Their is no they’re

Wittgenstein’s language

Wittgenstein’s legacy is multifaceted, and theorists and philosophers have discussed the difficulties inherent within searching for a political meaning in his works. The two approaches to applying Wittgenstein to politics are ‘quietist’ and ‘polemist’ (Gamero, 2016: 132; Polhaus and Wright, 2002; Pitkin, 1967). The quietist interpretation of Wittgenstein focuses on the political situation of consent and ‘blind’ obedience to rules. This argument posits that there are certain ‘bedrocks’ that provide the norms by which communities are able to coexist (Gamero, 2016; Tully, 1989; Polhaus and Wright, 2002). The polemist interpretation analyzes Wittgenstein’s discourse on ‘rules and bedrocks as multiple, changeable, and, above all, disputable’ (Gamero, 2016: 132; Kripke, 1982). Wittgenstein argues for the flexibility and creativity inherent in rules within Philosophical Investigations (2009: §66, 69, 131). Gamero (2016) argues that Wittgenstein is closer to the polemist approach due to the instability of language. However, the literature is still deeply divided regarding these approaches to understanding Wittgenstein.

The quietist scholars utilize Wittgenstein’s argument that philosophy needs to bring words back from metaphysics (2009: 53; Gunnell, 2004: 92; Polhaus and Wright, 2002). Wittgenstein argues within Philosophical Investigations that philosophy is the process of clarification. It has nothing to do with explaining the meaning of a thing (Wittgenstein, 2009: 55). The quietist interpretation of this argument is that political theory must be grounded in theoretical implications of realism (Gunnell, 2004: 95; Ogien, 2016; Tully, 1989). Political theory should not examine ‘multiplicity’ within Wittgenstein’s work. Quietists believe political theorists should ground their work solely on the empirical phenomenon of social normativity. In other words, political theory should focus on how individuals address social norms. Social norms are impersonal. They are binding activities of social coordination (Ogien, 2016; Polhaus and Wright, 2002; Kripke, 1982). Impersonality is highly tied to the Foucauldian argument of created truths (Foucault, 1980). Foucault (1980) states that truth is created by individuals who are viewed as legitimate. Thus, social norms are based on predictable bedrocks (Gamero, 2016; Tully, 1989). The polemic rejection of this is based in the argument that Wittgenstein avoided any positivism within his social theories (Polhaus and Wright, 2002; O’Connor, 2002). O’Connor (2002), Medina (2010), Polhaus and Wright (2002) among other polemics argue that quietism trivializes Wittgenstein’s philosophy of the common experience because he argues in Philosophical Investigations that society is built on the dialogue.

Wittgenstein’s argument that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ (2009: 55) draws both the philosopher and the skeptic back to language (Polhaus and Wright, 2002: 806; Kripke, 1982). Polhaus and Wright (2002) propose that this is done to move the debate away from the possibility that all misunderstandings are based upon languages. They argue that Wittgenstein is not interested in a narrow conception of language. Wittgenstein actively engages the skeptic’s questions within Philosophical Investigations. The skeptic raises questions of language, which Wittgenstein illuminates. The example that Polhaus and Wright provide is the question: how can we attribute pain to bodies (2002: 807)? Wittgenstein responds with, ‘What makes it plausible to say it is not the body?’ (2002: 105). The skeptic compels the philosopher to recognize that in comforting the afflicted we are comforting the person, not simply the body. The skeptic draws us back to the plurality of experiences, and thus to critically examine the political world.

Political theorist Hannah Pitkin (1972) asserts that Wittgenstein demonstrates that all individuals are products of their language. Pitkin argues that language is a ‘patterned unity greater than any of the individuals who participate in it and independent of any one of them’ (1972: 194) Language is an intrinsic part of the individual due to it shaping their experience. Analysts Caronia and Cooren (2014) adopt Wittgenstein’s argument that language is made of signifiers. They argue that in Wittgenstein’s view, individuals exist in dialogue with the world around them. X is not simply in conversation with Y; they are both informed by their context. Authority extends to objects – Caronia and Cooren use the example of disposable glove boxes in the hospital: individuals consent to the ‘command’ given by the container (2014: 50). Ideas and demands are represented not necessarily by individuals within their world. The dialectical nature of this world rests on the supposition that signs hold meaning outside out of social interactions. The power of semiotics rests on individuals accepting that signs have definitive meanings. Agreed upon worlds have a mythos that guides culture (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). The term for these are ‘legitimizing myths’ (LM), and they are often ‘hegemony extending’ (HE). The language we use and rely on is a reflection of how a mythos reinforces political scripts.

A second interpretation of the methods of qualifiers and questions is that these ‘inner models’ are comparable to the needs that may occur outside of philosophy (Morris, 1994; Baker and Hacker, 1983). Morris gives the example of a community member who is organizing a game night where he makes rules for what can be counted as a game to encourage mingling (1994: 307–8). He could say, ‘A game must have at least two players’, as akin to saying ‘What you understand must be a sentence…’ (Morris, 1994: 308). Wittgenstein’s process of questioning himself could be not calling in the skeptic but giving a voice to individuals who may engage with these language games inadvertently. He is bringing our attention to seeing that we can look at concepts differently through language games. Unlike Polhaus and Wright’s interpretation (2002), Morris (1994) is asking us to see Wittgenstein as presenting a possibility and not a concrete method by which to engage the world.

It should also be noted that scholars are debating Wittgenstein’s language games (Tully, 1989). Language games provide the mechanisms by which a thing can be understood (Tully, 1989: 194; Gustafsson, 2014). The world is understood through propositions. They can either be true or false. However, the exceptional factor in this is that Wittgenstein finds language to be intentional (Luntley, 2003; Voice, 2003). The argument being: we have a point of view and present this through language. Language games cannot be divorced from the goal of the game’s creator. In our own game creation, we should recognize the intentionality within it. The work on representation and Wittgenstein provide us with a complicated image of the world. It is dialectical, consistently creating itself and being created in turn. My analysis of Wittgenstein is polemic because I engage with language as intentional. The concept of politics is interpretive (2009: 52–3, 221–3).

The literature draws attention to the fact that Wittgenstein gives us overlapping visions of himself (Tully, 1989; Voice, 2003; Luntley, 2003; Polhaus and Wright, 2002). The later Wittgenstein is strikingly different from the early Wittgenstein. He accepts the multiplicity of rules within language. These two version of Wittgenstein have been used to justify his applicability to politics (Polhaus and Wright, 2002; Tully 1989: 194; Gustafsson, 2014; Erman and Möller, 2014). The overarching concerns of theorists is how to best understand Wittgenstein: either as a problematizing or as a stabilizing force. Political representation is selective (Scheweber, 2016; Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 2005). Polhaus and Wright (2002) describe the implications of this within our private lives. However, the extension of that into politics leads to the question of how this interacts with Polhaus and Wright’s discourse on the private sphere. This work is inspired by their contention that ‘we’ is a part of Wittgenstein’s work (Polhaus and Wright, 2002: 813). ‘We’ is contingent upon the recognition that individuals are able to communicate their individual experiences. They conclude that society is responsive, and that engaging in politics means an engagement of justice (Polhaus and Wright, 2002: 823). When their approach is taken politically, the ‘we’ does not exist outside of justice within the realm of politics. Politics is based upon the private experience. The role of the individual in a pluralist democracy is engaging with a large community and imaging their multiple experiences through discourse. Pluralist democracy is the process of a single individual experiencing ‘we’.

A dialectical world

Wittgenstein argues that we understand one another through discourse (2009: 87–8). He examines this through attempting to understand pain. Wittgenstein asks: ‘How do I understand another person’s pain?’ Wittgenstein argues that our understanding is not based in our believing someone is in pain due to their crying out or by imagining that their cough must feel like the one that oneself had (2009: 127–8). We believe that they have a painful cough due to the circumstances in which it is being expressed (Wittgenstein, 2009: 166). The process of communicating things that we experience requires a belief that is based on our ability to recognize that what a person claims adheres to our agreed upon reality (Wittgenstein, 2009: 166). Reality is agreed upon and negotiated through subjective experiences and how they correlate to the world we experience.

In this manner, Wittgenstein draws attention to language as a mechanism of disclosing private experiences (2009: 107):

294. If you say that he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have at any rate made an assumption about what he has before him. And this means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely…

Despite the collective nature of language, in a diverse nation there is no one language. Understanding a language is multifaceted (Wittgenstein, 2009: 87). There are numerous unwritten language rules, which have been assumed by culture; thus, to understand a language is ‘to have mastered a technique’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 87). Wittgenstein, a polyglot, was well aware of the fact that languages have different rules. He poses a language game, a method of examining how language is used, where we, as explorers, discover a people who use a language that is unintelligible to linguists (Wittgenstein, 2009: 88). There is one unifying factor about humanity which makes communication possible: shared human behavior (Wittgenstein, 2009: 88). For Wittgenstein, mastering a language is infinitely possible. Thus, in his political paradigm, communication is a consistent possibility. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the politics of imposed language. However, in order to not demand a single language, Wittgenstein offers translators and the use of ‘designer words’, or neologisms (2009). If a concept does not exist in a language, Wittgenstein believes that it can be created through our innate ability to communicate (2009: 87–8). Mutual intelligibility is a choice, according to Wittgenstein (2009: 87–8).

Mutual intelligibility implies agreed-upon norms. Wittgenstein, in examining why individuals cannot understand one another, proposes: ‘What is true or false is what humans beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but in forms of life’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 9). The moments in which we agree on our reality we are agreeing on norms. For example, democratic regimes have informal rules which are built into custom. During political campaigns, politicians do not typically threaten their opposition. Norms such as these, Wittgenstein argues, are essential to how we live with each other. Our world is built on discourse, and thus the rules we establish for our discourse are significant: when we communicate we are agreeing on how we live together. Understanding one another depends upon the process of collective norm-building. The process of norm-building develops in Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’.

Imagining games

One cannot play a game if one does not know the rules. However, there are many different games, and different variations of the same game but with different rules. How can one be certain that a group is using the same game with the same rules at any given point in time? Wittgenstein proposes that games have a ‘complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing’ (2009: 36). The theory of multiple bedrocks is fundamental to an understanding of pluralistic politics. If our political system involves many different people, then each person is participating in their own game, but there must be similarities in order for them to cohabitate. However, there is no guarantee that these norms would be something we view as significant. For example, while a group of people may agree to freedom of the press. Not all members of that same group would agree to certain acts being labeled as hate crimes. Still, we maintain a base level of mutual understanding for us to live and work together, despite our differences. Insofar as we want to expand beyond our differences, we must know that we are not ‘talking nonsense’, or consciously being unintelligible (Wittgenstein, 2009: 41–2). We participate and follow norms that make sense. Americans drive on the right-hand side of the street. If someone were to suddenly drive in the left-hand side of the street there could potentially be a car accident. Although we have shifting bedrocks and are each in different games, when interacting with others there is an expectation of understanding.

Through wanting to understand another person’s game, or way of living and being, we are attempting to get outside of our own game. We are trying to transcend our method of living. Wittgenstein argues that in doing this we may be tempted to look at an ideal game, ‘A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 53). Communication, even as it binds people together, is the greatest threat to mutual intelligibility. Any knowledge that we have about ourselves and our world threatens our ability to understand another individual. Understanding is a mental process – we are able to understand something in circumstances that are particular to understanding it (Wittgenstein, 2009: 66).

By this reading of understanding, politics is understandable insofar as we are in circumstances allowing us to understand it. We understand discrimination when we have evidence of it that allows us to directly experience what happens to other individuals. Dialogues of power are understandable when they are accessible. Wittgenstein maintains that this mental process is reflective. We are able to comprehend inequality when we encounter it and proceed to reflect. Reflection is our way out of the picture frame. The ‘we’ does not disappear once we have transcended the picture frame through encountering inequality. If the ‘we’ disappeared one would be talking nonsense, unable to account for what the other is experiencing in their game. The rules for others’ lives are intelligible insofar as we are able to experience them. This experience does not have to be direct. It is enough that I understand the mechanisms of a game; I do not have to actively play it. I can still play my own game, while understanding other people’s games.

Intelligible politics hinges upon an ability to experience. However, Wittgenstein argues that private experiences cannot be experienced by another person; they can only be shared (2009: 102). We share the experience of the color red, but we cannot be certain that we experience it in the same way. Similarly, we share the experience of being in a pluralistic society by encountering one another, but we cannot be certain that we experience the society identically. Regarding the ability to experience, I mean our being able to know and engage in the mental process of understanding. The challenge raised by this is a ‘we’ that encounters one another. The challenge being how do people live with one another. ‘We’ do not live in segmented society, in this paradigm. Acknowledging that ‘we’ may stand in different degrees of alienation despite living in a pluralistic society takes account of the different ways in which ‘we’ can engage in the process of encountering one another.

The process of understanding one another makes the private experience public. Wittgenstein contends that when we encounter a mental image it is ‘the image which is described when someone describes what he imagines’ (2009: 122). This process, while necessarily imprecise, is real. He asks: ‘Is calculating in the head less real than calculating on paper?’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 122). The ‘we’, or the collective society in a pluralistic democracy, cannot be certain that it is accurately understanding the individual’s experience; however, it is trying to. Wittgenstein calls this process ‘noticing an aspect’ (2009: 203). In describing a private experience, the audience is able to comprehend parts of it in relation to themselves. One person may not be able to fully understand another’s experience of discrimination; however, they may have the capacity to relate to the feelings that result from discrimination. Relating to one another draws on the methodology of first having the experiences described. Then, the listener imagining what that experience is. Finally, they relate to an aspect of the speaker’s experience.

Intelligibility is an inherent possibility due to the process of communication; however, there are times when we are unintelligible to one another, due to actively not wanting to communicate with one another. Wittgenstein characterizes this as acting outside of the boundaries of a game (2009: 146). We create these boundaries to exclude things from our language, and thus from our communication. If the ‘we’ is unable to recognize its members we cannot be certain why. However, it cannot be because we view them as non-human. Wittgenstein argues that this is repulsive because we inherently view people as distinct individuals who cannot be reduced to an unfeeling image; if we did this it would be, ‘analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another, the cross-piece of a window as a swastika, for example’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 133). The unintelligible ‘we’, in this analysis, maintains a recognition of the other as a person. Wittgenstein presents a reality in which people cannot be dehumanized, and if they reject another’s games there must be some human meaning in it, even if we cannot understand it. ²

Language and communicating rely on an ability to imagine other games (Wittgenstein, 2009: 18). Wittgenstein begins his analysis of game learning by suggesting that we can imagine a person who has learned a game without fully understanding the rules (2009: 18). No citizen is born innately knowing the rules of a state. Instead, they will learn the norms and laws from their school, parents, and government. Citizens must be able to imagine how to operate in a society without knowing all of the laws of the state. They may even be aware of how certain laws are enforced, while others are customary. For example, although jaywalking in the United States is a crime, it is largely ignored. From this, a citizen may gather that the state prioritizes certain laws above others. The citizen is able to imagine situations in which the rules are different. The game, in other words, is contestable.

Inhabiting a contestable world requires imagination. The meaning of a word, a rule, or a norm can be explained by how it is used in society (Wittgenstein, 2009: 25). The usage of a norm may depend on a person’s game. Pluralistic society assumes that different groups of people have different games that they engage in, and ‘we’ have the option of engaging with them or building boundaries. Politics, as a collective action, assumes that the ‘we’ can and will engage in imagination to understand the political processes. ‘We’ may not fully grasp the reasons for certain norms; however, ‘we’ agree to them in order to have a stable society. This is not to suggest that pluralistic society engages with politics in a way that is predictable or preferable. The option of speaking nonsense is ever-present.

Dynamic democracy

A dialectical politics relies on our ability to communicate with one another purposefully: ‘Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing how things are’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 41). Discourse cannot conceal since the rules of a game, while contestable, cannot be false. Our communications are restricted to the real. These restrictions limit political deliberation to realistic imagination. ‘We’ do not play games that are nonsensical. The rules may be largely unintelligible to others, outside of the overlapping norms, but they will be grounded in experiencing the world. Wittgenstein argues that our shared behavior is ‘the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language’ (2009: 88). By sharing parts of language, we can reference the world in which we live.

Humans reference the world through our norms: ‘the agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists of this: that if I say falsely that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it isn’t’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: 135). If a political actor claims that a law does not exist, they will use the example of the law to prove that it does not exist. In this way, Wittgenstein argues, we know what is real, even if people are attempting to deceive us. Politics, as earlier expressed, is a realm that contests reality. However, it requires a political actor to describe something that is in order to prove that it does not. The political participant, by pointing out the law that they want to disavow, establishes it is a law that is present in our world. ³ Wittgenstein suggests that in this manner of speaking individuals will not be deceived. Thus, even though politics is a realm of contention, ‘we’ still know that certain norms exist. ⁴

Pluralistic democracy necessitates that people who may be very different from one another exist in the same space. These groups may vehemently disagree with one another. However, they must coexist. Although there are similarities due to crisscrossed rules, Wittgenstein does not believe that people can have identical experiences (2009: 97–8). People may conclude that a law exists; yet, it can affect them to different degrees. Two people who break the same law may receive disparate punishment. For example, black Americans tend to receive longer sentences for the same crimes as white Americans. Wittgenstein claims that if we believe people can share identical experiences we make assumptions about their identity. Insofar as a democracy is pluralistic, the ‘we’ cannot share a strict identity. Furthermore, we cannot claim that members of a group share an identical identity. Wittgenstein does not conclude from the lack of a shared identity that this eschews mutual intelligibility. We are able to communicate similar expressions of experience and reality, but we cannot claim to have identical experiences. For instance, when two individuals call up the image for the word ‘tree’ they may each have a different tree in mind. However, they are still able to recognize each image as ‘tree’.

Insofar as we communicate, we are engaging in the process of sharing experiences. This sharing of experiences prevents us from viewing people as automatons (Wittgenstein, 2009: 133). If experiences cannot be generalized due to the lack of identical experiences, then we engage in imagination. The content of imagination is a picture or a description (Wittgenstein, 2009: 184). A description can replace the picture (Wittgenstein, 2009: 186). Verbal communication is central to communicating political needs. Mental images, the basis for mutual understanding, lead us through deliberation. The ‘we’ engages in imagining the experiences of other individuals, and through this is able to understand the needs of those individuals. Understanding requires knowledge of the circumstances of an action. The ‘we’ grasps how games can negatively impact someone’s life through the process of engaging in dialogue with one another.

Imagination in the sense of description is an enunciation of aspects developed through deliberation. Wittgenstein proposes that by reporting the individual is describing themselves, not the incident (2009: 200). Deliberating can demonstrate the game that an individual is engaged in. In describing the experience that they have heard from another, they may inaccurately convey what the person was trying to express. Inaccurate articulation may come from an individual perceiving a situation differently. The infamous duck-rabbit pictorial illusion may be seen as a duck to one person and a rabbit to another. Who is wrong? Wittgenstein does not give us a process for dismissing one interpretation of an aspect. Instead, both perspectives are correct but for different reasons. Thus, deliberation has the potential to lead to inaccurate understandings that are equally valid. If a white supremacist uses a racial slur, they may view it as a normative accurate statement, whereas, the recipient of the slur may experience it as threatening. Neither person is wrong subjectively.

Wittgenstein may not distinguish between different interpretations; however, he argues that humans cannot be viewed as inhuman (2009: 133). This interpretation protects marginalized minorities in pluralistic democracies. The ‘we’ would not support a racist’s interpretation of a racial epithet due to the alternate reading of it as dehumanizing. In this way, Wittgenstein privileges interpretations of aspects. The process of deliberation may be inaccurate; however, it cannot depict individuals as less-than. Our interpretations of aspects that we convey through deliberation come from what we see as we interpret it (Wittgenstein, 2009: 203). Our deliberations convey both the verbal description of an experience as well as the person themselves. Deliberation is an intimate process of communication. Wittgenstein implies that this form of discourse is mutually intelligible. By seeing, interpreting, and discussing interactions with others we cannot speak nonsense. We have to transcend our picture frames.

Our private games overlap and correspond to one another due to the dialectical nature of the political realm. We have expectations of political actors. These expectations are embedded in the world (Wittgenstein, 2009: 133). Situational expectations depend upon sharing rules. One takes for granted that constitutions will be followed, and if there is a debate over law its applicability will be discussed. Citizens have a basis for these expectations in that it is grounded in the history of their country, or that this process has happened before and been successfully deliberated on. ⁵ We believe that our reality will coincide with the norms that we have collectively established.

Politics by being a dialectical process implies that our communication is ongoing; we do not stop creating norms. What we describe to one another has a meaning, and this meaning continues to exist even after the incident occurs (Wittgenstein, 2009: 31). Wittgenstein uses this in regard to names; names give meaning to the thing (2009: 193). Meaning cannot be destroyed when the bearer of a name dies or is no longer remembered. The thing continues to have a description attached to it. The expectations that we hold in the political realm hold meaning regardless if those norms are followed. Citizens, then, have a right to voice their discontent. The ‘we’ is justified in objecting if a law or norm no longer has meaning. Civil disobedience, insofar as it relates to norms, is a method that ‘we’ can use to argue that a name continues to have meaning. Meaning may not be destroyed, yet it may not be shared (Wittgenstein, 2009: 193). If this is so, and political reality is contested, how do we come to a consensus on meaning? Interpretations of rules do not necessarily have meaning, but we create a ‘system of reference’ by sharing behavior (Wittgenstein, 2009: 86–8). We agree, then, on forms of life (Wittgenstein, 2009: 94). By agreeing on how we judge the world, we come to create uncontested language. If we agree that all citizens have the right to participate in the government, we come to a consensus through developing collective judgements. Thus, although individuals may disagree on the particulars of a governmental system, they agree to overarching principles, thus legitimizing their government. The political realm is valid when individuals cannot agree on the meaning of the particulars, such as constitutional amendments; however, citizens must consent to the overarching principles in order for it to sustain its legitimacy.

Believing in norms is a state of mind; Wittgenstein says that believing requires attending to oneself, to make sure that one is not speaking nonsense (2009: 201). Pluralistic democracy and the dialogues within it are a process of revealing. Political discourses are the means by which we establish sociopolitical norms. The ‘we’ has rights due to collectively deliberating on whether this is a judgement that has meaning in our system of references. Wittgenstein’s conception of belief necessitates that individuals within a democracy are able to understand themselves and their picture frames before they are able to communicate with others. Communication grounds our reality in a world in which we speak purposefully (Wittgenstein, 2009: 41–2). Insofar as we are mutually intelligible we believe that we are noticing the same aspects of a picture (Wittgenstein, 2009: 203). This is perhaps the most important quality of protecting pluralistic democracy from a politics of rejecting the sociopolitical world. If we remove ourselves from this world, we speak only with ourselves, and this, for Wittgenstein, removes us from reality. If we ignore mutual intelligibility that we develop through imagining others’ games, their lived experiences, then it is a tragic failure of engagement.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein argues that our reality is developed by our communication, and mutual intelligibility is something that we actively participate in. This provides us with a politics of ‘opting in’; we have the ever-present potential to engage in other’s lives. However, this engagement requires being able to imagine the lived experiences of other individuals. Pluralistic democracy necessitates undergoing the process of understanding in order to have a political realm, which even if it is contested includes all citizens as equal participants. The conception of pluralistic democracy in this manner is challenging. Wittgenstein gives us a potential reality in which individuals actively involve themselves with one another. This reality is a challenge and requires citizens to think deeply about other’s realities as well as their own. Pluralistic democracy challenges citizens to climb out of their own pictures and to re-imagine the norms which we build together.