What we have in common: David Graeber and the anthropological critique of philosophy

The anthropological critique of philosophy has traditionally challenged conjectural histories and simplistic abstractions used by philosophers to define human nature. While this critique often leans toward cultural relativism, this paper argues that David Graeber's work exemplifies a distinctive, anti-relativist version of the anthropological critique. Grounded in ethnographic, historical and archaeological material, Graeber's approach contests Eurocentric assumptions not only about non-European societies but also about Western social institutions themselves. The paper situates Graeber's position within contemporary anthropological debates, contrasting it with prevailing forms of anti-relativism such as cognitive, ecological and ontological perspectives. It then reconstructs Graeber's anthropological critique through key examples from Debt and The Dawn of Everything, including his reinterpretation of freedom inspired by the Indigenous critique of European society. Ultimately, this paper proposes that Graeber's work models a form of concrete universalism that respects cultural differences while offering a plural, historically informed critique of dominant social theories. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Italian are mine.