To Adopt or Not to Adopt: Contextualizing Police Body-Worn Cameras Through Structural Contingency and Institutional Theoretical Perspectives

Abstract

There has been an increase in the adoption of body-worn cameras (BWCs) by law enforcement agencies in the United States and abroad. While several studies have showed promising results in officer satisfaction, community satisfaction, and other outcomes, the rationale for the adoption and diffusion of this technology has received little attention.This article suggests that agency adoption of BWCs can be understood through two competing theoretical frameworks: structural contingency theory and institutional theory. Intended as a research note, the paper sets up a number of testable propositions and hypotheses pertaining to BWCs as contextualized through these theories and measurable through the recent Law Enforcement Management Administrative Statistics-Body-Worn Camera Supplement.

Keywords

police body-worn cameras adoption diffusion structural contingency theory institutional theory

Over the last few years, police agencies worldwide have adopted body-worn cameras (BWCs) at a rapid pace (Bud, 2016; Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer, 2015; Lum, Koper, Merola, Scherer, & Reioux, 2015; Miller, Toliver, & Police Executive Research Forum, 2014; White, 2014). BWC technology enables real time audio and video recording of activities from the police officer’s perspective. The recorded footage can be stored and retrieved at a later date (Coudert et al., 2015; White, 2014).

Proponents of BWCs tout several benefits. Cameras are hypothesized to have a “civilizing effect” (White, 2014, p. 6) on police and citizens, calming both parties and leading to amicable interactions and decreased resistance in coercive situations. Decreased resistance and less use of force reduces officer and citizen injuries and the likelihood of complaints (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Ariel et al., 2016a, 2016b; Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis, Jenkins, & Smith, 2015; Grossmith et al., 2015; Jennings, Fridell, & Lynch, 2014; Jennings, Lynch, & Fridell, 2015; Katz, Choate, Ready, & Nuňo, 2014; Miller et al., 2014). BWCs also provide a means of holding officers accountable for their words and actions, and ensuring compliance with legal search, seizure, and evidence collection procedures (Harris, 2010), concerns that marginalized groups of citizens and Civil Rights groups, such as the America Civil Liberties Union, may appreciate (Ariel et al., 2016a; Bud, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2015; Grossmith et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014; Scheindlin & Manning, 2015; Taylor, 2016). Such outcomes have the potential to positively impact community perceptions of the police organization as a whole (Ariel, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2015; Grossmith et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014). Improved community perceptions may lead to more citizen reporting of and assistance in solving crimes (Ariel, 2016).

BWCs have additional benefits. Some scholars suggest BWCs may increase officer productivity and efficiency (Ready & Young, 2015) and improve evidence collection by providing on the spot recording of victim, suspect, and witness statements, among other aspects of crime scenes (Bud, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2015; Katz et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2014; Victoria Police Department, 2010). The use of BWC recordings of police actions for training purposes has also been proposed (Coudert et al., 2015; Grossmith et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014). Further, some studies have found that officers have been supportive of the technology in protecting them from injury and unfounded citizen complaints (Jennings et al., 2014, 2015; Katz et al., 2014; Victoria Police Department, 2010).

Conversely, critics have pointed to drawbacks of the technology, including privacy concerns surrounding the recording of victim statements and the interior of people’s homes, as well as the recording of police officer downtime (Bud, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014; Taylor, 2016). Critics have also pointed to substantial start-up costs associated with purchasing and maintaining equipment, training officers, and developing new standard operating procedures regarding BWC usage and control of footage (Bud, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014; Taylor, 2016; Timan, 2016). Moreover, some police administrators have expressed concern that officers will be reluctant to use force when necessary or that the media will utilize footage from BWCs to embarrass and undermine officers (Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & Snyder, 2016). One study conducted by Ariel and colleagues (2016b) revealed a potential negative consequence of BWC use. Officers in their sample equipped with cameras were assaulted more frequently than those without cameras.

Despite criticism, it is anticipated law enforcement agencies will continue to invest in BWC technology (Bud, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015; Lum et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2014). In 2014, President Obama oversaw the creation of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing and the recommendation that the Justice Department provides US$75 million in funding for police agencies to purchase BWCs (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2015; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). Such funding opportunities have continued under the Trump administration. This push is interesting, as some scholars contend it is too early to know if BWCs will have the desired impacts with respect to improving police performance (Bud, 2016; Lum et al., 2015). Commentators have warned that encouraging agencies to equip their officers with BWCs is merely a false panacea, a technical fix to more serious underlying social problems (Ariel, 2016; Coudert et al., 2015).

Given the newness of BWCs, it is questionable why so many agencies are investing in it. The rationale for BWC adoption has remained underexplored with most studies focusing on the effects of the implementation of BWCs. Two studies have examined adoption decision-making and the diffusion of BWCs. Todak, Gaub, and White (2018) investigated the adoption of the technology using the diffusion of innovation framework. Nowacki and Willits (2018) examined adoption through a structural contingency theoretical framework similar to that proposed here, but used data from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey.

This article aims to contribute to this growing discussion by providing suggestions for testing two theories, structural contingency theory (Donaldson, 1995) and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), using questions from the newly released Law Enforcement Management Administrative Statistics-Body-Worn Camera Supplement (LEMAS-BWCS). Intended as a research note, this article is structured as follows. First, both theories will be explained and situated within the policing literature. Second, a discussion will be presented to illustrate how these theories impact the adoption of BWC technology. Third, some of the findings from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement Agencies, 2016 released in November 2018 will be presented along with commentary on how the findings relate to theory. Finally, the article will conclude with a discussion of future research directions utilizing the measures in the LEMAS-BWCS.

Theoretical Framework

Two theories can be utilized to explain the widespread adoption and diffusion of police BWCs: structural contingency theory (e.g., Donaldson, 1995) and institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These theories differ in their explanations and therefore lend themselves to research question and hypothesis generation. This section provides a discussion of each theory and how they are situated in the policing literature.

Structural Contingency Theory

According to Donaldson (1995), structural contingency theory proposes that an organization’s end goals are to achieve, maintain, and increase performance. To achieve maximum performance, the organization’s structure is rationally selected and adapted to fit the needs of internal and external factors, termed contingencies, that may adversely affect performance (Donaldson, 1995). Internal contingencies include organizational size and technology (Donaldson, 1995; Giblin, 2006). As an organization hires more employees, for example, more diversification of tasks will be required, or more technological resources will be needed to ensure employees possess the tools needed to perform their jobs efficiently (Donaldson, 1995). External contingencies relate to the task environment in which an organization is situated (Donaldson, 1995). In a policing context, external contingencies include the political environment, crime rate, or the socioeconomic status of the community (Giblin, 2006).

Structural contingency theory and the police

While structural contingency theory is typically applied to private, for-profit institutions (Donaldson, 1995), it has been applied to policing. Maguire (1997) examined how police agencies adapted their structures to implement community-oriented policing (COP), specifically through decentralization and flattening of the hierarchy. He found that actual structural change was minimal compared to the extensive changes called for by COP advocates (Maguire, 1997). Similarly, Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich (2010) studied structural change in relation to COP adoption and found minimal evidence of adaptation.

Some scholars have proffered testing competing theories simultaneously. To that end, Burruss, Giblin, and Schafer (2010) contrasted structural contingency, resource dependence, and institutional theories by isolating factors that predicted agency alignment with Homeland Security initiatives. Their study found more support for institutional predictors. Giblin (2006) compared structural contingency and institutional perspectives as competing explanations for police agency adoption of crime analysis units and found more support for institutional factors.

Institutional Theory

In contrast to structural contingency theory, institutional theory posits that organizations strive to achieve and maintain legitimacy with their constituents, stakeholders, and the public (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Sovereigns, such as the local polity, provide an organization with economic resources necessary for its continued survival (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, the organization is cognizant of and responds to the needs of the sovereigns, whether those needs help or inhibit the day-to-day operations of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Specific structures and practices are adopted that follow established societal norms that dictate how an organization in that profession should be structured and what tasks it should perform (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Crank and Langworthy (1992) were perhaps the first scholars to link institutional theory to the study of the police. They argued police agencies engage in behaviors and activities termed “myths” and “rituals” to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents even though such actions are not necessary to perform the day-to-day operations of the organization. For instance, police agencies continue to engage in preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and follow-up investigation despite empirical evidence that suggests such activities do not achieve crime control and prevention gains (Bayley, 1994; Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Yet, if an agency were to discontinue these tactics, it would risk losing legitimacy, support, and resources from the sovereign due to the near universal perception that these actions are what a proper police agency should do (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Thus, the agency will continue to engage in such activities, but they are only “loosely coupled” to day-to-day operations. That is, the agency will endorse such tactics publicly and engage in them even though they do not help the agency achieve its goals (Crank, 2003; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Institutional theory was further advanced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who conceptualized several processes to explain why organizations come to resemble one another over time, a concept they termed “institutional isomorphism.” They argue that formal and informal isomorphic pressures originating from external sources force an organization to adopt certain structures to maintain legitimacy and that such structural adaptation creates homogenization across organizations in the same field of practice. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) sources of isomorphic pressure include coercive, mimetic, and normative forces.

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism occurs when an authoritative body enacts a law, rule, or regulation that all organizations must comply with. For example, the commonly invoked Miranda warnings became routine practice in American police agencies after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when one organization copies the structure of another that it deems successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For instance, Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis (2003) documented the rapid adoption of the Compstat managerial model by police agencies all over the United States after its implementation and heralded success in reducing crime in New York City. Normative isomorphic pressure results from two sources: the need to establish formal standards of education and training and the need to be involved in a communicative network with other agencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Crank and Langworthy (1992) assert that organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) create standards that police agencies are expected to adhereto and that such standards are communicated through events such as annual meetings and also publications. The requirement of local law enforcement agency interaction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an example of the second type of normative pressure (Crank & Langworthy, 1992).

Institutional theory and the police

Institutional theory has been studied in relation to police organizations. Many discussions involve how various agencies have engaged in specific practices to demonstrate legitimacy to their constituents (e.g., Crank, 1994; 2003; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Katz, 2001; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987). For example, Mastrofski, Ritti, and Hoffmaster (1987) examined discretionary decision-making regarding traffic and DUI enforcement in several large and small agencies. They noted more vigorous enforcement in smaller agencies and suggested that small departments may have more of a need to assert legitimacy, thus they increasingly issued citations and made DUI arrests whereas larger agencies whose existence was more firmly established had the ability to be more lenient. Crank (1994) argued the development of COP, specifically the idea of the benevolent watchman safeguarding the community, was an institutional myth created to improve police and community relations in the wake of the professional policing movement and anti-Vietnam protests and Civil Rights demonstrations. Katz (2001) documented the creation of a police gang unit in a Midwestern community and concluded that it was developed in response to local concerns over gang problems despite little evidence that they existed. Maguire and Katz (2002) studied the diffusion of COP and found that agencies that claimed to have adopted it were only engaged in some of the practices entailed by the philosophy which they explained in terms of loose coupling.

Beyond issues of legitimacy, researchers have considered the impact of institutional isomorphic pressures on the adoption of various activities and innovations (e.g., Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, 2006; Giblin & Burruss, 2009). Two studies have utilized external funding resources as examples of coercive pressure (e.g., Giblin, 2006; Giblin & Burruss, 2009). In their study of Homeland Security preparedness, Burruss and colleagues (2010) investigated mimetic pressure through the use of surveying to determine the extent to which the respondent agencies modeled their preparedness efforts after other agencies, and other agencies they deemed successful. Similarly, Giblin and Burruss (2009) used survey questions about the extent to which agency adoption of COP was due to the fact that other agencies, and other agencies deemed successful, had adopted it. Lastly, Giblin and Burruss (2009) and Burruss et al. (2010) operationalized normative isomorphic pressures through measures pertaining to the responding agency’s perceptions of the influence of various academic and government literature as well as involvement in professional associations, such as the IACP, on shaping organizational structures and activities.

Toward an Integrated Theoretical Explanation of BWC Adoption

In his guidebook for police administrators, White (2014) points to four benefits of BWC technology. First, cameras increase agency transparency that increases the legitimacy of the police. Second, cameras improve officer behavior, citizen behavior, or both and expedite handling of complaints (White, 2014). Third, cameras enhance evidence collection. Lastly, cameras provide footage that is useful for training (White, 2014). Each point will be considered within the context of the theoretical framework provided by structural contingency and institutional theories.

The idea that BWC adoption improves the legitimacy of the police could be assessed through both perspectives. Under structural contingency theory, it is assumed police administrators are working toward maximizing the performance of the agency. What constitutes maximized performance in a policing context? The answer depends on how one defines the role of the police in society. There has been considerable debate as to whether the primary goals of the police are to fight and prevent crime, maintain order, provide social services, or an amalgamation of all roles (e.g., Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 1974; Wilson, 1968).

The debate about the role of police is beyond the scope of this article. However, some scholars assert that the general perception of the public is the police fight and prevent crime (e.g., Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 1974). Moreover, it has been argued that police officers themselves are evaluated and held accountable for their role as crime fighters. For instance, the felony arrest is highly sought among officers (Brown, 1988; Paoline, 2003). Similarly, police department managerial models such as Compstat base accountability mechanisms on performance criteria such as the amount of reported crime in a district and whether it is reduced over time (Silverman, 2006). Therefore, in assessing how police performance may be maximized, crime reduction can be considered a reasonable outcome.

If the primary goal of the police is crime fighting, then, under a structural contingency perspective, the effective police agency will maximize its crime fighting potential. As White (2014) suggests, BWC adoption has the potential to increase the legitimacy of the police by making police actions transparent. Increased legitimacy can result in crime control for two key reasons. First, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) suggests the police need cooperation from the public to detect, solve, and prevent crime, a point that has been argued for decades (e.g., Bayley, 1994; Garland, 2001). This is also the basis of the COP movement (Bayley, 1994; Skogan, 2006). Second, there is a growing body of research that suggests people are more willing to obey and cooperate with law enforcement when they perceive criminal justice system actors are legitimate (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Thus, an agency that adopts BWCs has the potential to increase legitimacy and achieve its goals of controlling and preventing crime through prosocial interactions between the police and the public.

The reverse could also occur. A police administrator may realize their agency lacks community support. As a result of lost legitimacy, the agency’s crime control efforts suffer. This leads to decreased performance. Investment in BWC technology may be a way of regaining fit by matching BWC adoption to the community needs.

However, the concept of police legitimacy is at the heart of any institutional argument (Crank, 2003, Crank & Langworthy, 1992). An agency that loses legitimacy with its sovereigns is at stake of losing resources and potentially not surviving (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, an agency could adopt BWCs as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate to its constituents that it is transparent. It is also noteworthy that BWCs do not seriously impede the day-to-day activities of officers equipped with them, a scenario reminiscent of loose coupling. Further, because the recording is triggered by the officer, some have argued that troubling incidents may go unrecorded (Coudert et al., 2015; Taylor, 2016). It is questionable that BWCs will change the day-to-day activities of officers.

If the adoption of BWCs is merely symbolic, it would not be the first time a police agency responded to a legitimacy crisis in such a manner. For example, Crank and Langworthy (1992) cite the public ousting of Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates in the wake of the Rodney King scandal as evidence the agency placated the public through the chief’s removal, yet the chief’s actions had little bearing on the events that led to the incident. Over the last few years, there have been several documented incidents of questionable police shootings, such as the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, and the deaths of suspects in police custody, such as the 2014 death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore, MD, which have threatened the legitimacy of the agencies involved and pitted them against the communities (Patterson & Swan, 2016). Some have postulated that BWC adoption is a response to such incidents (Culhane, Boman, & Schweitzer, 2016).

A second benefit of the adoption of BWCs is their potential to improve citizen behavior, officer behavior, or both as well as expedite the handling of citizen complaints (Ariel, 2016; Ariel et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2015; White, 2014). Structural contingency and institutional arguments could apply in explaining BWC adoption along these premises. If BWCs improve citizen behavior, officer behavior, and induce citizen compliance, it is possible that the legitimacy of the police improves as does cooperation and crime detection and prevention ends.

From a structural contingency perspective, if one considers service a goal of the police, then BWC adoption provides a means of ensuring quality delivery of service through improved officer behavior. For instance, in Wilson’s (1968) study of eight U.S. police departments in the mid-1960s, he describes the goal of the police in “service” style departments as being responsive to community concerns. The professional demeanor and politeness of the police in interactions with citizens were stressed by department administrators, and citizen complaints were investigated with vigor (Wilson, 1968). If a benefit of BWC adoption is improved officer conduct (White, 2014), it would stand to reason adoption would be touted in “service” style departments. Moreover, such departments may prioritize investigations of citizen complaints about officer improprieties and thus BWC adoption may be a way to expedite complaint processing. Complaints could either be sustained or dismissed based on the availability of BWC footage.

From an institutional perspective, expeditious handling of citizen complaints has benefits in placating the public. Departments that adopt BWCs can espouse speedy and unbiased resolution of civilian complaints through the use of camera footage. However, it is questionable whether efficient handling of complaints will impact citizen perceptions, specifically in areas where structural disadvantage is highly concentrated. While it is these locations where police and community relations are poorest, research has shown that residents in such places harbor cynicism toward the police and are unlikely to voice complaints through legal channels (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Cynically, it could be argued that police administrators may adopt BWCs to demonstrate to those constituents whose support actually matters, such as the local polity, that the agency is being proactive in their interactions with disadvantaged communities, yet knowing such places will not utilize the reporting mechanisms extended to them.

The possibility of a backfire effect also exists. When a citizen attempts to file a formal complaint against an officer, they are often informed that the incident was recorded and that they could be charged with lodging a false complaint if the footage does not align with their story. Such practices could dissuade citizen complaints and harm the public image of the police, thus threatening the legitimacy of the agency.

A third benefit of BWC adoption is enhanced evidence collection (White, 2014). BWCs permit recording of responses to calls for service and the documentation of crime scenes, including victim and suspect statements, in the immediate aftermath (Coudert et al., 2015; White, 2014). Some advocates also suggest that BWCs may increase officer compliance with Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules (Harris, 2010; White, 2014).

The utility of BWCs for enhanced evidence collection under a structural contingency perspective is apparent. If the role of the police is to fight crime, this ideology may extend to the collection of evidence to ensure successful prosecution of offenders. Thus, if procuring evidence to aid prosecution efforts is viewed as an agency goal, BWC adoption will maximize performance.

Conversely, an institutional argument can be advanced, specifically with regard to the use of BWCs to ensure compliance with Fourth Amendment procedures. On the one hand, an agency can tout the cameras as a means of ensuring officer compliance. On the other hand, the cameras have the potential of being easily, unintentionally (or intentionally) subverted, as the recording is often officer initiated (Taylor, 2016).

The possibility exists that constitutional violations may occur, but not be recorded (Taylor, 2016). Mal intent on the part of the officer need not enter into the equation. For example, Gould and Mastrofski (2004) demonstrated that some officers violated search and seizure procedures in routine citizen contacts that did not culminate with an arrest, thus such unconstitutional behavior was not detectable by the court due to its low visibility. Additionally, other research suggests that some officers have a limited understanding of constitutional guidelines and unknowingly engage in unconstitutional searches and seizures (Heffernan & Lovely, 1991). Therefore, it is questionable that BWCs will have an impact on search and seizure procedures unless there is reason to review the footage later, such as in the case of a citizen-initiated complaint or an arrest.

Lastly, White (2014) argues cameras may improve officer training. Footage acquired from real-life incidents recorded by BWCs could be critiqued, evaluated, and used as hypotheticals of the proper way to handle specific scenarios. From a structural contingency perspective, if the goal of increased performance is measured in training, then adoption of BWCs makes intuitive sense. Yet, under institutional theory, it could be argued that agencies could espouse to their constituents BWCs are being utilized for training. While footage from BWCs can be used for training, its use as a teaching aid does not translate to officers carrying out best practices in the field.

Moving beyond White’s (2014) explanations, there are other reasons agencies may adopt BWCs that have connotations for institutional perspectives. For instance, consider DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) sources of isomorphic pressure. In 2013, in the Federal District Court of Manhattan, Judge Scheindlin ruled that New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) Stop, Question, and Frisk program was unconstitutional as it promoted racial profiling of civilians (Long, 2013; White, 2014). Scheindlin ordered officers housed in precincts identified as having the highest number of questionable stop and frisks be equipped with BWCs to prevent instances of racial profiling (Long, 2013; White, 2014). NYPD’s compliance with the ruling is an example of coercive pressure.

Additional sources of coercive pressure include funding opportunities. A key recommendation of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) was agency adoption of BWCs. This was followed by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) allocation of US$20 million in funding for pilot programs to implement and test BWC technology (DOJ, 2016; Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2015).

Coercive pressures are not the sole source of isomorphic pressure, however. The DOJ Office of Justice Programs’ Bureau of Justice Assistance created an Internet-based clearinghouse of information on BWCs called the National Body-Worn Camera Toolkit. The website contains information and standards for agencies interested in adopting BWCs (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2018). Assuming the literature on the site proliferates, it may serve as a crucial source of normative pressure.

Testing the Theoretical Framework With LEMAS-BWCS

A recently released data set that is invaluable for theory testing is the LEMAS-BWCS. This is a supplement to the traditional LEMAS survey. It was first administered in 2016, and the results published by the BJS in November 2018. The report contains data from agencies that reported they had adopted or were in the process of adopting BWCs in 2016. Among the key findings, 47% of the 15,328 general-purpose law enforcement agencies surveyed had adopted BWCs in some capacity in 2016 (Hyland, 2018).

Agency Type, Size, and Adoption Trends

The survey revealed 80% of large departments employing 500 or more officers had adopted BWCs compared to 31% of local departments employing part-time sworn officers. Similarly, 58% of large sheriff’s offices had adopted the technology compared to 44% of smaller agencies who reported doing so (Hyland, 2018). These findings support the structural contingency orientation, as larger agencies have more of a need to exercise control over their officers/deputies (the size contingency). Conversely, those interested in exploring the complexities of this relationship from an institutional perspective may investigate agencies of different sizes with respect to adoption. Adoption of BWCs may be seen as legitimizing behavior, thus smaller agencies may be more likely to adopt if they perceive a need to assert their legitimacy, whereas larger agencies may not perceive such a need (see Mastrofski et al., 1987, for discussion of DUI enforcement in small departments as a means of demonstrating legitimacy).

Reasons BWCs Were Acquired

One series of questions sought to understand the reasons why the agency adopted BWCs. Table 1 presents a truncated version of the findings presented in the BJS report with respect to the reason for BWC adoption.

Table 1.

Reasons for Body-Worn Camera Adoption.

Reason for Adoption	Local (%)	Sheriff (%)
Improve officer safety	82.1	80.3
Reduce/resolve citizen complaints	81.4	78.5
Improve evidence quality	77.9	81.5
Reduce agency liability	78.6	74.1
Improve officer/agency accountability	73.5	73.6
Make cases more prosecutable	68.6	73.8
Improve officer professionalism	60.3	59.6
Improve community perceptions	58.2	50.3
Simplify incident review	49.9	52.1
Improve training	48.9	48.6
Reduce use of force	34.2	32.8
Strengthen police leadership	25.1	22.5
Pilot testing only	17.3	16.9
Other	15.5	14.3

Under the structural contingency perspective, if one considers crime fighting as the end goal of the agency, many of these responses make sense, specifically “improving officer safety,” “reducing and resolving citizen complaints,” “improving evidence quality,” “making cases more prosecutable,” “improving officer professionalism,” “simplifying incident review,” “improving training,” “strengthening police leadership,” and “pilot testing.” Conversely, reasons such as “reducing agency liability,” “improving officer/agency accountability,” “improving community perceptions,” and “reducing the use of force” could be construed as institutional arguments. Further, the “other” category includes options such as “to receive BWC funding,” “to relieve external pressure,” “to supplement or replace dashboard cameras,” “to increase citizen accountability,” “because BWCs were donated or free,” and “other agency-specified responses.” Receiving BWC funding and relieving external pressure could be construed as measures of isomorphic pressures.

While these data provide research opportunities, these measures are not without problems. First, many of the measures are amenable to either theory. For example, “reducing and resolving citizen complaints” could be construed from a structural contingency argument. If the agency is concerned with efficiency in handling complaints, BWC adoption may be a viable option to sustain or dismiss complaints quickly to achieve and maintain a high level of public service performance (if service is the end goal) or fight crime (if crime fighting is the end goal) through increased legitimacy which increases public cooperation with detecting and solving crimes.

However, the institutional argument is applicable too. Reduced complaints due to BWC adoption could be seen as a means of placating the public to restore or maintain legitimacy. Or, legitimacy could be threatened if the complaint process dissuades citizen complaints.

Future researchers must be very careful in structuring their research questions and hypotheses. Using the complaint example cited above, a directional hypothesis would have to be specified with respect to the investigator’s theoretical orientation and the effect they are testing. Sophisticated statistical modeling techniques, such as structural equation modeling (SEM), would be necessary. An advantage of SEM is its ability to combine confirmatory factor analysis of the theoretical constructs (to test whether the underlying theory is well represented) with path analysis (to test the direction and strength of each theoretical orientation at predicting variation in the dependent variable; Acock, 2013).

Another problem with these questions is the way they are presented to the respondent. On question 16 of the LEMAS-BWCS, the respondent is presented with a list of adoption reasons and asked to check all that apply. Incidentally, this is the data presented in the BJS report. On the one hand, the adoption decision is likely multidimensional, so measuring it in this manner is logical. On the other hand, it becomes impossible to distinguish which reasons are most important to the respondent. Question 17 attempts to clarify by presenting the respondent with the same list and requiring them to indicate the “most important” reason for acquiring BWCs and to select only one answer. While this is straightforward, there is the potential to lose variation. Future versions of the LEMAS-BWCS would be more useful if the respondent was presented with the list and asked to rank order the reasons in terms of importance, or perhaps just select the “top five.”

An additional improvement would be the inclusion of questions about the rationale for adoption as it pertains to mimetic pressure. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that agencies are more likely to mimic other agencies and, more specifically, agencies they deem successful. Thus, the following questions could be asked: (1) In terms of your agency’s adoption or nonadoption of BWC technology, to what extent did you model your decision to adopt or not adopt based on the actions of agencies like your own, and (2) to what extent did you model your decision to adopt or not adopt based on the actions of agencies you view as successful?

BWC Deployment

The report provides data on agencies that have fully or partially deployed BWCs. Table 2 displays some of the data with respect to deployment.

Table 2.

Deployment.

Type of Agency and Size	Full (%)	Partial (%)
Local police	59.5	18.8
500 or more	12.5^a	43.1
100–499	28.1	32.7
25–99	53.1	19.5
0–24	64.1	17.2
Sheriff’s office	48.8	27.1
500 or more	18.2^a	36.4^a
100–499	21.7	38.0
25–99	38.5	35.8
1–24	62.2	18.8

^aToo few cases to provide a reliable rate.

The trends generally indicate that full and partial deployment is realized less as the agency increases in size, though some caution in interpretation of the findings is required. The obvious implication is that increases in personnel require more BWCs and therefore more funding and resources. However, that may only be part of the story. In a follow-up question with respect to why adoption has yet to be fully realized, both local agencies (61%) and sheriff’s offices (71%) cite insufficient funding as the reason for not realizing full deployment (Hyland, 2018). Considering funding is but one source of coercive pressure, it would be interesting to explore the effects of coercive pressures on agencies of different types and sizes and how this pressure aligns, or does not, with adoption decision-making.

Formal Policies Regarding BWCs

The LEMAS-BWCS contains a series of questions with respect to whether the agency has formal policies regarding the use of BWCs. Among some of the findings, 86% of all agencies surveyed indicated they had some formal policies in place or were in the process of developing policy. Specifically, 86% of local agencies and 84% of sheriff’s offices that had acquired BWCs had formal policies regarding their use or a draft of a policy. Among all general-purpose agencies, 84% had specific guidelines about what events to record with BWCs, and 87% had formal policies regarding video transfer, storage, and disposal of footage. More than 45% of agencies had policies that required informing citizens that they were being recorded. About 9 out of 10 agencies required recording of traffic stops (Hyland, 2018).

These questions present opportunities to examine the influence of normative isomorphic pressures. Per DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conception of normative pressure, agencies come to resemble one another in structure and practice through the development and dissemination of formal policy. Crank and Langworthy (1992) assert the IACP is a source of normative pressure as it is a source of the promulgation and dissemination of standards that agencies are expected to follow. Past studies (e.g., Burruss et al., 2010; Giblin & Burruss, 2009) operationalized normative isomorphic pressures through measures pertaining to agency perception of the influence of various academic and government literature as well as involvement in professional associations, such as the IACP, on shaping organizational structures and activities. While the measures used in these studies are proxies, the original questions in the LEMAS-BWCS provide an opportunity to more directly capture the effects of the development of formal policy on other agency’s adoption decisions as well as how they tailor their own policies.

Nonadoption of BWCs

The LEMAS-BWCS contains a number of questions specific to agencies that reported they have not adopted BWCs. This provides a wealth of opportunities for comparisons between adopters and nonadopters. The differences between the two could be explored by logistic regression where adoption is a dichotomous outcome. Table 3 presents the reasons why agencies reported they did not adopt along local departments and sheriff’s offices.

Table 3.

Reasons Body-Worn Cameras Not Adopted.

Nonadoption Reason	Local (%)	Sheriff (%)	Primary State (%)
Video storage/disposal costs	76.7	76.2	71.0
Hardware costs	73.3	78.7	64.5
Ongoing maintenance/support costs	73.0	72.5	64.5
Public records request/video redaction costs	69.1	65.1	54.8
Privacy concerns	41.1	32.3	45.2
Training costs	38.6	39.6	29.0^a
Video transfer/storage issues	31.0	33.4	48.4
Liability concerns	26.1	21.0	19.4^a
Camera operation technical difficulties	18.1	19.2	19.4^a
No perceived need	13.9	10.8	35.5
Lack of support	7.6	5.8	6.5^a
Other	13.7	10.4	19.4^a

^aToo few cases to provide a reliable rate.

From a structural contingency standpoint, agencies can be compared along size factors such as the number of officers and nonsworn staff, and the budget. The hypothesis being that as agency size increases, so too does the likelihood for BWC adoption. Further, under structural contingency theory, the relationship between hard and soft technology and BWC adoption could be tested. Technology could be operationalized through measuring agency use of soft and hard technologies. Soft technologies include programs such as COP. For instance, Giblin (2006) proposed a correlation between agency involvement in COP and the adoption of crime analysis units. Similar research questions could be proposed about the relationship between COP and BWCs. For example, are agencies that engage in more COP activities also more likely to adopt BWCs?

Hard technology could also be examined under the structural contingency perspective. Specifically, the LEMAS-BWCS contains a series of questions with respect to alternate means of recording such as dashboard cameras, personal audio recorders, or other recording equipment. Scholars have recognized agencies that have already adopted previous technology are more likely to invest in new technology (Chamard, 2006; Skogan and Hartnett, 2005; Weisburd & Lum, 2005). Thus, these measures could be examined with relation to BWC adoption versus nonadoption to see whether this relationship comports with theoretical expectations. Moreover, the LEMAS-BWCS has a number of answer options pertaining to cost-relatedcontingenciessuch as“video storage/disposal costs,” “hardware costs,” “ongoing maintenance/support costs,” “public records request/video redaction costs,” and “training costs.” A line of inquiry here could be an examination of nonadoption for these reasons and their correlation with agency type and size. Per structural contingency theory, one would expect to find that smaller agencies would report these problems and thus nonadoption results more frequently than larger agencies which are more likely to be adopters or at least partial adopters.

The contrast between adopters and nonadopters also has implications for institutional theory. For instance, 13.9% local police, 10.8% sheriff’s offices, and 35.5% state agencies report “no perceived need” to adopt BWCs (Hyland, 2018). Why is this case? Could it be that state agencies are more firmly established thus do not feel as strong a need to assert their legitimacy?

What is the relationship between agency size and type and this specific rationale with respect to nonadoption? If one considers agency size, are smaller agencies more in touch with the community needs, and therefore have a better perception of if a need exists, thus their nonadoption decision follows that reasoning? Bivariate analysis of the relationship between agency size and the “no perceived need” option could be a good starting point to test if a correlation exists. If one is found, specific agencies could become the subject of in-depth qualitative case studies to explore the reasons why such agencies deem that a need does not exist.

Relatedly, 7.6% of local police and 5.8% of sheriff’s offices report a “lack of support” for adoption. Per Hyland (2018), sources of support include “community,” “agency,” “leadership,” and “patrol officers.” A line of qualitative inquiry could be conducted to understand the complexities of support from these various entities and which proves more or less important to decision makers.

Additional questions concern privacy or liability issues. For example, 41.1% of local departments, 32.3% of sheriff’s offices, and 45.2% of state agencies report nonadoption due to “privacy concerns” (Hyland, 2018). Similarly, consider that all three agency types cite “liability concerns” as reasons for nonadoption: local police = 26.1%, sheriff’s offices = 21.0%, and primary state police = 19.4% (interpret state police estimate with caution due to an insufficient number of cases; Hyland, 2018).

These trends are compelling and may tell some interesting stories. Under an institutional perspective, it could be argued that BWC adoption could be a means to increase legitimacy by way of increasing agency transparency. Yet, these figures present an intriguing counterargument. Why are some agencies taking this stance? Did those agencies who reported nonadoption for this reason experience some prior scandal that threatened their legitimacy in such a way that BWC adoption would actually have a backfire effect?

Possible insight could also be gleaned by consulting the “other” category as reported by 13.7% of local agencies, 10.4% of sheriff’s offices, and 19.4% of primary state police. Options here include “legislation/legal issues,” “need for improved technology,” “best practices unknown,” and “other agency-specific responses.” Further investigation should tease out the complexity of nonadoption decision-making, specifically with respect to each of these categories.

One caveat worth mentioning. This portion of the survey also suffers from a similar methodological limitation as the “reasons for adoption” section in that response options are not mutually exclusive and the respondent is encouraged to check all that apply. Thus, rank ordering importance for nonadoption with respect to the currently available data is impossible. Future researchers should be wary of this limitation.

Discussion and Conclusion

While many studies have addressed various facets of the backend postadoption decision-making with respect to the outcomes of BWC usage, very few studies have attempted to examine the frontend with respect to factors that encourage BWC adoption. It has been argued here that adoption can be understood through two competing perspectives derived from organizational literature: structural contingency theory and institutional theory. This article presented the basic components of each theory, described how each may be related to BWC adoption decision-making, and provided commentary and future directions for research based on these premises and the newly released findings of the LEMAS-BWCS. Intended as a research note, it is hoped that this article will spark new discussion and investigation with a strong emphasis on theoretical development.

While the sections above outlined the findings of the recently released BJS report, there are many areas left unexplored in the report, yet available to researchers through additional questions in the survey. The discussion now turns to and concludes with some possible research directions based on the additional, as yet unreported, survey data. Space limitations preclude a full discussion of every question in the survey and the implications with respect to each theory. Therefore, this is not a definitive list, but rather a guide suggesting some possible directions.

Questions 11 and 12 ask the respondent to indicate when their agency first adopted BWCs and how many were deployed. Under structural contingency theory, researchers could explore if increases in hiring or the budget are correlated with the investment in BWCs based on the date provided. Additionally, institutional theorists might examine these dates with respect to specific high-profile agency scandals as reported in the media. Qualitative methods and content analysis of internal and external documentation helped frame the inquiry in Katz’ (2001) examination of the adoption of gang units in a single agency.

Questions 19 and 20 pertain to the development of formal policies with respect to using BWCs and how policy was developed. Specifically, question 20 asks the following, “Were any published guidelines from independent sources (such as the NIJ, BJA, PERF, IACP, CALEA, etc.) used in the formulation of policies and procedures regarding body-worn camera deployment, use, or video storage?” This question taps isomorphic pressures specifically, normative and mimetic pressures. Future investigation could reveal the extent that these sources of pressure have on adoption decision-making and also the continued development of formal policies across agencies of different types and sizes.

Questions 28–49 assess the degree to which cameras have been assigned to personnel engaged in a variety of activities and specialized units. For instance, the survey asks the respondent to indicate if BWCs have been assigned to officers engaged intraditional patrol/vehicle-based patrols; primarily proactive/self-initiated public contacts; foot patrols; bicycle patrols; motorcycle patrols; traffic enforcement; warrant executions; criminal investigations; drug enforcement; detentions and transfers; and SWAT operations. Bivariate examination of camera assignment and reasons for adoption could shed light on structural contingency and institutional perspectives. For example, is there a relationship between camera assignment to officers that have a great deal of public interaction and the need to adopt based on improving community perceptions? Perhaps this could be construed as need to maintain or restore legitimacy, possibly in the wake of a publicized scandal.

Question 52 provides a matrix with statements coupled with an attitudinal Likert-type scale. Statements such as “BWCs provide reliable evidence of officer citizen interactions,” “BWCs have been useful in protecting officers from unwarranted complaints,” “BWCs have improved professionalism of officers,” and “BWCs have improved relationships between the agency and the community” could be used to asses a number of structural contingency or institutional arguments. For instance, what is the correlation between agreement on these statements and the number of complaints sustained (Questions 67–72)? Could this provide evidence of attempts to restore legitimacy in light of excessive complaints? Is there a relationship between agreement with these statements and the number of officers employed, thus organization size as an important contingency in need of management?

Question 66 pertains to perceptions of community support for BWC adoption. What is the relationship between community support and actual adoption or nonadoption for those agencies who have not adopted or only partially adopted BWCs? Would a correlation here provide support for an institutional argument? Additional questions with respect to complaints could also provide insight into the relationship between community support, complaints, adoption or nonadoption and also perhaps factors such as which officers are receiving BWCs.

In conclusion, this research note has only exposed the tip of the iceberg of the research options available to future investigators. In order for our field to continue advancing in a worthwhile direction, we need more theory testing. It is hoped that this note will start that discussion as it pertains to the frontend of the BWC craze.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Justin J. Smith is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Central Florida. He earned his master’s degree in criminal justice from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University, where he was the recipient of the Graduate Student of the Year Award for academic year 2012–2013. His research interests include a wide range of topics pertaining to police innovation, police culture, and organizational culture.

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