Art as praxis: Danko Grlić’s conception of art beyond technological determinism

I Introduction

The role played by culture and art in the reproduction of capitalism and their potential role in revolutionary processes is a central element of 20th-century varieties of Marxism. However, if we go back to Marx and Engels, we see the question of art and culture was in fact not one of the many themes they explored in detail. Although Marx clearly did not develop any kind of a unique philosophy of art, in his theoretical and critical writings he distanced himself from vulgar and deterministic understandings of art within the context of the base–superstructure metaphor. Marx stated that ‘[i]n the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their flowering are out of all proportion to the general development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization’ (Marx, 1973: 110). ¹ Engels made somewhat more deterministic comments on art, later becoming the cornerstone of the theory of reflection, although Engels does not refer to it since his conception is more nuanced. Engels claimed:

[p]olitical, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc. development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is not that the economic position is the cause and alone active, while everything else only has a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of the economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself. (Engels, 1968)

Within these debates on the role of art in the reproduction of capitalist social relations and its revolutionary and emancipatory potential in the processes of humanisation, Danko Grlić developed a special (anti-)philosophy of art and particular understanding of the role held by art in the processes of emancipation. This new aesthetics, which is actually the negation of aesthetics and affirmation of art as praxis beyond both vulgar or instrumental conceptions of art and technological determinism, was developed by Grlić within a specific philosophical context – the Yugoslav Praxis School that developed and deepened the concept of praxis (practice) as the species-essence of the human being.

This paper thus has two aims. First, it argues Grlić’s understanding of art is closely related to the specific theory of the subject as the subject of practice, as developed by the Praxis School. Second, it explains how Grlić’s critique of various Marxist aesthetics and especially of Walter Benjamin’s materialist conception of art – regarding the issue of technology, the importance of the technological reproducibility of art and its emancipatory potential – is connected to his theory of the subject and art as praxis. In order to explain the specific understanding of art as practice found in Danko Grlić’s writings, after the introduction, the paper proceeds by outlining the main concepts within the Praxis School, focusing on the theory of the subject and the concept of praxis. The third section explores and explains Grlić’s conception of art as praxis. Section four sketches the three main conceptions of art within Marxism, as understood by Grlić, and his critique of these approaches. The fifth section considers Grlić’s criticism of Benjamin’s conception of the importance of technology and technological reproduction of artworks in the emancipation processes. The concluding section highlights the importance of Grlić’s understanding of the subject and of art as praxis beyond technological determinism in the 21st century. ²

II The Praxis School and the theory of the subject

To adequately explain Grlić’s philosophical and practical innovations concerning the role played by art in society and its emancipatory and revolutionary potential, one must explain his theory of the subject, itself connected to the philosophical and anthropological assumptions made by the Yugoslav Praxis School.

Inspiration for the Yugoslav Praxis School’s distinct philosophy came from Marx’s early writings, especially Theses on Feuerbach and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (see Petrović, 1964a; Bošnjak, 1964). In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx claimed that: ‘[p]roductive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species character, is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character’ (Marx, 1988: 76). It is hence not surprising that Marx emphasised that ‘[s]ocial life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice’ (Marx, 1978a: 145). This means that the subject is always the subject of practice through which they create and change both their living conditions and own nature. Therefore, Marx argued that humans are creative beings and this has an influence on everyday living conditions:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. (Marx, 1978b: 595)

Within Marx’s conception of the subject as a creative and revolutionary being, the Yugoslav Praxis School defined praxis as being the: ‘essentially conscious, to a greater or lesser extent free, and planned, creation, transformation of a reality’ (Vranicki, 1964: 43) and is a free, universal and creative activity of human beings (Petrović, 1964b: 22). Vranicki stated that practical-creative activity is actually the path to the ‘transformation of reality’ (Vranicki, 1964: 43). Although the telos of praxis is the liberation of the subject and society as such or, more precisely, the processes of liberation and emancipation without a clear and finite endpoint, praxis is clearly directed against one thing – class exploitation and class society as such. Therefore, one of the final ends (Endzweck) of praxis is ‘the sublation of classes and class relations’ (Bošnjak, 1964: 17). ⁴ Thus, praxis means the transformation of the objective world and social structures as well as, as noted above, of human needs and human nature, beyond capitalist class relations. Thus, the species-essence of humans is to change and to revolutionise their living conditions and abolish class relations and, therefore, capitalism. ⁵ This means the objective world and reality surrounding us are partly the consequence of our own activity or non-activity within the given social structures (see Grlić, 1967a: 484).

The Praxis School also stressed two important features of the subject as the subject of praxis: creative and revolutionary activity. It is important to consider both of these features of praxis: creativity, and humane and revolutionary action (see Grlić, 1969: 111). We can only speak of praxis when the activity is actually a ‘revolutionary and practical-critical activity’ (Bošnjak, 1964: 18). First, in this sense, since humans change themselves and their social relations, this also means they are revolutionary beings. Second, praxis is also a creative activity, a practice whereby the existing conditions produce changes and humanise the world beyond alienation and exploitation, while creating new social relations. Creativity, that is, the transformation of the status quo and creation of new, more humane living conditions, is crucial when speaking of the subject and of praxis (see Grlić, 1965: 51).

Therefore, to truly understand humans as the subject of praxis one must do away with the deterministic and vulgarised conception of human history, social and class relations. Since humans make their own history and have the capacity to change and alter the world surrounding them, it is important to stress, that ‘[i]n reality, human existence is…free creative activity by which man creates his world and himself’ (Petrović, 1964b: 33). We may therefore add that ‘[h]uman practice – as opposed to animal adaptation – could be defined as a true transformation of the world, a transformation which is historically relevant, as an active interference with the structure of reality’ (Grlić, 1965: 51). The only essence we can speak of, apart from the satisfaction of the basic human needs required for survival, is the creative and revolutionary change of existing (power) relations and living conditions (see Bošnjak, 1964).

Inspired by Marx’s humanist writings on the species-essence of humans, the Yugoslav Praxis School developed a theory of the subject that connected the subject with praxis, with the practical, creative and revolutionary action of changing one’s own living conditions and social relations. Thus, human species-essence is praxis, which is in fact the process of the transformation of social structures and, above all, the process of abolishing class relations. This specific theory of the subject as the subject of praxis served as the vital intellectual context for Danko Grlić who, as a member of the Praxis School, helped develop this specific Marxist-humanist philosophical approach and, in addition, applied it to his conceptualisation of art.

III Art as praxis

Within the context of Grlić’s theory of the subject sketched out above, he claimed that art should be separated from abstract notions of the beautiful and other aesthetic criteria in order to restore the unity of art and aesthetics in praxis – the creative and revolutionary transformation of living conditions.

Grlić argued against aesthetics in this sense, since according to him it was a science, a philosophical discipline based on abstract notions and abstract criteria, that together were detached from the material living conditions of humans and, as such, did not help in the processes of liberation and emancipation, namely, in the processes of doing away with capitalism. Aesthetics represents more a prescription of what art should be that always depends on power relations and is not based on the conception of art as praxis whose goal lies in the creative transformation of living conditions. As a result, Grlić claimed art should never be subjected to aesthetics because art:

cannot be only the object of analyses, interpretations…nor only the object of one discipline that deals with it as a limited area of its exploration; conversely today, more than ever, art is a matter of life and death of each of us separately and all of as humanity, a matter of ‘implemented naturalism, i.e. humanism’. (Grlić, 1978: 119–20)

Since Grlić’s main goal was to conceptualise ‘art itself beyond every possible aesthetic and ideological subjugation of its autonomy’ (Paić, 2004: 97; see also Kreft, 2004), he conceptualised art beyond aesthetics, as the affirmation of praxis and of human existence, and as a kind of revolutionary and creative practice. Thus, art is a crucial aspect of human existence because art’s main task is to liberate man from domination and to liberate all human powers and creative potential and affirm that the subject is the subject praxis. As the subject of practice, beyond aesthetics, man actually ‘liberates himself in art and becomes a vision of an unrestrained game of the most humane and free powers’ (Grlić, 1978: 115). Art is thus closely connected to praxis, creativity is an emanation of praxis, and aesthetics is ‘by its definition only…contemplation about that creativity. Aesthetics, thus, remains in the framework of the non-creative approach to creativity’ (Grlić, 1970: 359).

Art’s revolutionary potential lies in the fact that, even if and when pessimistic, it is never simply an expression nor a reflection of the existing world and, therefore, according to Grlić, constitutes ‘a radical negation of the existing as existing’ (Grlić, 1973: 717). Art is a revolutionary aspect of human existence, a tool as well as the essence – the form and content – of the processes of changing the world. Grlić hence argued that art in its true meaning – art as a creative and revolutionary practice – does not ‘put up with conventions, staleness’, but is actually always the ‘negation of the existing in the name of the not-yet-existing, the negation of uniform…human life’ (Grlić, 1979: 21). The triumph of art, and in that sense of humans, cannot happen in philosophy as such nor in philosophy of art, but on the level of practice. The triumph of art ‘has as its necessary consequence a definite defeat and breakdown of aesthetics’ (Grlić, 1978: 118). Thus, art as a practice is a tool for liberating humankind from the narrow frameworks of the existing order and, crucially, it liberates humans from the chains they experience in everyday life and from ‘reification and every power over man’ (Grlić, 1978: 115).

Building on the above-mentioned ontological and epistemological assumptions, Grlić concluded that Marxism, as a philosophy with its end-goal the sublation (Aufhebung) of philosophy as such, should also be oriented to the sublation of the philosophy of art, namely, the sublation of aesthetics. Grlić was certain that only the abolition of certain ‘frameworks and coordinates of the aesthetical enables a freer, more complete, if you will, more vital flourishing of the artistic in its unpredictable, its monstrous life…The death of the aesthetical enables the life of the artistic’ (Grlić, 1988: 405). He therefore argued, ‘Marxism as a philosophy of liberation that strives above all towards freedom – has to be beyond any kind of fettering…of the artistic, that is, beyond any kind of aesthetics’ (Grlić, 1978: 125). Following Marx’s ‘Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach’, as concerns Marxism Grlić claimed that ‘the only true aesthetics would be its sublation in art as the essence of life itself’ (Grlić, 1978: 114).

Thus, art may be viewed as an emanation of praxis, which is the species-essence of every species-being. This means art should be understood in the context of the wider theory of the subject as developed by the Praxis School. Grlić thus believed art is not and should not simply be a matter of aesthetics – art can only become the essence of humankind when aesthetics is sublated (aufgehoben) and art is affirmed as praxis, the creative and revolutionary changing of living conditions and social relations – art as praxis.

IV Grlić’s critique of Marxist aesthetics

Grlić’s distinct theory of the subject and of art as praxis led him to reject the three dominant Marxist approaches to art which, according to Grlić, were the conception of: 1) art as ideology; 2) art as a reflection of the objective world; 3) art as social analysis (see Grlić, 1978, 1979). ⁶ Grlić thought none of these provide a suitable explanation of art and of its role in society since none includes the ontological assumption of the subject as the subject of practice.

First, those strains of Marxist aesthetics that equate art with ideology simply place art on the level of ideological superstructure, and therefore believe it is subjected to the laws operating within that sphere (Grlić, 1979: 16). Yet, it is important to emphasise that humankind is not totally determined by ideology, and that praxis, creative, liberating and revolutionary practice, is not and cannot be subsumed within any ideology. Of course, modern art can and has been used for ideological purposes (see Grlić, 1979: 20), although this modern art has nothing to do with Grlić’s conception of art as praxis. True art, art as praxis, ‘is not easily used for ideological-doctrinally purposes, because it is something that always escapes…any kind of schemes and subsumptions’ (Grlić, 1979: 17–18). ⁷ Namely, art as praxis escapes and exists beyond ideological frameworks (see Grlić, 1978: 121).

The second widespread Marxist approach to art is the theory of reflection. ⁸ Here, art is conceived as a reflection of the objective world, of class relations. In this setting, art as such holds neither emancipatory potential nor revolutionary drive. Grlić argued that the theory of reflection is ‘with the bourgeois horizon a determined attempt to fixate and justify today’s world in that fixed stasis and to…guarantee the immutability of the objective world, which can then in turn be – more or less subjectively – reflected or mirrored’ (Grlić, 1978: 127–8). Grlić argued that, due to its ontological assumptions, the theory of reflection is unable to explain social changes. More importantly, the subject, by and through practice, cannot change the existing conditions – all they can do is reflect them. Grlić therefore claims the theory of reflection is ‘mechanical-materialistic, passive and therefore anti-Marxist’ (Grlić, 1978: 128). As a result, for Grlić the theory of reflection marks the ‘clearest, most blatant, most elaborate, even philosophically most consistent attempt to negate in its foundations the historical pathos, the innermost meaning of Marx’s thought and movement, to negate the necessity to change the existing’ (Grlić, 1979: 23; emphasis in original). Thus, only the complete negation of the theory of reflection can lead to the discovery of the creative potential of art and its ‘immanent revolutionary power’ (Grlić, 1979: 25).

The third approach within Marxism equates art with social analysis or, as Grlić puts it, with sociological analysis. The sociological approach to art builds on the presumption that ‘art is above all a sociological representation of the general state of a society’ (Grlić, 1978: 132–3). This means that artwork is completely identified with the analysis of society. Given its anti-humanist, anti-revolutionary and anti-praxis approach, Grlić rejects this third possible Marxist approach to art as being insufficient and even a lower level of any kind of aesthetics (see Grlić, 1979: 26–30). Once again, what is missing from this conception is the possibility of humans creating their own living conditions by and through art. It remains on the level of ideas, of analysing and interpreting the world – it is not directed to change and the creation of new living conditions.

To conclude, Grlić criticised the above-mentioned three main Marxist approaches to art: art is not an ideological instrument; art is not a mere reflection of the objective world; art is not sociological analysis. His critique of these approaches is linked to his understanding of the subject as the subject of praxis and, of course, his understanding of art as an emanation of praxis. Since none of the Marxist approaches to art and aesthetics conceives humankind as the being of praxis, it is understandable that Grlić rejected other Marxist understandings of art.

V Art beyond technology: Grlić’s critique of Benjamin

We have thus far explained why and how Grlić developed a unique understanding of art as praxis and its relation to Grlić’s conception of the subject as the subject of praxis, with both underpinning his rejection of different Marxist approaches to art. However, a vital topic concerning Grlić’s affirmation of art as praxis and his rejection of aesthetics is the relationship between art as praxis and technology and technological development (see Grlić, 1967b: 568). We find the clearest rejection of technological determinism in his book on Walter Benjamin in which he analyses Benjamin’s philosophy of art and also criticises his somewhat odd faith in technology in relation to art and the processes of emancipation.

In his essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’, Benjamin argued that significant changes had occurred in art closely related to the development of technology, ⁹ representing a harbinger of social change. New technologies within art were manifesting themselves in the form of the advent and development of film and photography as crucial artistic forms, marking the end of ‘auratic art’, namely, the demise of traditional art with its uniqueness and authenticity which we can ascribe with ‘cult value’ (Benjamin, 2006). Since technological developments have enabled the reproducibility of artworks and the rise of their ‘exhibition value’, this has led to a process where ‘what withers in the age of the technological reproducibility of the work of art is the latter’s aura’ (Benjamin, 2006: 104). This means the authenticity of an artwork is lost which, according to Benjamin, holds emancipatory potential. That is, authenticity ‘eludes technological – and of course not only technological – reproduction. But whereas the authentic work retains its full authority in the face of a reproduction made by hand, which it generally brands a forgery, this is not the case with technological reproduction’ (Benjamin, 2006: 103). Therefore, the technological reproducibility of art is essential and may be seen not only as a quantitative but also a qualitative change within class society: ‘The masses are a matrix from which all customary behaviour toward works of art is today emerging newborn. Quantity has been transformed into quality: the greatly increased mass of participants has produced a different kind of participation’ (Benjamin, 2006: 119). This might eventually lead to and serve the communist cause of ‘politicising art’ (Benjamin, 2006: 122).

It is clear that Benjamin was focused on the broader political and social implications of the new possibilities arising with the technological reproducibility of artworks; most importantly, he was trying to understand the emancipatory potential of these new technologies within the context of art which, however, would certainly not be limited to art but would hold broader emancipatory implications for class society as such. Thus, the concept of technology is crucial for Benjamin, ‘because the socially practical function of a work is discernible in its technique – to put it more exactly: its instructive function for political application’ (Paetzoldt and Westphal, 1977: 27). Yet, did he go too far in his emphasis on the emancipatory potential of technology itself?

Grlić was very careful when assessing the potential of technology in the process of emancipation. He was determined to demonstrate the negative aspects of technology and technological development generally: ‘Equating the social, economic, class and even the progress of ideas with the progress of technology…has today become highly problematic’ (Grlić, 1984: 59). Technology also brings with it the specialisation of skills and labour. It actually leads to the loss of the totality of humankind by forcing people to become specialists in certain fields, in which technology plays the key role – that is, to become specialists in handling machines. Technology in fact represents ‘a metaphysical basis of the modern world’ and is spreading ‘the ideal of totalitarianism’ and could lead to a ‘robotic way of life’ (Grlić, 1984: 60). At the very core of technology lies something anti-humane since it ‘destroys the peculiar singularity of humanity, which posits itself as an obstacle to technology’ (Grlić, 1984: 60). ¹⁰ Technology is generally establishing the conditions whereby humans are only merely becoming an extension of the machine, simply a substitute for a machine when broken. Therefore, it does not lead to the emancipation of human potential and creativity but, conversely, supresses human potential, creativity and practice in order to stabilise capitalist production and maximise profits. Grlić hence stresses that the ‘totality of technology carries within itself – at first glance paradoxically – the loss of humane totality’ (Grlić, 1984: 61) and provides the framework for creating one-dimensional humans and society as such.

The problem of technologically-determined art is that it always depends on the sphere of material production and development of productive forces (Grlić, 1984: 71). The development of technology is necessary in the sphere of production in capitalist society – there is thus always a danger of art becoming subsumed within the sphere of production, which in capitalism means the production of commodities. Therefore, what Benjamin sees as a rupture, Grlić sees as continuity. According to Grlić, there is no rupture between auratic art and art which can be technologically reproduced. He states that technology does not lead to the abolition of aura and of auratic art, but reproduces it on a quantitatively new level. The concept of technology and technologically reproducible art is in Grlić’s work mostly identified in this way with the culture industry and commodity production, which are essential for capitalism: ‘The products of the culture industry are not – as it was the case also with artworks to a greater or lesser degree– also commodities, but only, that is completely, commodities’ (Grlić, 1984: 75). Moreover, culture industry fetishises technology and ‘eternalises the status quo’ (Grlić, 1984: 77) and produces a ‘distorted, alienated modus of art’ (Grlić, 1984: 75). As a result, due to technology, art is becoming ‘parasitic’ (Grlić, 1966: 163) and simply a commodity that can be easily (re)produced (Grlić, 1984: 71).

The problem is thus that we are overestimating the emancipatory potential held by technology and new media. Modern art, it might be said à la Grlić, is losing its aura and fetishistic character but is not becoming integrated into society (Grlić, 1984: 66). In this process, and here Grlić points in the direction of Benjamin, there is no cooperation of the people or of the ‘masses as subjects or creators’ (Grlić, 1984: 61). Mass art that can be reproduced technologically could and should play an important role in changing capitalist society – yet, as Grlić notes, it happens to play a role in reinforcing capitalism and the capitalist relations of exploitation (Grlić, 1984: 71). Politically determined and technologically dominated art is actually non-art since it is directed at meeting the demands of the economy and politics, not of art and society. Technology and artworks that depend on technological reproducibility in its current form only ‘prolong and reproduce the factual state and strengthen the existing stream of institutionalised and reified society’ (Grlić, 1984: 76).

Grlić claims authentic art exists ‘beyond quantitative usefulness, which is solely determined by the commodity’s character and is realised in its market value’ (Grlić, 1984: 75). Moreover, he argued, ‘the technological stays ephemeral and can never become the core of art, something that gives meaning to the essence of its existence’ (Grlić, 1966: 162). Thus, Grlić’s main argument countering Benjamin’s idea of the emancipatory potential of technologically reproducible art is that it posits a false alternative. Namely, technologically dominated art is no alternative to modern and auratic art. It cannot be authentic art since the subject is almost excluded or relativised only at the level of the recipient, of the object (Grlić, 1984: 78). Given that human practice is excluded from technologically dominated one-dimensional society, technology in general, and especially in the relationship between art and technology, is regarded with great suspicion by Grlić because technology ‘destroys the last sparks of singularity, intimacy’ and ‘throws them as romantic prejudices into a lumber room’ (Grlić, 1984: 60). Without the peculiar singularity that characterises human beings, art as praxis ‘cannot and has never existed’ (Grlić, 1984: 67). ¹¹ The sum up, technology holds no emancipatory potential in itself - its emancipatory potential depends on the subject and how the subject utilises it.

With the same camera, the same technology, a good director or actor will create a big work, and a bad one a worthless work. Therefore, certainly, technology that opens endless possibilities should not be underestimated; while it can, it does not have to be used. (Grlić, 1984: 70)

VI Concluding remarks

Grlić’s conception of art as praxis was a key theoretical and practical innovation of the Yugoslav Praxis School. Grlić transformed and adapted various conceptions of art within a broader philosophical stream of Marxist humanism theoretically based on Marx’s understanding of humans as revolutionary, creative and practical subjects. Thus, the article claims two points: first, that Grlić’s conception of art as praxis can only be properly explained within both the broader context of the Yugoslav Praxis School and the specific theory of the subject; and second, that Grlić’s critique of Walter Benjamin, from whom he drew considerable inspiration, can only be fully understood within Grlić’s broader conception of art as praxis and his theory of the subject.

Grlić developed his theory within the socio-historical context of the post-Second World War societies that were encountering technological revolutions and when the technologically dominated way of thinking was starting to emerge in both the capitalist West and socialist East, threatening the free, creative, transformative and revolutionary potential of human beings by subsuming them within technology. Since we are experiencing an even more technologically dominated world and reason (Vernunft), Grlić’s conception of humankind and his conception of art as praxis, which is inseparable from the humanisation of the world beyond class exploitation and technological domination, remain important in the processes of emancipation occurring in our technologically dominated one-dimensional capitalist societies of spectacle.