Constructing ‘others’ and a wider ‘we’ as emotional processes: A case of South Korea in times of crisis

Abstract

This article examines how growing fears, insecurities and uncertainties during the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted an emotional distance from others. The aim is to explore how global solidarity and nationalism are challenged and constructed as collective emotional processes concerning ‘others’. Drawing on social theories of emotions during crises and emotions towards others, this study looks at policy decisions around vaccines and health services and their associated emotions in the context of Korea, which has a relatively small migrant population and a short history of supporting people in lower-income countries. The study finds that the COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened nationalism, both ethnic nationalism and cosmopolitan nationalism. This points to the need to highlight global norms such as human rights and justice and cultivate foundational emotions such as empathy and compassion. This article suggests paying attention to the role of emotions in generating othering practices and developing global solidarity.

Keywords

emotion foreign aid migrant othering pandemic solidarity

Introduction

The rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted how closely we are connected globally, and the need to address such common challenges on a global scale. However, awareness of interconnection does not necessarily lead to global solidarity. As a result, the Secretary-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO) urged the world to ‘break the cycle of panic and neglect’ in December 2020, observing that the emotional barriers to global solidarity are getting higher. While solidarity at the local or national level has been widely reported in the media and praised as a sign of hope in this crisis (Azmanova, 2020), solidarity at the global level has been less emphasised (Libal and Kashwan, 2020). Moreover, widening inequalities between countries raise an issue of global justice in relation to access to vaccines and treatments within the global order. However, the global community’s responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have been dominated by nationalistic rationales for putting ‘us’ ahead of ‘others’.

This article aims to explore how the ideas of global solidarity and nationalism are challenged and constructed as collective emotional processes concerning ‘others’. Given the social nature of emotions and the emotional nature of social phenomena (Barbalet, 2001; Bericat, 2016), this paper examines how emotions and social policies shape each other. In the present paper, social policies of interest concern vaccines and health services for migrants and people in developing countries, who are often regarded as similar. For example, European countries have attempted to regulate immigration by targeting aid towards top sending countries, despite mixed empirical evidence that this is effective (Lanati and Thiele, 2018). The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the otherness and marginality of migrants by excluding them from social protection (Lind et al., 2021). Despite the more significant need for international assistance, the provision of international aid has become increasingly politicised and self-interested, with growing concerns about security and the domestic economy (Brown, 2021). Supporting distant others through aid has been widely understood as driven by both global commitments and national interests (Gulrajani and Swiss, 2019; Ware, 2015; Younas, 2008). The tensions between global responsibility and national interests increased during the COVID-19 crisis, as seen in traditional donor countries’ vaccine nationalism despite their agreement on equitable access to vaccines through COVAX facilities (Nhamo et al., 2021). Although such tensions are not new, the pandemic can reinforce ‘exclusionary nationalism’, building on the existing notions of nationalism (Bieber, 2020).

For research purposes, Korea can serve as an interesting case with a relatively short history of living with and caring for those who are different in terms of race, ethnicity, or nationality. Korea has been characterised by ethnic nationalism as summarised as ‘one blood, one culture, and one nation’ (Moon, 2010: 6; Shin et al., 1999). The growing need for Korea to reconsider its ethnic nationalism reflects an increasing immigrant population during the early 21st century. In terms of aid, Korea has strengthened its global responsibility as an emerging donor by joining the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) in 2009 (Patterson and Choi, 2019). Such a strong drive for global responsibility led Korea to be an example of ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’, which means strengthening nationalism in the name of cosmopolitanism and internationalisation (Maxwell et al., 2020). In the wake of COVID-19, Korea’s roles in advancing global responses to the crisis, as a middle power and non-traditional donor, have received attention. This study of Korea can offer an insight into the emotional dynamics around nationalistic and global views, as challenged or reinforced by the pandemic.

This article first discusses how social theories provide an explanation for this discrepancy between heightened awareness of living in a global world and widened the emotional distance between ‘us and them’. Then, particular attention is paid to the role of emotions in creating othering practices, but at the same time, in developing global solidarity. Then, how emotions and narratives of others have shaped each other is discussed in the context of Korean policies on vaccines, health services, and aid.

Theories of emotions

This research is informed by sociologists who have examined ‘what, why, and how emotions do’ as social constructs. This section focuses on the emotional grounds of core concepts of this study: nationalism, global solidarity, and otherness.

Emotions in nationalism and global solidarity

Emotions are understood as comprising and encouraging specific beliefs and norms such as justice or nationalism (Mercer, 2010). Nationalism involves emotions such as national pride and a sense of shared national identity (Nussbaum, 2010). Although nationalism is often regarded as a counterpart of global solidarity and justice, nationalism has evolved beyond national interests and ethnicity-centred views (Beck, 2002; Calzada, 2021). New forms of nationalism appeared to suit the state’s need to be integrated into the global political economy, described as ‘globalist nationalism’ (Anaid, 2014) or ‘global nationalism’ (Bieber, 2020). When emphasis is given to embracing a universal morality or global justice, such nationalism has been called ‘lofty nationalism’ (Pogge, 2008) or ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ (Brett and Morgan, 2011; Maxwell et al., 2020). The notion of global solidarity and justice has also evolved as an incomplete process, challenging fear and distrust with shared sympathy and compassion (Delanty, 2006; Hannerz, 2006, 2018).

Collins is recognised as deepening understanding of the relationship between nationalism and solidarity, articulating how emotions are generated in social practices (King, 2019). Collins (1998) suggests that group emotions can be intensified when the interactions are bounded within in-groups, and that the shared emotions can strengthen the group bonding. Such in-group feelings can be developed as emotional attachment to the nation-state, particularly in crises (Malešević, 2019). Collins’ later work (2012, 2016) identifies how solidarity can be created when faced with conflicts. He also links nationalism and solidarity, defining nationalism as ‘an intensely felt bond of solidarity’ (2014: 54). Collins’ concept of solidary can be limited to a homogenised and bounded group. So-called ‘micro solidary’ is found to be more potent than universal values such as human rights and equality (David, 2019). However, Malešević (2019) notes that national pride can also incorporate a sense of global responsibility. This suggests a nation can promote global solidarity while also enhancing nationalism, going beyond the dichotomy between the national and the global.

Furthermore, solidarity is a way of challenging the boundaries of different communities and building a relationship with others (Kelz, 2015). Durkheim distinguished mechanical solidarity, simply based on commonalities, from organic solidarity, derived from ‘functional interdependence’ (Calhoun, 2002: 160). An understanding of interdependence can be grounds for solidarity beyond national boundaries, as solidarity is defined as ‘an enacted commitment to carry costs (financial, social and emotional) to assist others with whom a person or persons recognise the similarity in a relevant respect’ (Yeh and Chen, 2020: 52). This suggests the possibility of developing global solidarity by appreciating the interconnectedness with so-called ‘distant others’ and ‘global neighbours’ (Appiah, 2007).

This pandemic crisis shows well that we are all connected in the globalised world. However, awareness of interconnection and shared destiny does not necessarily lead to a sense of solidarity across the globe. This directs our attention to the role of emotions in building a sense of global solidarity. Global solidarity is fellow feeling based on common concerns and shared values (Gould, 2007). Suggested values include common humanity and dignity (Appiah, 2007; Fozdar and Woodward, 2021), human rights and justice (Pogge, 2008), and mutual commitment (Calhoun, 2002). Gould (2007) suggests that people’s commitment to justice and human rights can be strengthened by transnational empathy. Likewise, empathy, affection, and affinity are recognised as essential for global solidarity (Crawford, 2000; Bayram and Holmes, 2020; Hannerz, 2018). As Mercer (1995) maintains, empathy is critical for adopting an other’s perspectives. Building on Mercer’s ideas, Crawford (2000) has elaborated on how empathy could be institutionalised to build trust and collaborative relations. Another fundamental emotion is compassion (Nussbaum, 2001, 2013). Compassion emphasises commitment to take action based on empathy towards others’ suffering. Nussbaum (1996, 2001) argues that compassion can be learned, as compassion is rooted in well-grounded norms and beliefs about the importance of taking care of others’ wellbeing.

In short, the boundaries of solidarity are expandable when ‘mutuality and common concerns’ are highly valued (de Rivera and Mahoney, 2018: 347). The literature suggests the foundation of global solidarity includes belief in the universality of human dignity and rights (Appiah, 2007; Pogge, 2008), emotional attributes such as empathy and compassion (Bayram, 2017; Gould, 2007; Nussbaum, 2001), and commitment to action (Calhoun, 2002). The motivations and processes of achieving global solidarity can be well explored through the lens of emotions (Hudson et al., 2019).

Emotions towards others in crisis

Emotions help individuals to make sense of themselves and how they are situated in relation to others (Hutchison, 2014). Further, either conflict or cooperation can be generated and fed by the boundary between self and other (Mercer, 1995). Yet it is important to note that otherness should be understood as a matter of degree, not as a simple binary between self and other (Clément and Sanger, 2018). Such boundaries are discursively constructed through the process of othering (Holland, 2014; Clément and Sanger, 2018). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the racial othering of migrants has been seen (Scambler, 2020). For example, the separating of ‘us’ from others has been evident in border closures and restrictions placed on migrants’ access to services and benefits (Sharma, 2020; Yeh and Chen, 2020).

Crisis contexts invoke feelings of fear and insecurity (Bar-Tal et al., 2007) and negative emotions such as shame, grief, and bitterness (Neckel and Hasenfratz, 2021; Scambler, 2020). These emotions can drive people to expressions of anger (Clément and Sanger, 2018), but they may also enable them to seek solutions and find hope (Adams, 2015; Neckel and Hasenfratz, 2021; Sjöberg, 2007).

During the current pandemic, increased fear and resentment have been directed toward others, as observed in the Sinophobia of Trump’s naming of the coronavirus the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘kung flu’, as well as in an uptick of hate crimes against Asians and refugees (Scheinin and Molbaek-Steensig, 2021). The historical record shows that othering and attributing blame to people from marginalised backgrounds, especially racial and ethnic minorities, can become particularly intense during viral epidemics and outbreaks. Such othering practices are related to fear and anxiety among the public towards foreign ‘contaminants’, prompting marginalised groups’ fears of encountering discrimination and stigmatisation (Dionne and Turkmen, 2020).

In addition to othering practices, another noticeable trend is politicisation and securitisation of aid. Aid has been the major response of the international community to the spread of COVID-19 in lower-income countries, underpinned by an ongoing desire to alleviate global poverty and health injustice. Although aiding distant others has been primarily driven by national interests and moral responsibilities (Gulrajani and Swiss, 2019; Ware, 2015; Younas, 2008), there has been considerable discussion about developed countries’ accountability, i.e. whether wealthy and powerful countries should bear global accountability as they have benefitted from and perpetuated intertwined and unjust economic and political relationships with the developing world (Beitz, 1979; Pogge, 2008). However, Duffield (2014) discusses recent changes in aid discourses and notes a fading-out of duty-based ethics (deontological ethics) and a rise of consequentialism (teleological ethics). European donor countries’ generosity is also suggested to be self-serving, motivated by the goal of decreasing the number of refugees and migrants by supporting the sending countries (Kiratli, 2020). The pandemic is accelerating this change. Donor countries explicitly prioritise the protection of ‘us’ over the global accountability for ‘them’ and institutionalise aid to block ‘their’ movement to ‘our’ territory. Global responses to COVID-19 have also been determined by national safety concerns and economic interests, not by the needs of disproportionately affected communities in developing countries.

Some studies note the role of emotion in shaping public support for aid. At a collective level, affective empathy is suggested to positively influence perspectives on aid effectiveness and the deservingness of the recipient country (Bayram and Holmes, 2020). Another study suggests the significant role of the framing process by demonstrating that anger-inciting messages shape people’s view of social issues as personal troubles which need individualised solutions, while fear appeals to societal responses to address underlying causes (Nabi, 2003). Similarly, in fundraising, donation appeals mainly invoke pity and empathy, while hope and solidarity work for deep and long-term engagement (Hudson et al., 2019). These studies suggest that public attitudes can be shaped differently by arousing different emotions, confirming that emotions play a role in deciding which evidence to choose and how to interpret it (Mercer, 2010). Concerns are also raised regarding emotional appeals. Aid and development organisations have used emotions to mobilise public support for people in developing countries (Adams, 2015), sometimes involving ‘neo-colonial “us and them” mentalities’ (Tallon and McGregor, 2014: 1407). Hutchison (2014) demonstrates how emotional images can produce stereotypes of distant others, while attempting to generate financial support for them.

Emotions as collective and political processes in Korea

Korean contexts of othering and aiding others

Understanding the Korean context is critical for making sense of otherness, solidarity, and emotions as perceived and experienced by Korean people. Otherness is a pressing issue in Korea in the wake of the increasing number of immigrants, mainly from China, Vietnam, and Thailand, now reaching 2% of the population. Korea’s minimal experience of living with others has resulted in a limited understanding of diversity and biased attitudes against different racial and religious groups.

Solidarity is also differently originated by a country’s historical, cultural and social contexts (Yeh and Chen, 2020). Polls of public opinion on Korean aid in 2017 showed that 62.4% of Korean people were supportive of foreign aid and that 33.6% of them responded with ‘history of receiving aid’ as the primary reason for helping other countries. This suggests that reciprocity and gratitude can explain Korean people’s attitude towards international aid. However, given that such an attitude can be significantly influenced by their perception of the domestic economic situation (Kim and Yoon, 2019), the current economic grim picture is likely to have a negative influence on support for foreign aid among the Korean public.

An analysis of Korean news articles during COVID-19 suggests that negative emotions such as anxiety and fear became much more prevalent in news reports because of the pandemic (Kim, 2020). Furthermore, a survey result shows that living in a context of uncertainties has led many Korean people to experience anxiety and, in turn, trust issues, as illustrated by Korean people’s lack of trust towards foreigners (CSES, 2020). This result finds echoes in another recent survey result, which found Koreans’ trust in foreigners was rated to be 0.3 on a 4-point scale, with only 20% of Korean people reportedly tolerant of people from different backgrounds or cultures, ranking Korea’s tolerance as 26th out of 27 countries (Choi, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised questions about individual states’ capacities to respond to such a global crisis (Salazar, 2021). The earlier mentioned survey (CSES, 2020) also shows that Korean people did not regard international organisations or foreign countries as reliable agencies for problem-solving. Korean people’s waning trust in global governance can be related to their increased trust in Korean governmental agencies as a reliable source of information and as an actor to respond to the pandemic. In addition, the success of the ‘K-Quarantine’ model without any complete lockdown was attributed to citizens’ active participation in protective behaviours, in the form of self-quarantine, social distancing, information sharing, or volunteering for assisting isolated and marginalised people (Kim and Kim, 2020). In this way, Korea’s successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic has raised trust in the state’s capability and trust in fellow Koreans, enhancing national pride.

Marginalisation of immigrants

In Korea, as elsewhere, the pandemic situation has created negative emotions such as fear, feelings of loss, and anger. These emotions have fed hatred, and the targets of hate have variously shifted from China and hot-spot regions to Christian denominations, sexual minorities, or even those infected, depending on the source of infection (Heo, 2021). In the early stages of the pandemic, Korean politicians and media promoted hostility towards China, calling the coronavirus ‘Wuhan pneumonia’, despite the international guidelines that specify not to attach a specific location or ethnicity to the virus (KRCOVID19, 2020). Hostility towards China has been directed at Chinese residents in Korea, and about 760,000 Korean people signed a petition opposing the entry of Chinese people to Korea (The People’s Health Institute, 2020). This shows how collective emotions were mobilised and politicised (Kim, 2020). Anti-Chinese sentiment has expanded to all foreigners in Korea (KRCOVID19, 2020). A study on the development of the Korean version of the COVID-19 phobia scale suggests that Korean people tend to develop a different level of fear and anxiety when with non-Koreans (Seong et al., 2021). As a result, aversion and stigma attached to migrants has been intensified.

The construction of the public’s fear of immigrants was reflected in COVID-19 testing policies. Immigrants and foreigners are typically more socially vulnerable due to their lower income, poor working environments, and high-density housing, but not more physically vulnerable (ECDC, 2020). However, testing policies assume they have a higher risk of infection. Foreigners were ordered to get tested in February and March in 2021. This administrative order caused a dispute over racial discrimination and human rights violations. The mandatory testing was called ‘discriminative and xenophobic’, and 3,440 people agreed with a call to invalidate the order on the national petition website. The executive order was withdrawn in Seoul, a metropolitan city, but not in other provinces. This withdrawal was explained by pressure coming from the embassies and business councils of European countries based in Seoul (Koh, 2021). Other provinces remain unchallenged, reproducing the presumption that foreigners are more likely to spread the virus (KRCOVID19, 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic has also exacerbated the otherness and marginality of migrants by excluding them from social protection (Lind et al., 2021). Provision of financial and medical services for non-Korean residents involves defining and identifying others and justifying the decisions on behalf of Korean taxpayers. A report published by a group of Korean citizens highlights that migrants’ access to information and services has been limited and discriminative (The People’s Health Institute, 2020). For example, the policy to supply masks did not include a range of migrants such as short-term residents, international students, unregistered migrant workers, and asylum seekers who are not eligible for the national health insurance scheme (KRCOVID19, 2020). Migrant workers’ access to hospitals was also greatly limited, as some hospitals that had provided migrants with free health care services were designated exclusively for COVID-19 (The People’s Health Institute, 2020). The Korean government introduced a temporary financial assistance scheme, which later included low-income migrants following the recommendation of the National Human Rights Commission. However, this was contested by members of the Korean public who regarded financial support for foreigners as reverse discrimination when not every Korean benefits from the measure, as petitioned at least three times on the national petition website. Journalistic reporting has focused on the increase in the governmental stimulus payment, describing it as ‘emptying our national coffers’ (e.g. Jeon, 2020).

Waning solidarity with people in lower-income countries

People living in lower-income countries have been ‘absent others’, who are physically and emotionally distant (Robinson, 1997: 125). Likewise, global affairs, including foreign aid, have been widely regarded as irrelevant to domestic affairs (Scotto et al., 2018). However, the pandemic raised the tensions between protecting us and them, as seen in the debates around vaccines. Although international health organisations have promoted vaccine justice and conceptualised vaccines as ‘global public goods’, there have been disparities in access to vaccines, due to limited supply and the rivalrous and excludable nature of vaccines as public goods (Saksena, 2021). The promise for just redistribution of vaccines through COVAX facilities was not fulfilled, as most countries prioritised securing vaccines for their own people. Instead of strengthening the global governance of a socially just distribution of vaccines, some higher-income countries, including Korea, declared two-track strategies, increasing international assistance for lower-income countries while stocking up on the COVID-19 vaccines for themselves.

Korea increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2021 at a time when many conventional donors had cut foreign aid budgets, due to pandemic-related financial distress (Donor Tracker, 2021). It also pledged US$200 million to the COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC) to provide COVID-19 vaccines to low-and-middle-income countries (Donor Tracker, 2021). Korea also signed the Sustainable Recovery Pledge in 2021 along with 32 other countries and seven non-state organisations, placing human rights at the centre of the new global order in the post-COVID-19 era. However, the Korean government increasingly highlights nationalisation and securitisation of aid. The latest Mid-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation (2021–25) states that its official development assistance should serve national interests, including job creation for Korean young people, and greater business opportunities for Korean companies through the K-model or the Green New Deal (Korean Ministries, 2021). Although seeking national interests through aid is neither new nor exclusive to Korea, it is noticeable that Korea openly merges national interests into its aid strategies. Korean civil society has urged the government to play a proactive role in global justice by promoting equitable access to vaccines and treatments (The People’s Health Institute, 2020). However, policy decisions regarding vaccines and health services for lower-income countries are far from justice-grounded solidarity.

In association with the emotional changes that Korean people have gone through during the pandemic, policy direction can influence the public’s perceptions of aid and the people of developing countries (Ky et al., 2012). Attention and commitment to helping distant others have decreased among the public. A survey entitled ‘Trends in charitable giving during the COVID-19 pandemic in South Korea’ shows that COVID-19 did not significantly affect the amount of charitable giving, though donations have decreased slightly as time goes by (The Beautiful Foundation, 2020). What to note, however, is that 95.8% of donations were for charity work happening in Korea. This is a marked change, compared to the result of a 2018 study, where out of 2,011 web interview participants, 31% had donated to aid and development projects abroad (The Beautiful Foundation, 2018). This suggests there has been a negative influence of the pandemic on public support for aid, which was by no means high but had been increasing prior to the pandemic.

Discussion

This study explored how nationalism and global solidarity were challenged and constructed, focusing on the emotional underpinnings in the context of Korea, a country described as having a strong nationalism (Moon, 2010; Shin et al., 1999). This exploration illustrated that pandemic-generated emotions of fear, anxiety and distrust intensified nationalism in Korea, as manifested in othering practices. Immigrants in Korea and people in lower-income countries were considered ‘others’ competing for limited resources such as vaccines and social services against ‘us’ native Koreans. As a result, these neighbouring others and distant others were marginalised. This confirms that the rise of nationalism has promoted otherness throughout the pandemic (Sharma, 2020). However, the Korean government also emphasised global solidarity by pledging support for lower-income countries through aid. In accordance with previous studies highlighting the motives of aid as a mix of national interests and global responsibility (Gulrajani and Swiss, 2019; Ware, 2015; Younas 2008), Korean aid has pursued both, but with an increasing focus on global norms and accountability since Korea joined the OECD DAC (Patterson and Choi, 2019). The COVID-19 crisis led Korea to redirect its aid to serve national interests, as has also been observed in other conventional donors (Brown, 2021; Korean Ministries, 2021). Korea’s initiatives for a global response to the pandemic seem grounded in beliefs in its capabilities and national pride, which were enhanced during the crisis, rather than in foundational emotions such as empathy and compassion. Korea’s nationalism in the name of global solidarity is aligned with findings of other studies, which have identified the convergence of nationalistic and cosmopolitan norms as ‘global nationalism’ (Bieber, 2020) or ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ (Maxwell et al., 2020).

It should be noted that there are tensions in reconciling global solidarity with nationalistic visions. This study demonstrated how Korea’s othering, through prioritisation of Korean people and Korean interests, has been contested by parts of Korean civil society in the name of global justice and solidarity. Juskowiak (2018) criticises the superficial way of integrating global norms into diverse contexts without significant internal changes. Selective or add-on approaches to global norms such as human rights and global justice cannot address underlying issues of the crisis. Many higher-income countries, including Korea, have suggested solidarity as their ostensible reason for supporting others. However, the concept of solidarity here can be questioned. The current orientation to neo-liberalism as well as security concerns are weakening the sense of global interconnectedness and mutual responsibility. We observe states’ individualising problems and solutions to transfer their accountabilities to non-state actors, even in the name of solidarity (Azmanova, 2020; Parsell et al., 2021). Solidarity should involve challenging the structural and underlying causes of inequality and injustice faced by others. In that sense, solidarity should be understood as a transformative process, as rightly noted by Delanty (2006, 2014), and a ‘process of becoming’ (Salazar, 2021: 168).

This study demonstrates the importance of emotions in changing narratives about others. Crises tend to generate anti-other sentiment and authorise othering practices. However, in times of crisis, emotions can also be generated that carry a sense of community and ethical responsibility (Adams, 2015). Affinity and sympathy should be encouraged to challenge ‘uncertainty, fear, and distrust toward strangers’ (Hannerz, 2018: 132). Empathy is suggested as central for deepening our understanding of others (Mercer, 1995) and strengthening our commitment to normative values, including human rights and global justice (Gould, 2007). Further, Nussbaum (2010) highlights the critical role of compassion for learning more about ‘us and them’ and taking actions to address global problems, arguing that compassion can be learned (Nussbaum, 1996, 2001). What we need to do is to build an enabling environment to cultivate such emotions. Without collective and transformative changes in foundational emotions, otherings will be expanded to other groups, impacting the whole society.

This study affirms that contexts are influential for the construction and validation of global and cosmopolitan viewpoints (Werbner, 2006), as well as nationalism (Bieber, 2020). Emotions are socio-political and cultural constructions (Crawford, 2000; Mercer, 2010). Yeh and Chen (2020) identified ‘the re-emerged nationalism and an ethos of common life’ as origins of solidarity in the Taiwanese context, noting its differences from Western society. Korea’s historical, social, cultural, and political condition for challenging or generating solidarity warrants future research.

Concluding thought

‘No one is safe before everyone is safe.’ This slogan emphasises the importance of global solidarity in responding to this global crisis. This article draws attention to the influence of emotions created by COVID-19 on nationalistic perspectives and the sense of global solidarity. The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced nationalism. However, it has also opened up an opportunity to reshape global solidarity with a renewed focus on foundational beliefs and emotions. Global solidarity is achievable when fundamental emotions, including transnational empathy and compassion, are translated into principled actions of states and their citizens. The current form of global solidarity has room for such challenges and redirection. Unequal resources and power distribution should be tackled, beyond just assisting others with whatever resources are left over after allocating them to ourselves. The COVID-19 pandemic renews the call for global solidarity.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-OLU-20200039).

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