Abstract
We argue that social order emerges from interactions among human individuals who develop and internalize emotional beliefs on their place within wider social surroundings in the form of social contract. Although parts of this thesis can be justified by referencing recent works in international relations, the sociology of emotions allows elaborating the thesis more consistently across various analytical levels: the individual, the intrastate/societal, and the international. We rely on sociological theories of emotions and draw implications for the establishment and maintenance of social contract, as well as the restoration and bolstering of social order in failing states. Knowledge of local culture, rituals, perceptions of self and others, modes of exchange, power and status hierarchies, and stratification patterns can all provide clues, here summarized in the form of guidelines as to how more effective, yet noninvasive, means of engagement in failing states may be thought out and put to action.
Introduction
A decade and a half ago, Neta C. Crawford (2000) was among the first to point toward the importance of and the opportunities for application of emotion research to the field of international relations. Although the number of significant contributions (Long and Brecke 2003; McDermott 2004; Mercer 2010; Moïsi 2009; Sasley 2011; Saurette 2006) in the wake of Crawford’s work is growing steadily, the particular field of sociology of emotions, a branch of sociology that has recently been especially productive in emotion research, largely remains out of the scope of international relations, or has been touched upon in passing only (Berezin 2002; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008).
Part of the reasons for such neglect may lie in different disciplinary traditions of the fields of international relations, on one hand, and sociology, on the other. These differences may be illustrated with two somewhat stereotypical citations from the respective bodies of literature. On one hand, international relations scholars seem to regard sociological approaches as “nebulous in their specification of factors that affect the behavior of states or other political actors” (Katzenstein 1996:7). On the other hand, sociologists tend to view “professionalized political science” as having a “penchant for studied indifference, which it regards as value-free science,” striving “to develop theories in which there can be nothing new under the sun” (Streeck [2013] 2014:163).
In this article, we thoroughly extend our previous work on the implications of the sociology of emotions for restoration of social order (Srbljinovic and Bozic 2014), and argue that the sociology of emotions can be productively applied to the field of international relations. In doing so, we attempt to avoid both the alleged sociological “nebulousness in specification,” and the supposed political-scientific “penchant for studied indifference and the theories in which there can be nothing new under the sun.” More to the point, we focus on the problem of connecting different levels of analysis, which has been long-known to both of the two disciplines (e.g., Mead 1934; Parsons 1937, 1951; Waltz 1959), and we argue that the sociology of emotions can be helpful in connecting different analytical levels. First, it can help us understand social processes by which social order within states is established and maintained. In other words, it can help us understand relations between an individual and a society. Second, this improved understanding at the intrastate level can be applied at the international level by guiding foreign policy interventions of international or supranational organizations representing well-ordered, “functioning” states, aimed at restoring social order in failing states. 1
The primary purpose of the article is not to make a direct contribution to the sociological theories of emotions. Rather, it aims to inform both the sociological and the international relations research community of the relevance of the sociology of emotions for the problems of social order in failing states, as well as to offer well-grounded theoretical leads that have policy relevance. The hope is that the members of both communities could pick up these leads and develop them further. Half-jokingly, we may also say that our article can be regarded as “a confidence-building measure between the Province of the International Relations and the Province of the Sociology of Emotions.”
The article proceeds as follows: First, we clarify what we mean by social order and how we see the restoration of social order in failing states related to human emotions. We conceive of social order as a macro-level, societal condition of predictability and cooperativeness, which emerges from micro-level, interpersonal social interactions, and is internalized within individuals in the form of psychological social contract. We contend that emotions are key to both emergence and maintenance of social order, as emotions may act as facilitators of or impediments to interpersonal social bonding, as well as catalysts of or blockages to socialization processes. In this first part, we also position our work within the context of earlier works relevant to international relations and dealing with emotions-related phenomena across different analytical levels. In particular, by tying Fathali M.Moghaddam’s (2008) notion of psychological social contract to Jonathan Mercer’s (2010) notion of emotional beliefs, we begin to argue that various theories of the sociology of emotions (Turner and Stets 2005) can be seen as tackling various means by which certain emotional beliefs, that is, certain types of psychological social contract, become adopted by certain individuals or groups. In such a way, the emergence of large-scale patterns of emotional beliefs, pointed out by Dominique Moïsi (2009), can be accounted for. We are particularly interested in the implications such an integrative body of theory, admittedly still under construction, would have on the international efforts to restore social order in failing states.
With this in mind, we review several groups of theories within the disciplinary framework of the sociology of emotions and inquire into the role of various factors—such as culture, interaction rituals, the verification of self, exchanges of material and other goods, power and status, social stratification—in emotionally mediated social processes of belief formation. We probe deeper at those groups of theories, and inquire how knowledge of local culture, rituals, perceptions of self and others, modes of exchange, power and status hierarchies, and stratification patterns can offer us various clues as to how more effective, yet noninvasive, means of engagement in failing states may be devised and perhaps employed in near future. We devote particular attention to the conditions that may increase the probability that positive, socially integrative emotions, which regularly emerge in the course of micro-level interpersonal encounters, contribute to restoration of social order at the meso and the macro level.
On the basis of our review, we begin to draw contours of a distinctly sociological platform for the purpose of productive exchange with the field of international relations on the emotional aspects of social order. We summarize our considerations in the form of guidelines bearing importance on restitution of social order in failing states. Finally, we outline some further research topics that would naturally extend current considerations.
Emotions, Restoration of Order, and International Relations
Social order can be conceived as a “human product” or an “ongoing human production,” which is carried out through social interactions in everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966:52). 2 Predictability and cooperativeness are two features considered essential to social order. Yet, we would like to stress that predictability alone is not sufficient—the war of all against all in a Hobbesian “state of nature” is predictable, but not ordered. Only when individuals, at least to a degree, comply with social norms and laws that permit and promote cooperation can we speak about the emergence of order (Hechter and Kabiri 2008).
In modern societies, order is virtually inconceivable in the absence of state. 3 At times, however, we are witnessing collapses of the most basic social order, resulting in breakdowns of a minimum of the predictability and cooperativeness needed for a continuation of everyday life, in states such as Somalia, or Afghanistan. We are referring to such states as “failing states.” 4 This article, for the most part, deals with the problem of how the basic social order in failing states can be restored with the help from other states, international, or supranational organizations. 5
The notion of social order refers to the macro level of the society as a whole. A long-standing problem of social theory is to explain how this macro-level condition emerges and continues, sustained by micro-level, interindividual social interactions. The concept of social contract suggests that the macro-level order is rooted in a sort of agreement between individuals, and that internalizing such an agreement on the part of individuals contributes to the maintenance of order at the societal level.
According to classical conceptualizations (Hobbes [1651] 1991; Locke [1689] 1986; Rousseau [1762] 2010), social contract is a matter of rational calculation performed by self-interested individuals. Moghaddam’s (2008) concept of “psychological social contract” focuses, however, on socialization of “psychological citizens,” who may be self-serving, but need not be rational. Psychological social contract assumes an individual’s cognitive and affective—not necessarily explicit or conscious—acceptance of his or her place within a wider order. Endorsement of psychological social contract takes place during an individual’s socialization. A strong point of Moghaddam’s approach is that it can account for compliance to even those social norms and practices that are generally seen as detrimental to rational self-interest and, therefore, cannot be explained within the classical conceptualization of the social contract.
Discussion of psychological social contract is primarily concerned with maintenance and reproduction of order at the macro level, as well as the ways in which the macro-level order is “projected” onto the individual members of a society. The approach is, however, less explicit regarding links in the opposite direction. To a considerable extent, it leaves unanswered the question of how the multitude of individuals may come into mutual agreement that gives rise to the social order at the macro level. This question needs to be addressed, in particular, if the psychological approach to social contract aims to suggest “a more general theory of the psychological basis of social order on a grander scale” (Moghaddam and Harré 2010:5).
Moghaddam’s (2008) approach also leaves international relations largely out of scope. The implications of the psychological social contract for the international order have not been worked out, and it is generally not clear what significance, if any, the psychological social contract should bear on the field of international relations.
In contrast to the work on psychological social contract, Mercer’s (2010) work on emotional beliefs provides a nice example of linking the individual with the international level. 6 Starting from the notion of emotional belief, “where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief and which makes possible a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence” (Mercer 2010:2), 7 Mercer shows how consideration of those beliefs could deepen international studies by providing new perspectives on credibility and persuasion, among others. For the most part, however, Mercer leaves the societal level out of considerations. Although he seems to be aware that emotional beliefs can be held collectively, 8 he does not develop this insight further. Mercer is also not particularly concerned with social order.
In contrast to heretofore mentioned authors, Moïsi (2009) focuses on the societal level and its implications for international relations. He describes or, to use his terminology, “maps” characteristic macro-level emotional patterns of select nations and cultures and then draws conclusions about the impact of these emotional patterns on the world’s future. He also seems to be aware of the implications of such a view for the notions of both intrastate and international order. Unfortunately, he neglects the individual level for the most part. The questions of where the macro-level emotional patterns come from and how they emerge from interpersonal, micro-level interactions are not tackled, so that Moïsi’s account remains incapable of including the individual level into a more comprehensive framework.
Our aim in this article is to explore the role of emotions in both establishment and reproduction of social order, eyeing to better connect and hopefully improve some of the heretofore reviewed approaches. As the sociology of emotions inquires how social structures and culture impact on the arousal and flow of emotions in individuals, as well as how such emotional arousal feeds back into social structures and culture (Turner and Stets 2005), it is natural to ask what, if anything, sociologists of emotions have to say about the links between various levels: the individual, the intrastate/societal, and the international.
First of all, regarding the question on how the individuals come into the agreement that gives rise to the social order at the macro level, we contend that psychological social contract is nothing more or less than a collectively held set of emotional beliefs about the place of individual members of a society within a wider social order. Holding such emotional beliefs and knowing that other people hold beliefs similar to ours makes social order on a large scale possible. In other words, emotional beliefs are those mental constructs by which psychological social contract becomes concretized within individual minds.
Second, the emotional beliefs underlying the psychological social contract are socially constructed through interpersonal interactions in everyday life. As we shall show, various groups of sociological theories of emotions point to various means by which certain emotional beliefs become adopted by certain individuals or groups. These means include, among others, cultural scripts and narratives, interaction rituals, ways of self-verification through social encounters, exchange of valuable resources, power, and status conferral. It is important to stress that although these means are often mediated by social structure and/or culture, there is also considerable room for the agency of individuals and their maneuvers. This will become particularly evident when we tackle the issue of change agents.
Third, social processes leading toward the emergence of social order give rise to social norms, institutions, and other macro-level means by which new generations of individuals become socialized into the existing order in the ways described by Moghaddam (2008), among others. Political institutions also have a prominent role in this respect. We do not claim that political procedures and institutions are irrelevant for the establishment, maintenance, and reproduction of social order. Our contention is that efforts in rebuilding political institutions in failing states are less likely to succeed if not coupled with a wider concern for psychosocial constructs, such as emotional beliefs and psychological social contract, which connote a sense of meaningful participation of citizens in political institutions.
Moreover, introduction of affective factors into analyses of social order, political processes, and institutions does not need to imply complete abandonment of approaches based on theories of rational choice. Rationality in many respects depends on emotion, so that augmenting analyses with emotional considerations means complementing rather than surrendering more traditional rational-choice approaches (Crawford 2000; McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005). For example, a number of structural conditions shaping organizations, communities, and groups have been hypothesized as conducive to the clarity of expectations and positive emotional arousal among their members (Turner 2007:127–29). Most of these conditions do not conflict with predominantly rationalist, “design-for-efficiency” requirements, so that strivings to fulfill these conditions might only increase chances of success of any particular “optimal” governmental design scheme.
Fourth, although the sociology of emotions is not particularly concerned with international relations, we argue that findings concerning social order at the interindividual and the state/societal level bear importance on the international level as well. Here, we concur with Moïsi (2009), who regards patterns of emotional beliefs characteristic of certain nations and cultures important for international politics. Again, we do not claim that political mechanisms and institutions at the international level are irrelevant for the restitution of social order in failing states. However, as political institutions within failing states collapse, most of the usual political mechanisms at the international level become inapplicable, as the interfaces between such mechanisms and the collapsing state institutions also break down. External, intervening actors are faced with bare society, exposed and largely devoid of its political-system “overlay.”
As yet, we lack detailed empirical data supporting the claim that the breakdown of the state is associated with a prevalence of negative emotions and a lack of positive ones among the country’s population. However, there is some evidence from Afghanistan in support of this claim. In two of Afghanistan’s provinces—Helmand and Kandahar—a sample of respondents were asked which of the listed emotions they felt most strongly on a regular basis. The results showed anger was by far the most prevalent emotion, followed by sadness/depression, frustration, and fear—all negative emotions. It is also worth noting that strong positive emotions, which can foster cooperation, have been reported by only 6 percent of the respondents in Helmand and 16 percent in Kandahar (MacDonald et al. 2010:38). Another nationwide study “found that 42 percent of Afghans suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and 68 percent exhibited signs of major depression” (Badkhen 2012:34).
Although systematic, empirical studies of emotions felt by citizens of failing states are generally lacking, and the fragmentary data that exist are far from conclusive, we shall probably not err much if we hypothesize a prevalence of negative and a lack of positive emotions among the populations of such states. This is because under the circumstances of social disorder, people are generally more exposed to negative psychological conditions and negative stimuli, giving rise to negative emotions.
The question of the intensity of emotional arousal of inhabitants of failing states, however, seems to be more uncertain. Whereas Norine Macdonald et al. (2010) found the highly arousing and relatively short-lived emotion of anger to be prevalent, the accounts of persistent “normlessnness” (Geller 2010) seem to indicate the prevalence of more enduring and only mildly arousing negative emotions—or negative moods.
In any case, it has been well known that negative events and information tend to be more closely attended and better remembered, and negative emotions seem to have a greater influence on human behavior than the positive ones (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007; Cacioppo and Gardner 1999; Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). Moreover, negative emotions tend to exhibit the so-called “distal bias” (Lawler 2001; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2009; Turner 2007, 2012), which means that people who experience negative emotions are more likely to attribute these emotions to meso- and macro-level social formations (e.g., state institutions, political system, other nations or cultures, international institutions, etc.) than to the micro-level, local units and groups, and they tend to do so even when they themselves and their immediate social surroundings are the real sources of negative emotions. Unfortunately for order-restoration efforts, this also means that negative emotions are more difficult to reverse than the positive ones, and that, once negative emotions have been attributed to wider social structures and/or international causes, it is extremely difficult and time-consuming to change such an attribution. And, if the hypothesis of the prevalence of negative emotions in failing states is true—and there is every indication, indeed, that it is—then this helps to explain why the restoration of order in failing states is such a difficult task.
As one of the reviewers of this article rightly remarked, Without the political system “overlay” and without legitimacy attached to what remains of the political system, social order can only be reconstructed or restored by going to the source of all such order: the arousal of positive emotions among individuals in interaction in local groupings.
This is also the main point where emotional politics in failing states of necessity differ from the emotional politics in viable states: A viable state is comprised of a set of institutions constituting its political system, as well as a set of processes by which the political system interacts or “interpenetrates” with the wider society. Emotional politics in a viable state are, therefore, “channeled” through these institutions and processes, whereas in a failing state, such institutions and processes—or such “channels,” in general—do not exist, and have to be rebuilt, by rooting them within the host country’s society. To be able to do so, the psychological social contract has to be reestablished.
Under such circumstances, understanding emotional phenomena and processes at both the societal and the interindividual level should be crucial for the reestablishment of a psychological social contract, which is also a first step toward rebuilding political institutions within the failing state. This is where our article aims and, as we intend to show, the sociology of emotions can provide important guidelines in this respect.
The Sociology of Emotions and Social Order
Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets (2005) identify several general theoretical approaches to understanding the dynamics of human emotions. Next, we follow Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets (2005, 2006; Turner 2009) in briefly reviewing these various groups of theories. 9 Unlike Turner and Stets, who provide a thorough and comprehensive review, we are interested in only those facets of the theories that can be used to clarify various phenomena related to the breakdown and possible restoration of social order in failing states. Within each reviewed group of theories, we underscore such aspects, discuss their implications for social order, and, wherever possible, offer examples from various sources, illustrating some of the theoretical concepts in more concrete terms. 10 We are particularly alert to various means by which certain emotional beliefs become adopted by certain individuals or groups. We inquire for ways in which those means can be incorporated into attempts at restoration of social order in failing states.
Dramaturgical Theories
Dramaturgical theories of emotions emphasize the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced and expressed in certain situations. The emotion culture, by various forms of cultural scripts, constrains the actions of individuals on a stage in front of audiences, and yet individuals do have some degree of flexibility to engage in strategic action (Turner and Stets 2006).
Dramaturgical perspective on culturally mediated emotions points toward the importance of taking into account local cultural and emotional context in order-restoration efforts.
First of all, culture is a macro-level factor influencing formation and transfer of emotional beliefs among the members of a society. Moghaddam’s (2008) discussion of “carriers” (p. 891)—means by which styles of thinking and doing are passed from generation to generation—and “story lines” (p. 893)—narrative constructs that weave through the history of different societies and carry forward certain aspects of collective identity—elucidates how sociopolitical order “enters into” individuals and comes to regulate personal life.
Understanding behavior of a population cannot, therefore, be achieved without understanding the local cultural context: carriers, story lines, local interpretations of the self, and the situation. Dramaturgical theories of emotions stress that cultural context carries with itself an emotional charge. In other words, the local interpretations cannot be grasped without trying to “map” (Moïsi 2009:22) dominant emotions of the local population and trying to understand how these emotions both shape and are shaped by the local sociocultural environment.
Social order can rarely be simply imposed “from the outside.” “Reading” emotional responses of local actors and responding to culturally sensitive factors might, as an alternative, provide the key to effectively leveraging a renewal of the psychological social contract and restoration of social order “from the inside” of the affected society itself.
The question whether the local population is more driven by greed or anger, for instance, has clear policy implications because a policy response must be different in each case (Mercer 2005). Once local interpretations are identified and understood, influencing behavior of the local population may become possible through mitigating cultural factors that contributed to the development of current interpretations, or through providing alternative interpretations.
Second, dramaturgical theories point out that culture is not only a constraint on individual behavior, but it also provides individual agency with “material” to use in their strategic action. This observation has important implications for the attempts to restore social order “bottom-up”—through changes in cognitive and emotional endorsement of the psychological social contract on the part of individuals.
Because emotion can be regarded as “that part of the social relationship in which the subject of the relationship . . . is in some way changed, and, in being so changed, is disposed to change the relationship itself” (Barbalet 2002:4), changing emotions of individual subjects often changes their relationships with others, which provide a social foundation for changing wider social structures. In such a way, the role of certain local actors as “change agents” (Ellickson 2001) might be encouraged, thereby beginning a possible cascade of micro changes at the level of individual interactions leading to an all-pervasive social change at the macro level. 11
Although it is too ambitious to expect that attempts at restoration of social order can instantly change prevailing emotional cultures, they can certainly be influenced. The fulcrums for change may be local conversations and narratives, which “can serve as pattern-interrupts that may encourage members of a system to begin reorganizing and reinterpreting their existing worldviews” (Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall 2009:9). In countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, U.S. government agencies would do well to amplify the local narratives of Muslim youth who recognize the politically motivated and narrowly self-interested messages of their own extremist religious leaders . . . By calling into question their motivations and authority to lead, local members of communities are crafting a counter narrative about the negative consequences of suicide missions and, by extension, the value of martyrdom. (Trethewey et al. 2009:11)
To serve as “pattern-interrupts,” however, narratives must strike “emotional chords” within participants, and it is these emotional chords that need to be aimed. The emotional chords within the local audience can best be struck by using common emotion vocabulary and syntax, as well as by invoking common emotion scenarios of the narratives that are characteristic of a given culture. 12
Ritual Theories
Ritual theories, as their name suggests, focus on the role of interaction rituals in emotional arousal. Emile Durkheim’s ([1912] 1960) work on elementary forms of religious life is an important precursor to contemporary ritual theories, the most prominent of which is Randall Collins’s (2004) theory of interaction rituals. Collins conceptualizes human interactions as chains of rituals exhibiting up-and-down variation in intensity. The theory focuses on the ways mutual entrainment of emotion and attention during group assemblies produce shared emotional and cognitive experience, group solidarity, heightened emotional energy, symbols of social relationship, and standards of morality (Collins 2004).
Whereas dramaturgical theories point to cultural variations in social order, ritual theories point to ritual as a common base of it. Ritual is conceptualized as a source of shared emotional beliefs underlying social order. While the form of ritual and thereby generated emotional beliefs may vary, the production of shared emotional experience during ritual is universal. Moreover, it is precisely this shared emotional experience that makes subsequent generalizations that involve “certainty beyond evidence” possible. For example, once cultural symbols, such as totems or flags, become attached to certain emotional responses, they attain the power to reactivate these emotional responses even without the ritual that had mediated the attachment in the first instance.
The state, together with its political system, is primarily a facilitator, rather than a generator of socially integrative rituals (Berezin 2002; Srbljinovic and Bozic 2014). Yet, there is an important class of rituals, called “reconciliation events” (Long and Brecke 2003:6), which have often been state-sponsored. Reconciliation events include direct physical contact or proximity between opposing parties; a public ceremony that relays the event to the wider society; and ritualistic or symbolic behavior indicating resolution of previous disputes and prospective, more amicable mutual relations. William J. Long and Peter Brecke (2003) have found reconciliation events conducive to bringing civil conflicts to an end. They have also found that reconciliation events can contribute to international dispute settlement, but in such cases, rituals are less emotionally charged and more “part of a negotiated bargain characterized by signals that are costly, voluntary, and irrevocable” (Long and Brecke 2003:157). In other words, emotionally laden reconciliation rituals seem to be more effective in intra- than international settings. Why is that so?
Long and Brecke (2003) hypothesize that credible commitments are easier to secure in an international environment than in civil conflicts, so that rational bargaining has greater weight in international dispute resolution. In civil conflicts, opposing parties are too intimately interrelated for the rational bargaining to be easily applicable, so emotionally laden forgiveness rituals are needed. In other words, the explanation starts from the premise that when rational solutions are not easily available, then emotional factors will come into play.
An alternative explanation that we propose, drawing on the sociology of emotions, turns things upside-down and argues that when emotional means are less handy and successful, then rational factors enter the stage. More precisely, ritual theories of the sociology of emotions maintain that the successfulness of interaction rituals generally rises with the intensity of the ritual, the centrality of participation in ritual events, the proportion of time people spend together during ritual events, and the stability of the group involved in ritual gatherings (Collins 2004). As the latter two conditions are obviously (and the former two probably also) more easily secured in domestic than in the international settings, it is understandable that emotionally charged reconciliation rituals will be more effective in intrastate conflict resolution. The advantage of this line of explanation over the one starting from rational premises is in its better correspondence with historical evidence, as it is well known that emotionally charged reconciliation rituals historically predate international dispute settlement.
Symbolic Interactionist Theories
Symbolic interactionist theories of emotions emphasize the role of symbolic interactions in the course of human communication. An individual experiences positive emotions when self is verified by others responding to self in a manner that is consistent with self’s own view. Alternatively, when self is not confirmed, the individual experiences negative emotions. Individuals are, therefore, “motivated to bring cognitions about self into line with the responses of others and, correspondingly, to turn negative emotions into positive emotions” (Turner and Stets 2006:29). Symbolic interactionist theories have been enriched with psychoanalytical elements, pointing out that individuals often invoke various defense mechanisms in response to negative emotions, rather than correct their cognitions and behaviors in ways that bring self into line with the expectations of others (Scheff 1988; Turner and Stets 2005).
Symbolic interactionist theories point to the interplay between self-verification successes or failures taking place at the level of interpersonal interactions on one hand, and the overall social order at the macro, societal level on the other. Whereas successes in self-verification through interpersonal interactions incite positive emotions and generally strengthen the psychological social contract, repetitive failures of self-verification increase negative emotions and make the endorsement of the contract tenuous.
Psychological defense mechanisms at the individual level, such as repression of negative emotions, may facilitate transmutation of repressed emotions into new kinds of emotions that further disrupt normal interaction. Social structure and culture may contribute to mass repression of shame and its collective transmutation into anger, eventually leading to societal-level violence and war (Scheff 1994; Scheff and Retzinger 1991). An example of a political scientist applying psychoanalytical insights is Moïsi’s (2009) account of the culture of “bad humiliation” (p. 58) prevailing today in the Arab-Islamic world, including some failing states, where “humiliation without hope leads to despair and to the nurturing of a yearning for revenge that can easily turn into an impulse towards destruction” (p. 57). Occasional spectacular attacks on domestic and international targets—symbols of power that is apparently arrogant and unjust toward the local people—can be explained along the lines of such theories.
However, it seems that in Afghanistan and some other failing states, negative emotions often perpetuate for rather long periods of time in a milder form, without leading to highly intense violence or abrupt structural or cultural changes, but to a persisting state of “normlessness” (Geller 2010) accompanied with only a moderate level of negative socioemotional behavior. How can one account for this perpetual normlessness?
It has been hypothesized for smaller face-to-face groups that once a moderately high level of disagreement is established in a group, the recipient of disagreements cannot be certain whether these disagreements are attributable to the situational norm, or to self, or other (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). Consequently, the recipient is likely to feel frustrated by the disagreement, but confused about where to direct that frustration. Only a moderate level of negative socioemotional behavior is expected in spite of frustration, because emotional reactions are mitigated by already established patterns of acceptability and frequency of disagreement, as well as the uncertainty about who is to blame (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). In other words, people’s expectations seem to gradually adapt to anomic conditions, and such “low” expectations of order may as well become internalized as part of the psychological social contract. If a similar mechanism is at play in larger groups, it might contribute to the perpetuation of “normlessness” at the macro level.
How can one break up the vicious circles of aggressive and destructive or alienating and depressing negative emotions? We see reconciliation events as one possible way of jolting people out of their daily routine of perpetuating normlessness toward social interactions that are more effective in bringing about positive emotions fostering cooperation and order. There may well exist other generic forms of ritual that lead to successful self-verification, such as exchange and power and status rituals, to which we turn next. In any case, political mechanisms of order restitution may be more effective if accompanied with order-supportive symbolic interactions.
Exchange Theories
Exchange theories of emotion see exchanges between individuals and groups as interaction rituals in themselves, promoting positive feelings and perceptions of predictability. Exchange participants are seen as dispensing with certain resources to receive others that they value more. A surplus of value gained—the reward or utility—is likely to induce positive emotions, and a loss of value is likely to induce negative ones.
Sometimes, however, mere surplus of value is not enough to induce positive emotions, as when the reward is not equal to the expectations. More generally, the nature and intensity of the emotions experienced by individuals may vary with the type of exchange, the types of structures in which exchanges occur, the relative power and dependence of actors on each other, the expectations for resources, the standards of justice that apply to the exchange, and the attributions that actors make for success or failure in receiving profitable payoffs (Turner and Stets 2006).
When people perceive payoffs of exchange as unfair or unjust, they feel negative emotions and develop negative emotional beliefs. Equity considerations—that is, the allocation of rewards in proportion to each actor’s contribution—seem to play a particularly important role in judgments of fairness. Seeing oneself as unfairly treated indicates the lack of fulfillment of reward expectations, leads to negative assessments of the situation, and arouses negative emotion—anger (Hegtvedt 1990).
Edward J. Lawler’s (2001) “affect theory of social exchange” seeks to explain the emergence of “micro social order”—a recurrent pattern of interaction through which actors come to perceive themselves as parts of a larger social unit, as well as develop affective attachments to that unit (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008). Lawler and collaborators consider certain types of exchange more conducive to development of micro social order than others. They argue that productive exchanges, that is, group-oriented coordination tasks when actors seek to produce a valued result through their joint collaboration, contribute to micro social order more than other types of exchanges, such as negotiated, reciprocal, or generalized ones (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). It is the lack of a productive exchange component that might help explain why the so-called Quick Impact Projects in Afghanistan “mainly achieve short-term stability benefits that are restricted to the immediate transactional exchange, . . . but they do not reflect the type of transformation necessary to generate trust and reduce suspicion over the long-term” (Thompson 2010:13–14).
It has often been noticed that economic development, conceptualized as large-scale expansion of micro exchanges, goes hand in hand with social order. 13 Findings of the affect theory of exchange indicate the existence of a micro relation between exchange and positive emotions, which may shed a new light on the macro-level concurrence between economic development and social order. Exchange frequency, which may be regarded as a micro-level proxy for economic development, positively influences predictability and positive emotion, and the latter positively affects group cohesion (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000). As group cohesion (and predictability as well) positively influences cooperativeness, the exchange frequency has beneficial effects on both predictability and cooperativeness—the two basic ingredients of social order.
Power and Status Theories
Power and status have often been regarded as two central, relational dimensions of human interaction: Power entails conduct by which actors compel other actors to do what they do not wish to do, whereas status entails conduct that conveys voluntary compliance, deference, and acceptance (Kemper and Collins 1990). According to the theories of emotions focusing on the role of power and status, when individuals have or gain power or status, they experience positive emotions, whereas when they lose power or status, they experience negative emotions (Kemper 1978; Kemper and Collins 1990). Starting from this premise, the theories strive to determine particular conditions of power and status interactional dynamics (Thamm 2004).
Status dynamics seem to be particularly important for social order as it is from status dynamics that social solidarity emerges. When an individual gains or loses status, emotional outcome depends on the attributions of responsibility for the outcome. Gains in status instigate pride, if self is attributed as responsible for the gain, and joy or happiness, if other or circumstance is deemed responsible. Gains in status also increase recipient’s liking for the giver, and the giver’s good feelings. Both of these increase the likelihood of repeating status conferral and strengthen solidarity bonds (Kemper and Collins 1990). When extended into the public domain, such mutualities form the affective basis for sustaining alliances in organizations, professions, and political communities. Losses of status disrupt solidarity—they do so most visibly through spiraling mutual status denials, and more quietly through depressed actors’ withdrawal from social life. Power dynamics can also erode solidarity inasmuch as disempowered individuals become resentful (Kemper and Collins 1990).
As always, care must be exercised when applying results obtained with small groups to wider collectives. Notwithstanding this caveat, a general guideline that can be gleaned from power and status theories is that acknowledgment of local actors’ status may provide strivings to reestablish eroded social order in failing states with additional leverage. It might be desirable, for instance, to secure endorsement of order-restoration efforts by local high-status individuals, such as tribal elders, if their prominent position within the local status hierarchy can help secure wider local support to the restoration efforts.
Stratification Theories
Stratification theories of emotions explore connections between emotions and their subjects’ positions within larger social stratification systems. Stratification theories are more general and macro-level oriented than power and status theories, although the two groups are sometimes lumped together under the “structural theories” heading (Turner and Stets 2005).
The distribution of positive and negative emotions among members of a population generally corresponds to the distribution of other resources such as money, power, prestige, influence, and others (Turner 2010). The pattern of emotional stratification reinforces class, ethnic, gender, age, or other stratification. A general premise of stratification theories is that individuals react emotionally to their place within a stratification system, but their emotional reactions also influence shaping and changing of such systems. The existence of a large segment of the population repressing shame and transmuting it into anger poses a threat to social order. The potential for anger is even greater if shame and humiliation are experienced by middle classes, who have higher expectations and, therefore, are less likely to endure hardships of shame. Jonathan H. Turner (2010), therefore, predicts that societies in which middle classes are thwarted will evidence more intense anger.
Jack M. Barbalet (1998), focusing on the link between social structure and emotions, sees confidence as a kind of emotional complement to rational assessments of predictability. 14 The feeling of confidence, in his view, is a necessary precondition for action, which helps people bridge the gap between the known present and an unknowable and incalculable future. Confidence does not simply arise in atomistic, individual minds; rather, it has a basis in a particular experience of social relationships. Barbalet (1998) notes that the greater the degree of acceptance and recognition accorded to an actor in a social relationship, the higher that actor’s feeling of confidence, and the more inclined that actor will be to engage in future interactions. He also suggests that the level of confidence experienced by participants in social interaction is affected by “the type and amount of resources which the actor has access to, as a result of the relationship into which they are accepted” (Barbalet 1998:87).
These observations are in line with our previous discussion of the importance of status conferral to local actors for order-restoration efforts. The acceptance and recognition of local actors as respectful and equal communication partners, as well as the provision of symbolic and necessary material resources to them, may embolden these actors to carry on amid the prevailing disorder and increase their confidence that a better future is on its way.
Who are the local actors whose confidence levels are to be increased? Two general strategies can be envisioned. First, if one views already existing local status hierarchies in need of mere strengthening, then local high-status individuals, such as tribal elders, will be most appropriate for receiving confidence boosts. Second, if the local status hierarchies appear to be obstacles to rather than pillars of incipient social order, then prospective change agents, such as local youths in the earlier example of crafting counter narratives to suicide terrorism, will be the primary recipients of support.
Discussion
Although development of a new theory is certainly outside the scope of this work, we should still clarify a few points of possible concern to some of the more theoretically inclined readers. First of all, not all the reviewed theories are mutually compatible. For example, the capacity for emotional arousal through exchange is viewed by exchange theorists as a universal human characteristic, largely independent of cultural background—an assumption rather at odds with viewpoints of the more culturally relativistic dramaturgical theories. Or, as another example, methodologically individualistic approaches assumed by more psychologically oriented theories (such as Mercer’s and Moghaddam’s conceptions that we started with) can hardly be reconciled, from a theoretical perspective, with Collins’s ritual theory whose starting point is “situation rather than individual” (Collins 2004:3).
Second, some of the leading sociologists of emotions (Turner and Stets 2005:295–96) have already observed that each of the reviewed groups of theories addresses only a portion of interpersonal emotional dynamics. Certain facets of these dynamics escape the purview of some of the theories entirely. For example, one cannot expect from ritual theories to provide explanation as to how emotions aroused during ritual gatherings affect individual psychological and biophysiological states. In contrast, it is equally unlikely that the more psychologically oriented theories could account for collective emotional arousal during ritual performances. Indeed, such “theoretical overstretches” we regard as neither required nor desirable. Yet, we are also of the opinion that the role of emotions in complex social phenomena, of which social order is but one example, cannot be engaged with adequately from the sole perspective of any of the theories that we reviewed. For example, we regard both emotionally charged interaction rituals and internal psychological and biophysiological states of individuals involved in such rituals important in the processes of establishment and maintenance of social order (Srbljinovic and Bozic 2014).
The time is probably much too soon for a “grand unified sociological theory of emotions” to appear and, if such a theory is ever to emerge, its development will very likely require further refinements and modifications of various current theories. 15 Meanwhile, the key question, as we see it, is more pragmatic: Can we synthesize a distinctly sociological perspective that could, notwithstanding its origins in a wide and somewhat disparate array of the sociological theories of emotions, still offer a possibility for a productive exchange with the field of international relations on the issues of social order in failing states? Our answer to this question is positive, and we begin to delineate contours of such a perspective in the sequel.
In the literature on failing states, it has been pointed out that states fail when they can no longer deliver positive political goods (such as human security, rule of law, civil and human rights, health care, education, physical infrastructures, and the like) to their citizens (Rotberg 2003). The political goods that collapsing states fail to provide “encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, [that] inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions” (Rotberg 2003:3). In other words, a state fails when it loses capacities to guarantee and enforce the social contract. According to further explanations, the state can lose those capacities for various political and/or economic reasons: lack of meaningful linkages between state and society, greed for resources, excessive concentration of power, gross institutional mismanagement, deliberate destabilization from abroad, general economic vulnerability (Doornbos 2002), interclan (Doornbos and Markakis 1994) or interfactional conflict (Rashid 2000), external imposition of institutional structures alien to local institutions (Ahmed and Green 1999), skewed incentives and distorted economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), and so on. The question, however, that remains unanswered in most such accounts is what it really means for a state to lose the capacities for maintaining the social contract. And even those approaches that take into account the importance of social contract for state-building more explicitly (Ingram 2010; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008) leave out, almost entirely, the emotional dimension of social contract, which is central to our considerations.
It is our contention that the inability to maintain the social contract means failing to reinforce emotional beliefs about the place of individual members of the society in question within a wider social order. It is important to stress, however, that, with the exception of some totalitarian regimes perhaps, the state is not the agent that would normally inculcate emotional beliefs in the minds of individuals. Yet, the role of the state as a facilitator and enabler of this process is indispensable. Public schools, hospitals, markets, courtrooms, military barracks, recreational and sporting facilities are all places where people from different families, clans, or neighborhoods can meet together and engage in dramaturgical acts, emotionally charged rituals, symbolic interactions, market and other exchanges, and acts of power and status conferral. And such venues most often crumble with the collapse of the state. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the absence of state’s support for such emotionally charged interactions at the levels beyond immediate family or neighborhood, emotional underpinnings of the social contract, together with the social order that rests on them, break down.
However, when people are able to employ cultural scripts and narratives, interaction rituals, self-verification mechanisms, means of exchange, and power and status conferral in the course of their social interactions in various public venues, positive, socially integrative emotions, which tend to circulate through interpersonal encounters, families, and small groups, are gradually channeled toward larger social meso and macro structures, thereby increasing individuals’ commitments to the formation, maintenance, or constructive change of these larger structures. Such commitments become the core of the emotional beliefs about the place of individual members of a society within a wider social order. Patterns of emotional stratification emerge as individuals react emotionally to their place within a stratification system, as well as such emotional reactions influence further development of the system. Psychological social contract gets established, and the usual socialization mechanisms contribute to its maintenance and reproduction.
It must be stressed here that channeling positive emotions toward wider social structures is by no means self-evident. We have already mentioned a general human tendency—the so-called “proximal bias”—to attribute positive emotions to self and a close circle of family, friends, colleagues, and the like, and a parallel tendency—the so-called “distal bias”—to attribute negative emotions to the more distant meso- and macro-level structures (Lawler 2001; Turner 2007, 2012). Moreover, as “people make attributions for these negative emotions, they not only target meso-level units but also develop beliefs 16 (often inaccurate) about why they feel” these wider structures are to blame (Turner 2012:113). As we noticed in the discussion of dramaturgical theories, such beliefs need to be changed and replaced with the new ones that may provide a basis for a more viable social order.
Indeed, human individuals and collectivities are capable of overcoming proximal and distal biases under suitable conditions. As we have already indicated, Lawler and his collaborators see fostering “productive exchanges” (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008, 2009) as a particularly promising way of overcoming proximal and distal biases. Turner, however, claims that the general condition under which positive emotions begin to go external and target meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations is when encounters embedded in meso units consistently lead to the arousal of positive emotions. Under this condition, the power of the proximal bias is broken, and attributions begin to move outward as individuals recognize that the structure in which encounters are embedded is also responsible for positive feeling. (Turner 2012:112, emphasis in original)
In addition, our review indicates that certain individuals—the “change agents”—may figure prominently in emotionally based, order-restoration processes. If distinctive cognitive abilities of change agents are augmented by certain emotional capacities, larger social units may begin to form around such individuals—the units to which direct emotional attachments may develop, beyond a dozen or two strong attachments that a human individual is able to maintain at the level of immediate interpersonal ties. The more emotional change agents there are, the greater the chances that positive, affective attachments would reach out of small and closed cliques, toward the larger social units, and across the wider society. 17
Again, various groups of reviewed theories point toward somewhat different mechanisms by which this general process may unfold. Change agents may craft emotionally charged narratives and use other dramaturgical resources. They may try to modify existing or invent new interaction rituals. They may invest conscious efforts at identifying ego-defensive mechanisms that impede development of social bonds. Change agents may facilitate development of particular types of exchanges conducive to development of micro social order. They may also try to shift existing power and status hierarchies, or even wider social stratification systems. A combination of several techniques is more likely to succeed than only one.
Regarding the question of which of the reviewed theories could be most helpful under what conditions, we can also offer some preliminary insights, based on a consideration of time frames for which particular theories are suited best. 18 In both conflict resolution and state-building, three time frames have often been distinguished (Department for International Development [DFID] 2009; Reimann 2004). First, in a short term, the focus is most often on conflict settlement. This stage is usually labeled as outcome-oriented, since the emphasis is on immediate outcomes: getting the representatives of the opposed sides to the table and ending direct violence (Reimann 2004). Among the theories that we reviewed, we see exchange and power and status theories as potentially most suitable for application at this stage because various arrangements of exchange and power and status conferral are the usual ingredients of negotiations between key leading figures and other actors involved in conflict settlement efforts.
In a medium term, conflict resolution approaches focus on “process oriented activities that aim to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence” (Reimann 2004:49). As conflict and disorder have been viewed as results of unmet human needs (Burton 1968), these unmet needs have to be addressed if the conflict is to be resolved. Similarly, state-building approaches emphasize, in a medium term, development of the “survival functions” of the state being restored. The most crucial “survival functions” typically include security, revenue collection, and rule of law (DFID 2009), and these are aimed to satisfy some of the basic human needs. However, we also see this stage as the one during which the reinforcement of emotional beliefs about the place of individual members of the society within a wider social order should begin. In other words, in this stage, the focus should shift from interelite negotiations about conflict settlement toward elite-constituency relations, which are vital for a lasting social order. We see dramaturgical, ritual, and symbolic-interactionist theories as process-oriented ones, and, as such, best suited for application at this stage, although valuable insights, particularly those on “productive exchanges” (Lawler 2001), can also be expected from exchange theories.
Finally, in a long term, the focus of conflict resolution efforts remains on process-oriented, but also encompasses structure-oriented activities. These are often referred to as “conflict transformation,” and they include capacity building, grassroots training, development and human rights work, trauma work, and so on (Reimann 2004). Similarly, the focus of state-building approaches shifts, in a long term, toward “expected functions” of the state: “delivery of public services, governance arrangements or other actions by the state which help to build its legitimacy among the population” (DFID 2009:7). Among the theories that we reviewed, we see both process-oriented ones, such as dramaturgical, ritual, and symbolic-interactionist theories, and structure-oriented ones, such as stratification theories, as potentially most useful in the long term.
In particular, the “psychological needs” perspective on conflict resolution (Burton 1969), which often underlies efforts at establishing viable truth and reconciliation, forgiveness, and transitional justice programs (Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher 2008), is very much compatible with our approach to restoration of social order through renewal of the psychological social contract, as the removal of threats to basic psychological needs is virtually inseparable from the establishment of emotional beliefs about the place of individual members of a society within a wider social order.
Conclusion
The activities of change agents can hardly be set in operation “by decree.” However, by being responsive to “bottom-up” processes set in motion by change agents, and by being prepared to support those processes of change that contribute to the restitution of social order, restorative efforts from the supranational level can be made more successful. The sociology of emotions is a useful source of insights in this regard. Based on our review, we can formulate a number of guidelines bearing importance on the attempts at restoration of social order in failing states 19 :
Various cultures foster various forms of emotional experience and display, and various forms of social contract and social order emerge in various parts of the world. Insights into emotional dimension of local culture can help restoration and maintenance of social order in failing states. By amplifying the local narratives of select change agents, the processes of emotional belief formation can be influenced.
Local communities are often supplied with emotional energy, necessary for sustainment of cohesion and solidarity, by means of interaction rituals. Certain rituals of political life, such as reconciliation events, may provide an important means toward restoration of social order in conflict-ridden societies.
Self-verification through interactions at the interpersonal level affects higher, meso, and macro levels of social order, and vice versa, meso and macro structures of order influence the ways in which individuals verify selves at the micro level. Successes in self-verification generally incite positive emotions and strengthen psychological social contract, whereas repetitive failures of self-verification increase negative emotions and threaten social contract. 20 Emotion-generating rituals that lead to genuinely positive self-verification may circumvent, moderate, or shake even deeply rooted defense-against-change mechanisms.
Successful exchanges of material and less tangible goods contribute to human physical and psychological well-being, particularly when the exchanges are perceived as fair. Exchanges become particularly conducive to social order when successes are emotionally associated not only with particular person-to-person ties, but also with larger social units, within which those exchanges take place. Group coordination tasks in which actors aim to produce a valued result through their joint collaboration seem to be particularly conducive to larger-scale social order.
Position of individuals in power and status hierarchies impacts on their emotional experience and expression. Acknowledging the status of some local actors, who may act as change agents, can spur efforts at restoration of social order in failing states.
Emotional stratification patterns within a society matter for social order. If large segments of population experience shame and humiliation and transmute it into anger, order may become threatened. If large segments of population experience rising confidence, order may stabilize and expand.
Some of these guidelines may appear commonsensical. However, we have not yet seen them interdisciplinarily conceptually grounded in well-established social theories, which is a good enough reason for their elaborated articulation. We are also of the opinion that these guidelines have often not been given enough consideration either by international relations scholars, or policy makers and other practitioners.
Order-restoring interventions have often been discussed in terms of intervention versus isolation dilemma (e.g., Buzan 1995; Tucker 1985), which is too simplistic. On one hand, by reducing the complexity of a decision to a binary choice between the application of force and disregard, an analyst or a decision maker robs herself of numerous in-between possibilities for consideration—possibilities that may lead to various courses of action, including combinations of military and nonmilitary means of intervention, various forms of communicative and diplomatic action, and so on. On the other hand, even a casual glance at the aforementioned guidelines reminds one of the existence of a whole spectrum of possibilities in between the two extremes of military action and total passivity, which may prompt a more careful consideration and eventually lead toward an application of some of these alternative approaches that would be more pointed than mere isolation with occasional humanitarian relief, and yet less invasive than a full-fledged military intervention.
An insightful discussion that recognizes the complexities related to the restoration of order in weak and failing states is provided by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2004). They argue that in international interventions in countries with dysfunctional state apparatuses, “mission creep” 21 —or escalation of mission goals and requirements—is inevitable, precisely because the lacking state infrastructure needs to be rebuilt almost from scratch, which is a formidable task. Such projects tend to last for years and give rise to a form of internationally supported governance that Fearon and Laitin refer to as “neotrusteeship.” Among the most promising solutions that would facilitate state-building, these authors see loans to the host state, which could serve as the sources of funding for order-restoration efforts, as well as “an incentive to move the country from international welfare toward self-governance” (Fearon and Laitin 2004:42). Fearon and Laitin (2004:38) admit that it would be “callous” to demand repayment of such loans from the very start of order-restoration efforts, and they are aware of several problems of such arrangements, but they also argue that better recruitment for and coordination of order-restoration efforts, increased accountability on the part of agents involved in such efforts, and clearer exit strategies would contribute to successful “neotrusteeship.”
While we can agree with most of Fearon and Laitin’s observations and conclusions, we are less inclined to believe that, even if recruitment, coordination, accountability, and exit problems were solved, then all this would be sufficient for success of order-restoration efforts. What we see as crucial, yet absent from Fearon and Laitin’s account, is a restitution of emotional beliefs among the members of the local population about their place within the wider society. Whereas the guidelines that we stated above do not provide straightforward recipes for such renewal of the psychological social contract, we see them as a first step in the right direction.
Admittedly, in terms of hindrances to the application of the guidelines, one should acknowledge that communication and engagement with others are usually more demanding in terms of emotional and other psychological resources than merely showing a military muscle or a lack of interest, particularly when those “others”—for instance, representatives of a failing state, or change agents—are not easily identifiable. And even when it is more or less clear who they are, trying some of the more sensitive and nuanced approaches need not provide a guarantee of success.
Moreover, there is still some way to go until a more comprehensive, detailed, and reliable account of emotions, their impact on intra- and international order, as well as their role in order-restoration policies could be developed. The above considerations have, in particular, mostly been focused on the links between the individual and the societal level and the implications of such links for “unemotional” policy interventions at the international level. What has been, for the most part, left out is that national and international leaders and governing bodies involved in order-restoration interventions in failing states are also affected by emotions. It can be argued, for example, that the very idea of intervention in failing states comes from external actors’ fear for their own security that would become endangered if disorder from the failing state spills over into the wider region.
Further analysis would need to take such considerations also into account and attempt to decipher how individual and collective emotions of various actors influence foreign policy decisions and international relations in general. Some clues can be found in the works on emotional beliefs (Mercer 2010) and intergroup emotions theory (Sasley 2011), as well as in the studies of specific emotions, such as humiliation (Saurette 2006), in political settings. These considerations can be further augmented by sociological insights.
In the other direction, the sociology of emotions could benefit from widening its scope to include studies of human emotions in various political settings, for example, symbolic and emotional importance of reconciliation rituals between representatives of belligerent groups or nations, possible effects of power and status hierarchies in state administration on the emotions of state officials, and so on. For now, we can only speculate about a possible impact of various electoral rules, parliamentary procedures, and other political arrangements at both the national and the international level, on the emotions of the persons and groups involved. If emotion, indeed, is part of any social relationship, as sociologists often claim, then one should find emotion in political relations as well.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.