The Problem of Pétain: The State Politics of Difficult Reputations

Abstract

How do governments commemorate salient national figures with contested reputations? The case of Marshal Philippe Pétain, whose fame followed World War I (WWI), but was later stigmatized for having led the Nazi-affiliated Vichy regime during World War II (WWII), suggests that political leaders consider the interests of competing groups. In the case of Pétain, these include veterans’ organizations, Jewish heritage groups, leftists, and, eventually, the rightist National Front. State leaders attempt to reconcile these pressures in the hope of avoiding politically damaging conflicts. Successful commemorations reinforce the legitimacy of the State as the guardian of symbolic compatibility between visions of history and morality. Recognizing memorialization as political process, we describe how Presidents of France attempt to distinguish an honorable Pétain from a dishonorable one. We describe four strategies by which states address difficult reputations: erasing, selecting, reconciling, and differentiating. Competing groups may create ambiguous meanings, attacking the State, while keeping distant from those with difficult reputations.

Keywords

culture collective memory France reputation memory scandal

Forgetting is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.

—Ernest Renan

The symbolic representation of States depends on the remembrance and commemoration of salient historical figures, linked to the public’s idea of national identity and the choices of political leaders. In the best case, these figures are supported by consensual reputations. Yet, governments in promoting public virtue and basking in shared memory may desire to commemorate prominent figures who have difficult reputations (Fine 2001). These might involve those with inconsistent reputations or conflicting reputations. Some figures have complex histories to the extent that their assessment is complicated, on both the “right” and the “wrong” side of history at various points. Others have dissimilar reputations among different publics, glorified by the left and demonized by the right—or conversely. Both have reputations that are difficult either because their acts are open to multiple interpretations, as portions of their careers receive different evaluations, or because distinct communities value them differently. Furthermore, values change and, as a result, reputations vary over time and actions viewed as harmful may come to overwhelm well-established esteem. As memory politics prefers coherent reputations, commemoration often demands historical amnesia—the politics of ignorance (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008), omission (Aguilar 2002), or silence (Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 2010). Actions that are inconsistent with an overall, solidified reputation are erased or ignored. However, this strategy is challenging once virtue has been established when these disreputable behaviors must be incorporated into a usable reputation. As a society refines its moral lens, reputations are altered and political leaders must decide how to incorporate new evaluations, especially in light of public commemorations that enact the memorial status attributed to various figures.

In this article, we address the linkage of reputations and State-promoted collective memory in the context of groups operating within a nation’s political field. As central research questions, we ask:

1: What are the strategies through which a State commemorates those who have, over time, acquired a problematic, dual reputation?

2: How do governments and their leaders balance alternative claims and political constraints from rival interest groups in the context of the nation’s political culture and electoral processes?

3: How do interest groups and counter-publics attempt to force the hand of governments?

While the examination of collective memory has contributed much to the understanding of how publics evaluate historical figures, the strategies of governmental leaders have been insufficiently addressed, given the focus on segmental pressure groups and reputational entrepreneurs. We address the first two questions through the responses of Presidents of France as the symbolic representatives of the French nation to commemorations of Marshal Philippe Pétain, and the third through an examination of counter-mobilization from the National Front.

Politicians desire to build broad popular support through their actions and proclamations. These decisions are strategic attempts to solidify support among allies, neutralize opponents, and inspire publics. This is why governments invest in embracing heroes and in stigmatizing villains: the honoring of once esteemed leaders suggests the stability of State legitimacy throughout time and preservation of core values. In turn, the censure or erasure of evildoers, albeit less frequent, also legitimates core values by establishing a boundary. We contribute to research on how States, in constant interaction with civil societies, present their contested history (Aguilar 2002; Olick 2007) and manage difficult reputations (Fine 2001).

We focus on the politics of memory during the French Fourth and Fifth Republics (1946–1958; 1958–present) by analyzing how Philippe Pétain has been commemorated, disparaged, and now largely marginalized as an object of memory (Williams 2005). Phillippe Pétain (1856–1951), known familiarly as the “Old Marshal,” was arguably the greatest French general of the First World War. For decades, he was revered as a national hero (Fisher 2002; Servent [1992] 2014). This reputation was not to last. Pétain’s position was permanently tarnished when he agreed in 1940 to lead the Nazi-front Vichy government in the south of France, working with German officials in rounding up Jews and in sending French citizens to concentration camps. He is now seen by the majority of the French population as a collaborator and traitor, despite the pressure from those who wish to recall his early heroics. This makes the memory of Pétain a compelling case study of State management of difficult reputations. Retracing how French presidents dealt with this sensitive issue leads us to distinguish four general strategies of commemoration: erasing, selecting, reconciling, and differentiating.

We describe those strategies that allow a State, in relation to various interest groups, to recall its glorious and/or shameful past. In this, as scholars have argued, the past constrains the present (Schudson 1989; Schwartz 2000), but, given the obduracy of events, present frameworks construct and define the past (Halbwachs 1992). While the accounts literature has focused on individual accounts for untoward action (Orbuch 1997; Scott and Lyman 1968), and memory studies have shown that the construction of collective memory is iterative (Olick 1999; Simko 2012; Whitlinger 2020) and fragmented (Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002), we describe how governments seek coherence in national commemorations (Saunders 2018). We ask how the French government, in their remembrance of the First World War, refers to the Marshal in ways that dampened controversy. The institutional challenge is to coordinate his heroic reputation, cemented into minds of the French of his generation, with his later odious actions. This process is complicated by multiple reputational entrepreneurs who stand outside the State apparatus with the interest and resources to shape a public image, given their position in civil society. These groups include Pétain’s World War I (WWI) loyal troops, his political supporters, critical Jewish heritage groups, Resistance fighters’ organizations, the National Front, and other rightist groups.

To be sure, every case has unique features. The case of Pétain reveals a public figure whose difficult reputation emerged during his life and has continually challenged any positive State notice. In contrast to controversial figures from the American Civil War, Pétain lacks a regional basis of support, which can generate a positive evaluation. Vichy is no “Lost Cause.” In contrast to figures such as Hitler or Stalin, there is no State demand that all positive public remembrance be erased. Furthermore, Pétain had a virtuous career for much of his life. The fact that Pétain, the person, stands for moral virtues and sins, used by those with larger political concerns, provides an instance of the personalization of politics (Fine 2006; Rahat and Sheafer 2007), and the commemoration of such salient political figures can be understood as both resulting from the dynamics of political cultures and shaping those cultures (Welch 1993). In sum, the way in which French collective memory of the Vichy regime became intertwined with memory of Pétain provides a compelling case of the strategies of governmental leaders in light of interest group pressure. While we concentrate on the evolution of these strategies over time, we conclude by suggesting the social conditions that shape how these strategies are chosen and enacted.

Finding Pétain

To analyze how the French government dealt with the dual face of Pétain in official commemorations, we examined some 1,500 relevant documents from a diverse array of locations, hoping to gain a wide view of how Pétain was commemorated and how moments of remembrance were canceled.¹ We collected documentary material from the following sources:

The Historical Service of the Ministry of Defense, previously in charge of organizing WWI commemorations (Service Historique de la Défense [SHD]);

The French National Archives, holding documents of the French Presidency (Archives Nationales [AN]);

The National Institute of Audiovisual, the archive of French television programs (Institut National de l’Audiovisuel [INA]);

The Media Library of the French Army, where videos produced by the army are stored;

The database Europress, which accesses French newspaper articles;

Three French museums dedicated to WWI (the Museum of the Great War, including an interview with its creator/director; the “Historial de la Grande Guerre”; and the Memorial of Verdun);

Parliamentary debates mentioning “Pétain,” referenced in the official journal: This includes 440 documents since 1945 (Journal Officiel [JO]);

Online research on public positions taken by the National Front and other organizations involved in Pétain’s commemorations, especially “Jeune Nation” (Young Nation);

An interview with Serge Klarsfeld, activist and founder of the association, “Sons and Daughters of Jewish Deportees from France.” Klarsfeld has had a significant role in advising French presidents about World War II (WWII) commemorations since the 1990s.

These sources must be read cautiously as they inform us not only about commemorations but also about how certain groups (journalists and State agencies) frame related debates, including notable omissions. Our focus on national sources does not address local or sub-national sources, such as municipal archives.

We utilize the chronology of memory politics, as we retrace the evolution of national memory of Pétain, distinguishing the strategies of erasing, selecting, reconciling, and differentiating. These processes were developed inductively through a close examination and coding of our data. After presenting Pétain’s biography, we outline this typology and show how each strategy was utilized by French government in the decades following WWII. We address the growing difficulties of differentiating strategies, especially during the Mitterrand presidency. We then depict the various strategies advanced by the French far right, both to embrace and distance from Pétain.

Knowing Pétain

Born in 1856 in the North of France, Philippe Pétain entered Saint-Cyr, the prestigious French military academy, in 1876. He received slow promotions from the rank of second lieutenant to colonel, while teaching military strategy (Atkin [1997] 2014; Bruce 2008; Williams 2005). Pétain became a public figure during the First World War. He was then a 58-year-old colonel who had distinguished himself through outstanding performance in several major battles. In 1917, he was promoted to Commander-in-Chief, and in his new position reorganized the French army, diminishing mutinies, formerly a major problem. He was honored as a Marshal of France in 1918, nicknamed “the Lion of Verdun,” after his greatest victory. President Blum described him as “the most noble and humane of all our military chiefs” (Vergez-Chaignon 2014:193).

Because of his shining reputation, Pétain was considered a model for a generation of French officers, including Charles de Gaulle, who served under his direct command. In 1921, de Gaulle named his only son Philippe, as a tribute to his commanding officer. During the interwar period, Pétain held several honorary positions and was elected to the Académie Française while remaining involved in military affairs. He was appointed Minister of War in 1934 and named ambassador to Spain in 1939 (Catala 1997). The documentary made by the French army for the 1939 commemoration of the WWI armistice (Service Cinématographique des Armées 1939) closes with a famous quote from Pétain, “Courage, on les aura!”: “Courage, we’ll get them!” This reveals the esteem in which Pétain was held when WWII broke out.

Many critics have tried without success to discover in Pétain’s early career sympathy for fascism. Without doubt, he was a conservative and was strongly opposed to the (Communist) Popular Front (Ambron 1951). However, nothing suggested that Pétain would use his popularity with the French and his connections with Spain to ask the German government for an armistice or to collaborate with the Nazis. While raising the hope of not being crushed by Nazi Germany, Pétain participated in the establishment of a fascist government headquartered in the small central French city of Vichy, known as the Vichy government. In fact, Pétain’s appointment to lead the government was approved by the French parliament in 1940, albeit with German pressure. In this capacity, Pétain permitted the deportation of thousands of Jews as well as supporting other Nazi aims. He referred to his version of government as “the social revolution,” using a traditionalist rhetoric (Jennings 2002). de Gaulle’s victory in 1944 placed Pétain on the dustbin of history, especially as leaders of the post–1945 political elite used their participation in the Resistance as a source of political legitimacy and moral authority.

Following his trial in 1945 for treason, Pétain was sentenced to death. During the proceedings, he declared, “Your sentence does not matter to me, I made to France the gift of my person.” Eventually, de Gaulle commuted Pétain’s punishment to a life sentence, officially due to his age, but perhaps a result of their formerly close relations. Pétain was jailed on the Island of Yeu, where his wife could visit him easily. During his prison term, he was offered political asylum by the United States (President Truman), Spain (Generalissimo Francisco Franco), and the United Kingdom (Queen Mary). Each request was denied by French authorities.

After his conviction, Pétain lost his rank of Marshal. Although there had once been a ceremony of “military degradation” (Garfinkel 1956)—in front of troops, a noncommissioned officer would rip the decoration off the condemned, his insignias, and the buttons of his jacket, and would break his parade sword—de Gaulle had eliminated this ceremony. Pétain also lost his seat in the French Academy, where members are elected for life. Remarkably, nobody was elected to fill his place during his life, as if the seat itself was tainted by his reputation. Pétain died in prison in 1951.

Given this history, Philippe Pétain has had a double face for the French people. Pétain was a beloved hero of WWI. His contribution to the Allied victory cannot be denied, and this propelled him into an admired fame until 1940. But this esteem was ruined for most when Pétain fronted the Vichy government. He lost the goodwill that his military victories provided and even that his apparent desire to maintain French autonomy might have afforded. In his zeal to implement German policy, Pétain became hated by many French citizens. In postwar France, citizens had to examine—or ignore—their own wartime actions if they joined the Resistance, collaborated with the German or Vichy government, or avoided endorsing any camp. This provides the background of how France chose to commemorate Verdun and their WWI triumph. To the extent that the leader of the French army in their glorious triumph became the exemplification of evil, commemoration became problematic. To put it kindly, Pétain has a difficult reputation. This conflation of French victories in the two world wars was ironic as, under German occupation and in Vichy, WWI-related commemorations were prohibited and became in themselves emblematic of Resistance (Dalisson 2013).

While we have chosen a singular case study for this analysis, Pétain is not the only such figure with a complex, contentious reputation who problematizes government commemoration. In the United States, difficult reputations have notably occurred with Civil War era figures who supported the Confederacy and are now seen as treasonous, such as General Robert E. Lee. While for much of the past 150 years, Lee was a relatively unproblematic figure, honored on postage stamps, schoolbooks, statuary and solidified in popular memory, particularly in the South, today these positive memories have become controversial, even offensive. The memory and commemoration of figures linked to colonialism, imperialism, racism, or racial oppression, such as Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, or Cecil Rhodes, are further examples. At times, nations struggle with their pasts, a necessary process, if uncomfortably reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984. When heroic figures are officially stigmatized, commemoration may become the source of polemics and demonstrations among groups desiring to shape civil society.

Strategies of State Commemoration

State commemoration of those with difficult and controversial reputations can take several forms. As noted, we focus on four: Erasing, Selecting, Reconciling, and Differentiating. In the case of Pétain, each strategy comes with significant challenges for government commemoration. As strategies, they are tied to a set of pragmatic political practices in addressing public concerns. Each potentially contributes to a renewal of the scandals.

The first strategy, erasing, is to transform Pétain into a nonperson (Ducharme and Fine 1995), a minor figure who deserves to be neglected, or, as in the present case, actively not-remembered, evoking what Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger (2010) call “covert silences.” Erasing does not entail the literal forgetting of a personality by the public, but a set of actions and avoidances involving the elimination of this person from public ceremonies and commemorative monuments. While appealing in the case of a evildoer, such a strategy cannot be entirely maintained: first, because this omission is too obvious (celebrating the battle of Verdun without mentioning Pétain is nearly impossible); second, because admiring groups, such as veteran’s associations with sufficient resources, can mobilize to contest this omission; and third, because Pétain’s memory is linked to his personal relations with important members of the postwar governments, notably Charles de Gaulle.

In contrast, one might argue that his (WWI) heroic action represents the “true” Pétain with the later action explained away through infirmity or error; conversely, the later stigmatized action might define his character, marginalizing or ignoring his actions previously defined as heroic. This represents the selecting of a primary framework for memory (Halbwachs 1992), defining Pétain either through early exploits or later betrayal. The latter has been the dominant form of memory. His connection with Nazi atrocities is too salient to be forgotten. From this perspective, one set of actions reflects the true and unitary person—the pro-German Pétain—and this reputation must be what the State considers primary. This option requires one aspect of Pétain’s reputation to be ignored throughout civil society, which, to date, has never been the case.

A third option, reconciling, claims that the two sets of actions are consistent, finding disrepute in the original “heroism” or justification in what might otherwise be notorious behavior. As a result, the reputation should become consistent, even while including both moments. The goal is to provide a single reputation, but, unlike selection, that incorporates both Pétain’s WWI and WWII actions in a model in which a singular character can be discerned. This strategy attempts, often unsuccessfully, to align the two periods of Pétain’s public notice to make them coherent (Stokes and Hewitt 1976). A few authors deflated Pétain’s role in WWI, showing that the “construction” of his popularity was based on political reasons (Servent [1992] 2014) and that he was always avid for power. Conversely, for several decades, some writers claimed that Pétain was secretly aiding France and the Resistance while working with the Germans. In other words, despite the memory of Vichy, he was always a hero. Could someone once so noble become villainous; many French citizens believed this was impossible. For the same reasons as selecting, reconciling is a challenging strategy for French political leaders: It amounts to taking sides with segmental actors of civil society, notably far-right movements or Jewish associations.

The fourth option, differentiating, has often been selected as a solution, seemingly appealing to all parties. This suggests that both reputations are true. Pétain can be sequentially famous and infamous. People change and both earlier and later deserve to be recalled, even if they cannot be made consistent. In essence, this gives Pétain a dual reputation, each used on relevant symbolic occasions. From Mitterrand to Macron, this posture could have been seen as the most reasonable to adopt. However, because of the desire for consistency, such a stance is difficult to maintain, especially in a contentious political culture in which pressure groups demand a single, overriding moral evaluation.

These four strategies constitute ways in which French politicians and political groups attempt to present and recall the difficult reputation(s) of Pétain. They are characterized by their fundamental instability. The problem of Pétain is that whenever attempts are made to commemorate Pétain’s memory, conflict erupts. Pétain has a sticky reputation (Fine 2012). While laying a floral wreath at his gravesite, mentioning him in a speech, or considering moving his corpse to the ossuary at Verdun might appear to be minor matters of State, they cause anger and dismay.

Erasing Pétain and the Construction of Nonpersonhood

In occupied France of 1940–1944, public gatherings honoring France’s victory in the First World War were prohibited by the German and Vichy authorities. The Nazis wished no part of symbolic ceremonies that recalled the defeat of Germany and, by implication, looked ahead as well. Commemorating the armistice become a gesture of civil disobedience (Dalisson 2013) as it confronted the oppressors (Johnston 2006).

After 1945, official ceremonies resumed to recall the end of WWI. These ceremonies honored not only the allied victory but a few selected heroes, in particular Clémenceau, who was the Minister of War, and Marshals Foch and Fayolle. The memorial to the Unknown Soldier, representing all the soldiers of WWI, is a central point of pride at the Arc de Triomphe. In addition, State-run commemorative events honored groups of heroes such as the “Tribute to the Marshals,” namely, all who served as Marshal in French history. In this category, Pétain belongs, or belonged, as his title was stripped. Particularly in the immediate postwar years, official mention of Pétain was taboo. Historian Henry Rousso (1994) describes 1944–1954 as the “mourning period,” but mourning starts to decline after Pétain’s death in 1951, opening the possibility of incorporating Pétain back into French commemoration. Despite attempts to remove Pétain from official memory and treat him as a nonperson, he continued to be mentioned in accounts of French victories in the “Great War.”

Even the symbolic presence of Pétain’s image at sites of commemoration proved controversial. In 1948, Le Monde (Puissesseau 1948) reported that government officials canceled their participation in the ceremonies at Verdun, where the major WWI battle took place and Pétain was one of the victorious generals. Some were asked to abstain by “orders from above.” The journalist suggested that these cancellations resulted from the fact that the “monument of victory” is backed by a huge statue of Pétain. Some believed that merely attending a ceremony near such a statue might associate the attendees with Pétain’s crimes. The mere sculptural presence of the Marshal was too much. As the commemorations of November 11 stabilized after WWII around the figures of Joffre and Clémenceau (and, later, Foch), Pétain remained taboo for official government recognition on most occasions.

Given his sentence for treason, only a very committed part of the population dared to support Pétain openly. After his death in 1951, the Association for the Defense of the Memory of Pétain (ADMP) was organized by General Pierre Héring (JO 1951a, 1951b, 1951c). This group was so controversial that a Member of Parliament (MP) inquired into its legality (Senate 1951). It was judged legal and became Pétain’s primary reputational supporter, serving for decades as the leading group for preserving Pétain’s honored place in French history. In 1955, Mr. Lugo, former general counselor of Yeu Island, owner of the house in which Pétain died, declared his intention to place a commemorative plaque on the wall. “Here died on July 23rd 1951 Philippe Pétain, Marshal of France.” The Ministry of Home Affairs ordered him to remove the plaque (Sud Ouest 1955). The less said of Philippe Pétain, the better.

Selecting Pétain: The Perfideous Marshal

However, Pétain could not be fully ignored, and he alone could be a stand-in for the actions of French supporters of the Germans, of whom there were many. In 1947, French authorities officially replaced the name “Vichy government” with “Pétain’s government.” The former appellation was judged insulting to Vichy’s inhabitants (JO 1947): The personalization of what happened in Vichy enabled the French to disassociate it from the citizens of the city, even if it made forgetting Pétain less possible. He was the villain, not the many other French citizens who were sympathetic, part of a desire to attribute French collaboration not to citizens, or to “France,” but to a singular leader: Philippe Pétain (along with his collaborator, Pierre Laval). Pétain came to personify the French betrayal of their nation, preserving the morality of those who might have been collaborators at a time where everyone was under suspicion: 300,000 trials for collaboration took place in the years following the allies’ victory—almost 1 percent of the population, a number that does not include uncountable personal attacks (Aron 1969). At Yeu Island, even today, Pétain’s grave is regularly defaced, and the municipality has had to restrict the opening hours of the cemetery to limit the cost of repairs.

The hostility to any positive remembrance is revealed by events in 1953, the second anniversary of Pétain’s death where commemorations by his supporters occurred at his burial site. The inscription on Pétain’s grave was defaced soon after the commemorative ceremony. In 1956, Pétain’s supporters hoped to celebrate the 100th anniversary of his birth, but the ceremony at Verdun was prohibited by the Minister of Home Affairs. Only a religious ceremony was allowed. After the mass, Pétain’s supporters planned to visit the grave of the Unknown Soldier, but some former members of the Resistance and deportee groups protested, and the police prevented the gathering (Le Monde 1956).

Anger toward Pétain was so intense that in 1957, the “National Confederation of Voluntary Fighters of the Resistance” asked the tribunal of Paris to dissolve the ADMP, the group that was organized to commemorate Pétain and defend his reputation. In turn, the ADMP asked the Resistance group to pay damages for “malicious prosecution” (Le Monde 1957a). The tribunal refused both claims, explaining that no association is qualified to represent the moral interests of the Resistance, and that the government and not civilians has the authority to prosecute those who promote collaboration (Le Monde 1957b). The ADMP continued to be the target of the anger of the Resistance during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1959 and 1960, its national congresses were disrupted and eventually canceled due to the protests of former Resistance fighters.

Left-wing politicians regularly complained about restoring Pétain’s reputation. In the aftermath of the 1966 commemoration of the battle of Verdun, since Pétain was mentioned in the ceremonies, some accused the French State of attempting to “rehabilitate” him, emphasizing that he was a “servant of the Nazis” (JO 1966a, 1966b). There could be no noble Pétain, only an evil one.

Reconciling Pétain: The Consistent Marshal

Disdain for Pétain was not universal, and several strategies were used to protest this reputational disparagement. One was to contend that Pétain was noble throughout. The claim that Pétain actively implemented Nazi policies is widely accepted by most academic historians, especially since the 1970s. However, this view has been challenged in several ways, allowing some to advance that Pétain’s heroism remained intact, an act of reconstructing memory.

Some supporters denied the extent to which Pétain actively collaborated with German forces, arguing that he agreed to serve to protect the French people. Certainly, whatever the nature of his collaboration, he was never a full believer in Nazi ideology. These supporters’ assertion is that casualties would have been much greater without a French government, even in name only: that without Pétain’s heroic sacrifice, France would have been under direct German governance, suffering the same fate as Poland. Others contend that Pétain was manipulated due to his age, as he became leader when he was 84 years old and served until 88. This can be a mitigating circumstance, suggesting, perhaps, that WWII Pétain was merely a senile puppet, leaving the brave, younger WWI Pétain untouched.

The most striking and vindicating hypothesis—a defense strategy employed by Pétain and his attorneys during his trial in 1945—has been called “the thesis of the sword and the shield” (Rousso 1994). This view claims that Pétain secretly coordinated with de Gaulle. One leader—de Gaulle—would fight “outside” (the sword), while a second leader—Pétain—would collaborate “inside” (the shield). This claim was spread in the years following the war, especially in Robert Aron’s (1954) book Histoire de Vichy. Widely cited by Pétain’s admirers, Aron argued that Pétain was consistently heroic. Likewise, the book Pétain before Vichy (Amouroux 1967) affirms that in both WWI and WWII, Pétain desired “to save men.” However, Robert Paxton’s (1972) subsequent Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944, challenged this thesis and, for many, demolished it. Published in 1972 in English and translated into French the following year, Paxton provided compelling evidence that Pétain had an active role in Vichy France with no proven link to de Gaulle. Still, even if historically dubious, the sword and the shield thesis had the appeal of supporting French honor.

For some of Pétain’s defenders, Paxton’s work does not discredit this thesis, because even without documented communication between Pétain and de Gaulle, de Gaulle could not liberate France without someone inside to moderate German oppression. However, de Gaulle never confirmed this thesis. If Pétain undercut German interests, he did so without the knowledge of his comrade and without much in the way of documentation. Accordingly, a last variation of the hypothesis is that, without any contact nor common intent, de Gaulle could not have been successful without Pétain’s actions, an argument too speculative to justify memorialization. As a result, the process of reconciling Pétain’s reputation has been largely unpersuasive, except for the fraction of the far right that considers his 1940–1944 “social revolution” a political model.

Differentiating Pétain: The Two Marshals

Despite attempts to create a morally consistent Pétain, the collective memory of Pétain’s triumphs, especially as the Lion of Verdun, is not easily erased by his later action. For the generations of French citizens who experienced the First Word War, his glory was influential. But for those who lived through Nazism, so was his betrayal. An attempt to recognize two Pétains has remained a constant theme, provoking ire from those who see a single (evil) Marshal.

As early as 1948, Charles de Gaulle, the military hero of the Second World War, refers to Pétain. He does this cautiously at a time when collaborators were hunted (Aron 1969). Without naming Pétain, de Gaulle differentiates his two faces, characterizing his WWI service as “undying” while using a troubling formulation to present his later life, blurring his agency:

This is when we have seen a regime that claimed to be France abdicating and dissolving all its elements. This is when we have seen a great leader of the Great War, the very one who had given to the country the undying favor of winning the battle of Verdun, swept along, under the effect of age, by the torrent of abandonment. (AN 1948)

The Feuille d’avis de Neuchâtel (1948), a Swiss newspaper, reported that de Gaulle had initially planned to talk more extensively about Pétain but removed portions of the text at the last minute to avoid controversy.

Differentiating may appear as an appeal to political necessity. The challenge of establishing a purely negative reputation for Pétain, particularly during the 1950s as France became more politically conservative, is that leading figures of French politics had voted to give Pétain full power in the Vichy government in July 1940 and many filled important positions in his government. This includes two Presidents of the Council²: Robert Schuman, who would become a founder of the European Union, had to write to de Gaulle, personally, for support, and Antoine Pinay—who also helped the Resistance—benefited from the help of friends in high places. Under these circumstances, arguing that Pétain was consistently evil was problematic.

In 1955, General Héring, president of the ADMP, asked all the noncommunist outgoing MPs about transferring Pétain’s body to the Douaumont ossuary near the battle of Verdun where the remains of French soldiers from WWI are interred. According to his relatives, this was one of Pétain’s dearest wishes. Of these legislators, 70 approved and only 11 objected (Le Monde 1955). However, few had an interest in taking a political risk in supporting the move, and, thus, support was likely greater for those leaving office. The ADMP promised to pursue their cause until Pétain’s body is finally laid to rest in Douaumont (Le Monde 1959, 1960). Given the divisions of France between the established Left and the rising Right in the 1950s, support for remembering Pétain seemed to increase, triggered in part by the influence of veteran associations in civil society, but never sufficiently to change government policy.

The French government’s differentiating strategy reappeared in the last half of the 1960s, when France experienced an upsurge of commemorative events dealing with Pétain, a result of historical circumstance: the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Verdun in 1966 made Pétain’s military success salient. The debate was contentious. Although the President of the Association of the Mayors of France wrote to de Gaulle that Pétain as a traitor should not be mentioned in official ceremonies, most letters addressed to the Presidency supported Pétain (AN 1966). An open letter to “any French of good faith” by G. Briaumont, honorary magistrate and veteran, asks,

Do you think, in good conscience, that the Marshal Pétain can be considered as having deliberately betrayed his homeland? For some millions of French people, is not it as if we ask some de Gaulle supporters if the General-President has also betrayed France, either in quitting wearing its uniform in June 1940, either in abandoning 3 French territories to Algeria in 1960?

He wished de Gaulle to acknowledge that Pétain tried to preserve lives “under the limits of the possible and the impossible.” The president of the National Union of Veterans regretted that of those commemorated in Verdun, “one will be missing” (Audollent 1966).

Perhaps as a result of pressure from conservative supporters, de Gaulle does mention Pétain, albeit once again with caution, at the 1966 Verdun ceremony. He narrates the battle from a military standpoint, evoking logistics and tactics, and then remarks,

These gifts of leadership, Pétain possesses them par excellence. On February 26th, he is put at the head of the 2nd Army . . . [His military strategy] will never cease, as a whole, to be well organized, well provided and well determined . . . If by misfortune, at other times, in the extreme winter of his life, in the midst of excessive events, the wear of age led Marshal Pétain to reprehensible failings, the glory he had acquired at Verdun, by then leading the French army to victory, cannot be contested or misunderstood by the homeland.

At the ceremony for the 50th anniversary of the WWI armistice in 1968, the French government for the first time laid wreaths on the graves of all four WWI Marshals, Pétain included, differentiating his military prowess from his political failings. Nonetheless, Pétain’s role in the French victory in WWI was deliberately underplayed by the government agencies in charge of organizing the 50th anniversary commemorations. A working document identifies the significant events and figures of the war to design corresponding ceremonies (SHD 1968). This document mentions Pétain in describing a few events where he played an important role but removes him from related ceremonies. Thus, the liberation of Metz by “General Pétain, 10th army” becomes “Nov 17th, 1968 at Metz, ceremony of the Liberation of Metz,” noting, instead, a visit of Marshal Foch, who passed by the city one week after its liberation by Pétain. Likewise, the liberation of Strasbourg is commemorated without mention of Pétain, although he was a leading officer along with General Foch and became Marshal in Strasbourg after the French victory.

Furthermore, the archives hint at discomfort about the decision to include Pétain in the Tribute to the Marshals. A confidential letter written by the Minister of Veteran Affairs to de Gaulle’s Chief of Staff mentions that on November 10, flowers will be brought on behalf of the Presidency to the graves of Marshals Joffre, Gallieni, and Pétain (SHD 1968). The related letters emphasize their “highly confidential character,” suggesting embarrassment in some offices of the State administration, perhaps moderated by deference to de Gaulle. The archives include the program of the ceremonies, which does not indicate Pétain’s commemoration: Differentiation has limits.

On November 10 at the Invalides, Pierre Messmer, Ministry of the Army, honored all eight Marshals of France, including Pétain. de Gaulle, perhaps hoping to send a signal to those who wish a reestablishment of State authority after the May riots, mentions Pétain as well, while still emphasizing military strategy:

Pétain, having broken in Verdun the fierce German shock, revived the French Army in healing its injured morale, in organizing it around modern weaponry that finally came out of factories, and in engaging it only after having methodically set up everything for success.

After the ceremony, a “confidential” letter from the Union of Associations of Veterans and another letter from the “followers of Marshal Pétain” thank de Gaulle for this mention but given the political situation, neither group expresses their satisfaction publicly, while allowing their members to do so individually. In parallel, Sud Ouest (1968) reports a “moving ceremony” organized around Pétain’s grave by the ADMP, noting, however, that the ribbon on the wreath laid on the grave was stolen afterward. Despite these challenges, a dual Pétain begins to enter the public scene.

The Strains of Official Memory

Strategies of State commemoration evolved after the 1960s as recalling Pétain’s heroics proved impolitic, given the increased prominence of those groups that wished to select Pétain’s evil as defining. In particular, the attempt to differentiate the military Pétain from the political Pétain foundered during the Presidency of François Mitterrand, the first Socialist French president after the immediate postwar period, tied to Mitterrand’s own conflicted past. Born in 1916, raised when Pétain was the quintessential hero, Mitterrand began WWII as a war prisoner, but subsequently found a minor position in the Vichy government while eventually joining the Resistance as a member of a marginal group (Conan and Rousso 1996). Mitterrand represented the gray zone that included much of the French population. He promoted himself as a Resistance fighter as he navigated postwar politics, especially in the Socialist Party, while maintaining links with former members of the Vichy government, the political community with which he had once socialized. As a Socialist, President Mitterrand gave unexpected support to the memory of Pétain; in 1984, he sent red roses to Pétain’s grave during the historic ceremony when he and Helmut Kohl, then German Chancellor, held hands in the cemetery of Verdun (L’Express 1984) and each year from 1986 on Mitterrand ordered a wreath to be laid on Pétain’s grave (Le Monde 1992). Although commemorating Pétain was risky and contrary to the desires of his supporters, this was Mitterrand’s choice.

These actions were discreet and received little public attention until 1992, when a scandal burst with full force. The controversy emerged with the commemoration of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, a July 1942 mass arrest of Jews in Paris, aided by the French/Vichy police, a symbol of French active complicity with Nazi Germany. Mitterrand attended the ceremony, which triggered discussions in the press about his position regarding Vichy and his willingness to place a wreath on Pétain’s grave. For this reason, the president was whistled at during the event (Sud Ouest 1992). Mitterrand insisted that both occupied France and Pétain’s government were distinct from the French State, and, as a result, Mitterrand felt no responsibility for the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup. This declaration was interpreted as a minimization of responsibility (Le Monde 1992). Serge Klarsfeld, the lawyer and activist, announced that Mitterrand informed him that he would stop placing flowers on Pétain’s grave; in fact, it was a media maneuver to pressure the President, who had intended to keep decorating the grave, perhaps a function of his previous affection for the Marshal. Jewish associations, who demanded no memorials to Pétain, organized an “ironic tribute” to Mitterrand at the Vel’ d’Hiv ceremonies, laying a wreath on which is written: “To François Mitterrand, with all gratitude. Philippe Pétain” (INA 1992). Mitterrand asserted in vain that laying the wreath was the same as for all the Marshals of France, but this widely reported claim of balance was not well received, even by his own party.

Whatever his private opinions, Mitterrand attempted to respond to the criticism in 1993. He instituted by decree an official day to recognize racist and anti-Semitic persecution (Ferenczi 1993). This was set for July 16, the day of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, at which Mitterrand formally acknowledged the responsibility of Pétain’s government. This was three days before the WWI ceremony in which the President finally announced that France will not commemorate Pétain, placing the government on the side of those who wish to erase Pétain’s memory. When interviewed, a frustrated Mitterrand declared,

I have been reproached for the wreaths on the tomb of Marshal Pétain. General de Gaulle, Mr. Pompidou and Mr. Giscard d’Estaing had done the same on the occasion of these national anniversaries. I do not want to arouse division among the French, especially not with my friends, that is, with the Resistance and the Socialists. So, I stopped following this tradition.

Mitterrand’s challenge in memorial politics was that it was easy for both opponents and disappointed supporters to link his own past to that of Pétain. This reputational chaining, made plausible through his biography, emphasizes that the biography of a reputational entrepreneur is a potential source of reputation that then has the potential to connect back to the original figure. Any tie to Vichy, for Mitterrand and for others, could become a lens through which his commemorative choices are seen as the motivation for decisions. Biography is a resource through which reputations are yoked.

While his decision satisfied Jewish and Resistance groups, it provided an opening for the expanding National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, emphasizing Mitterrand’s own ties to Vichy. Pro-Pétain associations, such as “Pétain-Verdun,” condemned the decision, and its vice president regretted that Mitterrand “gave in to media pressure” (INA 1993). The group laid a wreath on Pétain’s grave “to highlight this injustice done to the memory of the victor of Verdun” (Sud Ouest 1993: 4). In time, Pétain’s grave became a potent symbol and site for rightist groups.

Throughout the Mitterrand presidency, the political interests in commemorating Pétain became less connected to the aging veterans who retained fond memories of Pétain’s triumphs and more to rightist social movements who could use his memory to argue against national apologies for WWII actions. As the soldiers from the First World War died, fewer members of the general public cared about Pétain and the annual attendance at his gravesite decreased (Puyalte 1999). The only ones who cared were those with a political agenda. Increasingly, memories of Pétain were more about the effects of contemporary politics on collective memory, balancing relations with Jewish and leftist groups with the growing far-right movement. By this point, Pétain was a figure from the increasingly distant past, but his symbolic connection to contemporary politics meant that the government must tread carefully. With time, differentiating, promoting the two Pétains, became an increasingly untenable option, given rivalrous organizations. Furthermore, neither was willing to have the two components of Pétain’s career reconciled in a single reputation. To the extent possible, erasure seemed the preferred option, although when pressured, political leaders had to select (prioritize) Pétain’s treason as defining.

The National Front: From Reconciling to Differentiating

When one examines the State strategies of commemorating Pétain, consideration of the politics of the National Front is essential, as the rising role of the Front provided a context in which the politics of Pétain’s memory was played out. The Front had its own desires to remember Pétain, alternatively claiming that he deserved to be recalled as a French patriot, maintaining an ambiguous position, or casting their opponents as supporters of a traitor, sarcastically redirecting this label of fascism often used to stigmatize it. At various points, the Front defined the Marshal as evil or as heroic, preserving a blurred boundary between the two. By the 1960s, the associations defending the memory of Pétain had allied with pro-French Algeria/anti-immigration associations (Le Monde 1964). Within two years after the independence of Algeria, Pétain represented a vision of France in which capitulation to their colonies was inconceivable. The conservative associational nexus led by supporters of Pétain opposed both the left and the Gaullist right. While the French State would not endorse the demands of the far-right movements, political leaders had to anticipate their reaction in designing commemorations.

The National Front’s posture was surprisingly complex. Established in 1972, for its first decade it remained a marginal movement with little impact on the politics of France before becoming a powerful political force in the 1980s (Shields 2007). The growing National Front appealed to pro-Pétain activists for whom both Pétains are noble (reconciliation) and who organized ceremonies at Verdun and on the Island of Yeu (Sud Ouest 1981), where they decorated Pétain’s gravesite. The Front condemned the 1993 decree by President Mitterrand to establish July 16, the day of Vel’ d’Hiv, as an official ceremonial event (Ferenczi 1993). A Front leader suggested that the Vel’ d’Hiv ceremony makes French people feel guilty over their past, and that condemning Pétain and his government omits that this government included, “besides some dubious personalities, indisputable patriots” (Biffaud 1993: 6). The National Front organized a celebration for the 100th anniversary of Pétain’s famous slogan, “Courage, on les aura!” (“Courage, we’ll get them!”). German forces were compared with current migrant “invaders” (Boschiero 2016).

This reconciliation of Pétain’s reputations continued until the Front (currently rebranded as the “National Rally”) attempted to jettison its past extremism to acquire a more mainstream façade under Marine Le Pen (Stockemer 2017). Indeed, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 2015 expulsion from the National Front was presented as a consequence of his statements about the Second World War in general and about honoring Philippe Pétain in particular. When Marine Le Pen installed a new leader of the party, Jean-François Jalkh, an early Front activist, who had attended a celebration of the death of Pétain in 1991 (Chaulet 2017; Midi Libre 2017), he was pressured to resign a few days later (Ouest-France 2017).

The party walks a thin line, appealing to Pétain sympathizers while also distancing from Pétain, moving from reconciling to differentiating. This is evident in their use of Pétain’s memory to defuse criticism from the Socialist Party. In 2013, the Front’s vice president responds to the Socialist Party spokesman who refers to the National Front’s “Pétainist bloodline,” by emphasizing that Mitterrand had a deep friendship with some former collaborators. In 2015, two announcements on the National Front Web site associate Pétain with the Socialists. One asserts the “guilty unconscious” of the Socialists regarding the connection of their former leader with Pétain. In 2016, on the National Front’s official Web site, Gilbert Collard, a leading figure of the Front and MP, objected to the installation of a commemorative plaque to the memory of Robert Schuman, previously presented in “respect of the republican tradition,” because of his connection with the Vichy government. The sticky stigma of Pétain is turned against the government with apparent sarcasm.

Over the past decade, the politics of Pétain has been used in a contradictory fashion on the French Far Right. The Front wants it both ways, moderating the image of the party in elections with voters and with the media who treat Pétain as evil, while staying connected with the most active and committed nucleus of the party, who continue to admire Pétain’s two careers. They recognize the evil Marshal when targeting the Socialists, but for their own members, who desire reconciling the Marshal’s reputations, they hope that his actions could be seen as of one piece, both preserving France from German incursions.

Any direct approval of Pétain’s role as an agent of the Nazis—reconciling—would indicate for the media and Front opponents (such as other rightist groups that distance themselves from Pétainism, such as The Patriots or Debout la France) that the party had not exorcized their demons. However, too much distance would lose part of their electoral core and permit other far-right movements (such as Young Nation, now organizing commemorations of Pétain after the decline of the ADMP) to attract their supporters. In sum, Pétain politics becomes a way for rightist groups to position themselves in light of the memorial decisions of the State, promoting a strategy of differentiating that the State cannot afford to endorse, while clouding the issue to gain political respectability.

Aperçu: An Enduring Scandal

Some reputations remain available, always present for controversy. Although it might seem that Vichy France is a “dead event” (Bearman, Faris, and Moody 1999:505), for many French citizens it remains very much alive. Time passes, but the ghost of Pétain is never far from resurfacing. Politicians may hope for memories to be settled, but they often are restless (Wagner-Pacifici 2010). The endless dispute around Pétain’s legacy, largely quiescent, was unintentionally reignited by President Emanuel Macron, in a failed attempt to differentiate the two Pétains.

For the 2018 celebration of the centenary of the WWI armistice, Macron attempted a gesture of goodwill to the Army Chief of Staff, annoyed at his intention of organizing a purely civil ceremony (Mareschal 2018). The “Tribute to the Marshals” had been dropped from the initial plans, a decision that ignored that this ceremony was to commemorate all French soldiers, often neglected in civil ceremonies. Macron’s staff included the tribute in the program, which raised the question of whether Pétain would be commemorated along with the other Marshals. Macron answered affirmatively (Ouest-France 2018)

I do not hide any page of history; he was a great soldier, it’s a reality. Political lives, as human nature, are sometimes more complex than we would like to believe . . . We owe him the victory.

Numerous newspapers and TV channels considered Macron’s position scandalous, outraging many Jewish associations. In contrast to Mitterrand who had ties with Pétainism and who served in the Vichy government, Macron, born in 1977, was of a different generation for whom Pétain had less salience. Macron seemed startled by the controversy and, wishing to avoid the political heat, canceled the tribute to the Marshals (Bouchon 2018). Pétain’s memory became for those on the left a means of attacking Macron’s administration. Once again, the scandal was appropriated by far-right leaders, notably by the National Front Web site that declared that not commemorating Pétain reveals the “historical masochism” that undermines France.

Pétain, Memory, and the Challenge of Governing

We analyze the politics of French commemoration 80 years after Pétain’s accession as head of the Vichy government and over a century after the battle of Verdun. Every veteran of WWI is dead. Few soldiers in WWII or adult citizens of Vichy remain. Pétain’s court verdict will not be overturned. His body will surely never be transferred to the ossuary at Douaumont. While, as noted, where the bones of a long-dead man are located might seem to be a matter of minor concern, the location of Pétain’s remains has intense symbolic meaning, just as cemeteries where Nazi soldiers are interred have proved to be. The commemorative politics of burial is no trivial matter. Perhaps Pétain’s program inspired the National Front, but even this party now denies his influence to participate in mainstream French politics. Over time, Pétain’s relevance for France’s identity has faded, theoretically allowing for the possibility of forgetting, although not yet in practice. Still, how to remember Pétain troubles governments and stains political leaders. It became a trigger for polemics and memory-related arguments.

The commemorative politics surrounding Marshal Pétain is merely our case. The argument about how States negotiate memory of those with difficult reputations goes deeper. Where will the bones of Donald Trump rest? What notice will the then-President take of his passage? More to the point, can an admired figure become a villain without a moral flaw: a hidden sympathy with evil? If so, must governments continue to confront those sins? How is wicked governance to be remembered? To be sure, the French do not have Hitler, but they do have Pétain. Overall, for most French citizens, the memory of Pétain’s betrayal of France has been solidified; the question is whether his salvation of France will also be recalled.

One means of dealing with a difficult reputation is to erase the person from memory. While understandable, this is challenging when the actions to be forgotten are too monumental. So, often preserving memory is the only option. We argue that several strategies of recall are possible for those with potentially dual reputations. For such figures, some wish to select their evil reputation, making clear that one set of actions are primary and the basis of remembrance. Typically, this illuminates a moral boundary revealing complicity in evil. Any positive actions are not to be considered. However, as appealing as choosing a single self might be, others wish to reconcile dual reputations: passionate heroism and foul malevolence—both emerging from the same self, although in different contexts. Both the virtuous and malign acts stem from a single self-in-action. Still others attempt to differentiate the two selves. Differentiating has served as an appealing strategy at times of established commemorations allowing governments to suggest that those to be recalled fundamentally changed, from passionate patriotism to foul malevolence. This attempts to provide each divergent public fraction what they desire, but has the weakness of providing each with a view that they disdain.

Our perspective suggests that, beyond the intricacies of Pétain’s role in French history, two broad sets of conditions intervene. First, memorial struggles occur in social configurations where several competing interest groups pressure the State to orient its commemorative work in their preferred direction. The case of Pétain is characterized by the involvement of numerous, active reputational entrepreneurs from veterans’ groups and far-right activists as supporters to former Resistance fighters, leftists, and Jewish associations as opponents, competing for State attention. None of the four possible strategies—erasing, selecting, reconciling, and differentiating—can satisfy all of these groups, given their conflicting preferences. National consensus is elusive in a democracy. The struggles of divergent groups reveal the potential for creating conflict in the face of the attempts of political authorities to provide for shared and unified memory. This difficulty prevents governments from organizing anodyne and consensual commemorations, or, in contrast, erasing undesired figures into the oblivion of nonpersonhood. This reality, grounded on the contention in democratic polities, underlies the fundamental instability of those with difficult reputations.

Furthermore, the memory of political figures is situated in a generational history (Corning and Schuman 2015; Mannheim 1952; Schuman and Scott 1989). Generations have particular memories linked to their cultural imprinting; they attribute different meanings to public figures and the events with which they are associated. As a result, we find commemorative battles waxing and waning to the extent that issues associated with the target become salient over time.³ With Pétain a major figure in both WWI and WWII, the longevity of his role in French culture is clear. Different generations saw his role in different ways. We see this in the case of Charles de Gaulle, François Mitterrand, and now Emanuel Macron. Today Pétain’s memory is no longer personal but found in history books and media presentations. As personal memory fades, the betrayal of Vichy took precedence over the earlier triumph at Verdun. Other controversial figures have a long life arc of actions, revealing moral alteration—or perhaps not. We see this in the case of figures such as Andrew Jackson or Richard Nixon, and always they revert to the embrace of historians.

This project raises a set of questions that our data cannot easily address. While we examine commemoration over time, we are not able to measure systematically the extent to which the choices of strategies alter. Are some strategies more often used in the early years and others subsequently? Perhaps over time, a firm memory is sealed as reputations are sedimented and the attempts at reconciling or differentiating become less plausible. Or, in contrast, perhaps a deliberate ambiguity or obfuscation is common, as suggested by the multiple, contradictory messages from the National Front. Furthermore, have certain strategies become used more frequently recently than in the past, or by conservative or progressive groups? A single case is limited in this regard.

While time shapes collective meanings, some symbolic figures—heroes and villains—remain salient. Generation after generation, governmental leaders must balance competing interests. Battles once salient can become ignored and later return to the fore. Events that appear buried can restlessly arise again. Reputational battles can be iterative. Even if politicians do not see commemoration as their primary concern, it must be managed to maintain credibility, whether by erasure, selection, reconciliation, or differentiation. All States have moments and figures that challenge national greatness, the question is how, given civic politics, these are to be managed. In the case of France, whether political leaders are willing to recognize the increasingly remote and vaguely admired “first Pétain”—and how they do so—is central to Pétain politics and by extension to the memory politics of all those with difficult reputations. Perhaps over time, a firm memory will be selected as reputations are sedimented and the attempts at reconciling or differentiating become less plausible. Or, in contrast, perhaps a deliberate ambiguity or obfuscation is necessary. This is a domain where a wreath of flowers expresses a political position, a transfer of bones constitutes a moral outrage, and a passing reference can suggest a hidden sympathy. This is the problem of Pétain.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Baptiste Brossard is a senior lecturer in Sociology at the Australian National University. His areas of research are mental health, sociological theory, qualitative methods and utopian studies.

Gary Alan Fine is James E. Johnson professor of Sociology at Northwestern University where he studies political reputations and collective memory. He is the author of Difficult Reputations: Collective Memories of the Evil, Inept, and Controversial and of Sticky Reputations: The Politics of Collective Memory in Midcentury America. His current research focuses on the political reputations of Southern politicians as related to racial politics.

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