Recent Legal Developments

First Amendment

Packingham v. North Carolina

The Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina was asked to determine whether a statute criminalizing sex offenders who accessed social media networks was a violation of the First Amendment. In this case, the petitioner was a registered sex offender who posted on social media about the outcome of a traffic court hearing. The petitioner was subsequently convicted and given a suspended prison sentence for violating North Carolina’s statute, which makes it a crime for registered sex offenders to access a social media network where minors can make profiles. The court of appeals sided with the petitioner in reversing the trial court’s decision but was later reversed on appeal by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy held that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech, as protections must also be provided for cyberspace. The Court found that while the statute serves the purpose of protecting minors, it was not “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Even though the statute seeks to prevent the initial step toward committing a crime against a minor, it broadly prevents all forms of free speech via social networking which imposes a significant burden on those who are restricted. Furthermore, the Court held that such a restriction prevents the viable exercise of First Amendment discourse and is something that even convicted criminals can benefit from in their attempts to obtain knowledge and become reformed. The Court held that the state failed to support its burden of showing that the law is necessary or legitimate in serving its purpose of protecting minors from being victimized by sex offenders.

Fourth Amendment

Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, et al

In Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, et al., the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of Fourth Amendment relief for pretrial detention challenges. In this case, Manuel was searched following a traffic stop, during which officers found a bottle of pills. None of the pills tested positive during a field test, but the officers arrested him nonetheless. At the station, the evidence technician tested the pills again, with the same result occurring, except he stated that one pill tested positive for ecstasy. The arresting officer also stated that he knew the pills were ecstasy despite no proof. Subsequently, Manuel was charged with possession of a controlled substance, and the trial judge found probable cause to detain him prior to trial. The Illinois police lab tested the pills too but found no such positive results. Manuel sat in pretrial detention for 48 days before his case was dismissed. Less than 2 years after his case was dismissed, Manuel filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the city and its officers, citing a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court disagreed with Manuel, holding that the statute of limitations prevented an unlawful arrest claim and that precedent also prevented Fourth Amendment relief in cases where pretrial detention has occurred after legal proceedings have begun. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision on appeal.

Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kagan stated that Manuel could challenge his detention via the Fourth Amendment as it governs not only arrests but detention as well (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 1975). Furthermore, unconstitutional pretrial detention can occur before and after the legal process has begun. Probable cause is always required for a person to be lawfully detained. In this case, the probable cause determination was based on false statements, and Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claims do not disappear just because the legal process has commenced. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine the claim’s accrual date regarding the statute of limitations. Justices Thomas and Alito filed separate dissenting opinions.

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

The Supreme Court in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez was tasked with evaluating the petitioners’ claims of unlawful warrantless entry by the police, that the officers did not knock and announce themselves, and that they used excessive force. In this case, officers received information that a dangerous parolee was seen in the vicinity of where petitioners Mendez and Garcia lived. The petitioners were napping in a shack at the back of the premises where they lived when officers entered without a warrant or announcing their presence. Mendez, who had a BB gun, got up from the bed, and the officers reacted by shooting both Mendez and Garcia. The petitioners sued the officers via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and were awarded damages for the claims concerning warrantless entry and the officers failing to announce themselves. However, the court found that the officers used reasonable force based on Graham v. Connor (1989) but still held them liable under the provocation rule created by the Ninth Circuit. This rule makes the reasonable use of force unreasonable if the officer “intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation” and “the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation.” The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the officers fell under qualified immunity for the knock and announce claim but still maintained that the warrantless entry was unlawful. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the use of the provocation rule in the lower court’s decision but also stated that proximate cause would also demonstrate liability without the provocation rule.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not support the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. The Court held that a framework created in Graham already exists for use of force claims under the Fourth Amendment, but the question of whether the force was excessive is related to Tennessee v. Garner’s (1985) ruling that the reasonableness of a seizure is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The Court stated that the provocation rule incorrectly directs courts to examine claims in hindsight to see whether a different violation was related to the use of force. The Court held that Graham requires Fourth Amendment claims to be examined separately, while the Ninth Circuit sought to define its own test which requires that the Fourth Amendment violation created a chain of events that caused the excessive use of force, and that the same violation was conducted recklessly or intentionally. Put simply, the Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit need not alter the excessive force claim to hold the officers liable for “all of the foreseeable consequences of their constitutional torts,” as other Fourth Amendment claims cannot change the initial use of force determination, which was determined to be reasonable, to satisfy an unreasonable seizure claim. Even if Mendez and Garcia cannot recover damages for the use of force claim, they still can for the injuries proximately caused by the unlawful warrantless entry. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the officers had qualified immunity under the knock and announce and knock claim, but their ruling focused on the foreseeable risks related to this failure, as opposed to the initial warrantless entry. The Court remanded the case for further consideration as to whether damages could be recouped for the warrantless entry claim.

Fifth Amendment

Bravo-Fernandez v. United States

In Bravo-Fernandez et al. v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the issue-preclusion aspect of the double jeopardy clause allows for an appeal of issues of fact or law that were determined by a prior judgment. In this case, a federal jury found both appellants guilty of violating a federal bribery statute but failed to find them guilty on the charges of conspiracy to commit bribery and traveling in interstate commerce to commit bribery. The First Circuit vacated the convictions due to an error in the judge’s jury instructions on the definition of bribery. On remand, the defendants argued that under the issue-preclusion rule, they could not be retried for the bribery charge, as the jury had already found them not guilty on the underlying charges: conspiracy to commit bribery and traveling to commit bribery. The District Court and First Circuit denied their motions for acquittal, holding that under United States v. Powell (1984), issue preclusion is not applicable when juries return logically inconsistent verdicts.

In a unanimous ruling, with the opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that due to the mixed results, the critical issue was whether the jury truly determined the defendants did not violate the bribery charge. The Court held that the petitioners’ arguments under Ashe v. Swenson (1970) and Yeager v. United States (2009), that the government was precluded from retrying them on counts that resulted in either an acquittal or a hung jury, respectively, fall short because the petitioners bore the burden of showing that the issue of whether they violated the bribery charge had resulted in acquittal. The Court determined that issue preclusion does not apply in cases where there are irreconcilably inconsistent results because “inconsistent verdicts shroud in mystery what the jury necessarily decided.”

Beckles v. United States

The petitioner in Beckles v. United States was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, he received a sentencing enhancement under the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines because he was a career criminal and his crime constituted a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his sentence, but Beckles sought to have his sentence vacated by the District Court because it was not a crime of violence. His motion was denied and the denial affirmed on appeal. While awaiting certiorari from the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States (2015) that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which was worded identically to the clause at issue here, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court then vacated and remanded Beckles’ sentence, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed again, arguing that the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines and the ACCA were not the same.

Writing for a unanimous court (Justice Kagan recused herself), Justice Thomas argued that the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole, including the residual clause, cannot be challenged for vagueness pursuant to the due process clause. Despite similar wording, the ACCA fixes one’s sentence at a higher range in a vague manner, but the Sentencing Guidelines do not fix any sentence as they are advisory and merely guide District Court discretion. The Court concluded that “[i]f a system of unfettered discretion is not unconstitutionally vague, then it is difficult to see how the present system of guided discretion could be.” Furthermore, the Guidelines cannot be challenged as vague because they provide notice and are not arbitrary.

Sixth Amendment

Buck v. Davis

Buck v. Davis centers on the influence of race in determining the defendant’s likelihood to commit future violent crimes. In this case, the defendant was convicted of capital murder, but the jury needed to find that he was capable of future violent crimes before a death sentence could be rendered. The defendant’s counsel called on a psychologist during trial, who testified that he was unlikely to commit such acts, but that because he was Black, he posed a higher risk to reoffend. The defendant was sentenced to death. Buck failed to claim ineffective assistance of counsel at the first postconviction proceeding but later attempted to argue this issue. It was later discovered that the same psychologist issued similar statements in court proceedings in five cases in Texas. The state admitted error in all of the cases, except Buck’s, even after he filed a second habeas petition, with the court dismissing this petition since the claim was not raised in the first petition. Buck used 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to obtain federal habeas relief, but the state declined to admit error again, and his case was subsequently held to be unreviewable. Two later cases, Martinez v. Ryan (2012) Trevino v. Thaler (2013), suggested Buck might be able to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to reopen his relief case, Buck relied on Martinez and Thaler, and numerous other factors such as the state linking his race to violence to demonstrate “the extraordinary circumstances” required for relief. The District Court determined that Buck failed to establish extraordinary circumstances. Buck sought a certificate of appealability (COA) from the Firth Circuit to challenge the denial, but the court ruled in favor of the lower court.

Writing for a 7-2 majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Fifth Circuit exceeded its authority in the COA determination, as they essentially decided the case on the merits when the issue was not whether the case was extraordinary but whether jurists could debate that determination. Second, the Court held that Buck had provided clear evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, since no competent attorney would have put the psychiatrist on the stand knowing what his conclusions were. Furthermore, but for the attorney’s conduct, the outcome would have likely been different, since race was not the issue, the potential for future violent conduct was. Thus, linking race to violence could have swayed the jury. Also, under Rule 60 (b)(6), the extraordinary nature of Buck’s cases is satisfied by the likelihood that race did play a role in sentencing, despite the District Court’s claim that race was a de minimis factor at sentencing and because the state admitted error in similar cases.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado

Pena-Rodriguez deals with juror bias and the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. In this case, the petitioner was convicted of unlawful sexual contact and harassment. It was revealed by two jurors that another juror made biased statements regarding the defendant’s and alibi witness’s ethnicity. The trial court acknowledged the bias but denied Pena-Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial, as Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits the use of testimony from jurors regarding other jurors’ statements during deliberations. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court. Relying heavily on Tanner v. United States (1987) and Warger v. Shauers (2014), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.

In highly contentious 5-3 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, argued that the Sixth Amendment requires trial courts to allow exceptions to the no impeachment rule when racial animus influences a conviction. Tracing the history of the common law rule, the Court argued that while the Tanner and Warger decisions suggested there was no exception to the rule, other cases have left open the door as to whether racial animus provides such an exception. The Court argued that unlike Tanner and Warger, the case at hand dealt with racial discrimination, which requires a heightened level of scrutiny. In terms of application, the Court ruled that for an exception to exist, lower courts would need to determine whether racial animus was a “significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” Both Justices Thomas and Alito filed dissenting opinions, with Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts joining the latter’s. Thomas and Alito argued that the Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment was not in line with precedent, with Thomas further adding that the Court misunderstood the original meaning of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, in also examining the historical evolution of the no impeachment rule, Alito argues against the Court’s decision to separate different types of bias as being more important than others, stating that creating such hierarchy is problematic and unsupported by precedent.

Lee v. United States

The Court in Lee v. United States was faced with evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim made by a lawful permanent resident from South Korea. Lee was suspected of selling drugs, and after obtaining a search warrant, officers found cash and illicit drugs in his house. He was indicted for possessing ecstasy with the intent to distribute and, after retaining counsel, began plea negotiations with the government. Lee repeatedly inquired as to whether he would be deported if he accepted a plea deal, to which his counsel told him that he would not. After accepting a plea deal, he was sentenced to a year and a day, but his crime fell under the category of “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)), which mandated deportation for such crimes. After discovering this, Lee filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Lee’s attorney testified at an evidentiary hearing that had he known Lee would be deported following a plea, he would have advised him to go to trial, as deportation was the most important factor in Lee’s decision to plead. The Magistrate Judge recommended the conviction be set aside and sentence vacated, but the District Court declined to do so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that even though it was clear his counsel was deficient, Lee could not show that his counsel had prejudiced his case, as the result would have not been different at trial, absent an acquittal.

Writing for a 6-2 majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated that Lee had in fact satisfied the burden of showing that his counsel’s advice was prejudiced his case. The Court held that Lee could demonstrate such as there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 1985). The Court argued that just because Lee may not be able to mount a viable defense, this does not mean his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not impeded. First, these inquiries require a case-by-case analysis that relies on all of the available evidence, and second, Hill focused on the fact that a defendant’s decision-making may not be wholly influenced by the probability of conviction from a trial. The Court held that the decision to plead guilty is influenced by the potential outcomes of both a plea and a trial, as even the slightest potential for a better outcome at trial may influence the defendant. While pleas should not be set aside because of evaluations made in hindsight, they should be supported by evidence of the defendant’s ultimate goals, which in this case was to avoid deportation. Justice Thomas dissented, with Justice Alito joining in part. Thomas argued that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that counsel should provide accurate information about the potential removal following a plea of guilty and that this decision undermines the finality of convictions.

Weaver v. Massachusetts

The Supreme Court in Weaver v. Massachusetts was faced with evaluating an appeal concerning a public trial violation; however, the claim was raised as a part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. During jury selection for Weaver’s trial, the courtroom was unable to fit all of the potential jurors, so the court removed all individuals, even a family member, who were not potential jurors. Weaver was convicted of murder, but 5 years later, he claimed his counsel was ineffective since he had not objected to the courtroom closure. The trial court denied his motion, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that Weaver’s right to a public trial was violated but still denied him relief because he failed to establish prejudice.

Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy argued that when a public trial violation occurs, but the claim is not raised at trial or on direct review, the petitioner must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice in order to obtain a new trial. When using an ineffective assistance claim to challenge public trial violation, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel was deficient and that but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different (per Strickland v. Washington, 1984). However, even if this standard cannot be satisfied, relief can be granted if the errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if his counsel had objected or fundamental unfairness. The courtroom was only closed during voir dire. Thus, even though the assumption of a Sixth Amendment violation occurs in this case, the violation did not affect the entirety of the trial or create unfairness.

Davila v. Davis

The Supreme Court in Davila v. Davis reviewed the petitioner’s claim that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel excused the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. While on trial for capital murder, Davila’s attorney objected to a proposed jury instruction, but the court overruled the objection, and the submitted instruction led to a conviction. On direct appeal, counsel did not challenge the instruction nor did Davila’s habeas counsel challenge the instruction or appellate counsel’s failure to challenge it. After state habeas relief was denied, Davila sought federal habeas relief via Martinez v. Ryan (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler (2013), which held that the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel excused the procedural default of the claim, since counsel failed to challenge the effectiveness of appellate counsel. The District Court stated that both cases only applied to claims related to trial counsel. The Fifth Circuit did not grant a certificate of appealability.

In writing for a 5-4 Court, Justice Thomas argued that the failures of postconviction counsel do not constitute a reason to excuse the procedural default of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. Citing Coleman v. Thompson (1991), the Court reiterated that there is no right to state defendants having postconviction counsel to begin with, so any errors by postconviction counsel cannot provide a cause to excuse the procedural default. Martinez provided an “equitable qualification” of Coleman’s rule that is limited in scope to cases in which state law mandates that an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim need to be brought forth in initial-review collateral proceedings as opposed to direct appeal. The Court reasoned that in situations outlined by Martinez, a procedural default does not prevent a federal habeas court from hearing a claim of ineffective assistance at trial if such default is a product of the deficient assistance of the individual’s counsel during the collateral proceeding. The Trevino decision stated that Martinez’s exception to Coleman can also apply to occurrences in which state procedure decreases the likelihood that on appeal, defendants will have a meaningful opportunity to raise such a claim. The Court declined to extend Martinez in providing federal courts the ability to hear procedurally defaulted claims of appellate ineffectiveness assistance in situations whereby the state postconviction counsel was also deficient by failing to raise an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg; he argued that the aspects of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that were considered in Martinez also apply to similarly related ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.

Eighth Amendment

Moore v. Texas

In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court was tasked with evaluating the constitutionality of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision concerning the use of the death penalty on individuals with mental disabilities. In this case, Moore was sentenced to death for fatally shooting a store clerk during a robbery. A state habeas court later determined that Moore’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and usual punishment since he qualified as mentally disabled. The habeas court drew on the popular definition of intellectual disability, which is comprised of intellectual functioning deficits, adaptive deficits, and the onset of these deficits while a minor. Relying on this definition, Moore’s IQ scores, and testimony from mental health professionals, the habeas court found him to be intellectually disabled. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the habeas court applied an inappropriate standard for assessing mental disabilities. The Court of Appeals also maintained that the adaptive deficits must be related to intellectual-functioning deficits.

Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Ginsburg argued overturned the Court of Appeals decision. The Court argued that while reliance on the most updated medical diagnostic guides is not essential for Eighth Amendment compliance, courts cannot disregard current medical standards. Pursuant to Hall v. Florida (2014), courts must account for the standard error of measurement when an individual’s IQ score is close to 70, and because Moore’s adjusted scores were below 70, the Court of Appeals needed to examine his level of adaptive functioning. The Court held that the Court of Appeals’ understanding of adaptive functioning deviated from common clinical standards. Also, requiring Moore to show that his lower IQ was not related to a personality disorder was not in line with common medical practice, as many disabled people may have coexisting mental and physical issues. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Alito and Thomas joined. The dissenting opinion argued that Court of Appeals did not err in its determination of Moore’s intellectual functioning. Furthermore, the dissenters argue that the majority departed from traditional modes of analysis in cases such as these, in relying too heavily on the medical consensus of intellectual disability, as opposed to the law.

Fourteenth Amendment/Due Process

Nelson v. Colorado

In Nelson v. Colorado, the Supreme Court examined Colorado’ Exoneration Act, which allows the state to keep conviction-related expenses and assessments, even after one has been exonerated. In this case, Nelson was found guilty of physical and sexual assault of her children, while Madden was found guilty of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted sexual assault. The appellate court ruled that trial error occurred in Nelson’s case, and on remand, she was acquitted of all charges. Similarly, one of the convictions was reversed on direct review for Madden, with the other being reversed on postconviction review. Both petitioners were assessed numerous costs, fees, and restitution following conviction, but following the aforementioned eventual outcomes, each moved for a return of these respective assessments. The trial court denied Nelson’s motion, but the postconviction court granted a return for all of Madden’s assessments except restitution. The Colorado Court of Appeals sided with the petitioners in maintaining that they were entitled to all of the assessments following their respective outcomes, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, since neither petitioner had filed a claim under the Exonerated Act, which governs the return of assessments following exoneration.

Writing for a 7-1 majority, Justice Ginsburg held that the Colorado Exoneration Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. The Court relied on Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) for evaluating a procedural due process claim, in arguing that the balancing of factors under Mathews includes the “private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the governmental interest at stake.” The Court reasoned that these factors weigh heavily against the Exoneration Act’s scheme, and that following invalidation of the petitioner’s convictions, a presumption of innocence was restored, which prevents Colorado from keeping the assessments. Furthermore, the requirement that the petitioners prove their innocence to reobtain the assessments is illogical because they are once against presumed innocent. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Overton v. United States

The Supreme Court in Overton v. United States was asked to consider whether certain types of information that were withheld by the prosecution during trial were material to the defense. In this case, seven individuals were indicted and convicted for kidnapping, robbery, and murder. Two additional individuals participated in the attack, but testified for the prosecution, and several witnesses substantiated their claims. At trial, none of the defendants challenged the witnesses’ claims about the attack. In postconviction proceedings, the group argued that the government had withheld potentially exculpatory evidence, in violation of the so-called Brady rule (from Brady v. Maryland, 1963). The evidence was comprised of the identity of a man seen running away from the murder scene, the statement of a passerby who claimed to hear groans coming from a closed garage, and evidence tending to impeach several of the witnesses. The D.C. Superior Court found that none of the information was material to the defense, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed.

Writing for a 6-2 majority, Justice Breyer concluded that the evidence was indeed not material under Brady. The petitioners argued that the evidence would have allowed them to use a different theory at trial that the attack was perpetrated by a single individual as opposed to the group. The Court argued; however, the evidence was too weak to meet Brady’s standards. The group attack depiction was the basis of the prosecution and was supported by three individuals who took part in the attacks as well as witness accounts. This would require that all of the testimony that aligned be coincidentally fabricated as well as some of the individuals falsely implicating themselves. Furthermore, the Court held that the impeachment evidence was mostly similar to what the petitioners presented at trial. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined, arguing that the withheld evidence was material under Brady as it would have allowed the defense to take a completely different and unified position and could have enabled them to impeach the witnesses and credibility of the Government’s case against them, as opposed to each of them focusing on undermining the other codefendant’s case for self-preservation.

Appeals/Habeas Corpus

Manrique v. United States

In Manrique v. United States, the Court was tasked with evaluating whether a defendant may appeal a deferred restitution order if they only appealed their initial conviction and not the later amended judgment. In this case, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)) and was required by law to make restitution to his victim. The District Court initially sentenced him to imprisonment but deferred the restitution decision until a later time. Manrique appealed his initial conviction, but later an amended judgment was handed down concerning the restitution amount. Manrique challenged the restitution order on appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that he could not challenge the order because he had not appealed the amended order, only the initial conviction decision.

Writing for a 6-2 majority, Justice Thomas held that when appealing from a deferred restitution order, a petitioner must appeal from that order, not the conviction, and that failing to do so results in a forfeiture of the ability to appeal the restitution order. The Court reasoned that pursuant to appellate procedure and U.S. code (18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)), a defendant must appeal from the decision rendered. Since the conviction occurred several months before the amended judgment was rendered, the appeal concerns only the initial conviction not the restitution order. The Court’s reasoning was based on Dolan v. United States (2010) in which the Court has found that an initial judgment and restitution order are two wholly separate and appealable determinations. Justice Ginsberg dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor. She argued that Manrique should be allowed to challenge the restitution order, as he was only advised of his ability to appeal following the initial decision, not the second, which was required.

McWilliams v. Dunn

In McWilliams v. Dunn, the Supreme Court was charged with evaluating whether the petitioner, who was on death row, had received adequate access to a psychiatrist pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma (1985). McWilliams was charged with rape and murder and was found to be indigent. His counsel requested access to a psychiatrist, which the state agreed to provide and convened a commission to evaluate him. The evaluation found him to be competent to stand trial and that he was not mentally ill at the time of the offense. He was convicted on both charges and prior to sentencing, his counsel requested neurological and psychoneurological evaluations, which the court granted. The doctor contended that McWilliams had some psychoneurological issues, despite exaggerating some of his symptoms. Before the sentencing hearing, McWilliams counsel received updated records from the commission as well as mental health records from the Department of Corrections. He requested a continuance so that he could further review the materials as well as help from an expert in psychological affairs to evaluate the materials. The state denied the request, and he was sentenced to death. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in claiming that McWilliams had received the level of care required under Ake. The State Supreme Court affirmed, and McWilliams sought habeas relief. The Magistrate Judge also agreed with the Court of Appeals that Ake had been satisfied, and the District Court judge subsequently denied relief, with the Eleventh Circuit later affirming.

Writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, Justice Breyer argued that the court’s decision that Ake had been satisfied was an unreasonable applicable of established law. The Court explained that Ake requires that in indigent cases where the mental health is relevant to the punishment the individual may receive, the state must provide them with access to a psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in preparation for, and conduct of, the trial. While Alabama did provide him with an independent examination, none of the other criteria were met, as no expert assisted in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the exam nor was he present during sentencing. The Court further reasoned that an evaluation of the medical records could have positively influenced McWilliams’ legal strategy. In fact, no expert aided counsel in direct or cross-examination of the witnesses at trial or even spoke at the sentencing hearing on McWilliams behalf. The Court maintained that these deficiencies demonstrates that the court’s affirming of the sentence was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts joined. The dissent argued that the majority eschewed its responsibility in addressing the very question for which the Court granted review, which was whether Ake sets forth that a defendant should have access to a mental health professional who is not just a neutral expert but instead a member of the defense. The dissent argued that Ake clearly does not establish this, and as such, the case should have been affirmed.

Statutory Interpretation

Shaw v. United States

Shaw v. United States involves the elements central to a defendant’s intent at the time of the crime. In this case, the defendant stole about US$300,000 by unlawfully transferring funds to his account from other bank accounts in his control. Shaw was indicted under the federal bank fraud statute, which criminalizes the act of knowingly defrauding a financial enterprise (18 U.S.C. § 1344(1)). Shaw acknowledged that he participated in the scheme but argued that he intended to defraud the individual, not the bank, and that the statute required an intent to defraud an institution rather than an individual. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument.

In a unanimous decision, with the opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court found each of the petitioner’s arguments without merit. First, the bank did have a property interest in the victim’s account, as they could do whatever they wanted with the funds deposited. Thus, a scheme to deprive a depositor of their funds is also a scheme to deprive an institution of their property. The Court also rejected the notion that Shaw did not know the bank had this interest, as ignorance is not a defense to the crime, especially since the Shaw willingly made false statements to obtain the funds. Also, the Court ruled that neither an intent to cause financial loss nor actual financial loss need to be demonstrated under the statute. Furthermore, the Court rejected Shaw’s argument that he needed to act with the knowledge to harm the institution and that such was his purpose, as there is no support for a criminal act to defraud needing more than knowledge of the act or scheme to convict. The court vacated and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for a decision on the merits of Shaw’s claims that the judge committed error in their jury instructions about whether a scheme to defraud a financial institution requires one to deceive or deprive it of property as opposed to deceive and deprive it of property.

Salman v. United States

In Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of tippee liability concerning insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5. In this case, Salman was indicted on securities fraud charges after trading on inside information he received from his relative by marriage, who had received the information from his own brother-in-law who worked at Citigroup. It was determined at trial that Salman had used the information knowing that it was from his brother-in-law, Maher Kara. While Salman’s appeal was awaiting a decision by the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit ruled that Dirks v. SEC (1983) requires “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship” to infer a personal benefit to the tipper when inside information is divulged and there is a potential for pecuniary gain (United States v. Newman, 2014). The Ninth Circuit disagreed in holding that Dirks permits an inference that the tipper breached their duty by divulging such information to a relative who was trading.

Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Alito declared that the Ninth Circuit was correct in its interpretation of Dirks, in that the jury could properly infer such a relationship between tipper and tippee. Salman challenged his convictions for insider trading and conspiracy by arguing that tippee liability does not hold in this situation, as it requires that the tipper’s goal is a financial benefit. The Court rejected Salman’s arguments because providing inside information to a trading relative is analogous to trading by the tipper followed by a portion of the gains. Salman knowingly traded on improperly divulged information that was gifted by the tipper to his friend, and as such, took on the duty from Maher and subsequently breached it.

Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions

In Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, the Supreme Court considered the victim age requirement as an element of a charge of statutory rape. The petitioner, who was 21 years old, pleaded no contest to statutory rape in California, where it is unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than 3 years younger than the perpetrator. California defined minor as under the age of 18; Esquivel-Quintana’s victim was 17 years old. Due to his conviction, removal proceedings against Esquivel-Quintana were conducted pursuant to the INA, since the Act allows the removal of any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that his crime was sexual abuse of a minor, with the Court of Appeals denying his petition for review.

Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas wrote that for the purposes of statutes criminalizing intercourse based on age alone, the federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires the victim to be less than 16. In this case, the Court examined whether Esquivel-Quintana’s offense constituted an aggravated felony based on a categorical approach, which essentially means that the crime is an aggravated felony if the “least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor” (i.e., based on the INA definition). In arguing that the age of the victim needed to be under 16, the Court held that the age of consent is 16 in most state criminal codes, as it was in 1996 when sexual abuse of a minor was added to the INA. Furthermore, in terms of understanding what a minor constitutes, the Court held that this refers to the age of consent, not the age of legal competence, and that if the Government’s argued definition was used, then it would define a federal offense as whatever is illegal under the law of the state of conviction. This is especially true since sexual abuse of a minor could potentially include victims who are almost 18 years old. Since the California definition does not fall within the federal definition, the crime cannot be considered an aggravated felony under the INA.

Dean v. United States

In Dean v. United States, the Supreme Court was tasked with evaluating whether a federal firearms sentencing enhancement (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence, could still apply when calculating a sentence for the base offense. Dean was convicted on several robbery and firearms charges since he and his brother had robbed multiple drug dealers, with Dean’s brother using a weapon to threaten and assault the victims, while Dean located the drugs and money. In this case, Dean was also charged with the firearms enhancement, which covers the “us[e] or carrying [of] a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such an underlying crime.” The statute requires a 5-year mandatory minimum for a first conviction, with a second conviction adding another 25-year sentence. Thus, Dean was to serve a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence consecutively to the other convictions he received. At sentencing, Dean asked the judge to consider the length of the total sentence by providing him with 1-day concurrent sentences for the other crimes, but the judge held that the statute precluded him from doing so. On appeal, Dean argued the District Court erred by failing to use its discretion to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines range. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that his sentence was reasonable.

In writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts reversed and remanded the appeal, holding that courts do enjoy the discretion to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines range when considering mandatory minimum sentences imposed. The Court argued that the Guidelines factors used to calculate sentences are used not only for the length of prison terms for each count but also for the total sentence levied. Thus, courts can consider sentences for other counts when calculating a sentence for another count. The Court held that nothing in the statute (§ 924(c)) demonstrates that courts cannot consider certain types of information at sentencing or even when considering sentences for counts not implicating the statute. Moreover, nothing in the statute precludes courts from imposing a 1-day sentence for the base offense so long as the mandatory minimum sentence runs consecutively to the base offense, per the statute.

Honeycutt v. United States

The Supreme Court in Honeycutt v. United States addressed the issue of joint and several (meaning multiple party) liability in conspiracy forfeitures after two brothers were indicted for federal drug crimes stemming from the sale of products that can be used to manufacture methamphetamine from a hardware store owned by one of the brothers. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, the Government sought US$270,000 from the brothers, as that is how much the profited from the sale of the product, and the statute requires forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” certain drug crimes (21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1)). One brother plead guilty and forfeited US$200,000, while the other brother went to trial and was convicted even though he did not profit from the enterprise nor did he have stake in the ownership of the store. The Government nonetheless sought joint and several liability against him, in seeking to recoup the outstanding US$70,000 in profits, but the District Court declined to do so since he was a salaried employee who had not profited from the sales. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, arguing that the brothers were both severally and jointly liable for the profits as they were coconspirators.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor argued that the statute limited forfeiture to property the defendant obtained as a result of the crimes, not the property obtained by his brother. The Court further reasoned that § 853 is focused on “tainted property acquired by the defendant,” which precluded the notion of joint and several liability.

Conclusion

The 2016 term was marked by a dearth of high-profile decisions involving criminal justice. While there were no particularly newsworthy decisions in the area, there were nonetheless a number of decisions that will have an impact on the day-to-day administration of the criminal justice system. These cases included decision involving police investigatory practices, prosecutorial misconduct, and the interpretation of criminal statutes. The term was also marked by the filling of the seat vacated when Justice Scalia died unexpectedly. Justice Neil Gorsuch became the 113th person selected to serve on the high court. It is early days, but it appears Justice Gorsuch will tread a path similar to the late Justice Scalia. Only time will tell. The 2017 term includes a number of cases dealing with significant criminal justice issues.