Negative recognition

Abstract

The publications of Taylor (1994) and Honneth (1995) have ignited a renewed interest in the Hegelian theme of recognition. But recognition has not only positive aspects, as there are also negative connotations to recognition seen as misrecognition. What might be termed negative recognition argues that there is more to recognition than simple misrecognition. This article aims to show that negative recognition reaches beyond misrecognition and non-recognition. The paper argues that there are at least four versions of negative recognition. These are misrecognition, non-recognition, de-recognition, and pathological mass-recognition. The examples used to illustrate the existence of these four forms of negative recognition have been drawn from the world of work and general politics. The conclusion enhances the negative side of the ‘recognition thesis’ as recently outlined by Martineau et al. (2012) and others.

Keywords

Hegel Honneth management misrecognition recognition work

Ever since the two German philosophers Fichte and – more prominently – Hegel (1807) introduced the concept of recognition, a debate on what has been termed ‘the recognition-theoretical turn’ has been taking place (Toppinnen, 2005: 428; cf. Mark, 2014). This debate on a ‘fundamental overarching moral category’ received a strong impetus during the 1990s with ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (Taylor, 1994) and The Struggle for Recognition (Honneth, 1995), written in the spirit of left-Hegelian critical theory. This debate was masterfully enhanced in Fraser and Honneth’s Redistribution or Recognition? (2003). It extended recognition to encompass all levels of social-philosophical theory. More recently, what has become known as ‘the recognition thesis’ has continued (Anderson, 2009; Klikauer, 2010; Mark, 2014) with Martineau et al.’s (2012) work on misrecognition outlining the negative side of recognition.

As a contribution to the ‘recognition-vs.-misrecognition’ debate (Martineau et al., 2012: 6), the following offers a discussion on misrecognition that many have viewed as simply ‘making a mistake’. The concept of misrecognition is advanced by offering three additional versions of failed or negative recognition. Taken together, all four versions of negative recognition remain ‘asymmetrical relationships such as that of master and slave [that] are unable to prove the recognition necessary for either party to lead a full flourishing human life’ (Martineau et al., 2012: 2). Today’s relationships that prevent mutual and equal recognition are no longer reflective of Hegel’s feudal Herr und Knecht (Kojève, 1947; Holz, 1968) but have mutated into ‘human-resource-vs.-management’ under advanced capitalism and managerialism (Klikauer, 2010: 105–25; 2013; Quante, 2013; Chitty, 2013). Hence,

the recognition of [a worker’s] performance can be measured along two axes: along the vertical axis, workers’ performance may be appreciated by their managers, and along the horizontal axis, it may be appreciated by the collective with which they work. In some cases, the latter sort of recognition by co-workers can compensate for a lack of recognition by bosses. (Martineau et al., 2012: 7)

What is described as ‘performance’ is termed ‘performance management’ in the world of management (Alexander, 2011; Paauwe et al., 2013). In management, the emphasis is no longer on workers with their performance being appreciated by management but the emphasis rests on performance itself when a managerial function is appreciated rather than workers (Bolton and Houlian, 2008). This is not simply ‘a mistake’ in recognition (Martineau et al., 2012: 6) but deliberate managerial ‘non-recognition’ of workers. But this represents just one form of negative recognition. Based on the Hegelian master-slave concept with recognition versus incomplete recognition, negative recognition also forms an asymmetrical version of recognition. Hegel described such one-sided recognition when noting that a worker ‘realises that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own’ (Hegel, 1807: §196; cf. Avineri, 1971; Blauner, 1964; Jaeggi, 2014). Hegel’s alienation is inextricably linked to negative recognition that expresses itself in, at least, four forms of negative recognition. These are:

1. Misrecognition

Misrecognition occurs when mutual and equal recognition fails because of structural settings that encourage asymmetric power relations. It can be seen in, for example, formal and official but one-sided recognition (e.g. law, corporate policies). These forms of negative recognition result in, at times, non-intentional but often unequal treatment of citizens and employees. This is the formal side. Meanwhile, informal misrecognition occurs in everyday interactions, e.g. cultural minorities.

2. Non-recognition

Non-recognition occurs when one side deliberately and purposely makes a conscious decision not to recognize the other. It happens in, for example, officially sanctioned forms of unequal treatment of citizens and employees. The unequal treatment is deliberately engineered and conducted. This can also be achieved through deliberate but informal acts of non-recognition, e.g. racist comments, degrading remarks, workplace bullying, sexual or racial harassment, employment, hiring practices and so on.

3. De-recognition

De-recognition occurs when one side moves from recognition to non-recognition, allowing it to deliberately de-recognize others. Officially sanctioned forms of de-recognition happen, for example, through the de-recognition of trade unions. It is achieved through deliberate acts of de-recognition, e.g. an incremental or sudden taking away of previously granted forms of recognition.

4. Pathological mass-recognition

This occurs when there is an engineered over-identification between leader and follower. It is achieved through party ideology as well as through officially sanctioned laws and policies, e.g. policies, official organizations. In management it takes the form of corporate policies and official company statements promoting corporate leadership. It is designed to deliberately engineer an asymmetrical leader-follower structure of domination. Informal mass-recognition can be seen as a voluntary adaptation of characteristics of a political or corporate leader, often engineered in the form of propaganda through mass-media (e.g. fascism) and corporate mass media (e.g. ‘The Great Corporate Leader’; Bolchover, 2005).

In all four main forms we can find corresponding types of mistreatment such as ‘humiliation, denigration, and indifference that are not only universally unpleasant experiences, but typically cause negative relations to the self (self-hatred, lack of self-respect, lack of self-esteem or lack of self-confidence), which distorts a person’s capacity to act’ (Laitinen, 2009: 16; Young, 2010: 193). Inside managerial regimes, humiliating others, denigrating them, and showing indifference also feature: excluding others, abusing them, workplace bullying, harming, harassment, workplace violence, disrespect, stress, mobbing, insults, denigration, discrimination, narcissistic managers, corporate psychopaths, aggression, violence, rape, self-hatred, lack of self-respect, lack of self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, depression, alcoholism, bullying victims, abjection, injuries, alienation, unfreedom, unfairness, desolation, desperation, discouragement, distress, dullness, hopelessness, marginalization, melancholy, dissemblance, low self-confidence and self-esteem, misery, feeling of powerlessness, inferiority, and the self-alienated spirit (Schrijvers, 2004; Pippin, 2010: 69; Samuel, 2010).

For the Hegelian master-slave and today’s employee-vs.-management regimes there is almost nothing more damaging than ‘a false normality and its power based pathologies’ that prevent ‘the formation of human identity’ (Van den Brink, 2010: 89). It engineers unhappiness and a division into the unhappily and the happily oppressed. For Van den Brink (2010: 90), both ‘suffer from the distorted images of human worth they have internalised with the help of the consumer society, the culture industry, false gurus, charismatic politicians, and psychotherapists [that] the stabilising seductive consumer society has to offer’. This reaches far beyond simple misrecognition.

Misrecognition: Trying but failing to recognize

Misrecognition is a form of an incomplete and unsuccessful recognition occurring in enforced power relations that damage recognition (Anderson, 2009: 95). In ‘the top-down view’ [as shown by management] wrongful acts are at the same time cases of misrecognition because they are wrong [due to] inadequate recognition’ (Laitinen, 2009: 14). Managerial regimes systematically engineer such inadequate forms of recognition, misdistribution and misrecognition. The key to this particular form of negative recognition is that misrecognition means ‘to misrecognise is to make a mistake’ (Martineau et al., 2012: 6). It assumes that one tries to recognize but fails. A more specific form of misrecognition, for example, is found in top-down toleration. According to Forst (2010: 220, 234 ff.) such a form of

toleration appears to be a strategic, or at least a hierarchical policy designed to prevent general and equal rights, but to give specific permissions that are granted, and that can always be revoked. This is a form of toleration that has liberating as well as repressive and disciplinary effects.

In this version management uses recognition and toleration as a tool against those it grants recognition. At the ideological level, management appears to give recognition thought tolerating employees while in reality management exploits its repressive and disciplinary effects. This is a form of simple misrecognition because often management does not show straightforward non-recognition of the other (framed as human resources) but grants a form of pathological misrecognition. ‘If misrecognition is to be a harm, it must matter to the one misrecognised [because it is a form of] psychological harm’ (Laden, 2010: 274). Management still recognizes the other but only as an ‘object of power’ that it can manipulate (Bauman, 1989). In addition to this, there are also relationships of pure non-recognition.

Non-recognition: The planned avoidance of recognition

In non-recognition such an incomplete and unsuccessful recognition no longer just occurs based on power asymmetries. Instead, non-recognition is deliberately engineered to give one side the upper hand. In these cases, a purpose-driven decision has been taken not to recognize the other. While misrecognition can result in a form of ‘minimal recognition’ (Bader, 2010: 250), non-recognition is not an issue of more or less or ‘higher-vs.-lower’ degrees of misrecognition. It is full, comprehensive and complete non-recognition with a ‘total ignorance of relevant reasons to recognise’ (Martineau et al., 2012: 6). But this is not the only key to understanding non-recognition. Non-recognition demands a degree of awareness and a rational assessment of one’s position inside asymmetric power relations. Once this has been achieved, steps are taken to avoid any form of recognition of the other. Anderson (2009) argues that this is not unique to Hegelian master-and-slave relations but exists in various forms of asymmetrical power relations (e.g. gender, race, etc.) where one is forced to recognize the other without mutual reciprocity.

All of these are asymmetrical power-based relationships that are non-equal and in which one side has power over the other. The prelude to many of these relationships might be found in many of the present institutions of childhood. These range from pre-schools where children in childcare experience relationships of domination and subordination through to later schooling, forms of technical training facilities and universities governed under the ideology of managerialism (Klikauer, 2013a). When such institutions are run directly or indirectly under management that has taken on features of managerialism the non-recognition of employees is enshrined in viewing them merely as ‘others’, as human resources and Menschenmaterial, as Poole (2006; cf. Klikauer, 2014: 33) has noted.

This has a very long history in management as well as management studies. In short, the literature of management ‘has much less to say of and for those who are managed’ (Marsden and Townley, 1996: 660). Under managerialism people are (non)identified merely as ‘others’ because ‘management creates performance through others’ taking labor for granted and framing it as ‘unthematized’ entities (Magretta, 2012: 7; Jameson, 2010: 93; Klikauer, 2013a). This sort of non-recognition represents the very opposite of Hegel’s recognition (Jameson, 2010: 113, 114; Klikauer, 2013b). But these relationships of non-recognition have to be seen differently from those qualifying for the more dynamic process of de-recognition because de-recognition

is exactly what the master will try to do to the slave. But if we are dependent on the other in essence, then in negating the other, we will negate ourselves … The master’s reality and importance, his essentiality, then, becomes hollow and inessential. (Kain, 2005: 43, 48)

Hegel’s inescapable logic of recognition determines that when those in power such as contemporary management de-recognize the slave/Knecht/employee, it not only damages employees but also negates management itself because both depend on recognition based on reciprocity. This applies to non-recognition and to de-recognition. But unlike non-recognition, de-recognition indicates a reversal of recognition when previously established recognition is reversed, taken away, and ended in favor of either misrecognition (non-deliberate) or non-recognition (deliberate).

De-recognition: No longer recognizing what was recognized before

In the world of work, de-recognition has become a known entity since Thatcherism’s fight against trade unions. It engineered the rise of managerial power, creating ‘macho-management’ (Klikauer, 2010: 180) and leading to ‘trade union de-recognition’ (Claydon, 1989; Gall and McKay, 1994). In management-employee relationships a deliberate de-recognition of employees often signals what Hirschman (1970) has termed the ‘exit-option’ used against employees. At a more dehumanizing level, human resource management expresses the firing of workers as ‘FIFO = ‘fit-in or f*** off!’, ‘letting you go’ and ‘seeking new opportunities’ (Klikauer, 2013a: 228). It remains an implicit formula in many companies under a well-established managerial maxim of regarding ‘labour as a cost to be reduced as far as rapidly possible’ (Selekman, 1959: 21). Overall, the most fundamental immorality of de-recognition remains enshrined in the term ‘human resource’ where human beings – before entering managerial regimes – are deliberately de-recognized and a new managerial ‘identity’ is placed on them (Klikauer 2015:99). Poole (2006: 66) described this process as:

the template of ‘natural resources’ must, further, be to blame for the modern barbarism of the corporate term ‘human resources’. To call human beings ‘resources’, firstly, is to deny their existence as individuals, since any one person will not spring up again once worn out; people are ‘resources’ only insofar as they are thought of as a breeding population, like rabbits or chickens. ‘Human resources’, first recorded in 1961, eventually succeeded the term ‘manpower’ in business parlance; the effect was merely to replace a crude sexism with a more generalised rhetorical violence. People considered as ‘human resources’ are mere instruments of a higher will. Compare the Nazi vocabulary of ‘human material’ [Menschenmaterial] and ‘liquidation’ [liquidieren], recasting murder as the realisation of profit; if ‘natural resources’ evinces merely as blithe disregard for the environment, ‘human resources’ contains an echo of totalitarian Unspeak.

Pathological mass-recognition: The leader-follower propaganda

While this may be the height of inhumanity, there is a perhaps equally inhumane form of false recognition, namely, pathological mass-recognition. Pathological mass-recognition can – rarely but still – be found in managerialism when glorification of a ‘great corporate leader’ is systematically engineered (Templeman, 2014). But it is more commonly also found in the political realm, when pathological mass-recognition, mass-identification, glorification, and adoration take place inside a leader-follower arrangement. Ikäheimo and Leitinen (2010: 35), for example, distinguish between

external identification and self-identification. External identifications are made by other persons (A and B are different), self-identification by the person herself (A and B are the same) … It makes a difference, for instance, whether something is identified generically as a terrorist organization (by focusing on certain qualities or features as the defining ones) or as a resistance movement (by focusing on some other qualities or features).

These are highly engineered forms of false recognition where face-to-face recognition between individuals is no longer central, achievable, and warranted. Individual recognition is replaced with a mass mediated form of false recognition based on symbols and signs as a medium between two entities. This is commonly associated with forms of mass propaganda for which examples such as the Duce (Mussolini), the Führer (Hitler), Pinochet, the Iron Lady, and the ‘dear leader’ (Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il) are just a few.

In pathological mass-recognition, one side – the followers – is made to recognize ‘The Great Leader’ without being recognized by the leader. In fact, such great leaders have more often than not also despised people, treating them with resentment. ‘The Great Business Leader’, for example, deliberately de-recognizes individuals, only seeing them as a dehumanized mass of employees (Bolchover, 2005). In de- and misrecognition ‘collective misrecognition is certainly amongst the most serious forms of structural inequalities’ (Bader, 2010: 240). Managerialism seeks to engineer such pathological mass-recognition by pushing the idea of a courageous business leader (e.g. Forbes’ top-10 business leaders). Such great business leaders are presented as hero CEOs who have saved companies from evil competitors. There is virtually no academic journal in management studies, management textbooks, popular business press, and management schools that has not followed the management fashion of leadership (Locke and Spender, 2011; Klikauer, 2013a). Inside a dyadic concept that ‘distinguishes between ethical and ideological forms of recognition’ (Van den Brink and Owen, 2010: 21), a managerially engineered leader-follower recognition is one of the clearest expressions of an ideological form of pathological mass-recognition.

Leadership might be a form of damaged and ideological recognition, but it remains – perhaps precisely because of this quality – vital for management and managerialism (Locke and Spender, 2011; Klikauer, 2013a). Management sees this as something that informs managerial reality. In order to manage, management ‘does not need good theory’ because it is management that ‘gives you today’s marching orders’ (Magretta, 2012: 10). In a true ‘military-equals-management’ style, management gives marching orders and all followers have to do is to follow ‘The Great Leader’ (e.g. Kolditz, 2009; Gutstein, 2009).

After all, managerial ideology believes ‘effective leadership is associated with both better performance and more ethical performance’ (Kreitner, 2009: 402). This might even lead ‘CEOs to use backstabbing and treachery to set the tone in order to win on the battlefield’ when ‘the businessman uses every trick he can think of to keep wages and fringe benefits down’ (Bolchover, 2005: 80; Anthony, 1960: 132). Such a great business leader is admired by the stock exchange and the corporate business press alike. As a consequence, today the ideology of managerialism has extended deep into society creating weak levels of pathological mass-recognition engineered through corporate mass media (e.g. Donald Trump’s TV-show ‘The Apprentice’).

Conclusion

There is a need to have more refined tools of what can be termed ‘negative recognition’. The theme of negative recognition enhances our understanding of recognition as initially outlined by Fichte and Hegel and more recently by Taylor, Honneth, Fraser, and others. Negative recognition highlights that there is more than just misrecognition. Overall, it has been found that negative recognition takes on four variants. These are misrecognition, non-recognition, de-recognition, and pathological mass-recognition. Together they provide valuable extensions to misrecognition. There certainly is misrecognition. But three more versions of negative recognition need to be considered to provide a more comprehensive picture of the positive and negative side of recognition. This is highly relevant for any debate on recognition. It is also relevant when the principle of recognition is used as an indicator of moral progress and when recognition informs social change. If mutual and equal recognition is a desired social goal, one might also need to focus on those inhibiting and working against recognition. The above outlined concept of negative recognition shows that such inhibitors to recognition can take on more forms than just misrecognition. Hence there are four elements that prevent mutual and equal recognition and, in turn, social progress.

Quite apart from one already recognized form of negative recognition – misrecognition – as a form of failed recognition there is also the more purposeful and deliberate form of non-recognition. Deliberate non-recognition is not the outcome of a failed attempt to recognize as the above examples of managerial regimes indicate. Non-recognition – rather than misrecognition – is a conscious decision not to recognize Hegel’s ‘other’. Examples taken from the managerial world have proven to be valuable when illustrating the impacts of non-recognition. These cases have sufficient explanatory powers to describe non-, mis- and de-recognition. The fourth form of negative recognition – pathological mass-recognition – rarely occurs in the managerial world but can still be found when ‘great corporate leaders’ are invented. Nonetheless, the domain of politics is better suited to describe this phenomenon of pathological mass-recognition.

In the sphere of management, meanwhile, management uses non-recognition, for example, in the form of not recognizing human beings as human beings (Kant’s ends-in-themselves) but instead human resource management sees human beings only as human resources (Kant’s means) and as a capacity to contribute to the bottom line. This sort of dehumanizing and, above all, deliberate non-recognition of humans as humans is shown in HRM’s focus on performance management that is not directed towards human beings – perhaps not even human resources – but towards organizational outcomes, the codeword for profits. Above that management also relies on forms of de-recognition when it no longer recognizes someone or something that was previously recognized. The case in point has been the planned and deliberate de-recognition of trade unions. Finally, with the assistance of managerialism and corporate mass media, pathological mass-recognition has been engineered inventing great corporate leaders – from Henry Ford and Rockefeller to, more recently, Bill Gates and Steve Jobs – to convert public affairs into an anti-democratic version of pathological leader-follower structure under neoliberalism’s twin ideology of managerialism.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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