnostic category of our time (Beck 1997 [1993], 2005, 2007: 37, note 6; Beck and Lau 2005).2 At the same time, one of Beck’s major interests now seems to be to understand the changed conditions and possibilities for political action in reflexive modernity – a transformation of politics that Beck seeks to grasp with the notion of ‘subpolitics' (Beck 1997 [1993], 1997; Holzer and Sørensen 2003). The political dimension is investigated further in Beck’s (2005 [2002], 2006 [2004], 2007; Beck and Grande 2004) most recent works on the ‘world risk society’ as a ‘cosmopolitan society’ in which the increasing global interdependence provides a breeding ground for the emergence of a ‘global citizen’ and a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’.3 Parallel to this theoretical development a main concern has been the attempt to strengthen the empirical foundations for the thesis of the ‘(world) risk society’ or ‘reflexive modernization’; this has been undertaken not least within the context of the interdisciplinary research project ‘Reflexive Modernization’ (‘Reflexive Modernisierung’), in which a range of German scholars within the social sciences have been collaborating on elaborating the theory and underpinning it empirically within different fields of research (Beck and Bonss 2001, 2005; Beck et al. 2003).4

Nevertheless, in spite of this impressive theoretical development, Beck’s theory still seems to be burdened by a range of problems and theoretical ambiguities that I will address in the following. As my point of departure, I will take into consideration some alternative views on risk (and insurance) that can be found in contemporary German, French and American social theory. On this basis, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses in Beck’s diagnosis of contemporary society as a ‘(world) risk society’ or a ‘reflexive (second) modernity’. In the course of the exposition I shall endeavour to keep the discussion up to date on the basis of Beck’s most recent works, not least his most recent principal work, World at Risk (2009) (Weltrisikogesellschaft, 2007), in which he summarizes and reflects on his theoretical development as a whole.

Risk and danger

One of the most obvious objections to the hypothesis of a ‘(world) risk society’ is that we have always been confronted with all kinds of risks: earthquakes, floods, plagues, cholera, etc. Not only have we always been confronted with risk, one can even claim that in some respects our existence today is less risky than it was just a hundred years ago.

Thus, average life expectancy has increased significantly in all modern industrialized countries in the 20th century, which is not least due to better living conditions, nutrition and public health, as well as improvements within medical science (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 13–15; Giddens 1991: 114–17; Glassner 1999: xii; Latour 2003: 36).5 Moreover, we take many significant risks in modern life, voluntarily, so to speak; these include smoking, driving, drinking, eating junk food, participating in extreme sports, unsafe sex, etc. (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 16–21; Greenfeld 1999: 54–62). Taken together, these things cause a significant number of deaths, generate additional hazards and thus increase health care expenditure.

In 1986, Beck had already anticipated some of these objections by arguing that it is the nature of risk that has changed. Whereas risks were previously more ‘accidental’ and ‘individual’ (i.e. bound to the actions of a single agent, e.g. the hunter who goes out hunting), they are today systematically produced by modern industrial-capitalistic forms of production. In late modern society, risks are ‘systems immanent’ and universalizing (increasingly global) (Beck 1992 [1986]: 21, 32, 62). In his more recent writings, however, Beck (1995 [1988]: 77–8; 1993: 278, note 10a) has attempted to clarify the differences between old and new, respectively voluntary and involuntary, risks, and in this he seems to have adopted Niklas Luhmann’s (1990) distinction between risk and danger.6

Risk as observation

In Luhmann’s systems theory, risks are analysed as ‘second order observations', that is, as ‘observations of observations' (Luhmann 1990: 137–8; 1991: 25; cf. Kneer and Nassehi 1997: 176). According to Luhmann (1997: 65), observations are related to social systems that operate from a distinction between system (self-reference) and the surrounding world (other-reference). The observations of social systems always take place on the basis of certain guiding differences (binary codes), with the result that some aspects of the observed matter are manifest while others are not (Luhmann 1991: 86–92). Social systems are self-referential, that is they are not able to communicate but can only make a surrounding world for, or ‘irritate’, each other (Luhmann 1992).

According to Luhmann, there is a close connection between risk and decision. Risk must be seen as decisions observed with respect to the future (Luhmann 1990: 136, 140–1). However, as decisions are always made towards a contingent future, the possibility, or risk, of unintended consequences of action is always present. Thus, all decisions, including decisions concerned with safety, are connected with risk (Luhmann 1990: 134–5, 159–60). Hence, it makes no sense to oppose risk to safety. In Luhmann’s (1990: 134–40; 1991: 30–38) opinion, the question of risk must rather be thought within the code-distinction risk/danger.

The way to determine whether the consequences of a given action constitute a risk or a danger has to do with the question of who makes the decision. For the one who decides, the consequences of the action appear as a risk; for the one who is affected, the consequences appear as a danger (Luhmann 1990: 137–40, 148–9). Thus, depending on the perspective, the same phenomenon can be observed as either risk or danger: If I am a smoker, I run the risk of getting lung cancer, whereas those who due to my smoking become passive smokers are exposed to danger. In Luhmann’s ‘radical’ constructivist approach, risk and danger are thus seen as relative phenomena closely linked with the observations and decisions of social systems; risks do not exist ‘as such’, but must be seen as symptoms of the way in which modern society observes itself with respect to the consequences of an increasing complexity of decisions.

Large-scale hazards

Now in the course of his writing Beck has developed his notion of risk in a way that bears a certain resemblance to Luhmann’s notion of risk. In Risk Society (1992 [1986]) Beck speaks indiscriminately of risk and danger; moreover, he points out the difficulties in connecting given risks with certain causes (Urheber) (cf. above). In his more recent work, however, Beck (1995 [1988], 1993, 1996) adopts Luhmann’s distinction between risk and danger, and at the same time he emphasizes the dependence of risks on decisions.

According to Beck (1995 [1988]: 77–8, 1996: 11), one now has to distinguish between pre-modern hazards stemming from unpredictable forces of nature and perceived as determined by fate (earthquakes, floods, epidemics, etc.) on the one hand, and modern risks that result from modern civilization and thereby, ultimately, from human decisions on the other. Hence, modern risks, contrary to pre-modern dangers, are characterized by their dependence on decisions. On the face of it, this might indicate a more ‘voluntaristic’ view on risk, but Beck (1992: 98) stresses that we are dealing with complex decision-making processes taking place within the framework of organizations, enterprises, state organs, political parties, etc.

Moreover, within the highly developed (industrial) risk society Beck underscores that one has also to distinguish between:

… (industrial) risks and the return of incalculable insecurities in the form of large-scale hazards of late industrialism. The latter also emerged historically out of human deeds, so they cannot be palmed off on extra-societal forces and influences; but they simultaneously undercut the social logic of risk calculation and provision. (Beck 1995 [1988]: 77)

Of course, the analogy between Luhmann’s and Beck’s view on risk should not be taken too far, in as much as Beck (1997 [1993]: 180, note 16; l997: 57) generally distances himself from Luhmann’s systems theory. Thus, Beck (1993: 278–9, note 10c; 2007: 252–8) criticizes Luhmann’s version of the distinction between risk and danger for being much too relative (in relation to themes and situations) and thereby making difficult the demarcation of social lines of conflict in relation to risks. Furthermore, Beck (1997 [1993]: 27, 112, 124, 157) criticizes the notion of self-referentiality for failing to acknowledge the increasing interdependence of social systems in reflexive modernity. Finally, Beck (1997: 55) – in line with Habermas (1994 [1992]: 67) – emphasizes that social systems are not ‘subject-free’ but, on the contrary, are reproduced by the actions of human beings and therefore also dependent on their consent.7

Generalized uncertainty

Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991, 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000) is another prominent sociologist who has based a substantial part of his analysis of late modernity on a notion of risk. As a matter of fact, Giddens is one of the contemporary sociologists who has been most inspired by Beck’s ideas, and in recent years the influence seems to have gone in the other direction as well (cf. Beck et al. 1994).

Giddens (1999: 21–3), like Beck, emphasizes that risk is a specifically modern phenomenon which is caused by human intervention in nature and, in a wider sense, by the increasing de-traditionalization and institutional reflexivity of late modern society. According to Giddens (1998a: 27; 1999: 26), early modernity, which by and large was coincident with industrial society, was dominated by ‘external risks', that is, risks that could somehow be perceived as independent of the actions of the individuals, that could fairly well be calculated, and that could therefore also be subjected to actuarial tables (e.g. unemployment, sickness, etc.).8

Today, however, we are increasingly confronted with new types of risk and existential uncertainty that can be seen as a result of the incredible dynamic and pace of change in late modern society. In Giddens' (1990) view, these forms of social change are expressed as a restructuring of time and space, a ‘disembedding’ of expert systems, and as a radically increased reflexivity. Rapid modernization undermines tradition which results in an increasing existential uncertainty as we can no longer know anything for sure. The rapid change and institutional reflexivity of late modernity, in other words, threatens the ‘ontological security’ that, in Giddens' (1991) view, is a condition for the creation of a coherent self capable of coping with the complexity of late modernity.

Thus, in late modernity pre-modern dangers and external risks are to a still larger degree replaced by a ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Giddens 1994: 78, 152, 219; 1998a: 28; 1999: 26–8), that is, an existential uncertainty found in societies where traditional certainties are eroded as a consequence of the ‘end’ of tradition and the ‘end’ of nature. Moreover, we are confronted with ‘high-consequence risks' that refer to global threats to the environment caused by human intervention in nature (holes in the ozone layer, global warming, etc.) (Giddens 1994: 78, 152, 219).

However, this new structure of risk does not necessarily mean that ‘real riskiness' altogether has increased in late modern society (Giddens 1991: 114–17; 1998a: 27). On the contrary, increasing life expectancy indicates that a risk-reduction has occurred with regard to the basic life security (cf. Nielsen 1996: 182). Thus, all in all, it seems more appropriate to say that late modernity is characterized by a change of the ‘risk profile’, from dangers determined by nature to man-made risks (Giddens 1994: 4; 1999: 36). Nevertheless, Giddens (1994: 152; 1998a: 28) seems to agree with Beck in that one of the most important characteristics of the new forms of risk and generalized uncertainty in late modernity is that they are not calculable and therefore cannot be managed by way of insurance.

Risk and insurance

Thus, both Beck and Giddens stress that (world) risk society is not simply an ‘insurance-society’ (Ewald 1991 [1989]). As long as risks were rather confined and could fairly well be calculated, they were insurable (e.g. health insurance, unemployment insurance, industrial injury insurance, etc.) – in that respect, the risk society and the insurance society are two sides of the same coin. ‘High-consequence risks' and ‘manufactured uncertainty’, however, indicate the breakdown of the principle of insurance, in as much as it becomes difficult to identify, predict and calculate risks (Beck 1995 [1988]: 85–6, 106–10).

Consequently, the highly developed (world) risk society’s ‘low probability, but high consequence risks' lead to a paradox: Even though technicians, experts and political decision-makers claim that the risk of a given damage is minimal, it cannot be insured; the technical risk assessment and the principle of insurance collide in the highly developed (world) risk society (Beck 1993: 44; 1994a: 11). The highly developed (world) risk society, in Beck’s and Giddens' opinion, seems to be a ‘post-risk-calculation-society’ (Dean 1998: 29, my emphasis; 1999: 183), and therefore it is also a ‘post-insurance-society’ (Beck 2007: 61–3, 202).9 The question, however, is whether it is possible to uphold Beck’s and Giddens' assumption of the existence of one historical stage (industrial society) where risks could be fairly well calculated, and another ((world) risk society) where it becomes more difficult to calculate, and thus insure, risks. In the final analysis, this opposition seems to be based on a realist assumption of the existence of different historical stages that are dominated by different types of (real) risks.

The critique of the realist notion of risk

The realist notion of risk has been subjected to a scathing critique by François Ewald (1991; 1991 [1989]), who points out that risk does not exist as such: ‘Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event’ (Ewald 1991: 199; cf. Dean 1999: 183–8).

Thus, risk or ‘riskiness' is not an inherent property of, but rather a way of observing, given phenomena (damages). One might say that whereas risk, according to Luhmann, is a way of observing decisions with respect to the future, risk for Ewald is a way of observing given phenomena (damages) from an insurance point of view. Hence, there is an inner connection between risk and insurance. Insurance is, as Ewald puts it, the technology of risk, as this is what makes it meaningful at all to speak of something as a risk: ‘Insurance can be defined as a technology of risk. In fact the term “risk” ... has no precise meaning other than as a category of this technology’ (Ewald 1991: 198). From an insurance point of view, risks are characterized by the fact that they are (1) calculable, (2) collective, and (3) are a capital (Ewald 1991: 201–4).

In other words, Ewald (1991: 201–2) wants to point out that for something to be a risk it must be amenable to actuarial principles, that is, statistics and calculations of probability. Moreover, if risks are to be calculated, it must be possible to survey their distribution across a given population, in so far as insurance against risks is a way of equalizing risks where the ‘insurance community’ sets off the individual loss (Ewald 1991: 202–3). Finally, by way of insurance it must be possible to compensate for damages that cannot in principle be priced (e.g. the loss of a limb caused by an industrial accident) (Ewald 1991: 204–5). This is determined on the basis of actuarial tables, whereby insurance must be seen as ‘an attempt to make the incalculable calculable’ (Dean 1998: 29; 1999: 177). Thus, if risk is defined in terms of insurance, it follows that it makes no sense to speak of risks that cannot be insured (cf. below). Taking this actuarial notion of risk as his point of departure, Ewald (1991 [1989]: 288, 291; 1991: 207, 209) conceives of the modern welfare state as a collective system of insurance against the risks of industrial society (unemployment, sickness, etc.). As a system of insurance, the welfare state socializes risk, wherefore insurance can be seen as constitutive of the social contract, and hence solidarity, in modern society.10

Three questionable assumptions concerning Beck’s theory

Taking Ewald’s notion of risk as his point of departure, Mitchell Dean (1998; 1999: 176–97) has argued that the theory of the risk society can be said to be based on three basic assumptions that reveal the problematic nature of Beck’s approach to the analysis of risk, namely (1) a ‘totalizing assumption’, (2) an ‘assumption of uniformity of risk’, and (3) a ‘realist assumption’.

The first assumption refers to Beck’s (2007: 47–8, 187) inclination to conceive of risks as representing a new inescapable and totalizing ‘context of alienation’ produced by the process of (industrial) modernization (Dean 1998: 28; 1999: 181). The second assumption refers to Beck’s idea that it is possible to categorize risks into general types that are predominant in different historical periods (cf. above). The third assumption refers to Beck’s (2007: 35–6) view that risks are not pure constructions but have a real content, a content that even changes in the highly developed (world) risk society (incalculability); that is: ‘that the reason why risk is a feature of quotidian existence in this risk society, and a component of individual and collective experience and identities, is that real riskiness has increased so much that it has outrun the mechanisms of its calculation and control’ (Dean 1998: 28; 1999: 182).

All in all, these are the assumptions that can be said to lie behind Beck’s ‘realist’ idea that it is possible to distinguish between one historical stage where risks were, in principle, calculable, and another where risks increasingly become incalculable. Thus, in Beck’s theory: ‘risk is viewed within a general schema and narrative of phases of modernity and as a feature of the ontological condition of humans within current social forms' (Dean 1998: 25; 1999: 178). Seen from Dean’s point of view, though, this idea proves to be wrong. If risk is defined in terms of insurance, it follows that it must be calculable (if it were not, it would not be a risk): ‘It is ... not possible to speak of incalculable risks, or of risks that escape our modes of calculation, and even less to speak of a social order in which risk is largely calculable and contrast it with one in which risk has become largely incalculable’ (Dean 1998: 25; 1999: 177). As making the incalculable calculable is what insurance is all about: ‘It is not possible to contrast calculable risks and incalculable risks. For insurance rationality, everything can be treated as a risk, and the task of insurers has been both to “produce” risks and to find ways of insuring what has previously been thought to be uninsurable’ (Dean 1998: 29).

Consequently, Beck’s view of risk as rooted primarily in the development of science and technology seems to be much too simple: ‘The genealogy of risk is much more complex than the theory of risk society allows' (Dean 1998: 34; 1999: 191). Instead, Dean (1998: 28; 1999: 188–97) suggests a more differentiated theoretical model where risk is analysed as connected with a range of complex steering technologies and practices in the modern welfare state. Important sources of inspiration for such an approach to the analysis of risk are the theories of Foucault (1991 [1978]) and Ewald (1991, 1991 [1989]) where ‘risk is analysed as a component of assemblages of practices, techniques and rationalities concerned with how we govern’ (Dean 1998: 25; 1999: 178). Thus, in Dean's (radical) constructivist approach, risk is not simply connected with science and technology but is also seen as having to do with modern forms of ‘governmentality’, that is, certain forms of governing practices concerned with the regulation and control of human conduct. In other words, we are dealing with new forms of risk management that seek to constitute (construct) certain areas of social reality as calculable and, thereby, also as manageable.

Risk as social construction

Dean’s critique of Beck’s ‘realism’, however, seems to play down the fact that from the very beginning, Beck’s theory contained a rather significant constructivist train of thought; moreover, it seems to ignore the fact that in recent years Beck (1996, 1999b) has explicitly distanced himself from a ‘naive realism’.

In Risk Society, Beck (1992 [1986]: 22, 26–34, 51–84) already emphasized the dependence of risk on knowledge. As risk often cannot be experienced directly (e.g. pesticides in the drinking water, holes in the ozone layer, etc.), the role of science in detecting risk is decisive. In this line of argument, one could claim that risks only ‘become risks' due to our (scientific) knowledge. And sometimes Beck (1992 [1986]: 22, 27, 55) actually goes as far as to claim that risks only exist in our knowledge.11 At the same time, however, Beck (l992 [1986]: 26, 62, 177) repeatedly, in a realist fashion, refers to the fact that real risks are increasing rapidly in contemporary society.

In its original formulation the theory of the risk society thus seems to be burdened by a basic inconsistency with respect to the epistemological and ontological status of risk. Are risks hard, material facts? Or are they rather to be seen as cultural and social constructions? Are risks increasing rapidly in late modernity? Or are we rather to speak of an increasing awareness of risk? In Risk Society, Beck (1992 [1986]: 55) seems to answer these questions in an ambiguous way: Our awareness of risk is increasing, because of the fact that risks are multiplying.

However, in his more recent writings Beck (1996, 1999c, 2007) takes a more explicit stand on the question of constructivism versus realism. His position can be described as a rejection of ‘naive realism’ as well as of ‘radical constructivism’. Whereas the first claims that risks exist in a hard, material, way and thus can be determined independently of the observer, the second conversely claims that risks are social and cultural phenomena that are determined – constructed – through complex processes of selection and definition. The realist approach is, of course, first and foremost represented by natural science. A classic study in the constructivist line of argument is Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky’s book Risk and Culture (1983), which is based on the assumption that every society is confronted with an in principle infinite number of risks. However, in so far as no society is able to face all risks at once, a risk-selection must necessarily take place. Therefore, what is interesting is to investigate the social and cultural processes of selection and definition through which certain types of risk become prevalent in a given society.12

In Beck’s (1996) opinion, however, neither of the two alternatives is tenable. A naive realism ignores the fact that risk assessments, threshold values, etc., are dependent on definitions, and are determined in a highly complex game of knowledge, power, political and economic interests, etc. (Beck 1992 [1986]: 22, 26–34, 51–84). Conversely, a radical constructivism leads to a relativism that ‘deprives' risks of any real content. This is problematic:

For, among other things, we know that people in the Stone Age did not have the capacity for nuclear and ecological annihilation, and that the dangers posed by lurking demons did not have the same political dynamic as the man-made hazards of ecological self-destruction. (Beck 1996: 4)

Thus, ‘risks are at the same time “real” and constituted by social perception and construction’ (Beck 1999d: 143; 2007: 51). Late modern risks, according to Beck (1999d: 138), must be seen as highly complex phenomena that at one and the same time are related to mathematical calculations, technical knowledge, culture and norms. However, because of the ‘real’ as well as ‘constructed’ character of risk, it is not possible to make a decision as to whether a realist or a constructivist approach is more adequate:

I consider realism and constructivism to be neither an either-or option nor a mere matter of belief. We should not have to swear allegiance to any particular view or theoretical perspective. The decision whether to take a realist or a constructivist approach is for me a rather pragmatic one, a matter of choosing the appropriate means for a desired goal. If I have to be a realist (for the moment) in order to open up the social sciences for the new and contradictory experiences of the global age of global risks, then I have no qualms about adopting the guise and language of a (‘reflexive’) ‘realist.’ If constructivism makes a (positive) problem shift possible and if it allows us to raise important questions that realists do not ask, then I am content (for the moment at least) to be a constructivist. … I find it insufficient today, especially in the area of risk, to restrict my analysis to one perspective or conceptual dogma only: I can be both a realist and constructivist, using realism and constructivism as far as those meta-narratives are useful for the purpose of understanding the complex and ambivalent ‘nature’ of risk in the world risk society we live in. (Beck 1999d: 134)

In his most recent work Beck (2007: 51, 167–8) basically seems to maintain his ‘reflexive realism’, which he now also – somewhat paradoxically – terms ‘constructivist realism’. Thus, on the one hand, he claims that risks exist solely in our observation (radical) constructivism): ‘… the objectivity of a risk is a product of its perception and its staging (also by experts)’ (Beck 2009 [2007]: 13, cf. 12, 30, 31). At the same time, however, he insists that risks are real phenomena that exist independently of our observation (realism):

Does the ‘staging’ of risk therefore mean that risks do not exist at all? Of course not. Nobody can deny that the fears that an intercontinental airliner will explode as a result of a terrorist attack, that a nuclear power plant will be built, that an oil tanker will run aground or that London and Tokyo will be inundated as a result of climate change as some predict, are founded on objective realities. (Beck 2009 [2007]: 13, cf. 86, 88)

Hence, Beck’s (2007: 232) attempt to ‘reconcile’ realism and constructivism seems to be identical with the claim that the ‘risk reality’ of reflexive modernity is a socially constructed reality: ‘The reality of risk is shown by its controversial character. Risks do not have any abstract existence in themselves. They acquire reality in the contradictory judgements of groups and populations' (Beck 2009 [2007]: 13; cf. 128). However, as indicated in the above, this ‘constructivist realism’ seems to encompass at least three different conceptions of risk that are not always separated from one another:

Risks are real phenomena, that have agency; their (objective) nature changes in the process of modernization, in so far as they are increasingly transformed into ‘large-scale hazards' that cannot be insured against (non-calculability) (realism) (Beck 2007: 35–6, 162, 166).

The idea of ‘reflexive modernization’

The ambiguity with regard to the relation between realism and (epistemological and ontological) constructivism seems to be repeated in Beck’s view on the relation between knowledge and unawareness in reflexive modernity. Beck, Giddens and Lash all launch the notion of reflexive modernization as an alternative to the rather protracted debate on modernity versus postmodernity (Beck et al. 1994: vi). Yet if we take a closer look at how Beck, Giddens and Lash conceptualize the notion of reflexive modernization, some theoretical differences seem to be at work. For Lash (1994a, 1994b), the reflexivity of late modernity first and foremost seems to refer to the cultural and aesthetic realm; Giddens (1994a, 1994b) prefers to speak of an ‘institutional reflexivity’ that in a wider sense can be said to be an effect of the post-traditional society; for Beck (1994a, 1994b), however, the notion of reflexive modernization refers to an epochal differentiation between different stages in the process of modernization.

In Beck’s (1992 [1986]: 10, 19, 153; 1997 [1993]: 11–19) theory of modernity, the transition from industrial to (world) risk society is thus seen as a transition from a simple to a reflexive modernity. In the early, ‘simple’ stage of modernity, belief in progress and science could still be upheld; risks could still be legitimated by progress and science was seen as part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. In the reflexive stage of modernity, however, belief in progress and science erodes as it becomes clear that the productive forces have turned into forces of destruction, and that science ‘participates' in the production of risks; as a result, risks can no longer be legitimated by science and progress (Beck 2007: 108).

The loss of legitimacy forces modernity to see itself in a matter-of-fact way; modernity, as Beck puts it, ‘becomes a theme and a problem for itself’ (Beck 1994a: 8; 1992 [1986]: 19). And it is exactly this ‘self-confrontation’ that makes modernity reflexive (Beck 1994a: 5–8). However, the reflexivity of late modernity does not necessarily lead to an increasing reflection on the ‘self-destructive potentials' of the (world) risk society. Thus, Beck (1999c: 109; 1994b: 175–8; 2007: 218–24) is critical of Giddens' and Lash’s inclination to conceive of reflexive modernization as a conscious process mediated by knowledge (reflection).

Beck (1999c: 110; 2007: 219) does not disagree with Giddens and Lash in that knowledge plays an important role in reflexive modernity. But, contrary to Giddens and Lash, Beck emphasizes that the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernization to a large extent is unawareness, in as much as risk must be seen as the unintended consequences of industrial modernization (reflexivity):

What distinguishes my concept of reflexive modernization from those of Giddens and Lash? To put it briefly and pointedly: the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernization is not knowledge, but – more or less reflexive – unawareness. It is this aspect of the distribution and defence of unawareness (Nicht-Wissen) that opens the horizon of inquiry for non-linear theories (of reflexive modernization). We live in the age of unintended consequences, and it is this state of affairs that must be decoded and shaped methodologically and theoretically, in everyday life and politically. (Beck 1999c: 119; cf. 2007: 224).14

Nevertheless, with this notion of reflexivity, Beck seems to entangle himself in contradictions. On the one hand, Beck assumes that risks are real (but systematically excommunicated) in the risk society. It is, Beck says, an ‘interesting “law” of the risk society’ that ‘the less risks are publicly recognized, the more risks are produced’ (Beck 1999d: 144, emphasis in original; 2007: 95, 232). On the other hand, in a radical constructivist way, Beck claims that risks exist only in our knowledge of them: ‘So ultimately: it is cultural perception and definition that constitute risk. “Risk” and the “(public) definition of risk” are one and the same’ (Beck 1999d: 135, emphasis in the original; 2007: 34, 66, 68). Thus, at one and the same time, Beck seems to claim that risks are real, and that they are purely discursive phenomena (cf. above).

In an attempt to solve this contradiction, Beck introduces a hypothesis of a ‘time lag’ between (objective) production and (subjective) perception of risk (Alexander and Smith 1996: 254–6). Thus, he (Beck 1999b: 72–5; 2007: 162) distinguishes between two stages in the development of the risk society: a primary stage where risks are still latent, that is, where ‘the self-identity of industrial society’ still dominates; and a secondary stage where risks become so extensive and manifest that ‘industrial society sees and criticizes itself as risk society’. Consequently, according to this model it seems to be the (factual) multiplication of risks that makes them so extensive that the individuals necessarily become aware of them (Alexander and Smith 1996: 254).

However, the problem with this realist argument seems to be that it plays down the impact of cultural factors – norms and values, everyday life, mass media, etc. – in the perception of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Alexander and Smith 1996; Cottle 1998: 14–18; Mythen 2004: 104–7). Studies have shown that routines and habits play an important role in people’s perception of risk (Wynne 1996; Halkier 1999), as well as modern mass media which obviously have a great impact on the communication about – and thereby the social construction of – risk (Cottle 1998; Glassner 1999; Breck 2001; Furedi 2002; Boyne 2003: 23-41; Mythen 2004: ch. 4).

In his most recent work, Beck (2007: 162–3) recognizes the limitations of the realist two-stage model; in addition, he emphasizes the important role played by the media in the social construction of risk. Nevertheless, it is not clear if he claims that the media primarily reveal (previously hidden) risks, or if he also concedes that they might dramatize risks and thus cause an unjustified fear in the population.15 A possible explanation for this ambiguity might be that the media in Beck’s view can play both roles depending on the actual type of risk. In any case, it seems as if Beck (2007: 91–2, 112–16) tends to emphasize the revealing (enlightening) role played by the media in connection with (global) environmental risks and natural disasters, whereas he (Beck 2007: 138, 283) points to their dramatizing role when it comes to the threats from international terrorism. The question, however, as to why the media seem to act differently in relation to different types of risk is not gone into more thoroughly.16

Beck and critical theory

With the theory of reflexive modernization, Beck (1997 [1993]: 20–40; 2007: 376) claims to put forward a ‘non-linear’ paradigm of modernization that is contrary to most of the sociological tradition – from Marx, Durkheim and Weber via Horkheimer, Adorno and Parsons to Foucault and Luhmann – which has been theorizing within the paradigm of simple modernization. In other words, in Beck’s view we are dealing with ‘linear’ theories of an advancing modernization and rationalization.

At first it might seem as if Beck himself outlines a linear theory, in so far as (world) risk society is conceived of as an (apparently) new ‘stage’ in the development of society that necessarily follows from the previous stage (industrial society) (Beck 2007: 201). However, Beck emphasizes that reflexive modernization must be seen as a dialectic between modernization and ‘counter-modernization’. ‘Counter-modernity’ refers to phenomena that can be seen as regressive in relation to modernity’s ideals of reason, freedom and liberty (Beck 1992 [1986]: 108, 192, 214; 1997 [1993]: 61–93). ‘Counter-modernization’ is not a de-modernization but, on the contrary, is a product of reflexive modernization (Beck 1997 [1993]: 90). Religious fundamentalism, neo-nationalism, neo-racism, neo-tribalism, etc. are, in Beck’s sense, counter-modern phenomena that can be seen as reactions to a widespread reflexivity and as indicating a need for certainty in a detraditionalized lifeworld (hergestellte Fraglosigkeit). Hence, the process of modernization is not necessarily equivalent to an irreversible change for the better; on the contrary, the risk of repercussions and re-emerging irrationalism is always present.

Thus, ironically, Beck’s (1997 [1993]: 161) critical encounter with a linear concept of progress in some respects bears a resemblance to Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1971 [1944]) diagnosis of the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’ as a fatal and unrecoverable process ending up in the ‘project of Enlightenment’ turning into its opposite and becoming barbaric.17 Like Horkheimer and Adorno, Beck attempts to demonstrate that modern rationality contains a latent irrationalism. The modern ‘project of the conquering of nature’, which was meant to liberate us from the forces of nature, leads to a new dependency, in so far as we become subjected to the risks produced by modern civilization. If the vicious circle is to be broken, modernity must ‘come to its senses' (Beck 1994a: 54, note 19; 2007: 347). However, in Beck’s opinion, the prevailing irrationality can be overcome only by way of rationality:

It is not an excess of rationality, but a shocking lack of rationality, the prevailing irrationality, that explains the ailment of industrial modernity. It can be cured, if at all, not by a retreat, but only by a radicalization of rationality, which will absorb the repressed uncertainty. (Beck 1997 [1993]; 126; cf. Beck 1994a: 33)

Unlike critical theory, however, Beck (1994a: 9) points to the fact that goal-rationality (instrumental reason), because of its unpredictable and incalculable side-effects, tends to go beyond itself and become a reflexive and ‘self-critical’ ‘post-goal-rationality’ (Post-zweckrationalität):

Finally, risk rationality develops an existential ‘logic’ of shock, suffering and pity on a global scale in opposition to the ‘instrumental rationality’ which Max Weber places at the centre of his sociology and Horkheimer and Adorno and, most recently, also Jürgen Habermas have criticized (albeit in completely different ways). One could say that risk reflexivity – or, more generally, reflexive modernization – is an ambivalent, realist critique of instrumentally stunted reason. Here in key domains of social rationalization it can be empirically and theoretically demonstrated how the radicalization of modernity leads to a self-confrontation, self-delegitimation and self-transformation of instrumental rationality. (Beck 2009 [2007]: 198–9)

Conclusion

In this paper I have called attention to some basic problems in Beck’s theory of the (world) risk society. A main thread in the critique has been that of addressing the theoretical ambiguities that characterize Beck’s notion of risk. In the course of his development of his theory, Beck, as shown, has attempted to solve the problem of the relation between realism and constructivism by advocating a ‘reflexive realism’, and in his most recent writings he advances an ambivalent and rather pragmatic ‘both-and’ attitude. The relation between realism and constructivism, however, still seems to be unclarified in Beck’s theory.

A more radical constructivism would not seem to be a solution to Beck’s dilemma, in as much as the question of the (world) risk society as a ‘social fact’ would dissolve into a purely discourse-theoretical question as to why in the second half of the 20th century there has apparently been a change in the ‘semantics of crisis' of the highly developed industrial society – from an observation of the ‘legitimation crisis' of late capitalism (Habermas 1973) to an observation of the ‘ecological crisis' of late modern society.18 Conversely, the implicit realism that seems to lie behind the idea that the nature of risk changes within different stages of modernity (incalculability) seems to contradict Beck’s central hypothesis of the dependence of risks on knowledge and definitions – a hypothesis which is clearly anti-realistic and based on a sociology of knowledge.

With the alternative positions discussed in this paper, some indications have been given as to how one might elaborate further on the problem of risk. It has been suggested that risk could be seen as relating to the general structures of meaning that regulate the self-understanding of a society (Alexander and Smith), to the self-observation of modern society (Luhmann), or to modern forms of governmentality (Dean). A common characteristic of these alternative positions is that they avoid an exclusive focus on technology as well as a realist notion of risk (Lupton 1999: 28–35). Thus, rather than a mainly technology-driven new type of social reality, the ‘(world) risk society’ could be seen as indicating a changing cultural self-understanding of late modern society, a new ‘semantics of crisis', or the emergence of new forms of governmentality in the contemporary welfare state.

With regard to the changing cultural self-understanding, or new semantics of crisis, of late modern society, social theorists such as Barry Glassner (1999) and Frank Furedi (2002) have argued that we live in a ‘culture of fear’ where not least the mass media play a crucial role in the social construction of risk. According to Glassner’s and Furedi’s ‘sociology of fear’, the main reason for our obsession with risk in late modern society is to be found not in an increase of real riskiness but rather in the fact that the media in their constant search for ‘catchy one-liners' focus disproportionately on deadly deceases, crime, violence, sexual assaults, terror, etc. (Rasborg 2003a; Jacobsen 2003). In the Luhmannian perspective outlined in the above, this can be seen as indicating a changing self-observation of social systems in contemporary society – a self-observation in which the media-system plays a significant role (Luhmann 2000 [1996]).

Within the governmentality perspective, Dean (1999: 191) points out that the emergence of advanced liberal government in the last half of the 20th century is linked with an increasing de-socialization, privatization and individualization of the collective (solidaric) risk-management of the welfare state. We are thus witnessing the emergence of new types of risk-management that work through the freedom of choice of individuals in order to make them into ‘morally responsible subjects' that bear the responsibility for their own life-planning and reflexive risk management. In the Danish (institutional-redistributive) welfare state this management through ‘self-management’ appears, among other things, in the shape of (offensive) workfare policies where the long-term unemployed are expected to work out individual plans of action in order to optimize their opportunities of reintegration in the labour market (Torfing 1999: 13–21).

In the preventive measures launched by the Danish (liberal-conservative) government within the field of health care it is also emphasized that the single individual bears a responsibility for ‘self-initiative’ and ‘self-care’. At the same time, however, cross-sector collaborations (social partnerships) between voluntary organizations, municipalities, regions, workplaces and providers of health care services are encouraged (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2002: 4–10). In both cases we are dealing with reflexive forms of risk-management that are implemented through decentralized steering-networks (governance) and work through the fact that ‘groups of various kinds have come to understand themselves, their futures and their needs in terms of risk, with the assistance of a range of specialists and tutors in the identification and management of risk’ (Dean 1999: 192).

Common to these alternative positions is that they set the stage for concrete analyses of how risk can be seen not only as a side-effect of economic and technological development but also as being linked with complex forms of power and control in contemporary society. In other words, this seems to be a fruitful perspective for analyses of specific ‘risk logics' or ‘rationalities' in late modern society. Taking this more differentiated perspective as the point of departure, it seems questionable to speak of a ‘risk society’, or even a ‘world risk society’, in as much as risk is made into the defining characteristic of contemporary society. In order to avoid such a questionable ‘totalization’ or ‘absolutation’ of what, all things considered, seems to be only one trait of development in contemporary society, I suggest that rather than a risk society we should speak of specific ‘risk logics' or ‘rationalities' in late modern society. It seems to me that the advantage of such a more differentiated theoretical approach is that it provides a more matter of fact account of the important, but not all-important, and thus neither socially constitutive, role of risk in contemporary society.