Abstract
Occupational white-collar offenders are individuals who commit their offenses while in a position of trust and fiduciary responsibility within the respective company. Much has been written about their motivations and actual offenses; however, minimal empirical progress has been made determining whether the presence of an actual learning process exists that may inspire, encourage, or entice an individual to commit such crimes. Moreover, the research narrows further when attempting to determine whether a set of linguistic phrases that allows individuals to justify their crimes prior to commission may also be learned. Thus, the aim of this project was to understand the learning process behind occupational offenses, more specifically, do those we associate with provide neutralizations that may allow us to commit an occupational crime? To answer this question, 40 federally incarcerated occupational white-collar offenders were queried using semistructured one-on-one interviews. The results indicate that there is some empirical support for the notion that neutralizing language may in fact be learned from certain groups that we interact with both on and off the job. These findings suggest that further empirical investigation is warranted.
The importance of corporate culture in shaping an organizational actor’s behavior and the cultural transmission of neutralizations has been acknowledged by those who study occupational-related crime (Coleman, 1994, 2006). In fact, various occupational subcultures not only provide appropriate neutralizations to their workers, but they also may assist in isolating them from contact with those who would render harsh judgment on illegal or unethical occupational activities that may simply be taught as “standard operating” practices within that industry (Coleman,1994, 2006). Coleman acknowledges the important deviant role of the corporate subculture:
The business culture that is shared to one degree or another by most business people not only provides incentives for illicit activities but also contains justifications that can be used to neutralize ethical restraints. The common expression that “business is business” reflects the subculture’s belief that harsh necessity justifies both the unethical and the illegal activities of the business world. Polls indicate that the “everybody else is doing it” rationalization also has strong affinity to the attitudes and opinions of the business subculture. Most business people apparently believe, not only that their peers and competitors are willing to commit unethical acts, but that they are actually doing it. (p. 207).
Decades of research within organizations support the claim that neutralizations or “vocabularies of motive” allow organizational offenders the ability to redefine their illicit behavior as ordinary and socially accepted among their corporate counterparts (Coleman, 1994, 2006; Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Hochstetler & Copes, 2001; Simon, 2012; Simon & Eitzen, 1993). Such excuses and justifications are often learned on the job. Cressey (1957, 1973) argued that individual offenders do not invent their own verbalizations that permit them the moral ease to commit crimes in the workplace (1957, 1973). Instead, these offenders simply apply existing definitions to their behavior; definitions that are learned from interaction with others. He contends that although some people may create their own language based on relative circumstances or rework preexisting language shared by others, most people learn neutralizations that are industry specific and significant to that specific business’s corporate culture. That is, neutralizations, or what Cressey referred to as verbalizations, are learned through interacting with valued others.
Despite Sutherland’s call to arms against the crimes of the privileged in his classic address to the American Sociological Society in 1939, few have sought to examine whether white-collar offenders learn these excuses and justifications of their crimes on the job. With that said, the primary aim of this research was to first determine whether occupational offenders used neutralizing language to internally justify their illegal acts and if they did, where and from whom did they learn such language. Thus, the overall goal of this study was to provide a theoretical expansion regarding the possible role of neutralizations in the learning process of occupational offenders.
Techniques of Neutralization
By merging the earlier efforts of both Sutherland and Cressey, Sykes and Matza (1957) created a theory that sought to explain juvenile delinquency; more specifically the neutralizing language that they used to suppress feelings of internal guilt prior to the commission of their deviant act. Sykes and Matza offered five techniques of neutralization: denial of responsibility, denial of victim, denial of injury, condemnation of the condemners, and the appeal to higher loyalties. With denial of responsibility, the person disclaims personal liability for his actions; in other words, he believes that his behavior is beyond his control. By blaming others (i.e., unloving parents or growing up in a bad neighborhood), the juvenile attempts to separate himself from his actions to pacify any feelings of guilt. The denial of victim neutralization allows the offender to transform the victim into a justifiable target proclaiming that the victim somehow “had it coming” or “they got what they deserved.” As for the denial of injury, the actor suggests that claims that his actions are absent of the element of harm (e.g., it was a just a prank or I just borrowed the money). With condemnation of the condemners, the offender shifts the attention from his deviant behavior to the motives and behaviors of those who disapprove of his violations (e.g., how can they judge me, they do worse things than me). Finally, with an appeal to higher loyalties, the juvenile views his delinquent act as needed for the good of the group (e.g., I did it for my boys or My mom was sick, I had to get money). Aside from the five original techniques of neutralization offered by Sykes and Matza, other more recent techniques have been offered when attempting to account for various types of criminal behavior (see Maruna & Copes, 2005). More specifically, qualitative studies of white-collar offenders have determined that several newer techniques of neutralization including “defense of necessity” implying an emergency caused one to commit a crime (Minor, 1981); “claim of normality” proclaiming that everyone else is carrying out similar behaviors (Coleman, 1994); and the “claim of entitlement” insisting that one is owed or deserves something (Coleman, 1994) have also been used by occupational offenders with some frequency (Coleman, 1994, 2006; Conklin, 2004; Klenowski, 2008; Klenowski, Copes, & Mullins, 2011; Maruna & Copes, 2005).
Since its inception in 1957, Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory has been empirically debated, applied, and tested by scholars from various academic disciplines. Such work has expanded the theory from an explanation of juvenile delinquency to highly diverse forms of both deviant and criminal behavior (see Maruna & Copes, 2005 for review of literature). While offenders of all types use neutralizations, it appears that this is especially true for those who engage in occupational white-collar crime (i.e., crimes committed by individuals who occupy positions of trust and fiduciary responsibility within their company; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005; Shover & Hochstetler, 2006).
The types of occupational offenders investigated using neutralization theory are rather extensive. For example, in a pioneering study of neutralizations used by occupational offenders, Benson (1985) determined that neutralizations used vary by type of fraud they committed. In his study, Benson interviewed embezzlers, tax violators, antitrust offenders, and security and exchange violators. He discovered that the accounts provided by the offenders were structured by the type of their offense, its organizational format and history, and “the requirement that they undermine the conditions of successful degradation ceremonies” (p. 602). For example, antitrust violators proclaimed that they were merely following normal business protocol set by the industry. In fact, they often referred to their actions as minor when compared to regular street offenders. Benson’s classic work provided a foundational understanding regarding the role of neutralizations when committing certain types of occupational offenses, especially how these offenders may “deny” that their actions are criminal in order to pacify any feelings of guilt. Some other more recent empirical examples regarding the use of neutralizations by occupational offenders include Medicaid and Medicare fraud by health care professionals (Evans & Porshe, 2005; Jesilow, Pontell, & Geis, 1993), theft of hospital supplies and medicines by nurses (Dabney, 1995), deviance that occurs in veterinary practices (Gauthier, 2001), telemarketing fraud (Shover, Coffey, & Hobbs, 2003); identity theft (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009; Copes, Vieraitis, & Jochum, 2007); and various other types of occupational crimes (i.e., banking and finance, insurance, marketing, accounting, health care, real estate, and construction; Klenowski et al., 2011). Based on the work of Benson and the other empirical evidence discussed, it appears that neutralizations do play a part in the etiological equation for occupational offenders.
Learning to Neutralize
Unlike his predecessors from the early Chicago School of Criminology, Sutherland did not confine his research to only studying juvenile delinquents in local urban communities. In fact, one of the main goals of his theory of differential association was to account for offenses “committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his (or her) occupation” (1949, p. 9). Simply stated, Sutherland’s theory of differential association hypothesizes that crime is a function of learned moralities and that the extent to which persons learn values that favor an illegal act over those that disapprove it will in fact be the degree to which they will commit a criminal act (Green, 1997; Sutherland, 1949, 1983). Thus, the principal source of this learning process occurs primarily as a direct result of association with significant others, including family, friends, and work colleagues (Sutherland, 1983; Sutherland and Cressey, 1974).
According to Donald Cressey (1953, 1973), the theory of differential association is relevant when unmasking the learning process one may engage in prior the commission of a crime, especially how motives and drives behind such acts may originate from “definitions unfavorable and favorable” to the law. In fact, Cressey hypothesizes that if the “adjustive” rationalizations were nonexistent in one’s environment or if he or she had not been exposed to such socially accepted justifications regarding this type of illegal behavior, the “trust violator” may have proceeded differently when attempting to resolve his “nonshareable” financial predicament (1953, pp. 99, 137). Cressey (1953) points out that the criminal often thinks of himself as playing the part of a special kind of “borrower” or “businessman”. Cressey concluded that these “trusted” offenders do not necessarily have to invent a new verbalization to carry out their illicit behavior. In fact, Cressey clearly highlights the following in his summary and conclusion section of his seminal work when he states:
Each trusted person does not invent a new rationalization 1 for his violation of trust, but instead applies to his own situation a verbalization which has been made available to him by virtue of his having come into contact with a culture in which such verbalizations are present. Cultural ideologies which sanction trust violation are in basic contradiction to ideologies which hold non-violation as the norm, and in trust violation the trusted person applies a general rule to his specific case (1953, p. 137).
Therefore, according to Cressey, the trust violator must have come into contact with a culture that has somehow designed these roles as being socially acceptable. If these roles were defined differently in his community or if he had not been exposed to socially accepted group definitions of this type of illicit behavior, the trust violator may have indeed acted differently when trying to resolve his nonshareable financial problem.
By arguing that individuals learn these “verbalizations” from another person or group of people, Cressey initially attempted to discover whether Sutherland’s theory of Differential Association could be used to explain violations of trust such as fraud or embezzlement (Cressey, 1953; Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). The neutralization aspect of Cressey’s process is consistent with the theory of differential association in that there was a “gradual erosion of the subject’s morality,” culminating in the justification for the embezzlement (Green, 1997, p. 103). Although Cressey’s offenders did not specifically associate with persons who directly influenced their decisions to embezzle, there was some empirical evidence that through contact with others, they came to believe that a number of “business offenses were merely technical violations rather than morally wrong” (Cressey, 1953, p. 147). In fact, Cressey further elaborates on this learning of “vocabularies of adjustment” when he offers:
But such verbalizations necessarily are impressed upon the person by other persons who have had prior experience with situations involving positions of trust and trust violation. Before they are internalized by the individual they exist as group definitions of situations in which crime is “appropriate.” Contacts with such definitions obviously are necessary to their internalization as rationalizations (1970, p. 67).
Although Cressey could not conclusively determine whether a learning process took place for members of his sample, he did attempt to ascertain whether certain principles of differential association theory were applicable to the transmission of neutralizations that accompany the actual learning of the skills behind the violation of trust. Thus, Cressey’s study loosely supports certain principles of Sutherland’s classic theory of Differential Association, in particular the importance of learning “definitions favorable to the law” (1953, 1973).
Coleman (1994, 2006) later wrote in empirical support of both Cressey and Sutherland’s notion of a learning process behind the ideas of verbalizations and “definitions favorable to the law,” especially as they apply to occupational crimes:
Deviant subcultures need not be confined to a single employer or even a single profession. The business culture that is shared to one degree or another by most business people not only provides incentives for illicit activities but also contains justifications that can be used to neutralize ethical restraints. The common expression that “business is business” reflects the subculture’s belief that harsh necessity justifies both the unethical and the illegal activities of the business world.
With respect to current criminological research regarding white-collar crime decision making, especially a learning process that may take place, the research is extremely sparse. Furthermore, research regarding both the role of neutralization theory combined with differential association theory as it pertains to white-collar crime is virtually nonexistent. However, one recent study by Piquero, Tibbetts, and Blankenship (2005) attempts to add to the paucity of research regarding these theories as related to corporate crime. This study evaluated the offending decisions of master of business administration (MBA) students to commit corporate offending in the promotion/sales of a hypothetical pharmaceutical drug. Findings supported predictions that anticipated agreement of coworkers and the board of directors would be positively associated with decisions to further market and produce a hypothetical drug that was about to be recalled by the government. Results also showed that the decision to commit corporate crime was inversely related to perceptions that close friends and business professors agree with the decision, which went against predictions based on differential association theory. Evidence was also found to support that certain neutralizations were selected and used by the students when making their decisions. Although the findings of this study are purely based on hypothetical events regarding decisions of graduate students, the underlying empirical rationale of this work is important since it attempts to finally merge both differential association and neutralization theories as they pertain to corporate crime. Based on this obvious lack of research, it is the intent that this current study will assist in expanding the theoretical understanding of where and from whom occupational offenders learn the neutralizations which they employ.
With that said, there are multiple goals of this study. First, I seek to determine whether neutralizations are used by occupational offenders; and if they are, which neutralizations are used most frequently by the sample. Second, I will examine how and from whom occupational offenders learn these neutralizations or what Sutherland aptly referred to as “definitions favorable to the law.” More notably, I seek to determine whether those who neutralize their white-collar crimes can accurately establish the source of where they learned to justify their crimes. The major practical implication of this research is to understand the various social groups that may impact a person’s professional behavior so that workplace trainings may be created to appropriately dissuade individuals from internalizing and using neutralizations (Kieffer & Sloan, 2009).
Method
To explore where and from whom occupational white-collar offenders may learn to neutralize their crimes, I rely on data from 40 semistructured interviews with individuals federally convicted for occupational crimes. To meet the sampling criteria for inclusion, inmates had to have been convicted of an occupational-based white-collar offense while in a legitimate position of fiduciary responsibility and trust within their respective company. This was purposely sought to ensure that the offender’s individual accounts of their own behavior could be gathered, including any learning process they may have encountered. Thus, the types of crimes committed by the offenders in this study included identity theft, false bank and credit loans, false corporate reporting, tax fraud, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, insurance fraud (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security), mortgage fraud, and securities and exchange violations.
I interviewed inmates from various Federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) facilities in the Bureau’s Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions. While the BOP granted permission to conduct research in their facilities, they were unable to provide a list of inmates who had been convicted of white-collar offenses. To recruit participants, I relied on volunteers and snowball sampling within the facilities. First, I began by asking staff at the facilities whether they knew of individuals who met the study’s criteria. With the help of staff, I placed recruitment fliers throughout the facilities. The flyers asked interested inmates to indicate their possible willingness to participate by contacting their unit or case manager. These case managers then generated a list of those who volunteered and passed it along to the institutional contact for each facility who then assisted me with scheduling site visits for interviews. Additionally, some of the inmates I interviewed vouched for me to others who fit the sampling criteria and who were initially skeptical about my intentions. This process was done until I successfully recruited and interviewed 20 male and 20 female white-collar offenders, which is a sample size consistent with qualitative research in the field (Copes, Brown, & Tewksbury, 2011).
With respect to sampling demographics, the average age of participants at the time of the interview was mid-40s. However, ages of the participants ranged from 20 to 70 years. The majority of the participants were Caucasian. Twenty-five were White and fifteen were non-White. In regard to education, 7 participants had at least either a high school diploma or general educational development, 15 had completed some college courses, 10 had completed at least a bachelor’s degree of some kind, 3 had completed some master’s level work, and the remaining 5 had completed a graduate program. With respect to marriage, 9 participants had never been married, 17 were currently married, and 14 were no longer married (i.e., widowed, divorced, or legally separated). The average yearly income of participants was close to six figures; however, salaries of the participants ranged from 30,000 dollars to 1.2 million.
The data were collected through semistructured interviews. This style of interviewing involves outlining a set of issues to be explored with each respondent (Patton, 2002). Using a semistructured interview guide approach, I was able to word questions spontaneously, establish a personal and friendly rapport with each participant, revisit or ask for more elaboration on a particular topic, and establish an informal interview style that exclusively focused on areas of interest (Patton, 2002; Seidman, 1998). While this style of interviewing allowed participants’ flexibility in guiding the conversation, care was taken to ensure that all participants were asked questions that pertained directly to any learning process that may have occurred prior to commission of their crime. More specifically, the majority of questions in the guide focused on the history and demographics of the offender, a detailed explanation of the offense, the possible usage of language (i.e., neutralizations) internally or externally prior to the commission, and if language was used, where and from whom the did the offender learn it. If it was determined that the offender did in fact invoke neutralizations prior to commission of their crime, additional follow-up questions were asked to further understand and validate their accounts. Although much scholarly debate centers upon temporal order of the neutralization process, previous research suggests that white-collar offenders do seek to make sense of their crimes in socially acceptable terms in order to pacify any guilt that may exist prior to the commission of the act (Benson, 1985; Coleman, 1994, 2006; Copes et al., 2007; Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, 2012; Dabney, 1995; Evans & Porshe, 2005; Gauthier, 2001; Green, 1993; Hochstetler and Copes, 2001; Jesilow et al., 1993; Klenowski, 2008; Klenowski et al., 2011; Maruna & Copes, 2005; Payne, 2003; Simon, 2012).
When possible the interviews were recorded using a standard audio recorder. It was only when prison administrators refused my request to bring in a recorder or when the participants did not consent to the recording that I did not record the interviews. I was able to record all of the interviews with female participants and all but nine of the males. Regardless of whether the interviews were recorded or not, field notes were taken during all sessions. To ensure confidentiality of all parties who may have been privy to the inmate’s illegal act, I assigned each participant an alias, which is used in the presentation of quotes here. To aid in analysis, I transcribed all interviews to mirror the spoken words as closely as possible. During the transcription of interviews, all identifying elements were removed.
The data analysis technique used to examine the semistructured one-to-one interviews was a thematic content analysis. A deductive analysis was conducted to determine whether neutralizations were used by the occupational offenders. If neutralizations were discovered, a second analysis was conducted to determine where and from whom the offenders learned their neutralizations. A second and third reader was used to offer their own interpretations of the data to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings.
Neutralizations by White-Collar Criminals
Previous research on white-collar criminals shows that they mention various neutralizations or accounts when discussing their crimes (Benson, 1985; Copes et al., 2007; Copes & Vieraitis, 2009; Dabney, 1995; Evans & Porshe, 2005; Gauthier, 2001; Jesilow et al., 1993; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005; Shover et al., 2003). Futhermore, some argue that these types of offenders do so more often than street offenders (Shover & Hochstetler, 2006). The current findings support the claim that occupational offenders are prone to excuse or justify their crimes. In fact, all participants (N = 40), justified or excused their crimes. More specifically, participants articulated one or more of Sykes and Matza’s five original techniques of neutralization during the interviews: appeal to higher loyalties (N = 35), denial of injury (N = 14), condemnation of the condemners (N = 10), denial of victim (N = 9), and denial of responsibility (N = 10). Additionally, participants also mentioned three more recently proposed techniques of neutralization: defense of necessity (N = 8; Minor, 1981), and claim of normality (N = 11) and claim of entitlement (N = 10; Coleman, 1994).
Appeal to Higher Loyalties
The most commonly used technique for all offenders was the appeal to higher loyalties. Those using this technique neutralized the stigma of their illegal behavior by stating they committed their crimes for the betterment of others. This neutralization was most frequently connected to assisting the respondent’s family and friends. Xavier, who was incarcerated for his wrongdoings in the investment industry, exemplified this technique and provided the following explanations for his crimes:
My parents never really supported me. They never came to any of my athletic events or school functions. I think part of me never forgot that. So, I guess when I was committing my acts, I believed that maybe I was doing some of this for my family. I wanted to have the time and the financial security to be around my family to make sure I would be there for my children, so I guess family also subconsciously played into why I did what I did. It all boils down to power and greed and decisions you make in life, in my case, my family was part of my decision making for why I did what I did.
Similarly, Allyson was faced with a self-defined desperate situation due to financial, family, and health issues and tried to hide assets from federal bankruptcy officials so that she and her husband would not lose their businesses or home. She explained that her efforts to “support” her husband were a natural and compassionate attempt to save everything he had created. When asked about what motivated her, she replied:
I would say survival. I would say that my part in it was just being supportive of my husband. . . . I wanted to walk beside him . . . to me it is true commitment. It is showing the unity that we have.
While most claimed that their actions were to support their families, others said that they were merely trying to help support the larger community. Iris attributed her illegal activities to her desire both to succeed in business and, more importantly, to “help” those members of her community who needed her company’s services. When explaining her story, she proclaimed that it was both her need to provide for her terminally ill husband and her desire to do “God’s Will” that led to her current, and in her mind unjustifiable, incarceration.
I helped a church with a real estate issue. You know there were churches that were behind in their mortgage and they were facing foreclosure and I would help negotiate with the mortgage lender. I was doing a whole host of things but the more I helped one church, the more churches called. But then I realized they couldn’t afford to pay me so it was very difficult to work with these churches. I took a sabbatical from working for them and began developing a business model because I felt as though this was something that God wanted me to do, use my skills to help the church.
Denial of Injury
The denial of injury technique was the second most frequently offered account by participants. When using this technique individuals justify their actions by arguing that “nobody is getting hurt,” “it’s only money,” or “I am only borrowing it.” Isaac, the owner and operator of a construction company, was serving time for providing construction services and gifts to superintendents, school board members, and other politically connected individuals in his home state. In return, he received multimillion dollar contracts from various school districts. When asked why he did it he replied:
Why did I do it? I always looked at it to the point in the beginning, you know, I wasn’t stealing from anybody. I didn’t take that money. It wasn’t for me. You gave me an 8% fee. Come on what you are talking about 8% fee on 70 million is 5.6 million dollars.
White-collar offenders framed their actions as anything but theft. By using phrases like “I wasn’t stealing” or “I was only borrowing the money,” they claimed that they did not intend to cause any real harm and if given more time they would have paid their victims back in full.
Condemnation of the Condemners
It was not uncommon for the offenders to redirect the focus of their own actions toward those who condemned or judged them. Those who used this technique typically pointed out hypocrisy within the federal government as being the vehicle that allowed them to carry out their illicit activities. When asked why he chose to commit fraud Quinton replied:
The laws are too strict. Federal and state governments force people in this field to be criminal. Let’s face it; we have to make money too—to earn a living. I would say 5% of this is my fault, 95% is my partner’s fault, but the government acts like it plays no part, when in fact, it motivates us to do what we do. Why should we follow regulations that the government itself does not follow?
Similarly, in what came as an afterthought of his explanation as to why he engaged in his crimes, Martin expressed his view of the government and how this view contributed to his decisions.
Oh yeah, and the thing about the government because I said I never paid taxes on any of that money and what went through my mind quite a bit was “fuck the government.” If we can do something under the table, let’s do it. I mean that was it more so than anything else was the government, that’s how it started, that’s what caused this all to start.
Denial of Victim
Nine offenders laid blame for their crimes onto the victims. When framing their crimes this way, offenders presented their actions as excusable because their victims were deserving of victimization. Each participant admitted that they thought they were the “real” victim and that the person they were stealing from “had it coming” for the way they had treated others. In effect, they claimed that corporations and banks should not be given victim status because of their prior actions of preying on individuals. Katherine explained why she decided to steal from her employer:
I had access to his office I also had access to all his personnel files, which were my employees and my counterparts and when I realized that there were people with less employees working less hours getting work evaluations making more money, I think that was my, “I’ve had enough.”
Purvis mentioned on numerous occasions how he despised and disagreed with the federal government.
I did not want to pay taxes plain and simple. I do not believe in a government that forces individuals to pay taxes. The downfall for me in regards to the federal government is when they legalized abortion. I lost all faith in our government when they proceeded with this particular item and allowed it become legal. The federal government calls me a tax protestor, I agree. The tax rates are way too high. The federal government legalized abortion, screw the government. I hate the IRS. I will tell you that. I had two brothers in Vietnam. When they came back they were not treated with respect. So tell me, why should I respect the government? Tell me.
Denial of Responsibility
Many participants claimed that they should not be held responsible for the commission of their crimes because their actions were the result of social conditions or bad advice from others (i.e., boss, spouse, family) whom they trusted. Consequently, these offenders blamed the social conditions of their environment or in some cases, people, for their decision to engage in their trust violating behavior. Most who used this technique referred to either their impoverished upbringing or an unhealthy and/or abusive relationship with a parent. For example, Kent referenced family and psychological problems as a catalyst for the commission of his criminal acts.
I always had some guilt in feeling as though that I did not get the proper upbringing at a primary level, that I did not have the proper parental guidance that I know other children had. I always had to try to make more, to work harder. No matter what I did growing up, I wanted to be number one at what I did. . . . You just have to take a close look at yourself. I see a lot of the inmates here are attention deficit, a lot of them and they need therapy, they need pills, they don’t need prison. These are hyper individuals. They were hyper children, out of control. They became hyper adults, out of control. And I know I was ADD as a child and never diagnosed. I could not sit still, I couldn’t sit still. I couldn’t concentrate but I had a high intellect and it was all over the place. There was no focus. It was a shotgun effect rather than a rifle effect.
Defense of Necessity
Those using the defense of necessity claimed to be in a desperate situation and that their crimes were borne out of this necessity. Due to a feeling of exigency, they invoked this technique to pacify their conscience to carry out their crimes. In describing the events that led up to her getting involved in fraud, Iris described why she thought crime was her only option.
I was desperate for money. I filed bankruptcy and so they tried to throw that in but I filed bankruptcy because my husband was sick and my husband had been married before and the house was in his name so there were things that I had to do to protect our ability to stay in the home and to eliminate liability for me.
Offenders using the defense of necessity technique often coupled them with the fulfilling of the caregiver role (i.e., appeal to higher loyalties). They claimed that the necessity of their crimes was heightened because of their desire to protect or shield their family from harm. Again, when describing their self-defined desperation they almost always made mention of why others around them (usually men) were not around to offer help. There is a social burden to explain why they were in an active position about their crimes instead of a more gender-typical passive one.
Claim of Normality
Offenders who relied on the claim of normality argued that their actions were common business practice in the field where they worked. These respondents claimed their crimes were justifiable because others in their respective industries were committing the same types of behaviors with impunity. A noteworthy illustration of this technique was offered by Alex who was incarcerated for creating and distributing counterfeit products.
We had to stay up with the competition. The competition was doing it, why couldn’t we? Why can’t we all do it? I’ve been to conventions where 30 other distributors were doing it, all companies based here in the U.S. . . . We had to stay up with competition; they were doing it, why couldn’t we? Tell me, why?”
Purvis echoed this sentiment about how everybody in sales deceives and steals to remain viable and successful in the industry, “This whole industry is based on lies. Manipulation of buyers is the name of the game. . . . Everybody does it.”
The most noteworthy example of the claim of normality was given by Rachel who was convicted of multiple counts of bank fraud for falsifying loan applications for her husband’s business and for the mortgage on their home. She stated that since everybody at some time or another fails to provide the full truth on applications, what she did was not wrong. In her words, “I mean a lot of people lie on their application for their work, for a phone, for credit cards, if they want new credit cards. I mean, it’s not my fault. . . . Everybody does this, not just me.”
Claim of Entitlement
Ten participants claimed that they were entitled to the spoils of their crimes. All thought that through the commission of their illicit acts, they were ultimately and justly receiving what was owed to them. Felicia believed that she deserved to be better compensated for her duties as an officer manager. To recoup what she believed that she deserved she stole financial information from customers. When asked about her crimes she replied, “I would justify it and say, ‘Well he didn’t give me the raise that I was supposed to get, so you know I can keep it.’ You know you justify it and before, like I said you wouldn’t even think about it.” In short, when participants were asked what had allowed them to psychologically cross that moral and legal boundary to commit their individual acts, all of those using this technique indicated that their legitimate efforts were not meeting their financial expectations. Thus, they were entitled to the extra benefits that they obtained.
Learning the Neutralizations
Although neutralization theory has much in common with psychological theories (e.g., cognitive dissonance), its root point heavily to sociology (Maruna & Copes, 2005). That is, neutralizations are not created by the individual. Instead, they are learned through interaction with others. Cressey’s (1953) pioneering work on “trust violating behavior” helped spawn and later reinforce Sykes and Matza’s (1957) belief that neutralizations not only occur prior to the commission of an act, but of equal importance, are not created by the offender. Simply put, when invoked by those in the workforce, techniques of neutralization pacify the morality of the situation and dissuade the feelings of guilt that may occur prior to the commission of the act.
It is clear from the previous discussion that these white-collar offenders relied on neutralizations to make sense of their crimes. This fact, does not tell us about where individuals learn to think of their crimes in such a self-absolving way. Thus, I also asked participants if they could remember where they learned these neutralizations. Overall, I found that it was difficult, but not impossible, for the participants to remember and articulate where they first heard these justifications and excuses. This is to be expected considering most people cannot recall where and from whom they learned their specific behavior and language patterns. Despite this difficulty, many of the participants were able to discuss where their learning of the neutralizations took place. Specifically, 14 participants (35% of sample) provided accounts about where they learned the excuses necessary to commit their various occupational crimes. These individuals claimed that they were introduced to these ideas from two primary groups: (1) coworkers and (2) family members or friends.
The most common source of learning to excuse or justify white-collar crimes (for those who could point to the specific location) was coworkers or others peers in their industry. Eleven (N = 11) participants indicated that they learned their neutralizations on the job. For example, Peter, who operated his own industrial cleaning supply company, admitted that his entire industry was about deceit and that he was taught early in his career that he should do whatever it takes to make a sale. When asked whether this type of mind-set was common he replied:
Everybody does it. It’s 100% legal. We are in sales. This is the name of the game. We were very aggressive during our collections, almost like the mafia. We would go after individuals to make sure that they would pay what they owed us. I am telling you, it was all about the money and in our mentality our justification was that everybody is doing it. We thought it was 100% legal, everybody was doing it, why couldn’t we? We don’t sell light bulbs, we don’t sell cleaners, we sell gifts. Organized bribery, that’s exactly what it is. I learned this on the job my very first day back in the late 1970s. This is the way of sales. . . . Of course, but well, it is not an official process. I mean, people talk, tell you what works, what doesn’t. That’s it, you observe, listen and do what you’re told, if you do you will be successful. If you don’t, well, one should look to find employment elsewhere. So to answer your question, yes the industry promotes language that makes it easier to deal with it.
When asked whether “cutting corners” was part of the workforce learning process, Xavier offered a similar account of his learning experience.
Very early on I was made aware of the corners that you could cut and get away with it and the corners that you could not cut and I followed those guidelines. . . . On the Street [Wall Street], you listened to those who have been in the game for a while. You do not question their methods, tactics, or ethics. Rules of the game, especially ways to cut corners are shared, but they come only after a broker has proven himself. This takes time, patience and networking; knowing the right people and learning the game equals success in this business . . . as one proves their worthiness, people will befriend and teach you the ways in a manner, which you can go home and rest at night knowing you aren’t doing a fucking thing wrong—by industry practices of course.
Ken shared that the corrupt practices that are used, passed along, and ultimately practiced within the marketing/franchising were both common practice and taught.
[My mentor] over the years, had used what are called “singers” (they are fake references) so when you as a perspective franchisee wants a list of affiliates from around the country, he would supply you a list and all they would be his other sales people that were working in the other shows around the country, who had become the reference for this person in this city and whoever the sales person that was presenting to you, became a reference and he had been doing that for 30 years. It was a known thing throughout. It was something that we had never done through my company because we just knew that the results were a minimum 2 years for fake references. There was no reason to do this. I did not know they were doing it until around the fourth month because I don’t control that, that’s the home office, that’s his business to supply that information and when I found out, you know how wrong it is, you know that it’s 2 years, you know that it’s a monetary fine behind it, but on the other hand you see that you were just given a check for $180,000 that week. It’s very difficult. You take the money, you’re sick for taking the money, but you would be amazed on how quickly you get over it and that extra money didn’t change my lifestyle, it wasn’t as if we ran out and bought a home and we have always had a nice home, nice cars, private schools for the children, I mean that was just our lifestyle and we always stayed within our economics and it didn’t change with that really. . . . So yes, I believe I was encouraged to follow the ways of those who proceeded me, those who showed me the ropes.
Quincy offered yet another example of how an industry can influence a culture of deceptive practices by teaching and sharing the necessary language to justify the illicit nature of one’s actions.
This type of behavior is common throughout the lead, asbestos and, nuclear fields. It’s a culture; it’s invisible but it’s there. To be in the business, you must learn to embrace it and deal with it. You learn to not follow rules and regulations to the T; you do give benefits and even passes.
How did you learn not to follow the rules?
In all honesty, no, it’s not explicitly taught or spelled out. There is no manual. Information about the field is shared, people in the field talk. We share information on ways around the regs [regulations]. It’s the nature of the beast. The government has forced us to bend and sometimes even break the rules, you have to survive.
Quincy continued by stating that these practices are so pervasive that on one instance he was invited to a formal party of one of the largest real estate owners and developers in the northeastern United States the day of his federal preliminary hearing. He opted not to attend because of the embarrassment he was feeling about his recent criminal indictment. When the respondent called this real estate mogul’s home to offer his regrets that he would be unable to attend the party, the mogul’s wife lightheartedly said to Quincy:
Honey, if you are not indicted, you are not invited. Everybody who is going to be at the party has had at one time or another issues with the Uncle Sam. Darling, don’t worry about it, and come to the party.
Although this point offered by this respondent was meant to be comical, it should be a stark reminder about the attitude of some in various industries that their behaviors are not seen as illegal or immoral but simply standard operating practices.
Janice shared that those in her profession would walk her through the steps, including the dissemination of excuses to be used in their business; excuses she later said she adopted.
As a mortgage broker, you have lenders so you set up your accounts with different lenders. When dealing with lenders, you have to meet certain guidelines in order for them to accept the package which is you put together an application, you get an appraisal, and you get all of the documents together for them to be able to say that they are going to finance this loan. Sometimes the lender will walk you through certain things and tell you what you are supposed to do; they are not always ethical, but we still do them. I feel that because I allowed myself to be persuaded by listening and adapting to what I knew was wrong but I didn’t act on what I felt was the right way of doing it, I went along with what as they say going along with the program, I went along with the program so that’s why I’m here. I made a mistake actually. . . . It’s standard for it for sure; you will talk with any other mortgage company, you will find that in doing your mortgages when you call the company they have what’s called AE’s and you talk to them and they walk you through step by step or they have what’s called the underwriter so they are gonna tell you the exact documents that they need or what you need to do in order to make this loan fly. Now I’m by no means trying to blame anyone else because I take full responsibility for my actions, there’s that line, that gray area that you should know, you know this doesn’t sound right and you are the one that is responsible so not at all that I am trying to say that I’m not responsible. I still think responsibility needs to go others who gave me this knowledge; it’s still going on so it doesn’t make sense to me.
As previously stated, three (N = 3) respondents shared that they had gained both the necessary skills and accompanying justifications to carry out their crimes by either a family member or a friend. When asked to explain where he learned to excuse his crimes, Tyler replied:
The sad part is, my own father who had been in the same type of business for 30 years before me taught me the ropes.
What do you mean by “ropes”?
Well, how to do things in the insurance business. Both the good and well, not so good. The problem is that there is too much regulation see, and this causes problems for the smaller companies like my employer. So, in order to level the playing field, some rules need to be bent a bit. In essence, no one really gets hurt; it’s just a way of survival. So yeah, I learned from the best you can say. We are not crooks. We are just businessmen trying to survive.
Umma indicated that she had learned both the technical and verbal skills of her crime by close friends. She shared:
Okay the way I did my crime was I went and I bought prepaid cards from the bank and I would use credit cards to reload them. Once you reload the card, the maximum you can reload on them is like $2,750 in 14 days, I would reload them like that and I would reuse them. The prepaid cards they didn’t have anybody’s name on it so it was like how could you say that this person is doing fraud but you had to use somebody else’s credit card to reload the card and sometimes I would do bank transfer, that was basically it.
What led you to the frauds and the identity theft?
Well what led me to it was other people, other influences that I have seen do it and I saw them get away with it so I felt as though I could get away with it and I did it too . . . Friends, mostly.
Did they teach you how to do it?
Uh huh. They were doing it and I was listening and seeing the things that they were getting and I wanted to be turned on how that they were getting that stuff and once they showed me then I kind of like took it and that was it.
Summary of Findings
A total of 14 (35%) of the research sample specified that some form of learning took place that permitted them to select, internalize, and ultimately use their chosen neutralizations so that they could justify the commission of their illegal acts. These participants stated that a learning process had occurred, mainly skill acquisition coupled with appropriate corresponding neutralization. Eleven participants said they learned both the knowledge of how to and the language necessary to pacify the feelings of guilt prior to the commission of their crimes from coworkers or colleagues.
The results of this qualitative study show some support for the fact that neutralizations can be learned through interaction with others, especially coworkers and colleagues in the field with 14 participants sharing that they had engaged in some sort of learning of language that assisted in committing their white-collar acts. The findings of this study indicate moderate support for both Cressey’s (1953, 1970, 1973) argument that individual offenders do not invent their own neutralizations but simply apply existing definitions to their own workplace behavior and Sutherland’s theoretical proposition that “learning of definitions favorable to the law” may in fact happen in the workplace (Sutherland, 1949, 1983). With respect to the latter, this reaffirms the findings of earlier studies that concluded that attitudes regarding employee theft were often provided by offenders who learned them from their fellow coworkers on the job (Benson, 1985; Cressey, 1953; Horning, 1970; Mars, 1974; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005; Vieraitis, Piquero, Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2012; Zeitlin, 1971).
Conclusion
Although the empirical results of this study provide some evidence about how and from whom one learns neutralizations to commit white-collar offenses, it must be remembered that most people begin learning neutralizations during the early stages of cognitive development. Thus, it is safe to assume that by the time one enters the workforce, he or she has already amassed a basic set of justifications that can be readily called upon prior to conducting any behavior, especially acts deemed unethical or criminal. This cultural transmission of neutralizations learned through interactions with others is crucial for understanding this important process, especially with respect to one’s work subculture (Coleman, 2006; Cressey, 1973; Ermann & Lundam, 2006; Simon, 2012). The argument can be made that employees are socialized into the culture of their respective organization; that is, they learn skills, motivations, and neutralizations of criminal behavior on the job. Furthermore, part of this socialization process involves learning how to filter deviant acts “through a sanitizing, ideological prism, which gives them the appearance of not being criminal” (Simon & Eitzen, 1993, p. 300). This unique “sanitizing practice” or “moral pacification” ritual leads to both the transmission of neutralizations within the company and the possible creation of new verbalizations when new “non-shareable” financial problems arise and must be dealt with both on an individual and corporate level.
Based on the findings of this study, a little more than 25% of the sample did share that they learned the neutralizations on the job; an important fact that is worthy of further empirical testing. Thus, it can be concluded that some support exists for the idea that Sutherland’s idea of “association” with others includes the dissemination of “definitions favorable to the law” on the job that in fact could better be understood by dissecting the specific neutralizing language of the occupational offender. Once industry-specific neutralizations are understood, different means for counteracting them before they lead to a criminal event could in fact be created. For instance, workshops or corporate seminars that introduce “techniques of determination” that focus on potential consequences of white-collar crime may prove beneficial as a deterrent for would-be offenders. These counterlinguistic phrases could be introduced and taught in the corporate setting to employees to offset the neutralizations that may be learned on the job. By teaching employees how to deal with certain internal thought patterns, a company may in fact be able to dissuade an individual from committing that first illicit act (Kieffer & Sloan, 2009).
Also as previously mentioned, one of the main goals of this study was to be able to pinpoint the source of learning for the occupational offender. After analyzing the accounts provided by those who did learn their neutralizations on the job, it is realistic to conclude that a possible new technique of neutralization could be offered. The technique itself would be employed by individuals who have a work-related nonshareable problem that centered upon the language of “I learned it from them”; “I was just following orders”; “It’s just how it’s always been done.” The technique could be entitled “Claim of Obedience.” This particular technique then could be studied as part of the corporate socialization process; in other words, how one learns the good with the bad at work. If we are able to continue to dissect different industry types to learn about the specific corporate cultures, especially those that have high levels of corporate and occupational white-collar offenses, answers can be amassed that may lead to a new practical plan for deterring would-be white-collar criminals.
It does appear that neutralization theory warrants more empirical testing with regard to both the thought process and learning rituals that take place in the corporate subculture.Therefore, the argument can be provided that more qualitative empirical studies focusing on the role of neutralization theory during the “association” process could prove very beneficial for further understanding the social psychologically behind occupational white-collar crimes. Based on the results of this study, neutralizations are in fact used quite frequently by occupational offenders; results that adds further empirical support to earlier scholarly efforts regarding the role of neutralizations when committing white-collar crimes (Benson, 1985; Coleman, 1994; Copes et al., 2007; Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, 2012; Dabney, 1995; Evans & Porshe, 2005; Gauthier, 2001; Green, 1993; Hochstetler and Copes, 2001; Jesilow et al., 1993; Klenowski, 2008; Klenowski et al., 2011; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blackenship, 2005).
Additionally, the results of this study suggest that neutralization theory may be best understood as a component of Sutherland’s Differential Association theory, at least for occupational white-collar offenders; a finding that would add further support to the empirical claim by Piquero, Tibbetts, and Blankenship (2005). This supports the claim by Maruna and Copes (2005) that neutralization theory’s real value may be suited for only enhancing or developing existing theoretical frameworks. Moreover, it is generally accepted that inadequate or inappropriate training may foster attitudes conducive to crime in the workplace (Keenan, Brown, Pontell, & Geis, 1985; Maddocks, 1992; Payne, 2003; Wright & Cullen, 2000). Thus, if we are able to understand what is taught and from whom in the workplace, a reduction in occupational offenses by industry type may be realistic. At the minimum then, these findings demonstrate that a further examination of the learning processes regarding how and from whom industry-specific neutralizations are disseminated and employed by white-collar offenders would be beneficial before stronger conclusions can be determined. Finally, additional analysis regarding the potential pejorative impact of corporate subcultures on all levels of workers would prove to be very valuable when attempting to truly understand the mind-set of the occupational white-collar offender.
Footnotes
Note
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.