On Márkus’ new Marxist philosophy of language

Knowledge expressed by language: Critique of Popper’s instrumental rationality of language

Karl Popper, usually considered a positivist, is one of the representatives of the paradigm of language. Márkus suggests that Popper is different from the general positivists. In his late period, Popper denies the distinction between natural and social knowledge: ‘Popper stresses the objectivity of knowledge: knowledge designates the logical content of linguistically formulated expectations and presuppositions’ (Márkus, 1986: 4). In Popper’s theory, language is instrumentalized, merely as the externalized and objective form of logic and knowledge.

The first to be criticized is Popper’s theory of the ‘three worlds’. Popper divides the human world into the world of physical state, consciousness, and objective knowledge. In Popper’s view, subjective knowledge, ‘the consciousness and self-consciousness of individuals’, is formed by the interaction with ‘objective and objectified knowledge’. Although the latter is the product of human beings, it has become independent since its birth, ‘independent of their creators and of men’; various forms of language are only the ‘embodied and objectified’ forms of objective knowledge (Márkus, 1986: 4–5). For objective knowledge, language is only a tool with expressive function. Márkus (1986: 5) stresses that, for Popper, objective knowledge, as the basic principle of the human world, has been experienced through ‘linguistic objectivation’, and thus exceeds the finitude of the human body and can only be ‘critiqued’ theoretically. Here, Márkus critiques Popper’s theory based on the concept of ‘objectivity’ of Marxism, and exposes his instrumental rationality of language and exclusion of practical path to theoretical problems. Popper’s theoretical critique ultimately leads to a path to grasp the development of history in a theoretical manner. Márkus (1986: 5) concludes that it is a way to grasp historical change from ‘discussion of theories’ to ‘rational control’.

After a brief demonstration, Márkus further points out the instrumentality and internal logic of language in Popper’s thought. The starting point of Popper’s language thought is ‘Darwinistic Platonism’, that is, ‘language that makes both objective knowledge and sui generis human progress possible’ (Márkus, 1986: 5). Nevertheless, Márkus believes that for Popper, the position of language is not identical to Plato’s idea. Popper’s ‘language’ has four functions: expression, description, argument, and critique. For Popper, critical discussion expressed by language is only a tool of rationality. Language serves rationality. The key to the internal logic of the instrumentalization of language lies in his concept of ‘rationality’.

‘Rationality’ is regarded by him as ‘synonymous with adoption and application of the methodological ideal of natural sciences’ (Márkus, 1986: 6). The unity of natural science and social science for Popper is the target of Márkus. This unity restricts the ability and degree of understanding. In Márkus’ opinion, Popper reduces reason to instrumental rationality, reason to ‘partial social technology’, so he investigates social phenomena in the way of natural science, and reduces the problem of quality to the problem of quantity, ¹ and cannot ‘have its object some “whole” in its concrete totality’ (Márkus, 1986: 6–7). Therefore, when Popper encounters the territory of language, he inspects it from the perspective of subject–object dichotomy in a natural scientific way, takes language as a tool for the subject to grasp the object, and ignores the intersubjectivity of language. Language in Popper’s theory is only presented in the sense of the signifier and the signified, so language can only exist as the signifier and objectification of knowledge. Therefore, driven by this instrumental rationality, language becomes a vehicle of knowledge. Márkus (1986: 7) summarizes that ‘linguistically formulated knowledge, reaching its highest form in the hypothetical-deductive system of the natural sciences, is taken as the paradigm and model of all social objectivations’.

In clarifying the internal logic of the instrumentalization of language, Márkus critiques Popper’s instrumental rationality of language. By reducing language to a vehicle of rationality, Popper regards knowledge as a decisive factor in the development of history and believes in the determination of history by logic. This is a kind of historical idealism. Márkus (1986: 8–9) explains that ‘“unintended” social control and compulsion’ beyond logical necessity is inevitable, and the impact of social reality on knowledge is of totality and directionality, which includes ‘historical conditions’, ‘social relations’, ‘social needs’ themselves, and their impact on knowledge, for Popper’s instrumental rationality, are impossible to describe.

Owing to such historical idealism, instrumental rationality is unable to answer questions about practical value in real society. Therefore, Popper expels the interaction between reality and knowledge, history and logic to the territory of the ‘irrational’. His reasons are that the actual value choice grounded on ‘the concrete totality of an individual life history’ is contrary to partial instrumental rationality, and that ‘irrational’ value choice cannot be solved through scientific theoretical critique. Thus Márkus (1986: 9–10) writes that what Popper considers as ‘the object of a rational discussion’ is only ‘the realizability or compatibility of goals’.

Here, Popper’s theory is rooted in the opposition between ‘individual psychological contingency’ and ‘objective logical necessity’, and the interaction between ‘logicized theory’ and ‘irrationalized praxis’ (Márkus, 1986: 10). In this opposition, Popper intends to use language, the objectified form, to realize the ‘rational control’ of contingency and irrationality, which means in the form of language, society becomes ‘an explicit and empirically refutable form’ to be theoretically critiqued and rationally controlled (Márkus, 1986: 10). Popper strengthens language as a tool of knowledge, while Márkus (1986: 165) indicates that the ‘rule’ itself involved in language, representing a common value, has presupposed the existence of ‘a community of language users’. Popper’s instrumental rationalism exposes its inherent defects. Márkus (1986: 10) illustrates that it is because Popper ‘deprives knowledge of all its normative and practical components’ that this leads to the technical reduction of ‘social role’. The value attribute is reduced to the function of technology, and what remains in rational knowledge is only the function of formulating a scientific theoretical hypothesis. Márkus (1986: 11) sums up the social-practical critique of Popper’s instrumental rationalism in this way: ‘the reverse of Popper’s polemics with the epistemological instrumentalism of logical empiricism is purely instrumentalist interpretation of the social function of reason’.

Besides the theoretical deduction discussed above, his critique of Popper’s concept of democracy aims at the practical consequences of his theory. Márkus (1986: 11) believes that once language is only regarded as a tool of rationality and knowledge under the domination of instrumental rationality, judging the language expressing knowledge requires the judge to have corresponding knowledge, that is, ‘it is only questions of optimization of means which constitute the adequate subject matter of a rational-critical discussion’. As a result, Popper’s democracy can only be expert democracy. Popper’s instrumental rationalism beings the elimination of subjective factors and the pursuit of objective and professional knowledge in practice. The person who specializes in this kind of knowledge is an expert. Consequently, the society constructed by Popper’s theory is an expert society, which realizes the ‘democracy of experts’ through the language of experts.

In conclusion, according to Márkus, Popper’s taking language as the form of expression of knowledge exposes his intention to equate reason with instrumental rationality and rebuild the hegemony of instrumental rationality. Márkus (1986: 12) elucidates that Popper’s instrumental rationalism is bound to face the ‘loss of value’. Enlightenment rationalism perceived by Popper himself eventually turned to the opposite of enlightenment. In theory, knowledge dominates humans with objective language, and accordingly, in practice, it leads to the ‘democracy of experts’. In his critique, Márkus’ Marxist standpoint can be seen at work. Márkus denies partial instrumental rationality and proposes the necessity of value rationality from the standpoint of practice to reach the true comprehension of the human being. As Marx (1845) says, ‘the question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question’.

Irreducible language game: Critique of Wittgenstein’s pure reason

Different from Popper, there are three other representative paradigms of language, including the late Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist ethnography, and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This is due to their understanding of ‘the relation of man to his world and fellow human beings’ from the perspective of ‘the model of language’ by taking ‘language as language’, which ‘appears as paradigm and model of social objectivations’ (Márkus, 1986: 14). Márkus (1986: 14) emphasizes that the core of late Wittgenstein’s theory lies in irreducible language games, ‘the irreducible differences between linguistic functions, the various pragmatic models of the use of language’. Late Wittgenstein’s understanding and theoretical construction of society are based on the urfact of language game, of which the abstract characteristic is the target of Márkus’ critique.

First of all, Márkus expresses the meaning and position of rules in language games. Language game, one of the core concepts of late Wittgenstein’s theory, connotes that language is the action of language dialogue instead of an independent entity (Wittgenstein, 1967: 5). The understanding of language can only be carried out in games and uses of language. Márkus stresses that in this kind of game, ‘use’ and language rules are inseparable. In Wittgenstein’s theory, only the ‘pragmatic system of rules’ can guarantee the ‘objectivity of meaning’, so the objective understanding of language must rely on this rule system (Márkus, 1986: 20). Furthermore, the ‘use’ of language is not a naturalist and pragmatist ‘use’, not a simple speech activity, but a ‘use’ under specific rules. Specifically, ‘use’ is in the presupposition of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, which means under the control of rules (Márkus, 1986: 16). Consequently, even though the meaning of words is special, it is still determined by language rules, and even though rules can only be used in specific situations, the recognition of specific language behaviors still depends on language rules. ² Therefore, although language games, as the unity of ‘linguistic rules’, ‘objective situations’, and ‘social modes of action’, are irreducible facts, ‘primary data’ and ‘Ur-phenomena’, it is still language rules that possess the greatest cruciality. Márkus (1986: 16) believes that, in Wittgenstein’s view, ‘the normativity of concrete linguistic rules…is a final, irreducible fact of human life’.

In this situation, although the practice is important to language, language rules still govern language activities and understanding. Wittgenstein believes that language games, as a ‘form of life’, are subordinate to ‘practical-social reality’. Therefore, to learn a language game, one must carry out corresponding life practice, and the theoretical ‘understanding’ is no longer a theōria (contemplation) of objective language in the sense of Popper, but a ‘practical activity’, which is realized through practical participation in life (Márkus, 1986: 17). According to this, Márkus reveals the futility of Wittgenstein’s intention. Márkus (1986: 17) believes that in such a language game, ‘rules… eo ipso contain the criteria for their application’, and ‘intersubjective rules’ determine the development of ‘subject’ content. That is to say, rules entail use. Albeit language games have their practical characteristics and require participation in life, the way of participation itself has been determined by the theoretical rules of linguistic grammar. Language rules determine language use.

Besides, the restricting theoretical rules in Wittgenstein’s paradigm of language lead to the inability to theoretically grasp the totality. According to Wittgenstein’s understanding, ‘what is not possible, however, at all, is a critique of a language game as totality’, because, for a language game as a form of life, there are only two states, participation or not, of which the former needs a realistic basis, namely, the diachronic ‘conditions of one’s life and one’s needs’, and the latter leads to nonsense (Márkus, 1986: 17). Therefore, when life changes, language games will change accordingly. Human beings jump out of one language game and jump into another. We are always in a specific form of language game, not in two language games at the same time, not to mention the whole sum of language games. As a result, one cannot theoretically grasp the language game as a whole. According to Wittgenstein, one must participate in a specific life to theoretically understand a language game, and the theoretical understanding of the whole language game requires a life of totality, which proves to be impossible. Therefore, Márkus (1986: 17) stresses that it is impossible to have ‘the conscious, rational transformation of a form of life in its totality’ here because of the lack of independent ‘absolute evaluative criteria’. And Wittgenstein’s critique of a game only means the substitution of one game for another, not the transcendence of the language game. Dasein is always in-dem-Spiel-sein.

The conscious reason, or theory, cannot reach the understanding of totality, but there is another possible road, the road of practice to be discussed. Owing to the impossibility to understand language games as a whole, one’s theoretical understanding is always restrained to specific language games, of which the limits are constituted by specific rules. ‘Every linguistic articulation of the rules’ conflicts with the rules themselves, for linguistic articulation cannot reach the rules themselves, and rules forbid linguistic articulation of themselves (Márkus, 1986: 18). Although such rules cannot be perceived from reason (logos) with language (logos), ³ and ‘conscious reflection’ is impotent, ‘the rule as a fact of life’ can be understood in ‘the practice of participation’ (Márkus, 1986: 18). For Wittgenstein, practice and theory are opposed. As in Kant, he categorizes the content that pure reason cannot grasp the area of practice, but different from what Kant holds, the content included in practice cannot be expressed by language (logos), and the understanding of practice is irrational instead of rational or practically rational. The opposition between practice and reason has become the opposition between irrationality and reason. Unlike Popper’s reduction of reason into instrumental rationality, Wittgenstein purifies reason. Reason is pure reason, and irrationality is the boundary of reason. Hence, Márkus concludes that practice is an ‘insurmountable barrier’ here, and Wittgenstein’s so-called real reason is ‘the self-criticism of reason’ and ‘the recognition of its finitude’ (Márkus, 1986: 18). Wittgenstein’s practical road leads to the opposition between practice and reason.

Márkus’ critique starts from the irreducible language game, excavates the hidden rule system of language, and exposes Wittgenstein’s thought of pure reason. Under the guidance of pure reason, it is impossible to take language games as a whole and conduct ‘theoretical reflection’ and total reflection on them, so it is unreachable to take a ‘rational stance toward the entirety of social life’ (Márkus, 1986: 26). Márkus (1986: 31) holds that Wittgenstein’s separation of theory from practice is characterized by the opposition between ‘the living-practical appropriation of the rules and paradigmata’ and the possibility of the ‘knowledge’ in language games. Even though the themes that Wittgenstein discusses have gone beyond the category of pure reason, he carries out self-critique of reason by constructing this metaphysical opposition. Practice is not the real boundary, but one set by Wittgenstein himself. It is exactly because of ‘his insistence upon the irreducible plurality of language games’ that he ignores the real relationship between language and life, language and social history, and the sociality and historicity of language (Márkus, 1986: 19). In Márkus’ critique, we can see his Marxist social and historical perspective in play. He begins his critique of Wittgenstein from the angle of real practice, pointing out the one-sidedness and metaphysics of his pure reason, and opening a way for his practical rational understanding of language and the dialectical and unified understanding of theory and practice.

Language structure as the foundation: Critique of Lévi-Strauss’ alienated reason

Lévi-Strauss reached the same conclusion as Wittgenstein, that is, it is impossible to grasp the totality of social life rationally and critically. But different from Wittgenstein, Lévi-Strauss, based on universal reason, or ‘impersonal reason’, believes that such reason, as a ‘non-conscious structure’, determines ‘societies’, ‘cultures’ and ‘the individuals in their action’, so individuals must take a ‘radically theoretical and objectifying stance’ to ‘consciously’ participate in it (Márkus, 1986: 26). Here, reason is considered as an objective and different non-conscious ‘structure’, which is restrictive to human beings because ‘consciousness’ cannot bypass this ‘non-conscious structure’, indispensable to those who desire to realize rational life. This ‘non-conscious structure’, in Lévi-Strauss’ theory, is the language structure, the ultimate foundation of society and history, and a structure that transcends history. ‘The universality of the paradigm of language’ is the starting point of his theory (Márkus, 1986: 19). For Márkus, a Marxist, history itself is the history of human beings. Behind the ahistoricity embodied in this structure is the ‘transcendence’ of human beings, the alienation of human beings. Márkus critiques Lévi-Strauss’ linguistic structuralism and alienated, impersonal reason with Marxist historical materialism, which indicates the biographical context or history at work.

Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist ethnography is the breach of critique for this dilemma. As an ethnographer, in the process of understanding human society, he needs to realize an objective universality, that is, the abandonment of individual opinions. Owing to the subjectivity and particularity of individual opinions, the objective scientificity of ethnographic cognition is privileged. Thus, only after discarding special subjective opinions can epistemological neutrality be realized and finally achieve the objective-universal understanding of human society. It can be inferred that Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist ethnography is against ethnocentrism. But Márkus here discovers ‘the dilemma of the ethnographer’. Ethnography is born in western capitalist or colonial countries, and ethnographers are the representatives of western societies and theories. Although they seek a universal and effective way to theoretically comprehend the social life outside of them and enter the interior of other societies with universal ethnographic science, it is their entry and pursuit of universality that leads to the limited outcome in practice, that is, the confrontation and conflict between the two cultures as can be observed through the history of colonization. ‘The dilemma of the ethnographer’ is the contrast between the theoretical pursuit and the practical consequences.

To solve this problem, Lévi-Strauss resorts to language structure, placing theoretical language structure as the basis for the comprehension of social reality. In constructing his paradigm of language, Lévi-Strauss takes Saussure’s structuralist linguistics as his theoretical ground. Márkus (1986: 21) explains that Saussure views parole as a superficial phenomenon, and what plays a decisive role is the systems of relations, that is, langue, is a ‘synchronous’ ‘peculiar entity’. Saussure’s core thought achieves its extension in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist ethnography. This is because when dealing with sociality, the dimension of objective value ⁴ is necessary, or society will face the loss of objective common value and falls into chaos, and this kind of objectiveness is the connection between society and objective language. Once connected with language, the final destination of society is language structure. This is Márkus’ deduction of Lévi-Strauss’ theoretical logic.

While this theoretical construction is in line with logical deduction, there remain some problems here. The first is his reduction of the problem of society to the problem of language structure, of which the rationality stems from his object, that is, the so-called primitive societies. Márkus believes that the construction of intersubjectivity and the connection between people in primitive societies are possible through language communication, so Lévi-Strauss can find some rationality for his paradigm of language. But the true reality is that human society has been through many phases, including feudal society, capitalist society, and socialist society. Lévi-Strauss’ paradigm of language, which he obtains only from primitive societies, cannot guarantee the validity and suitability of this paradigm when analyzing other societies. This outdated paradigm of language differs from the society that it is used to explain nowadays. Moreover, a deeper problem of Lévi-Strauss is his biological reductionism. After he reduces social problems to the non-conscious structure of language, he naturalistically carries biological reduction of this structure and solves social problems by naturalizing them. As Márkus (1986: 21) says, ‘Lévi-Strauss relates them in a naturalistic manner to the universal structural characteristics of the human brain.’

Moreover, since Lévi-Strauss continues Saussure’s path, taking the language structure as an entity and apprehending the social life of totality with the language structure, he finally comes to historical idealism in the dimension of history, and then moves towards the alienation of human history. As an entity that generates everything, for itself there is no concept of time. From this deduction, history is no longer a diachronic history. It has become a display of the richness of language structure and lost the dimension of time. On that account, Márkus (1986: 22) writes: ‘historical change is…a new equilibrial arrangement of the same material constituted by a finite number of variables’. Besides, the structure deconstructs not only the history (Geschichte) but also man, the subject of human Geschichte. Because Geschichte has become the history (Historie) of structure, a historiographical concept, in Lévi-Strauss’ paradigm of language, Geschichte is also just the presentation of this system and has no relation with human beings. Human beings are no longer the subject of Geschichte, or Geschichte as Historie, and structure and its Historie have also become a kind of Anderssein. In Lévi-Strauss’ theory, since the pattern of Geschichte has been determined by language structure and Geschichte as Historie is the presentation of the structure, there is no need to mention historical development or development of Geschichte. He falls into circular historicism and historical relativism. Márkus (1986: 22) concludes that Lévi-Strauss radically rejects ‘the idea of progress’.

Moreover, under such naturalistic methodology, the structure of language (logos) exposes its alienation, and reason (logos) is hence the alienated reason. Lévi-Strauss tries to reveal the actual society and apprehend human history by language structure, which deposits history and culture under the control of the structure. For him, language structure determines everything originally, and everything originates from language structure. As a result, language structure has its independency from human beings, and Hegel’s (1977: 10) assertion that an entity is a subject is affirmed here again. Therefore, Lévi-Strauss (1962: 334) proposes that ‘language is human reason, which has its reasons and which man does not know’. In Lévi-Strauss’ theory, the reason of language structure is alienated.

For the reason of alienation, there is no distinction between subject and object, as they are unified as one. The inner logic is that the subject itself externalizes and alienates everything, so it becomes an object. Since to this extent reason has alienated, it has transcended specific individuals: ‘As the totalisation of all the ahistorical structuring principles of society, can be apprehended and appropriated…only through a purely contemplative, theoretical attitude’ rather than a practical attitude (Márkus, 1986: 24–5). Thus, as a concrete and historical Dasein, an individual cannot realize the theoretical understanding of social life as a whole – because such individuals are always practicing and acting instead of thinking theoretically. Thus, Lévi-Strauss reaches the same conclusion as Wittgenstein. About this alienated reason, Márkus (1986: 25) concludes that ‘the agent, paradoxically, is always a prisoner of its society, a mere instrument of external determinants, unintelligible to it’. Starting from language structure, Márkus reveals the alienated reason in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist ethnography in the way of Marxist anthropology, critiques Lévi-Strauss’ paradigm of language, and emphasizes the importance of personal reason in language.

Historically changing linguistic dialogue: Critique of Gadamer’s historical rationality

Different from Lévi-Strauss’ abandonment of history, Gadamer tries to seek a historical perspective rather than an ahistorical structure. But his historical rationality is superficial. Márkus (1986: 32) stresses the problem of this approach: Gadamer regards language as the occurrence (Geschehen) of dialogue, but it is just a simple replacement for Lévi-Strauss’ language structure, that is, ‘a fixed, circumscribed and discontinuous linguistic framework’ is replaced by ‘a constantly changing standpoint (Standort) in the continuity of history’. This so-called historical rationality is just a copy of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist alienated reason. Historicity is only a theoretical disguise.

As a representative of the hermeneutics of the paradigm of language, Gadamer also apprehends society from language. In Gadamer’s theory, language is defined as ‘dialogic communication’. In his view, without actual dialogue, language is solely a concept. Only in the dialogue of Dasein can language concretize itself and ‘receives its proper being’ (Gadamer, 1965: 422). Besides, Gadamer believes that dialogic communication, as a dynamic event, in which language is in constant presentation, is different from Lévi-Strauss’ structure. This process, instead of the signifier–signified structure of language, is of vital significance. Without dialogue, the signifier and the signified of language are set aside only as abstract symbols and concepts. In actual dialogue, the signifier and the signified enter into actuality, the linguistic symbols and things they denote are objectified, and the world is hence objectified as well in the way of language. Consequently, language is no longer just a description of structure and game, but a constituent factor. Since the world is objectified in dialogue, it can be asserted that dialogue unites language symbols and objective world, form, and content. In this regard, Márkus (1986: 27) concludes: ‘one cannot separate in language the linguistic form and the transmitted content from each other’.

The objectifying construction of the world realized by language through dialogue means the change of time and the unfolding of history. Historicity is crucial to Gadamer’s paradigm of language. Because dialogue is occurring in the objective and constantly changing actuality, the meaning of language in dialogue is also changing historically. Even the same word will possess different connotations at different times. By exposing this historicity, Gadamer adds a historical dimension to the unity of content and form, achieving a historical unity between concrete actuality and universal linguistic symbols, transcending Wittgenstein’s metaphysical emphasis on concrete and particular language games and Lévi-Strauss’ on universal language structure.

The above discussion stays at the logical consequence of dialogue, the unity of language, and does not yet reflect on language, the universal premise that makes dialogue possible. Therefore, Márkus further exposes that in Gadamer’s theory, the possibility of dialogue lies in mutual understanding, for otherwise, one would be talking nonsense to the other. But how can mutual understanding be achieved when languages differ from each other as they belong to different subjects? Gadamer argues that in dialogue, people use interpretation to achieve mutual understanding, that is, to interpret the language of others, and to naively understand others. Gadamer uses the concept of interpretation to realize the transformation from one language to another, to break down the barriers between Wittgenstein’s language games, and to unify various languages and the world they objectify.

Until now, for Gadamer, the connection of ‘language’–’dialogue’–’world’ has been established. He uses the interpretability of language itself to elicit dialogue and uses the objectivity and historicity of dialogue to establish the relationship between language and the world, to build the rationality of his paradigm of language. No matter how the world varies, as long as the historicity of dialogue is stuck, the world can be explained through the paradigm of language. Besides this theoretical construction derived from interpretability, Gadamer considers practical situations. In his view, the interpretation of actuality is based on a common factor, namely, historical ‘prejudice’. When one is interpreting the other, he always has language ability to a certain degree, which is historically accumulated in an evolutionist mode. That is to say, when people conduct activities of interpretation, the influences on them and the insights they have, that is, prejudices, are crucial. Márkus (1986: 29) highlights that for Gadamer, ‘prejudice’ is not a transcendent concept, but ‘the actual, historical character of our being’, which provides an expression for both the existence of Dasein and Seinkönnen of Dasein. Here, Gadamer seems to have unified theory and practice, breaking their long-standing opposition.

However, this is not the case in Márkus’ view. Márkus holds a critical attitude toward Gadamer’s theory and his conclusion. In Márkus’ (1986: 29) opinion, Gadamer fails to truly realize the unity of theory and practice, and eliminates this problem through a ‘generalising synthesis’. Through the analysis of Gadamer, it can be observed that in the process of opposing subjectivism and subjective philosophy, he finds a path of intersubjectivity, naming it dialogue and dialogic communication, thus drawing a clear line between the perspective of intersubjectivity and the perspective of the subject–object dichotomy. But he goes further. Gadamer presents this ‘dialogue’ as ‘the thing itself’ (Márkus, 1986: 30). According to Márkus, this approach is strictly not an objection to subjectivism, because subject and object always appear in pairs and there is no exception for ‘the thing itself’ – it internally covers subject and object. Gadamer does not realize the real transcendence of subjectivism here. For Gadamer, this ‘dialogue’ as a thing, unlike what subjectivism usually considers, not static but active, is of the same nature as Lévi-Strauss’ language structure, that is, a limitation of the human being. Dialogue, as an active object, thus demonstrates Gadamer’s ‘generalising synthesis’. The connection of dialogue between language and the world is of no difference from Lévi-Strauss’ language structure.

Therefore, for Gadamer, theory and practice are still opposed. This is because language as a theory and the practical relationships of humans are directly mixed as one, and ‘dialogue’ becomes a self-evident truth, without the need to be theoretically understood and practically researched – it will unfold itself on its own. This hence limits the theoretical understanding and practical activities in another sense. The same applies to ‘prejudice’. Márkus (1986: 32) elucidates that ‘the historicity of our Dasein, concretised in the “prejudical” structure of all understanding, itself becomes an untranscendable limitation on historical consciousness’ because history is the unfolding of a fact. History becomes a historiographic concept. Therefore, in Gadamer’s theory, the understanding of totality is still unattainable. ‘Dialogue’, like Wittgenstein’s language games, requires personal ‘participation’, which means a limitation of ‘being… in’ (in… sein).

Márkus studies Gadamer’s paradigm of language from the perspective of dialogue and reveals that what he has done is just a compromise between Wittgenstein and Lévi-Strauss. Although Gadamer insists on historical rationality and set the basis as constant-historical changing, it is finally just a replacement for Lévi-Strauss’ language structure, structurally connecting language and the world, and still limiting the understanding of totality in the way of Wittgenstein’s ‘participation’. It can be concluded that Gadamer’s historical rationality, like Hegel’s, is an idealistic historical rationality, not a Marxist materialistic historical rationality. As Márkus (1986: 30) writes: ‘the hermeneutical program is therefore properly formulated as the inversion of the procedure of Hegelian Phenomenology’, except that history has changed from the self-movement of ‘Geist’ to that of ‘dialogue’.

Construction in critique: A way of practical materialism for philosophy of language

Through the analysis of four paradigms of language, Márkus establishes their inherent problems. And he establishes his Marxist philosophy of language at the same time.

For Popper, language is only the formal expression of knowledge and does not have its own independent ontological significance. This exposes the character of instrumental rationality in his view of language. Under the guidance of this instrumental rationality, there is an inevitable loss of value, and the sociality of language is ignored. Popper delivers a technical reduction of language.

Different from Popper, for the other three theorists, language, with its independent ontological status, has become a mode for understanding society, which causes a deeper problem, that is, the separation of theory and practice. In late Wittgenstein’s theory, Márkus discovers the theoretical power of language rules by demonstrating the irreducibility of language games as an urfact. Language rules limit language games and human understanding theoretically and put practice aside as irrational. The reason is regarded as a pure theoretical reason. For Lévi-Strauss, the pure reason in Wittgenstein’s theory shows itself as language structure. Márkus believes that the language structure of Lévi-Strauss is ahistorical. Since history is always the history of human beings, this structure is then a-human, that is, for human, it is external and alienated to human beings. Wittgenstein’s pure reason evolves the characteristics of alienation. This alienation should be overcome. Therefore, Gadamer tries to view language as historical, but this theoretical attempt fell into the pattern of idealism. In Gadamer’s theory, dialogue replaces Hegel’s Geist, operates, and unfolds itself in an objective idealistic way to form history. Man is no longer the subject of history, but only an accessory of dialogue-Geist. Gadamer himself also believes that it is human that belongs to history, not the opposite.

This opposition between theory and practice exhibits the opposition between facts and norms, between Is and Ought. In Popper’s theory, the relationship between the two cannot be proved, it is ‘consequently, as a pseudo-question’; for Wittgenstein, Lévi-Strauss, and Gadamer, the connection between the two is a fact, so ‘it does not require a solution at all’ (Márkus, 1986: 33). However, in Márkus’ view, it is because of these views that the opposite of the unity of facts and norms is led to – the domination of theory over actuality: ‘Reason is actual (wirklich), and it is, therefore, impossible to counterpose reason to reality’ (Márkus, 1986: 33). This is the key to the problem of paradigms of language, a logic of Hegel. They unify reason and actuality in a Hegelian way and make actuality yield to reason. Every actual life form, culture, and phenomenon is the objectification of reason. Actuality can be expressed in language, while it is impossible to linguistically grasp such reason and language itself. As Márkus (1986: 33–4) writes, it:

is the ‘language’ in which the individuals can and do ‘express’ themselves – and there is no such thing as an ‘ideal language’ through which the adequacy of these expressions could be judged. Radical, social or historical, self-awareness can only be a description and not a critique.

In this analysis, it can be asserted that Márkus, from the perspective of specific-total dialectics, critiques instrumental rationality, pure reason, alienated reason, and historical objective idealism with value rationality, practical reason, personal reason, and historical materialism. Albeit there are problems inside these theories, Márkus believes that they are still true comprehension of language itself, worthy of affirmation and further explanation. Inspired by paradigms of language, Márkus considers that language has the following three important aspects.

The first is the actuality of language. Specifically, Márkus calls this a development issue. Márkus believes that actual language is a qualitative rather than quantitative concept. Different from theoretical knowledge, there is no ‘development’ or increase and accumulation of quantity and there is no universal standard to study a language. The so-called ‘development’ of language is the presentation of its different properties. Therefore, there is no distinction between languages, and any language has equal status with any other. The actuality of language indicates its richness and equality, not theoretical accumulation and hierarchy.

The second is the practicality of language. Márkus believes that there is usually a gap between the changes in language and conscious actions, and conscious actions on language cannot fully achieve the purposiveness of results. Because language is not purely theoretical, it cannot be completely mastered and changed through theory. Practical factors in it require the actual practice of life. Therefore, language is practicality, and language changes occur in human practical activities, which reflects the defect of various paradigms of language. Márkus believes that the theoretical interpretation of language is a task of science, which analyzes language as an epistemological object, while the mastery and creation of language is an existential event, which should be carried out in the practice of everyday life. These two cannot be confused. Just as for a native speaker, due to her native existence, she can carry out language activities before systematically mastering the grammatical rules of language. Therefore, Márkus (1986: 36) emphasizes that ‘the appropriation of language’, as the premise of theoretical knowledge, is ‘itself the most typical example of “practical” knowledge’.

The third is the sociality of language. In Márkus’ view, the language system is not independent of human beings like language structure but lies in specific speech acts. The language system is closely related to the human, that is, to human society, because the establishment of intersubjective relationships cannot be separated from communication in the language. Márkus (1986: 37) points out that ‘social relations understood as a system of communication necessarily appear therefore as an integrating totality…internalised by each of them’. Social relations appear as a language system, and the system is embodied in and understood by human beings, the subject of society. This language system is different from Lévi-Strauss’ language structure, for its being a human system and the embodiment of social relations. Márkus’ language system is the breakthrough for humans to understand their sociality.

Because language is of actuality, practicality, and sociality, Márkus opposes viewing the opinions of paradigms of language about language simply through the materialism–idealism paradigm. In his view, these paradigms of language are all against subjectivism, and intend to transcend the setting of personal consciousness and the limitations of consciousness philosophy and subject philosophy. Their problems are not theoretical and ontological, but methodological, that is, they make a linguistic reduction in the method of explaining society and history. Márkus (1986: 38) believes that among ‘language, objectified knowledge and labour’, there is no primacy and they cannot be reduced to each other.

Márkus constructs his new Marxist philosophy of language by criticizing paradigms of language. Márkus finds the core of his construction of philosophy of language in critique, that is, the actuality, practicality, and sociality of language, finds theoretical support from Marxist practical materialism, and endows his language theory with the systematicity of Marxist philosophy. In his view, Marxism is a theoretical and practical rebuttal to paradigms of language: paradigms of language cannot theoretically answer the causal question of historical changes, because language is determined by social history, which is the missing axis of paradigms of language. More, in human history, human beings are not ‘observers or suffering participants’, but ‘active and conscious co-creators’ (Márkus, 1986: 39). To understand social history, we should not start only from paradigms of language, but should return to the paradigm of human, that is, the paradigm of Marx’s ‘practical materialism’. This paradigm requires the realization of human agency as well as the understanding of society and history. Therefore, Cohen and Wartofsky (1986: vii, ix) write that Márkus finds that paradigms of language try to ‘read human self-constitution as essential linguistic’, and Márkus carries out not only a ‘theoretical critique’ of this paradigm but also ‘an exploration of feasible alternatives for social, transformative practice’, following in the tradition of Marxist praxis, which is constitutive for the Budapest School.

In this critique and exploration, Márkus establishes his new Marxist philosophy of language at the same time, thereby critically developing the philosophy of language and adding new levels of meaning to Marxism. Therefore, the kind of questions, posed here in beginning, can be answered. Márkus constructs the Marxist philosophy of language in the critique of paradigms of language, and the Marxist nature of this construction reflects the continuity of his ‘early’ and ‘late’ periods.