Agnes Heller: Changing Aspects of Her Socialist Theory in the 1980s

Introduction

Widely recognized as a leading figure of the Budapest School, Agnes Heller was arguably the most influential post-Marxist theorist in the late 20th century. The term ‘post-Marxist’, according to Simon Tormey (2001: 20), commonly describes those who were formerly Marxist or devoted themselves to Marxist philosophy or social theory, but who afterward self-consciously felt it necessary to ‘leave’ this philosophical position for the pursuit of a new theoretical system. After being held under house arrest in Budapest, between 1973 and 1977, Heller moved with her husband, Ferenc Fehér, to Melbourne, Australia, where she continued to progress her critical analysis of the actually existing socialist project in Soviet-type societies, and found her voice in progressive socialist theory, but now in the Western context. In 1982, she published the pamphlet Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective (referred to in this paper as the ALP pamphlet), based on an address made at a local symposium organized by Kooyong Federal Electorate Assembly, a branch of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). In the pamphlet, Heller identifies socialism with democracy and elaborates this strong idea from a post-Marxist perspective. The research questions of this paper are: what does democratic socialism mean for Heller, and to what extent does this represent her move beyond Marxism?

Before answering these two questions, this paper will begin with a brief biography of Heller, from the 1940s to the 1990s, which mainly consists of an outline of the social context in communist Hungary, her personal experience, and her intellectual career. Peter Beilharz (2003: 110) points out that Heller’s work depends on intuition and experience equally to insight and intellect. His remarks are not suggesting that Heller’s work is by any means ‘personal’ or ‘subjective’. In fact, his remarks emphasize that Heller deeply engages in developing her theory of ethics, socialism, and modernity based on personal thinking and everyday life. Gyorgy Márkus (1994: 258) also suggests that proper interpretation of Heller’s work should focus on the strongly ‘authorial’ character of her writings, since she does not hide herself behind the impersonal logic of problem-solving or the play of text. In short, Heller creates strong authorial voices in her writings, and these voices come from her experience and specific social background. The following notes intend to alert readers to the position and context in which Heller was located, for a better understanding of her ALP pamphlet and progressive socialist theory.

Heller was born in Budapest in 1929. She came from a Jewish family and suffered during the Nazi occupation period. Heller’s father, Pál Heller, was arrested and perished in Auschwitz in 1944. Before being arrested, Pál Heller, with his legal training and fluency in German, helped potential deportees prepare necessary documents to emigrate from Nazi Germany. When imprisoned in the concentration camp, he was courageous and supported others (Grumley, 2005: 5). Her father remained for her a moral model. His goodness, courage and responsibility left indirect but indelible marks on Heller. Her moral theory shows that being a good person is an inherent dimension of a human life, and a human life should consist of moral relationships regardless of utilitarianism or any forms of ‘objectivation’ (Burnheim, 1994: 14–15). Heller became a student and later a colleague of György Lukács at the University of Budapest. She joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1947 but was expelled in 1949. Initially, Heller believed in the redeeming power of socialism and a glimpse of a better world provided by the party. However, from 1948 onwards, the party turned to a Stalinist ideology under the regime of Mátyás Rákosi. Collectivization was initiated, the parliamentary system was undermined, and legal procedures gave way to party-political ‘class justice’ (Hoensch, 1996: 190–3). She was disappointed with Hungarian Stalinism and the party. What emerged as important to Heller were the ideas of autonomy and collective self-determination which were further developed in her studies of ethics as well as socialist theory. Her experience with Stalinism, to some extent, was the origin of her critical stance, which she maintained throughout her life.

Under Lukács’ supervision, Heller completed her doctoral dissertation, focusing on the ethics in Chernyshevsky’s What Is to Be Done?, a revolutionary socialist novel that influenced Lenin and other Russian populists. Heller took a strong position against self-sacrifice for the interest of the revolutionary cause and against the idea that a social programme can be realized without the interests of its participants (Tormey, 2001: 5). Simply put, individuals should have autonomy to act according to their own interests and needs instead of the party’s interests. In reality, however, the Hungarian Revolution against Stalinism in 1956, driven by Imre Nagy, was soon quashed by Soviet military force. It was the failure of this political movement that brought Heller to the realization that there was no room for the idea of autonomy and self-determination in this Soviet form of Marxism.

In 1957–8, Heller, as an assistant of Lukács, presented a course entitled ‘General Ethics’. In her lectures, she argued that ethics should not be reduced to the interest of the party but are rooted in human capacity as universal values and, therefore, are autonomous and non-political (Tormey, 2001: 6). Her understanding of ethics was not only opposed to utilitarian ethics devised by the party, but also represented a serious threat to the party ideology that stressed class struggle and collective will, regardless of individual autonomy. Consequently, Heller was dismissed from her academic post and forced to teach language in a high school. As the political situation stabilized, Heller was able to return to her academic position in the Sociological Institute at the Hungarian Academy in 1963. Around the early 1960s, Heller became a central figure of the Budapest School, comprised of a group of critical intellectuals based around Lukács and united by the idea of the ‘Renaissance of Marxism’, namely a retrieval of ‘early Marx’ (Márkus, 1994: 267). She reinterpreted ‘early Marx’ to formulate a series of critical as well as emancipatory theories, and generated critiques of the official Marxism imposed by Soviet authorities. In these emancipatory theories, values embodied in early Marxian work were revitalized, such as genuine equality of chances, self-determination of individuals, and self-government (Márkus, 1994: 268). Although the humanist reading of Marx and a craving for reform no longer attracted Heller afterwards, values such as individual self-determination and self-government resurfaced when she began to rethink the socialist system after she emigrated to Australia.

Unfortunately, from 1968 onwards, the situation for Heller and other members of the Budapest School became worse, especially after they publicly condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They had to endure ‘wearily precarious lives’, meaning one day ‘tolerated’, the next day ostracized (Tormey, 2001: 12). In this period, Heller concentrated on her two major books, Everyday Life (1984 [1970]) and The Theory of Need in Marx (1976 [1974]). Everyday Life is one of her landmark books, earning her a considerable international reputation. During the 1970s, Heller and other members of the Budapest School were held under police surveillance, banned from taking any kind of paid work, and prevented from publishing their work (Tormey, 2001: 12–13). Ultimately, Heller and Fehér were forced to emigrate to Australia in 1977, after being offered an academic post at La Trobe University in Melbourne.

According to Tormey (2001: 103), Heller and Fehér had more opportunity to write and publish their work in Australia between 1978 and 1986. Heller published A Theory of History (1982) and Dictatorship Over Needs (1983), co-authored with Fehér and Márkus. Heller also produced many important essays, some of which were collaborative. These essays are collected in The Power of Shame (1985) and Eastern Left, Western Left (1987). Her work of that period is not only progressive but, more importantly, characterized by the exploration of a theoretical framework beyond Marx, in the philosophical, political, sociological, and aesthetical spheres. For the purpose of this paper, Dictatorship Over Needs will be discussed, which provides a penetrating critical analysis of the existing socialist project in Soviet-type societies. Furthermore, Heller, during her stay in Australia, began to forge her theory of modernity, a new path to a post-Marxist theoretical paradigm.

As expressed in this biography, Heller’s changing conceptualization of socialism is associated with her long-term dissatisfaction with the existing socialist project and intention to explore democratic socialism from a post-Marxist perspective. This paper will summarize the ALP pamphlet and link the major ideas elaborated in the pamphlet to Dictatorship Over Needs and ‘The Great Republic’, an article first published in 1985 and collected in Eastern Left, Western Left. It is the argument of this paper that by identifying socialism as a long-term social experiment undertaken by the citizenry, Heller comes to challenge Marxism and establish a theoretical framework that explores possibilities of realizing a multiplicity of social worlds. Her critical analysis of Soviet-type societies and theoretical construction of the Great Republic suggests that socialism can be transformed into an all-embracing social experiment that contains multiple alternatives of the existing social arrangement and encourages the people to actualize pluralized forms of life.

Heller’s ALP pamphlet

Since the ALP pamphlet is a less known work of Heller, this section will provide a detailed summary, to demonstrate how she developed her socialist theory from a post-Marxist perspective that was further strengthened in her subsequent writings. One key to this development is to be found in the pamphlet, in which Heller comes to identify socialism with a long-term social experiment based on collective social imagination and the radicalization of democracy.

Heller begins her pamphlet by discussing what the ‘socialist objective’ means and why it matters. Heller tends to see the ‘socialist objective’ as an open concept. Its content needs to be articulated by the citizens who are capable of exercising social imagination. Social imagination, according to Heller (1982: 2), refers to the human capacity to imagine possible alternatives to the present situation. It also encompasses alternative understandings, suggestions or solutions to current movements and social systems. The exercise of social imagination will generate an interplay of different perspectives among citizens, while they are discussing the possible alternatives, that expand their horizon and further strengthen their imagination. Heller (1982: 2) argues that a citizenry without imagination is dangerous because if there are no social or economic alternatives to present affairs, for example, the future of Western societies in the socio-political sphere will possibly be reduced to matters of more or less progressive taxation. Without inspiring the collective imagination, labour parties will find themselves in a difficult situation, in which they are surrounded by passive, depoliticized citizens and, thus, are unable to deal with any conflict successfully. Therefore, according to Heller, a ‘socialist objective’ should be maintained, but it is the central task of the citizenry to determine what the ‘socialist objective’ is specifically about, through exercising social imagination.

By viewing the history of the labour movement, Heller (1982: 1) points out that the ‘socialist objective’ has been turned into either an empty slogan by the majority of parties, or a weapon by the communist parties against democracy and also against the working class itself (what she refers to here is the Soviet Communist Party that legitimizes the exercise of power against the working class). As discussed in the following sections, Heller attempts to not only revive the ‘socialist objective’ but, more importantly, to conceptualize socialism as a long-term social experiment by criticizing two major socialist models in the 20th century, namely the Bolshevik project and the radicalized welfare state. Although her criticism of the Soviet socialist project is relatively undeveloped in this pamphlet (further developed in Dictatorship Over Needs), Heller comes to thematize the ‘socialist objective’ for three interdependent reasons. The first and second reason can be reformulated as this: by thematizing the ‘socialist objective’, labour parties can cope with the ‘imagination deficit’ and encourage the citizenry to think about vigorous alternative images, in order to transform their pragmatic policies to more principled and independent policies (Heller, 1982: 4). For Heller, the thematization of the ‘socialist objective’ becomes an antidote to the ‘imagination deficit’ and, at the same time, prompts labour parties to make decisions based on what the citizenry proposes as the alternative image, rather than pragmatic political strategies that exclude the citizenry from participating in the pre-set state of affairs. The third reason to thematize the ‘socialist objective’ is that it improves the social movement initiated by Western labour parties, which ‘know what to refuse but do not yet know what to establish’ (Heller, 1982: 5). In the opinion of Heller, an idealized thematization of the ‘socialist objective’ engages the citizenry in the discussion of the alternatives, that is, what to create instead. Now, the fundamental thread that connects these three reasons reveals itself: thematizing the ‘socialist objective’ helps labour parties democratize the social and political sphere, provided that the citizenry takes responsibility for discussing the ‘socialist objective’.

It is necessary to consider the peculiar nature or status of this text with reference to its context, that is, a debate about the socialist objective in the ALP that began around 1920, where socialization suggested nationalization. Across this debate, the socialist objective was being diluted further because of the imprecise understanding of socialization as a mere antidote to occasional exploitation in capitalist production as well as the socialist rhetoric used within the ALP (Beilharz, 1985/6: 217–18). Heller not only intervened in the debate for reviving the objective but also evoked images of socialization units more like worker councils that were self-managed by the citizenry. By developing the idea of social imagination, Heller attempted to expand the conceptual apparatus of both labourism and socialization-talk to talk about democratic socialism after the Second World War, as in Britain and Germany. These debates did not, however, prefigure the terms of reference for Heller, who was using the opportunity to think for herself as well as to offer ideas to members of the ALP or the citizenry at large. Her interest was more broadly in the culture than in the politics of labour or the labour movement, which continued to drive her to arrive at a reconceptualization of socialism beyond Marxism (Beilharz, 1985/6: 217–20).

Heller goes further in elaborating collective social imagination and civic responsibility, through her detailed critical analysis of the radicalized welfare state. The main features of the welfare state include increasing state intervention in the market and economic system, a highly progressive taxation system, and extensive public spending, which together contribute to the implementation of socio-economic rights in different realms (Heller, 1982: 5–6). The protection and promotion of socio-economic rights represents a significant social progress but, according to Heller (1982: 6), even the best welfare state causes serious social ills, namely increasing bureaucratization, centralization, and paternalism. For Heller, the real crisis of the welfare state is its paternalistic system, rather than the economic crisis. Paternalism allows the state to monopolize decision-making processes and to endow itself with paternal authority, treating its citizens as children (Heller et al., 1983: 180). Although paternalism provides citizens with a sense of security, their life in the welfare state can only be a tolerable life rather than a good life. Heller (1982: 8) proclaims that a tolerable life is given or precisely circumscribed by higher authorities, but a good life is self-created by the people themselves. In short, a good life cannot be actualized in a paternalistic system because citizens are deprived of both the capability to imagine a good life and the means to realize it. For Heller, the citizenry is the agency to carry out the democratization of socialist projects, but this democratization process depends on whether citizens are self-determined with imaginative power.

Heller also criticizes the radicalization of the welfare state, especially its nationalization of industry. A nationalization programme increases state bureaucracy and, more importantly, preserves a hierarchal structure of power, in which citizens, also as members of different industries, are restricted from either owning or managing the industries and forced to be at the mercy of the all-powerful state (Heller, 1982: 10). For Heller, a programme of total nationalization is another form of alienation that atomizes the citizenry and transforms each citizen to the subordinate of the hegemonic state. When citizens become the subject of the hegemonic power of the state in nationalized industries, they can neither exercise social imagination to propose their own opinions nor participate in decision-making processes at both local and national levels.

Therefore, Heller refuses to identify ‘genuine socialism’ with the radicalization of the welfare state. Rather, she believes that socialism should be identified with the radicalization of democracy that is not merely limited to a parliamentary system but is more associated with citizen involvement. Heller (1982: 11) defines socialism as ‘a long-term social experiment undertaken not by a bureaucratized and centralized state apparatus but by the citizenry as a whole’. In the pamphlet, Heller speaks of the long-term social experiment at such a level of generality, without describing it in more concrete terms or giving specific instruction about how to realize it. For Heller, the long-term social experiment must result from social imagination, that is, from the discussion of socio-political issues by its participants, and can never be predictable or predetermined. Her proclamation makes it clear that the long-term social experiment depends on every citizen being given the chance to think and discuss social alternatives. Heller has a high expectation of the citizenry and its influence in the social and political spheres.

Heller’s long-term social experiment shows the utopian impulse inherent in socialism. Karl Popper, however, speaks of the danger of utopian engineering and social experiment on a large scale, arguing that this utopian engineering requires a blueprint, that is, a reconstruction of society that entails countless sacrifices based on powerful interests and excludes the possibility of piecemeal adjustment (Popper, 1947: 143–4). Heller favours an overarching social experiment, as an open-ended project, but echoes Popper’s rejection of a social blueprint. Her rejection might result from her own experience of the Soviet-type societies but, more importantly, from the idea of social imagination. Heller conceptualizes socialism as a utopia based on collective social imagination rather than any particular social blueprint. Therefore, the long-term social experiment on a large scale, for Heller, consists of many-sided discussions and reflections of socio-political issues, although it is not clear whether these discussions and reflections will bring about a consensus. Moreover, Heller turns to emphasize the importance of genuine pluralism, that is, the plurality of human life, rather than the reconstruction of society. In other words, since social imagination helps citizens, who come from different communities, communicate their values and needs, the outcome of the social experiment, as Heller (1982: 11–12) concludes, is a social movement created by its participants to support pluralized forms of life.

Heller further illustrates how self-management, as a programme diametrically opposed to the programme of nationalization, becomes a fundamental precondition of increasing citizen involvement. When citizens participate in a self-managed factory, office, or department store, they are more likely to articulate their needs and engage with discussions concerning their own industry. For Heller, self-management in small units prepares citizens to exercise their social imagination, so they are able to participate in the long-term social experiment. In short, Heller sees self-management not merely as a basic precondition, but as a driving force of activating the citizenry on the one hand, and shaking the state ownership and state bureaucracy on the other hand. Heller sees the conflict between private interest and collective interest as a source of social dynamics. She adds that we should be confident of collective interest being ‘self-restricted within the institutional framework of radical democracy’ (Heller, 1982: 12). Finally, Heller turns to the problem of alienation. She argues that the system of self-management reunifies the mental and manual aspects of the same productive process and, therefore, paves the way for the emergence of alternative technologies inherent in various lifestyles (Heller, 1982: 12). In other words, wage workers can regain their strength to master what they produce and, by implementing alternative technologies, further diversify the monotonous labour process according to their particular needs.

Heller holds up to citizens the ideal of a social experiment that is less centralistic and more individual. However, it is difficult for this ideal experiment to become actual, unless citizens take their civic responsibility and maintain a high level of active participation in articulating social-political issues. Heller (1982: 13) argues that the radicalization of democracy cannot be simply realized by certain measures taken by any party in power, although the party in power triumphs over its competitors in election and excels in observance of parliamentary rules. In other words, winning the majority of support and observing the parliamentary rules does not guarantee success in instituting radical democracy. Rather, Heller articulates her position by focusing on the inspiration of social imagination. Inspiring social imagination is vital because it increases citizen participation and avoids the political passivity that isolates citizens from one another and from the public life. A high level of citizen participation means that citizens should take responsibility for expressing their ideas, suggestions, and decisions regarding the social experiment as a whole. Therefore, according to Heller, labour parties should invite the working and middle classes to a free socialization-talk about what socialism means for them (Heller, 1982: 13). For citizens to employ their social imagination and freely discuss socialism, the very existence of socialism, including its objective and operation, must remain as a constantly open question. Therefore, social imagination, for Heller, is boundless and should not be controlled. It is best expressed and exercised when citizens take their responsibility for embarking on social experiments.

Heller (1982: 13) makes it clear that labour parties should help to challenge the conception of the ‘natural’ order of things. They should encourage citizens to think of not-yet possibilities, rather than take everything for granted. For Heller, challenging the ‘natural’ order is meant to challenge repressive authority, especially in a totalitarian state where everything is programmed and circumscribed by the state or the leading party. Heller further brings attention to the dialectics of possibility and impossibility, by quoting Max Weber: ‘Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible’ (Heller, 1982: 14). In other words, thinking about the impossible, especially how it might be achieved, opens up the human mind irrevocably and therefore extends the domain of the possible. It emerges as a vital power of not only initiating but also strengthening social imagination. In summary, the intention of inspiring social imagination is to make citizens actively participate in the long-term social project or social experiment, that is, to encourage them to provide their own ideas, suggestions, and solutions about the existing socialist system.

According to Heller, to better achieve social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, it is necessary to create a democratic public sphere. She explains that establishing a democratic public sphere opens up channels for social experiments, movements and initiatives, allowing citizens to develop their potentialities, which have been restricted due to bureaucratic and centralistic pressures (Heller, 1982: 14). Heller’s democratic public sphere echoes what Hannah Arendt articulates as the public realm in The Human Condition. The reality of the public realm, as Arendt (2018: 57) suggests, depends on ‘the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised’. Both Arendt and Heller recognize the richness of the public sphere, that is, a variety of possibilities and alternative perspectives that cannot be reduced to one dominant mode of thinking by any bureaucratic and centralistic attempts. A public realm is a space for plurality because it allows citizens to express themselves from their own perspectives, releasing and helping channel their energies toward self-determination that further leads to the real pluralization of lifestyles.

While Arendt describes the public realm according to the Greek polis, Heller attempts to delineate more concrete steps, such as institutionalizing self-management, providing workers with long-term state loans for the establishment of communal ownership, and breaking down the monolithic character of the mass media (Heller, 1982: 14). These measures lead to decentralization and depaternalization only if they are backed by social movements and initiatives undertaken by active citizens. For Heller, active citizens are not a multitude of spectators in the public sphere but are human agents who take actions to change the existing reality. These active citizens, as Heller indicates (1982: 14), not only make their own decisions but also create or recreate institutions according to their own needs, namely self-managed factories should be able to establish and run their own schools, childminding centres, and healthcare systems. Creating or recreating institutions is a striking power because it dispels the overcentralized and paternalistic control by the state over its citizens. More importantly, this power will never deplete, so long as the citizenry can recognize their particular needs. In these ‘civic’ institutions, citizens will carry social imagination and self-determination with them, practising the discussion of the alternatives, collective participation, and decision-making processes. Although Heller does not speak of the relationship between ‘civic’ institutions and larger political institutions, we can see these self-created and self-managed institutions as the testing ground for radical democracy.

Still, it is not easy for labour parties to practically realize socialism as the radicalization of democracy, this even more so 40 years later. First, from an economic perspective, Heller (1982: 15) points out that labour parties face scarcity, namely limited natural resources and ecological problems. Scarcity places restrictions on policy making and policy practice, which any form of government will have to experience. Second, it is even more difficult for parties to handle greater pressures within a global context, such as the blackmailing tactics of multinational corporations. Based on Heller’s view, the task for labour parties is to inspire socialist imagination, activate citizens with strong civic responsibility, create a democratic sphere, and open channels for pluralism. Pluralism comes about as one of the most important results of the long-term social experiment undertaken by the citizenry at large. For Heller, this whole task will lead to a self-created world which citizens are fond of, not a world imposed on them by higher authorities. At the end of the pamphlet, Heller reminds labour parties that their aim to complete the task will not earn them electoral successes immediately, and they could even experience momentary setbacks or defeats. For Heller, a labour party needs dignity and credibility, as a democratic party aiming for the radicalization of democracy, and mutual support – instead of pure pragmatism. Heller closes the pamphlet quoting Rosa Luxemburg: ‘socialism is free pluralism in all areas of life’ (1982: 17).

Now we can better understand why Heller refuses to provide ‘an exact catalogue of the elements of genuine socialism’. For Heller, socialism depends on the exercise of social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, rather than priori knowledge. Collective imagination transcends the existing social order, not through projecting a totally new world to citizens but through preparing them to embrace multifarious aspects of social life. Therefore, the socialist experiment must remain open-ended because it is developed and reformed constantly according to the needs of the citizenry, who become accustomed to the exercise of social imagination. It does not aim to create a new social world but to allow citizens to affirm and fulfil their own needs, freely and equally. According to this view, the radicalization of democracy does not represent a traditional, or actual, process of institutionalization of democracy but an emancipation of the citizenry from the control of the authorities. In other words, for Heller, the aim of ‘genuine socialism’ is not to revolutionize the whole social system but to encourage citizens to fulfil their own needs. Although the ALP pamphlet is not recognized as one of her landmark essays, and its ephemeral form means that it effectively disappeared, Heller elaborates social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, providing a theoretical framework that helps us to interpret her subsequent work, especially Dictatorship Over Needs.

Dictatorship Over Needs

Social imagination and the radicalization of democracy emerge as the framework for Heller’s critical analysis of Soviet-type societies. After completing the pamphlet, Heller, with Fehér and Márkus, published Dictatorship Over Needs (1983), which explains and criticizes the Soviet-style totalitarianism. For Heller, Soviet socialism became corrupted because the Communist Party initiated the social domination and totalization according to its supreme will. Peter Beilharz (2017: 56) suggests that Heller approaches the problem of modernity directly through the Soviet experience and her diagnosis of the Soviet-type societies becomes one of the key themes in her work on culture and modernity. Beilharz rightly points out that the book certainly discusses the Soviet form of modernization and prepares Heller for a closer investigation of modernity. Heller’s critical analysis of Soviet-type societies represents a further development of her changed conceptualization of socialism from a post-Marxist perspective, based on an experimental use of non-Marxist critical tools. We need to take into consideration that the ALP pamphlet also has parallels and precedents in the German edition of Dictatorship Over Needs that was published by Feher and Heller without Markus in 1979. Rather than a complete innovation, the pamphlet represents a vital outgrowth of Heller’s long-term contemplation of democratic socialism.

This section will consider how Heller bases her critical analysis of the Soviet socialist project, especially its political structure, on the major ideas that she articulates in the pamphlet, especially the conceptualization of socialism as a long-term social experiment, the framework of social imagination, and the radicalization of democracy. The political system in Soviet-type societies destroys social imagination. Heller (Heller et al., 1983: 156–7) claims that Soviet-type societies are characterized by a one-party political system, in that the Communist Party demands an absolutist leading role. For example, as shown in the Soviet Constitution of 1936, the Communist Party acts as ‘the leading nucleus of all workers’ and state’s organizations’ (p. 160). In other words, organizations can only be legitimized when they operate in accordance with the supreme will of the party and obey the rules set down by the party. According to Heller (pp. 156–7), the one-party system plays a significant role in assisting the party to achieve its leading role, by excluding not only all organizations with alternative programmes but also the possibility of proposing any kind of alternatives. Social imagination is outlawed in the Soviet-type societies because it provides organizations with alternative programmes that may challenge the absolutist authority of the party. Citizens are not allowed to exercise social imagination and their civic responsibility is, thus, undermined. They are deprived of their right to propose alternative programmes and, knowingly or unwittingly, become politically passive, excluded from political activity. The ultimate goal of the Soviet political system is to totalize society according to the party programme, by eliminating social imagination and depoliticizing its citizens. Based on Heller’s critique, the one-party system must be abolished to achieve a democratic socialism. The political system should encourage citizens to exercise social imagination and accommodate alternative programmes. Organizations should also be free from the control of the party on every level, local or national.

In addition to the removal of social imagination, the Soviet socialist project, as a system of domination organized by the party, also deprives citizens of their freedom to make decisions and, thus, consolidates its absolutist leadership. Heller further hints at her conceptualization of socialism by criticizing the socialist system in Soviet-type societies which feature overcentralization, bureaucracy, and paternalism. In the one-party system, the party is the sovereign, the source of all power (Heller et al., 1983: 157). The citizenry, by contrast, is merely a nominal sovereign and has never been involved in the sovereignty of the state. Citizens are excluded not only from decision-making processes at every level, but also from discussion of public issues in socio-political spheres. Accordingly, their civil rights and civil responsibility are undermined in the socialist system in Soviet-type societies.

The administration of the Soviet state is over-centralized under the party. The nomination of members of the Supreme Soviet relies solely on the sovereign, rather than the poll that turns out to be a symbolic act (Heller et al., 1983: 161). The concrete outcome of the poll, as Heller (p. 161) adds, is predetermined by the party leadership before the actual election. In other words, the party rules and runs the state by controlling the administrative system and, as a result, the people are excluded from it. More importantly, they will no longer feel responsible to the state, its decisions and political activities. In short, the Soviet Union is not a state of the people, but a state of the Communist Party. In addition, all powers are over-centralized under the party leadership. According to Heller (p. 171), legislative, judiciary, and executive powers are concentrated in the hands of the party, and they emanate from the party leadership in the Soviet state. The overcentralization of power guarantees that power can be exercised according to the needs of the party, maintaining and consolidating its system of domination. The balance of power between the people and government is therefore disbanded. For example, a constitution, according to Thomas Paine (1984: 71), is antecedent to a government and it is not the act of the government but of the people constituting the government. The constitution should be enacted and approved by the people constituting the government. Yet, in the Soviet state, the people are excluded from the government, and not only constitutions but all laws must be approved by the party leadership (Heller et al., 1983: 171). Legislative and judiciary powers are reduced to executive power solely based on the party leadership and, as a result, the people have no power to protect their rights against the ruling of the party and simply cannot represent their will or interest in the legal system.

Moreover, although the Soviet sovereign has never been bureaucratic in a Weberian sense, overcentralization encourages and increases bureaucracy that can be seen as one huge apparatus of power in Soviet-type societies (Heller et al., 1983: 175). The members of the Soviet bureaucracy, as Heller (p. 175) suggests, are not civil servants and not responsible to the people, but exclusively to their superiors. This description shows that the bureaucratic system in the USSR, similar to the structure of power of a top-down hierarchical system, was solely for the purpose of the party. The task of the bureaucrats is to pass decisions and orders from the top, but suggestions and requests from grassroots are unlikely to reach central organs or organizations. The people can only make requests by asking favours and, if disapproved, the requests possibly become a ‘black mark’ on their file and may be used against them (p. 176). Accordingly, the bureaucratic system restricts people from making suggestions about social improvements and decisions made by the party. The people, therefore, are forced to abandon their engagement with socio-political issues, because of the risk to their life when making requests. As the Soviet state becomes bureaucratized, individual rights are abused and civic responsibility is hindered on the one hand, and the system of domination is consolidated on the other hand.

Furthermore, the socialist system of Soviet-type societies is paternalistic. According to Heller (Heller et al., 1983: 180), the state, which projects itself in the image of father, makes all the decisions. In short, the people, projected in the image of children, are restricted from decision-making processes. The paternal authority is established and consolidated because the state controls the material needs of its population. All goods and services come from the state and, more importantly, as Heller (p. 181) adds, it is the state that determines the amount of goods necessary for survival and provides these to its people. Thus, the people depend on the state and the party for survival and better living conditions. They are forced to obey the paternal authorities and accept decisions made by these authorities. As they internalize the image of the state as a paternal figure, they lose their self-determination and, therefore, can no longer make their own suggestions or decisions. Paternalism, as a form of state control and absolute authority, makes the people, especially their needs and decisions, subordinate to the state and the party leadership, undermining their civic participation in all forms of decision making.

Therefore, what Heller elaborates in the pamphlet as the genuine features of socialism is in irreconcilable opposition to the structure of actually existing socialism. A democratic public sphere, as Heller suggests in the ALP pamphlet, is also necessary for citizens to launch a social experiment, because it creates a space for citizens to develop their potentialities. The democratic public sphere, according to Heller, contributes to the actualization of pluralism, namely the pluralization of values, lifestyles and patterns of behaviour, and also enhances the system of self-management in the socio-economic sphere. Yet, the Soviet state, as Heller (Heller et al., 1983: 161–2) argues, always attempts to homogenize a system of values according to the will of the party, outlawing all forms of pluralism. The homogenization of differing value systems disables the people from imagining or achieving their specific lifestyles and, therefore, extinguishes the hope of exercising social imagination. In short, outlawing pluralism in everyday life is a fundamental task of manipulating individual minds and destroying the social experiment. Although the social experiment may be launched by chance, it will not lead to any concrete outcomes, but becomes a subordinate programme of the party.

Moreover, as Heller (1982: 12) points out in the pamphlet, self-management in industrialization and economy will increase citizen involvement and, hence, encourages them to make decisions as well as establishes auxiliary institutions according to their own needs. Nevertheless, the system of self-management was replaced by forced collectivization in the USSR, namely its economic and industrial plans, which strengthen the power of the party. As Heller (Heller et al., 1983: 165) explains, after 1921 in the USSR, society was totalized by forced collectivization, that is abolition of free enterprise, both individual and collective, which led to two million people losing their lives, either killed or dying due to famine. Collectivization is an absolutist execution of the will of the party, without taking citizens and their needs into consideration. Based on Heller’s critical analysis, the will of the people should be freed from the control of the party and prioritized in order to achieve pluralistic forms of lifestyles and self-management. The homogenized system of values and collectivization, necessary to subject citizens to the will of the party, needs to be removed as it prevents citizens from taking responsibility in the socio-political sphere.

In Soviet-type societies, the party totalizes society and consolidates its leadership by excluding organizations with alternative programmes, turning its socialist system into a system of domination and establishing the party leadership as an absolutist authority over the citizenry. The nature of this ‘existing’ socialism, therefore, contradicts Heller’s conception of socialism as the long-term social experiment. By redefining and reconstructing socialism in the ALP pamphlet, Heller proves the Soviet system is not socialism because it stifles social imagination and the radicalization of democracy. Dictatorship Over Needs is a showcase example of the critical analysis of ‘existing’ socialism, which is marked by the framework of social imagination and radicalization of democracy, rather than by Marx’s early ideas that used to be interpreted and developed in Heller’s work, such as The Theory of Need in Marx (1976). The aspect of young Marx’s ideas that most inspires and impacts the Budapest School scholars, including Heller, is the formulation that a human being is an individual, as the basic unit, who demands the definition and satisfaction of his or her needs, that is, the individual ‘rich in need’ (Beilharz, 2015: 270; Bulira, 2018: 67). Although we can still find traces of young Marx in the book, Heller starts, as it is shown in this section, to use social imagination and radical democracy as the major framework for analysing Soviet-type societies. Unlike young Marx who uses the category of ‘need’ to explicate the problem of alienation in capitalist society, Heller discusses how the needs of the citizenry are encouraged and fulfilled within the framework of social imagination and the radicalization of democracy. At the same time, her critical analysis of Soviet-type societies shows the socio-political restrictions of the realization of the social imagination and radical democracy, namely, overcentralization, bureaucracy, state paternalism, and forced collectivization. Therefore, by criticizing the phenomenon as well as the nature of Soviet socialism, Heller explores the possibilities of socialist theory beyond the Marxist paradigm and develops her own non-Marxist conceptual categories.

Waldemar Bulira (2018: 76–7) concludes that Dictatorship Over Needs represents a new beginning for the Hungarian philosopher to realize that Soviet-type societies are the products of the modern era and to develop her own original theories of modernity. In fact, the specific kind of intellectual curiosity that Heller embodies beyond Marxism can be traced to the moment she redefines socialism with reference to social imagination and the radicalization of democracy. Heller was one of the first critical theorists, as James Dorahy (2019: 128–9) suggests, to embrace ‘a philosophical and socio-theoretical paradigm change’ from Marxism to a theory of modernity that emphasizes the simultaneous presence and interactions between capitalism, industrialization, and democracy. However, this paradigm change has been long prepared, and its transitional moment was when Heller was determined to redefine socialism and came to develop ideas such as social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, since the philosophy of Marxism fails to explain the sociopolitical contents of both Soviet-type societies and the modern era.

‘The Great Republic’

The main ideas in the ALP pamphlet are further developed by Heller in ‘The Great Republic’ (1985), one of the key articles in Eastern Left, Western Left (1987). Heller, as Tormey (2000: 288) suggests, puts forward a substantive, participatory model of democracy to highlight the involvement of citizens in all aspects of social functioning. This substantive, participatory model of democracy is strongly associated with the identification of socialism as the long-term social experiment undertaken by all citizens. The Great Republic is theoretically constructed, as a self-governed society, providing points of contrast to Soviet-type societies analysed in Dictatorship Over Needs and guiding the citizenry to practise social imagination and radical democracy in the social experiment. The theoretical construction of ‘The Great Republic’, therefore, can be read as an illustration and further development of Heller’s socialist theory from a burgeoning post-Marxist perspective.

Heller finds philosophical inspiration for her version of the Great Republic from the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Rosa Luxemburg. Kant, according to Heller (1987: 188), formulates a healthy relationship between morals and politics, suggesting, albeit in a relatively vague way, a combination of representation and participation. For Heller, the combination refers to a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy, which characterizes the political sphere of the Great Republic, to balance morals and politics. Luxemburg emphasizes the ‘spontaneity of movements, on self-education via participation, her commitment to the idea of councils and simultaneously, to the idea of representation’ (Heller, 1987: 188). The idea of councils relates to direct democracy, which can be traced back to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. In a combination similar to the one Kant proposes, Luxemburg also argues for spontaneity of movement, namely socio-political movements that should be self-governed by their own members and independent from the control of central authorities, leading to pluralism in every aspect of life. The self-education via participation model proposes that all citizens should be able to participate in both social and political life, making decisions without interference from central authorities or institutions. Participation, as such, has a profound influence on what Heller formulates as direct democracy and dual sovereignty. It is, therefore, Kant and Luxemburg’s ideas, rather than the philosophy of young Marx, that inspire Heller’s theoretical construction of the Great Republic with an emphasis on the radicalization of democracy.

Heller divides her version of self-governed society into the political and social spheres. For Heller, the political sphere combines direct democracy with representative democracy. Direct democracy primarily increases civic responsibility, encouraging the people to actively participate in decision-making processes. In the model of direct democracy, according to Heller (1987: 192), citizens raise political problems of public concern and these problems are discussed and addressed by public debate in which people can speak their mind. Building the model of direct democracy through public debate generates two central impacts on the citizenry. First, citizens will find the political problems closely related to their everyday life and pay attention to how to approach these problems collaboratively. Second, public debate not only allows citizens to freely provide their own opinion but also encourages them to speak of differences in opinion and interests. Public debate, though some efficiency will be lost, is the way to stimulate collective social imagination. The model of direct democracy is not a huge apparatus but is made up of many direct democratic institutions, namely primary political bodies that allow individual opinions to be voiced and acknowledged (Heller, 1987: 192). In summary, direct democracy involves the people in political activities, and improves their social imagination and civic responsibility, in contrast to Soviet-type societies in which the Communist Party monopolizes the political system and citizens become totally depoliticized.

However, Heller knows, for practical reasons, the model of direct democracy cannot operate alone to bring about the radicalization of democracy in the political sphere. According to her explanation, every affair or issue simply cannot be discussed in the bodies of direct democracy, because discussing all issues costs people too much time and exhausts them (Heller, 1987: 192). When citizens become exhausted and lose interest, the model of direct democracy fails to increase civic responsibility. Even worse, as Heller (p. 192) adds, a few would decide for the rest and become ‘masters’ over the rest. Therefore, a remedy for the possible corruption of direct democracy is that like-minded citizens will associate with one another and form representative political bodies. Members will delegate some of their power to representatives and representative bodies, to maintain their involvement and avoid ‘decision fatigue’.

In addition to the division of power, Heller further introduces the division of sovereignty, that is, dual sovereignty. Heller (1987: 193) describes dual sovereignty as ‘the citizenry is no longer a mere nominal sovereign which delegates its powers to the real sovereign […] the decisions as to which issues belong to the jurisdiction of the delegated power remain entirely with the citizenry’. When citizens elect representatives and form representative bodies, the sovereignty in the political system is divided into two – the citizenry and the representative bodies. Yet, according to Heller, the citizenry still retains its real sovereignty, after they delegate some power to the representative bodies. The people still master their delegated power, supervising the use of the power to ensure their will or interests will be carried out. In other words, the power of representatives is limited to increase the efficacy of direct democracy and channel the results of public discussion or debate into the actualization of different aspects of social experiment. Accordingly, dual sovereignty ensures that the people are constantly involved in political activities and decision-making processes, contrasting with Soviet sovereignty in which the Communist Party becomes the real sovereign, overcentralizing all sources of power.

Heller (1987: 193) boldly argues that every political issue can be discussed or re-discussed in the institutions of direct democracy whenever the members of these political bodies believe it is necessary. This procedure ensures that the most pertinent problems will be recognized, discussed, and decided entirely according to the citizenry. It also consolidates the real sovereignty of the citizenry by protecting the rights of the people from being overridden by the representative bodies. Moreover, the radicalization of democracy through dual sovereignty cannot avoid socio-political conflicts or contestations. If there is a conflict between the two sovereign bodies, the issues should be re-discussed in the public domain and institutions of direct democracy in order to achieve a possible consensus (Heller, 1987: 193). The priority is given to the citizenry, that is to say, to public debate that further stimulates the use of social imagination among the citizens. The model of direct democracy serves not only for problem-solving but also, more importantly, as a checks and balances in Heller’s model of democratic politics.

In addition to the political sphere, the social sphere of the Great Republic consolidates the idea of self-management. As explained in the ALP pamphlet, self-management serves as a precondition for the radicalization of democracy but not its guarantee (Heller, 1982: 12). In the article, however, Heller (1987: 193–4) elevates the role of self-management, claiming that the social basis of the Great Republic is the generalization of self-management, that is, social and economic institutions should be self-managed. Citizens working for specific institutions tend to provide better insights and suggestions on how these institutions can be managed and operated in a truly beneficial way, which are alternative, even contrary to the view of the agency of an overcentralized state, such as the USSR. They also become more capable of taking responsibility for the social institutions in which they are involved, and better at articulating socio-economic issues concerning their own needs and interests. The people, therefore, can offer alternative solutions routinely, as well as when any social or economic crisis emerges. Heller (1987: 194) adds that the rules of operation for any social institution should not be superimposed by any agency of social domination but established by the members of these institutions. It is crucial for the members of social institutions to participate in setting rules, as this ensures that they are capable of self-managing these institutions.

Moreover, for Heller, the realization of self-management, in its varied modes and forms, depends on collective ownership, management, or problem-solving. Heller (1987: 194) suggests, for example, if a factory is owned by a collective body, all members of this collective body can participate in decision-making processes concerning the operation of the factory. Collective ownership contrasts with state ownership that authorizes the monopoly of the agency of the state in decision-making processes. Not only collective ownership, but varied forms of collectivity help remove rigid hierarchical patterns in social institutions, encouraging autonomy and rational arrangement that fulfil the needs of the citizenry. More importantly, the collectivity that Heller articulates is an antithesis of the collectivization in Soviet-type societies. The former is established to promote collective decision-making, whereas the latter is solely for the totalization according to party leadership.

Another key aspect of the model of self-management is market regulation and redistribution of goods as well as social wealth. Heller argues that the future market should be co-regulated by the state and the citizenry, and both set unforeseen limits on market relationships. In essence, this co-regulation can also be seen as a division of power, similar to dual sovereignty in the political sphere. On the one hand, the division of power can prevent the future market from being totally subordinated to the interests of the state, rejecting the idea of overcentralized planning in the economy. On the other hand, the co-regulation ensures that citizens retain some economic and social power and, thus, become real participants of the market rather than its subjects. Regarding the redistribution of goods and social wealth, Heller (1987: 195) argues that ‘how much should be redistributed and in what way, is again a matter that has to be decided in public debates’. In other words, the redistribution of goods and social wealth are collectively decided by the model of direct democracy according to the needs of the citizenry, which contrasts with state paternalism in Soviet-type societies. This form of redistribution, without doubt, increases autonomy of the citizenry in the social sphere and decreases, or even eliminates, state paternalism accordingly, rejecting the ‘dictatorship over needs’. As Anthony Kammas (2007: 271) points out, the economy is democratized in a practical way, which is considered preferable. For Heller, the social sphere of the Great Republic is democratized through different forms of self-management that are designed and operated according to the needs of the citizenry.

The Great Republic that Heller constructs is a utopia. Her theoretical construction is radical but not revolutionary because this utopia contains and encourages the formation of many different ‘utopias’ within it. Karl Mannheim famously argues that utopian mentality can transcend the existing social system and takes a revolutionary function. The utopian mentality aims to transcend and shatter the existing order of things, so we can establish a new social order by collective activities (Mannheim, 1960: 173). For Heller, this all-or-nothing utopian mentality is dangerous, because it is strongly associated with the redemptive utopia envisaged by messianic Marxism, constituting a serious threat to the socio-political structure of the Great Republic, especially the long-term public debate and the model of self-management. Heller, not surprisingly, comes to distinguish her theory of utopia from messianic Marxism whose most well-known proponent was, arguably, Lukács. Driven by an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ that entails a desperate search for a final, abstract goal at all costs, Lukács sees the revolutionary proletariat as the tangible agent of redemption and projects a single utopian logic – the revolutionary one – as the only possible one that saves human beings from the corruption of capitalist civilization (Gardiner, 2018: 124, 127). However, for Heller, this redemptive paradigm fails to recognize the citizenry as a whole – specifically their diverse needs and pluralistic forms of life – and it compels the citizenry to accept, or to be rescued by, the realization of a particularly prescribed utopia. Messianic Marxism, therefore, undermines the diversity and complexity of social worlds that form as a result of social imagination and the radicalization of democracy. Michael Gardiner (2018: 135) points out that Heller favours the ‘open utopia’ that can ‘encourage and protect an efflorescence of pluralistic value-orientation’. For Heller, the ‘open utopia’ takes no concrete form and functions more like a canopy securing the emergence of multiple, particular utopias. Unlike Mannheim who sees utopia as something that transcends and revolutionizes the existing order of things, Heller turns to make the Great Republic an ‘open utopia’, without any binding programs, to promote social imagination and the radicalization of democracy within the existing social world. In other words, the ‘open utopia’ becomes a shared space and creates conditions that make it possible for citizens to imagine and realize their own utopias. Therefore, Heller’s ‘open utopia’ represents a fundamental challenge to messianic Marxism, which further shows her rejection of the redemptive power of socialism.

Heller is a revisionist, but she offers the task of reforming the society to the citizenry rather than the revolutionary proletariat or central authorities. Instead of putting forward a definitive plan for reforming the existing social system, Heller chooses to invite citizens to the ‘open utopia’, so they, as individuals who recognize their own needs and values, can reform the monolithic world to multifarious social worlds. For example, Heller emphasizes the application of dual sovereignty for the sake of securing the position of the people in both social and political bodies. The implementation of direct democracy, for Heller, also allows citizens to better exercise their social imagination in everyday life. Moreover, according to Heller, when self-management is practised in varied forms in socio-economic institutions, citizens can take advantage of the radicalization of democracy to pursue their own utopias and fulfil their own needs. The emergence of different utopias will, perhaps, cause quarrels and conflicts within the citizenry, since these utopias are associated with personal needs or a wide range of lifestyles. It is, however, not necessary to come up with a definitive solution for the quarrels and conflicts because they are the source of public debate that stimulates and reinforces social imagination. The quarrels and conflicts prompt citizens to reflect on their own utopias and give rise to the simultaneous presence of multiple perspectives in socio-political bodies. In other words, quarrels and conflicts will not undermine but rather increase the efficacy of the ‘open utopia’. Therefore, it is through the dynamics of different utopias that the existing society can constantly and promptly be reformed by the people who exercise social imagination and engage in the radicalization of democracy.

To conclude, Heller re-envisages utopia through developing her ideas of social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, from a post-Marxist perspective. The Great Republic as a ‘open utopia’ creates conditions for the citizenry to realize a multiplicity of utopias. Furthermore, Heller (1987: 196) makes it clear that the Great Republic provides ‘regulative and constitutive ideas for the actualization of societies’. When her ‘open utopia’ comes a reality, its socio-political structure will continue to not only strengthen social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, but also prevent the illegitimate exercise of power that undermines the coexistence of a multiplicity of utopias. The emergence of a dominant or tyrannical utopia is dangerous because it exploits other utopias, destroys the particularity of these utopias, and threatens the ‘open utopia’ as a whole. Heller has an acute understanding of how a major tyrannical utopia leads to a system of domination in Soviet-type societies and therefore proposes the division of power, especially the public debate, as a check and balance, to prevent the domination and exploitation of others in the political sphere.

Conclusion

The ALP pamphlet is one of Heller’s ‘lost’ works. Hopefully, readers of this paper will ‘discover’ it and bring it to light, especially if they are interested in the idea of democratic socialism. My paper is an experimental examination of a body of experimental ideas that Heller offered and elaborated in the early 1980s. Heller in the ALP pamphlet conceptualizes socialism as a long-term social experiment undertaken by the citizenry as a whole, rather than by the revolutionary proletariat, or the state. For Heller, no singular form of socialism can be considered definitively as the only correct or genuine one. Socialism as the long-term social experiment results from social imagination and the radicalization of democracy that prompts the citizenry to discuss socio-political issues and even to provide their alternative conception of socialism. More importantly, Heller proclaims that citizens should be encouraged to participate in decision-making processes through different forms of self-management and make decisions according to their own needs, in a democratic public sphere. The increase of participation in public discussion and decision-making processes, without doubt, makes the citizenry responsible for socio-political issues and their decisions.

It is important to trace the development of this body of ideas in Heller’s subsequent writings and add them to her intellectual profile in the 1980s. In Dictatorship Over Needs, Heller sets a contrast between her conceptualization of socialism and the actually existing socialism in Soviet-type societies, arguing that the Soviet socialist project stifles social imagination among the citizenry and rejects the radicalization of democracy. When Marxist conceptual categories fail to explain the system of domination engineered by the Communist Party in the USSR, social imagination and the radicalization of democracy emerge as two critical frameworks that prepare Heller for a pre-interrogation of the modern world. In addition to her rejection of Soviet socialism, Heller distances herself from both revolutionary utopianism and messianic Marxism. In ‘The Great Republic’, Heller demonstrates how to actualize social imagination and the radicalization of democracy in the social and political spheres, primarily through establishing dual sovereignty and the model of self-management. More importantly, her theoretical construction of the Great Republic is designed to be an ‘open utopia’. In fact, Heller tends to characterize socialism, that is, the long-term social experiment, as an overarching ‘open utopia’ that encourages a multiplicity of utopias. The ideas of social imagination and radical democracy show the changing aspect of her socialist theory in the early 1980s. Although these ideas may become influential, they suggest that Heller moved further beyond a Marxist paradigm to search for new perspectives to make sense of the modern era. Experimental ideas, such as social imagination and the radicalization of democracy, remain central to Heller’s writings, enriching her intellectual life and offering inspiration to others. Heller’s remarks on Arendt as a thinker also perfectly fit herself: ‘what you have always wanted most was to inspire others, to provoke argument, contradiction, and thereby make a difference in your world’ (Heller, 2020: 34).