Abstract
This article provides an analysis of definitions and tools of merit systems in Asia compared to the United States. It traces the history of meritocracy in Asia and describes real practices in selected countries. The analysis is based on a framework investigating five dimensions of Merit systems: recruitment criteria; corruption in recruitment and promotion; political affiliation and influence; level of centralization of recruitment and promotion processes; and the extent of merit-protection regimes. Data are derived from a large-scale survey of civil servants of seven countries (United States, China, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines) and interview data from two countries (Thailand and the Philippines). Findings suggest that recruitment criteria in Asia are highly reliant on central examinations and education qualifications are becoming more important in many countries. Installed prior to democracy, merit systems in Asia are intended to build strong and loyal bureaucracies to shape an elite class capable of running the country. Despite having central exams, many Asian countries continue to face the problem of corruption and patron–client problems in recruitment and promotion. This stems from historical experiences and the loopholes in these processes. Merit systems in Asia are primary intended to remedy this problem rather than the issue of political intervention as understood in the United States. The study also reveals the relations between having a centralized system of recruitment and the need to be flexible and fast in hiring. Lastly, findings suggest Asian countries lagging behind the United States in terms of merit-protection regimes that include whistleblower protection laws and trainings on ethics and merit. This could be the answer to ensuring Meritocracy in Asia.
Civil service systems provide rules and guidelines for conducts of personnel management in all aspects, including recruitment and promotion. Aside from being vital for building high-performing public agencies, these rules and guidelines shape distinct bureaucratic characteristics and culture in each country. Among the many principles that shape these rules, one of the most important today is the notion of meritocracy. Despite its importance, scholars have neglected to study the Asian context of meritocracy. We do not know what it entails, what it is used for, how it is different from the United States and what are the challenges. First of its kind, this article fills that gap by providing an analysis of how meritocracy is used in several Asian countries compared to the United States.
There are at least three issues about the concept of merit that can differentiate Asia and the United States. First, on one hand, Asia’s meritocracy is much less about democratic values and is less concern about social inequality than in contemporary United States. Yet it is as much about building a class of capable bureaucrats that can efficiently and effectively work alongside elected leaders as envisioned in the beginning of the United States. In the United States, democratic principles laid the foundation for a merit system. On the other hand, in Asia the idea of merit was introduced much earlier than the notion of democracy. Second, in conjunction to the goal of building strong bureaucracies, Asia’s merit systems are less concerned about political ties and political preferences but more concerned about family, patron ties, and corruption in appointing unqualified civil servants. Third, meritocracy in Asia focuses on giving equal opportunities to all to enter the public sector. At the same time, paradoxically, Asian governments struggle to target only those of certain merit (i.e., education qualification) to enter the civil service. This article will discuss these claims by looking at examples from selected Asian countries.
There is great diversity among Asian countries. Any study that claims there is one Asian model is almost always wrong. Having this in mind, this study provides a first cut at how scholars can study meritocracy in diverse systems. Comparative approach not only allows us to understand others but also to understand ourselves better. The study starts off by asking several key questions such as what merit means in different countries, how is it used, who gains, and for what reason. To answer these questions, the authors suggest having an analytical framework that can draw out the differences, similarities, and nuances of how merit is practiced in different countries. The study has divided the elements of the merit system into five aspects: (a) recruitment criteria; (b) corruption in recruitment and promotion; (c) political affiliation and influence; (d) level of centralization of recruitment and promotion processes; and (e) merit-protection regimes. The aim is to highlight recurring challenges to the notion of a merit-based civil service system. Specifically the authors ask whether the concept of merit is defined and practiced differently in Asia compared to the United States.
This study draws on quantitative data from the large-scale survey that was administered by a team of academics in 2011 to civil servants in different ranks in China, Malaysia, South Korea, India, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United States in the analysis. Respondents were appointed public officials of all ranks. 1 In total there are 3,702 complete surveys. In the survey, government officials were asked about their recruitment and promotion processes, definitions of the merit system, and its evolution throughout the years. The survey methods are described in the symposium introduction.
In addition to the survey data, experiences from Thailand and the Philippines are specifically drawn on. Aside from reports and documents as secondary data, this article draws on face-to-face interviews with government officials; government websites, and documents as primary data sources as well as our own experiences in these civil service systems. In 2012, four directorial-level officials from the civil service commission offices of Thailand and the Philippines were interviewed. The interview questions focused on the definition, general practice of merit, and challenges in the respective governments.
The Concept of Meritocracy
The concept of merit has been used extensively to guide modern civil service management around the world. Merit principle in recruitment and promotion was advocated in the influential Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854) that was instrumental in introducing merit in Britain. The Report suggested dividing between “intellectual” and “mechanical” work in the bureaucracy; to recruit through open competitive examination; and to promote civil servants solely on merit rather than seniority (Fry, 1995; Pyper, 1995). In the United States, the call for merit-based appointments echoed clearly in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 (Ingraham, 1995). In addition, Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 essay, The Study of Administration, helped set the intellectual grounds for the politics–administration dichotomy debate. He argued against partisan politics and stressed the need to properly run the constitution (Wilson, 1887).
Max Weber (1946) long promoted this concept in his writings on bureaucracy, without using the exact term. Public offices are for independent, competent experts to work in and not to be exploited for rent or favors (Weber, 1946). He also noted that popular election of officers can endanger the expert qualifications of the officials and weaken the bureaucratic mechanisms (Weber, 1946). Later on, the exact term “meritocracy” was first used in 1958 by the British sociologist Michael Young. He defined the concept as intelligence plus effort (Young, 2008). This is opposed to aristocracy of birth and plutocracy of wealth. It is the hallmark of modern bureaucracies where public office is a place for proper profession. Young described “meritocracy” as a competing society that accepts inequitable gaps of income, wealth, and social position taking into consideration talents, merit, competencies, motivation, and effort (Young, 2008). Since its inception, literature on meritocracy has focused on various issues such as merit and economic inequality (Arrow, Bowles, & Durlauf, 2000); meritocracy in education (Klitgard, 1986; McNamee & Miller, 2004); the extent of a society being meritocratic (Krauze & Slomezynski, 1985); and merit versus patronage in the public sector (Ingraham, 1995; Mosher, 1982; Peters, 1995). Most of these studies are focused on Western contexts.
Overall we can infer that meritocracy is a policy that reinforces the notion of equality and competence as it rejects patronage, nepotism, corruption, and incompetence for entering the civil service. It is a system that values the principles of competition, open selection, careful evaluation of qualities, and of having a set of qualification standards and established recruitment process; rather than arbitrary appointment of individuals to civil service positions. Today, meritocracy in recruitment processes is often associated with having education qualifications, passing general exams, and satisfying position qualifications. In many cases this is accompanied by panel interviews and psychological tests. For promotion processes, meritocracy is associated with performance-based assessments of individuals with clear performance expectations and indicators to measure actions and results of work. However, having said the above, there are great variations in the choice of instruments and the reasons to install merit systems among governments. Before discussing the variations in detail, we will first describe a brief history of meritocracy.
Development of Merit Systems in Asia
There is evidence that the idea of meritocracy first emerged in Asia, prior to being practiced in Europe and then transferred back to Asia in modern times. Hobson (2004) indicates the concept of merit travelled from China to the West through translations of Confucius texts in the era of European Enlightenment. He writes that the Chinese followed “natural laws” of the market and this influenced the French laissez-faire concept and the respect for natural order and science (Hobson, 2004, pp. 194-201). The Confucian model of Imperial competitive examination was institutionalized during the Sui Dynasty in 622 AD and was held every 3 years beginning in 1066 (Teng, 1943). The purpose was to recruit talented and educated literati as government officials and avoid the ossification of social status structure. The criteria included loyalty to the emperor, understanding of the Confucian philosophy, and dedication to well-being and moral tenets. This led to schools being set up to produce statesmen who could read and write administrative papers for the Dynasty (Elman, 2000). Teng’s extensive research of systems in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Persia, Greece, and Rome confirmed that China had the first entrance examination system in the world (Teng, 1943). Other East Asian countries also adopted the system. Korea adopted the exams as early as in 958
The idea of entrance examinations was adopted by the British in India and then became known in Continental Europe before being transferred to the United States. (Hobson, 2004). In Europe, the concept of a written exam was only introduced in Cambridge in 1702 (Teng, 1943, p. 273). In 1806, the British decided to set up East India College at Haileybury to train Indian civil servants (Teng, 1943, p. 302). Trevelyan, who advocated for merit-based selection in the U.K. civil service in the famous Northcote-Trevelyan 1854 report, spent the early part of his career in the Indian civil service (Pyper, 1995). Aside from learning through the Indian experience, various writers in Britain, especially Thomas Taylor Meadows’ work in 1847 and 1856, showed admiration for the Chinese selection system (Teng, 1943). 2 Following Prussia, which adopted the system in 1770, the British adopted it in 1870 when it had difficulty finding suitable noblemen to serve the government (Mueller, 1984). France also briefly adopted the Chinese system prior to the Revolution (Teng, 1943). After the British, the United States made meritocracy into policy in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 after a disappointed office seeker assassinated President Garfield 2 years earlier. The goal of the new law was to eliminate political intervention in the recruitment and promotion for government jobs. This was done by introducing open competitive examinations that emphasized practical skills and knowledge. During the drafting stage of this law, the U.S. lawmakers and consultants were corresponding with Sir Northcote and Sir Trevelyan of the United Kingdom (Ingraham, 1995, p. 26).
The Confucian model of entrance exams was aimed to select the best and brightest to serve the Emperor’s offices (Berman, 2010). The exams were open to those from all regions. It helped to centralize administration and education systems, which in turn contributed to nation building for China as well as forming the technocratic-elite class. In China fairness and equal opportunity was promoted by the use of anonymous marking so that smart individuals could rise up to form the noble and elite class. On the other hand, in Britain the intent was to break the noble and elite class of Oxford and Cambridge graduates holding office power. This was evident when there were proposals to set up a civil service college to train future civil servants that had more practical training than the dominant graduates (Fulton, 1966). Furthermore, the traditional Chinese system had little to do with eliminating political intervention in the civil service such as in the United States. This still holds true today (Zhang & Zhou, 2010).
After many years, the merit-based civil service system in Europe and the United States has come full circle back to China. A form of merit system was already developed in China in the 1930s by Nationalists (ruling China from the 1930s to 1948) that transplanted the system to Taiwan after the Second World War. However, only in the 1990s did China begun to adopt new rules that has some resemblance to the standards in Western countries, such as open recruitment and internal competition for posting (Zhang & Zhou, 2010). The 1993 Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants mark China’s beginning of modern civil service. It is said to be comparable to the United States’s Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 (Tsao & Abbott, 2009). This includes open examination competition for civil servants at the entry level, stable employment, performance-based evaluations, university degree requirements, and competitive salary structures (Burns, 2007). Despite long histories of Confucianism in East Asia and the practice of entrance exams, many governments other than China only adopted formal civil service laws, which specify the definition and scope of merit, in less than 30 years ago. This includes South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore. Thus all this time, the competitive exams were implemented without the structure of the modern civil service system.
Meritocracy in contemporary Asia is closely associated with Weberian principles of an ideal bureaucracy coupled with Confucianism (especially in East Asia and perhaps less so in India) together with the Emperor’s paradigm of merit and/or the colonial master’s paradigm of merit. For example, based on its historical development and the absence of democracy defined by U.S. experiences, the definition of merit in China has a strong leaning toward party affiliation, which stems from the tradition of loyalty to the Emperor. Similarly, Thailand’s civil servants are praised for their sincere respect for the Monarch. The first public administration school in Thailand was set up specially to train civil servants to serve the Monarch’s offices. The notion of merit was introduced in 1928 in the first Civil Service Act that promoted the principles of competence, fairness, and merit (Sivaraks, 2011). It was, as a matter of fact, in effect briefly before Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932.
Aside from Emperors and Kings, in colonies throughout Asia, bureaucrats were praised for their loyalty to the colonial masters. It may also be argued that the merit system came along with the educational system installed by the colonizers; after all it was the level of education and intelligence of individuals that predicated the concept of meritocracy to avert “elitism” in societies and pursue equality. Singapore is a case in point where its merit system was part of the legacy of British colonialism bundled with the intent to select only the best and brightest in the Confucius paradigm. Macao under the Portuguese also adapted from the West and Confucius models.
At the time of independence, some countries inherited civil service systems and principles that were not yet proven to be successful in the colonial empire. For example, in the Philippines the merit system was first included in the Malolos Constitution 1899, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, to have competitive examinations. But it was never put into effect. The Philippine Civil Service Act was passed in 1900 with the objective of ensuring and promoting merit and fitness in the bureaucracy (Sto. Tomas, 1991, pp. 4-6). Under American rule since 1902, the foundation of merit was further enforced and institutionalized (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011; Reyes, 2011), especially since the United States had also just passed the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 to eliminate its spoils system (Reyes, 2011). The first public administration school in the Philippines was set up by the Americans with the aim of setting the foundation for the establishment of a professional civil service system with bureaucrats recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and fitness insulated from politics. But, while emulating the U.S. system, a handful of positions were reserved for presidential appointees. In this regard, the system served to link civil servants with the political power in place, which has influenced how the merit system has been used to strengthen political power today.
Differences aside, meritocracy systems in Asia face similar criticisms to systems in the United States and the United Kingdom. Factors that hinder a true meritocratic system include inheritance, social capital, cultural capital, luck, unequal access to education, and discrimination based on race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion, physical disability, and physical appearance (McNamee & Miller, 2004). Also the problems of nepotism, patronage, and corruption in recruitment and promotion are still a major concern in Asia.
Framework for Analysis: Five Aspects of Merit Systems
Based on the above discussions of the historical evolutions of merit systems in Asia, this section suggests a framework to investigate five aspects of merit systems. First we ask what the recruitment qualifications are. How important is the entry-level exam as a selection tool and what is the purpose for using it? Second we look into how the problem of corruption in recruitment and promotion is tied to the merit system. Is the merit system helping to solve corruption? Third, we ask how Asian countries view the issue of political affiliation and political influence in recruitment and promotion processes. Is there an aim to shield administration from undue political influence? Fourth, provided that most governments aim to have efficient recruitment processes, we investigate how centralized public personnel systems affect the level of efficiency in the selected countries. Lastly we explore the idea of merit-protection regimes or in other words the combination of tools to ensure merit is upheld in all aspects of human resource management. We ask what it can constitute and where the gaps are in Asian countries. These aspects were chosen based on observations of where Asian countries and the United States might differ. The table below illustrates general descriptions of each aspect comparing Asia and the United States. The table serves as a starting point for discussion. We acknowledge that merit systems are fluid and do change over time. We cannot generalize that all of Asia is the same. These aspects are thoroughly elaborated in the next section. There, we will see how some Asian countries do deviate from this table.
Framework: Five Aspects of the Merit System.
Recruitment Criteria: Are Examinations Necessary?
There is no one right way to interpret “merit” and no one right instrument to use. There are various tensions and contradictions in how governments operationalize the merit concept. On the choice of whether to have entry-level exams, all Asian countries favor this instrument to ensure meritocracy as opposed to the United States (see table 1). Of the 1,400 respondents in the United States, only 163 or 11.6% indicated that they must pass civil service examinations. On the other hand China, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines all had more than 80% responding that there is a need to pass civil service examinations. Among the Asian countries surveyed, Philippines and South Korea valued civil service examinations the most, at 89.3% and 88.8% respectively. Surprisingly, in South Korea educational qualifications are valued least (22.7%) and along with work experience (24.9%). Recommendations are also least important (1.5%). This appears to show that South Korea strictly interprets merit as open for all and heavily relies on exams for recruitment.
Merit Principles in Hiring and Civil Service Examinations.
The survey question is “My department upholds merit principles in hiring” (7-point likert-type scale, 1 = Strongly Agree—7 = Strongly Disagree). These are combined percentages of those who answered Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2) and Somewhat Agree (3). bThe survey question is “In my department, job applicants must pass civil service examination,” 1 = yes, 0 = no. cThe survey question is “In my department, job applicants must have appropriate work experience,” 1= yes, 0 = no.
Aside from entry level, exams are also used for promotional and midlevel hiring purposes. These are referred to as competitive exams. Only 38.4% of American respondents agreed that they must participate in competitive examinations where it existed. Whereas in China, India, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Philippines, more than 70% said such competitive exams were a must. This survey result does not suggest that competitive exams do not exist in the United States. They do exist but are used to a much lesser extent than in Asia for recruitment purposes (see table 1).
Despite having examinations, it does not necessarily mean that employees across Asia will feel that their departments uphold merit principles in hiring and promotion. For example in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, where there are stringent exams to enter the service, only about 35% of survey respondents agreed that merit principles are used in the actual hiring. These two cases were among the lowest in all the countries surveyed. More than 80% of respondents from Malaysia and China also confirmed that exams were crucial to pass, but 49.1% of respondents from Malaysia and 55.9% from China agreed that their departments practice merit principles in hiring. One exception is the Philippines where a high percentage (71.7%) of respondents felt their departments upheld merit principles in hiring. In the United States, 47.9% of the respondents or slightly less than half agreed that the departments uphold merit principles in hiring. Despite not widely administering examinations, this percentage is higher than South Korea and Taiwan.
This is also evident in the case of Thailand where every entry level requires an examination. In a separate survey conducted in 2008 by the OCSC in Thailand (Sivaraks, 2011, p. 132) 75% of the respondents were satisfied with their work but less than half thought that the performance appraisal was merit-based and only 30% support the outcomes of promotion decisions of their departments (Sivaraks, 2011, p. 132). Also in 2009, OCSC asked public officials at the departmental level whether they agreed that the organization applies merit concepts in operations (The Office of Civil Service Commission, 2009). The response was 2.85 on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). This was one of the least favorable answers, second only to “progress in career path” which scored 2.83 (The Office of Civil Service Commission, 2009, p. 10). Thus having entrance exams does not translate into employees feeling that meritocracy is practiced. This debunks the myth that having central exams alone can help to ensure the sense of meritocracy in the recruitment process. These findings suggest that entry-level exams and competitive exams are not the only tools for effective merit-based recruitment. The exams must be accompanied by other criteria and methods of selection.
Selection processes in Asia are beginning to include other dimensions other than examinations. For example in Thailand, merit-based recruitment refers to selecting candidates based on their knowledge and competency; and having selection processes that ensure equality, fairness, and government interests (Civil Service Act of 2008). The selection processes are becoming more sophisticated than just multiple choice exams, they include numerical, verbal, and reasoning ability, and command of the Thai language. The specific knowledge section focuses on sets of expertise such as accountancy. The assessment of position suitability uses many tools including a review of the personal history record, work experience, a psychological test, and a competency test. In the Philippines, recruitment is shifting from requiring minimum standards of education, training, and relevant work experience to value dimensions, integrity, honesty, courtesy, love of service, and work ethic. These are characteristics that are very difficult to measure but nonetheless important for selecting the right candidates.
Also, to maintain their competitiveness to hire compared to the private sector, many governments make exemptions for certain experts, including lawyers, engineers, doctors, and scientists, where they are not required to sit the competitive exams. In sum, we can say that countrywide examination systems incorporate the Confucian model to find talented generalists but only through more thorough selection processes that governments can tease out the most qualified specialists. And for some specialists, exams are not necessary at all.
Aside from exams, many governments also use education qualifications as recruitment criteria. The usage of education qualification is linked to choices on the trade-off between open-for-all versus a targeted approach in recruitment. For example, as mentioned above, of the 269 respondents in South Korea, 208 or 77.3% indicated that there is no set education qualification for entering the civil service. This is to ensure that the system does not discriminate against those without higher degrees. This is an open-for-all approach. On the other hand, in both Thailand and the Philippines the issue of merit has shifted to find ways to attract the best and brightest to join the public sector as well as the need to curb corruption and nepotism. It is becoming less about equal opportunity to all and more about flexibility in hiring and promotion to compete with the private sector. It is moving toward a targeted approach to recruitment. These changes from open-for-all approach to a targeted approach are not without resistance. For example in 2011, law students sued the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) of Thailand for adding a clause to specify qualifications for an entry-level exam (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012). According to the Civil Service Act 2008, recruitment must be based on merit through competitive exams unless otherwise exempted due to special circumstances. Qualifications for applicants cannot be too specific. In this case OCSC specified the education level and also that those who graduated from college with honors could be exempted from the first exam. They were sued in the administrative court by a group of law students for being not meritocratic. OCSC lost the case and had to change its qualification specifications. This case depicts how OCSC faces challenges in trying to attract talented individuals to join the public sector, which needs a targeted approach, while the definition of merit in Thailand at large still values an open-for-all approach.
In addition to exams and education level, governments also use work experience as another criteria for recruitment. Compared with other countries, work experience is more highly valued in the United States as a criterion for recruitment. Almost 88.8% of the respondents to our survey of U.S. officials agreed that civil servants must have appropriate work experience. The United States gives much more weight to work experience than the ability to pass written exams. This probably reflects the selection process in the United States that is based more on interviews than written tests, which allows selection to be based on a combination of competencies. Among Asian countries, the Philippines seems to value work experience the most (77.9%). While in India, Malaysia, and especially South Korea, work experience is not an important qualification for recruitment. In the two Confucius societies of China and Taiwan 55.2% and 61.8% of respondents respectively said that work experience was important. This shows that aside from passing an exam, the cv and work experience are also somewhat important in China and Taiwan but perhaps not as important as in the United States.
In sum, entry examinations are widely used in Asia to ensure fairness in the selection process. This is probably due to the influence of the Confucius examination model from the past. Compared to Asian countries, the United States gives little importance to written exams but relies heavily on interviews and work experience. Due to the limitations of exams, most Asian governments have begun to combine examinations with other instruments to select the right person for each job. Some governments are moving toward more stringent education qualifications. Although some in Asia see this move as being nonmeritocratic and would rather continue an open-for-all approach, obviously there is no one right way. Proponents of various approaches should understand the implications that different criteria have. The bottom line is that merit systems are operationalized differently in different countries depending on the principles valued. We should always question what it actually means in practice and which instruments are used to measure merit.
Corruption in Recruitment and Promotion
Recruitment and promotion are becoming increasingly entwined with increased mobility between public and private sectors, making the issue of corruption in recruitment and promotion a complex one. It is worth noting that the buying and selling of public positions is not new. During the colonial days there was widespread buying of office positions around the globe (Reyes, 2011, p. 337). It was practiced in places such as France, Prussia, and India (Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996; Reyes, 2011). This problem still persists in some countries today. For example, there is still widespread corruption in selling civil service posts in China, especially in local governments and poorer inland areas (Burns, 2007). Burns (2007) categorizes China as having two systems—one that relies on competition, performance, and strong discipline and the second that operates as the employer of last resort, irrelevant selection criteria, and high levels of indiscipline and corruption.
Aside from buying and selling posts, selection and appointments are sometimes based on patron–client relations. Our interviews and survey data show that having central exams does not necessarily mean that there is no favoritism in hiring and promotion. The United States has the lowest percentage (32.1%) of employees who think there is favoritism in hiring and promotion, despite not having central exams. On the other hand, Malaysia and South Korea has the highest (49.1% and 44.2%, respectively) despite having central exams (see table 2). Apparently, favoritism in hiring usually occurs after the central examination stage.
Favoritism in Hiring and Promotion. a .
The survey question is “There is favoritism in hiring or promotion” (7-point Likert-type scale, 1 = Strongly Agree—7 = Strongly Disagree). These are combined percentages of those who answered Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2) and Somewhat Agree (3). For the Philippines the survey was conducted with only high-ranking officials. Despite the different set of sample group from other countries we still feel that the data tells an interesting story.
Interviews with Thai officials reveal that this can occur during the second and third stages of the selection process, after the candidate has passed the first stage of general written examinations. At the first stage the entire process is centralized by the OCSC, while the respective bureaus and agencies conduct the second specialized examinations and the third stage interviews. This second stage is where insiders might, for example, leak the exam questions (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012). Also during the third stage of the interview process, those who have connections might receive much better scores than others. “They might favor sons and daughters of elite families to receive the position” (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012).
Our data also revealed at least three other possible channels for corruption and patron–client relations in the selection process. First, countries where good recommendations from government officials are more important than others are the Philippines (21.4%) and Malaysia (15.3%). This practice, if misused, can lead to patron–client relations, where the person hired feels indebted to the person who made the recommendation. In addition, 25.6% of respondents from Malaysia state that to enter the service one must know a supervisor or agency head. This is the highest among all the countries surveyed. The second highest is the Philippines at 16.8%. The United States and South Korea scored the least at 2.4% and 1.5%, respectively. It is possible that this is a sign that there is higher patron–client relation in Malaysia and the Philippines compared to other countries. And third, based on interviews with Thai officials, there is also possible corruption in the selection of contract-based public employees. Usually the terms are for 4 years and each department has full discretion on how to select and who to select. As more and more positions in the public sector are contract-based rather than tenure appointments, this appears to be an important problem to address.
Aside from the outright patron–client problem, there is an inherit tension with merit when selection processes favor internal candidates. An internal person probably can answer the specialized questions more easily than an outside applicant. They would have a comparative advantage because they are part of the organization. Also sometimes the exam questions are designed with the intention of giving advantage to the internal employee. No doubt from outsiders’ point of view, this practice would be seen as nonmeritocratic and perhaps a form of corruption. In Asia, it is an open debate whether this is considered nonmeritocratic or a smart way to support internal employees’ career advancement.
Political Affiliation and Influence
There is a danger in using merit system to legitimize the ruling class. As warned in Young’s (2008) satire writing when he quoted Rawls’ reminder that fair opportunity could lead to “a callous meritocratic society.” Societies can become comfortable and social status and prestige preserved through the rationale that those in power came up through the ranks by merit. The irony is that those in power are often reluctant to rebalance the society by examining faults or biases in the established merit system of their society. In democratic settings, patronage might persist due to the incentive for political parties to gain influence over bureaucrats (Evans, 1995; Geddes, 1994; Haggard, 1990; Lewis, 2008). Thus in many countries, despite having a merit-based entry to the civil service, the promotion and rotation opportunities are still very much tied to political loyalty.
When the United States reformed its spoils system to the merit system in 1883, it was to reduce political appointees who were loyal to superiors in government but did not have the right qualifications. Meritocracy in the United States was about limiting political intervention in the civil service for the bureaucracy to be more efficient and effective. It was to eliminate the political patronage system (Ingraham, 1995; Peters, 1995). It was also to rid elitism in the United States, as Young (2008) has argued. Young popularized “meritocracy” in reaction to the rising “elitism” whom he referred to as those with the belief that their advancement comes from their own merits while many others viewed them as beneficiaries of nepotism (Young, 2008). The main paradox in the United States was how to make sure that neutral-meritocratic civil servants were responsive to the democratically elected political leaders (Ingraham, 1995). Peters (1995, p. 91) called this the problem of establishing bureaucracies with “responsive competence” rather than “neutral competence.”
Democratization process is an important factor to understand how each government views political neutrality. In Asia there is a stronger sense of using merit to build an elite class of civil servants than in the United States. The issue in Asia has been hardly about this tension between democratic politics and the merit system; it was simply about how to get the best people to serve the government and do away with patronage–client relations in the appointment of civil servants, that is, how to make the system fair for all and corruption free. The word “patronage” in the United States has meant political ties, whereas in Asia it has meant family and friend ties. The politics–administration dichotomy debate in the United States argued for bureaucrats to be nonpartisan, be politically neutral, and to serve the democratically elected leaders of the day. In contrast, many Asian countries went through democratization processes much later than when they adopted merit systems for the civil service. Asian governments were tasked to setup strong bureaucracies that could work hand in hand with political leaders. In other words Asian governments have focused on creating a “responsive competent” bureaucracy from the start. Regardless of the political system, the bureaucrats are to be responsive to political leaders and there was no shying away from the intention to create an elite class of public servants. With data and examples, this next section elaborates on this claim further.
Political affiliation
Some countries use a merit-based process to select the best into the regime or to join the ruling party (e.g., on Singapore, see Tan, 2008). Some have party membership as a prerequisite for joining the civil service. While most systems do not explicitly state this conditionality, as it would be considered nonmeritocratic from the public’s point of view but in practice it can be accepted as a hidden norm. China is the prime example in Asia. In China, civil servants in the Ministry of Personnel and personnel departments of all government bodies must be Communist Party members (Burns, 2007). Party members make up 5% of the total population but they hold 80% of the civil service posts (Burns, 2007, p. 69).
Thus the Chinese 1993 reform never accomplished making the civil service independent from the Party nor was it the intent. Furthermore the most current State of Civil Service Law in 2005 was actually a move to strengthen the Party’s hold on leadership change and management at various levels (Chan & Li, 2007; Zhang & Zhou, 2010). The Party continues to hold absolute power over cadres (i.e., Party and State organs, institutions and enterprises) and civil servants because political positions and civil service positions are unified into one scheme (Chan & Li, 2007). This allows career mobility between political and administrative positions. The fusion of politics and administration is seen as a positive step to foster highly competent administration (Chan & Li, 2007). Chan and Li (2007) argue that this is similar to the increase in political appointees in the U.S. federal civil service. The idea of a separation between politics and administration is an alien concept in China. There is no such thing as political neutrality (Zhang & Zhou, 2010).
In our survey, 55 respondents out of 458 in China, or 10.7%, said membership in a political party is taken into consideration for entering the civil service. Compared with other countries in Asia, this percentage is high, confirming the claims made. The percentages in other countries are United States (0.7%), India (2.0%), Malaysia (1.1%), South Korea (0.4%), Taiwan (3.7%), and the Philippines (4.6%). In Taiwan, bureaucrats were typically expected to be loyal KMT party members during the Chiang Kai-Shek regime, but this is not the case today under democratic rule. In Singapore, the People’s Association Party that has been in power for more than 40 years still has strong hold on appointments of all leading positions in government (Tan, 2008). This is practiced through the control by the elite group of Administrative Officers. In less democratic systems like Singapore and China, there is a higher tendency for party affiliation or party loyalty to be used as a condition for appointments into the highest levels of civil service. Arguably in one-party political systems, the definition of merit—in the sense of civil service neutrality—does not fit comfortably with practice.
Political influence in appointments
While some countries in Asia are comfortable allowing politicians to exercise full control over bureaucrats such as in China and Singapore, other civil service systems struggle to maintain independence from political influence in appointments. For example in Thailand, the role of a civil servant was originally to serve the Monarch. Up until today, royal badge-giving ceremonies and title recognitions are still very much part of the pride and nonmonetary incentives for the average Thai civil servant. Due to this history, the civil service has always had a distinct identity of its own and is not subject to control by politicians. Currently, as democracy has matured in Thailand, elected politicians are finding ways to better control bureaucrats and hold them accountable for policy implementation through interventions in promotion processes. A clear example of this is the new Civil Service Act 2008; Section 57 stipulates that representatives from the cabinet head the promotion committee for permanent secretaries, directors, and deputy directors for key agencies. The ministers often have tremendous power to nominate and approve these positions. At the same time, Section 42 states that “consideration of merit, promotion, and conferment of benefits must be carried fairly through work products, capacities and behaviours, and political views or political affiliations shall not be taken into consideration” (Office of the Civil Service Commission, 2009). The contradiction in these two articles illustrates the ongoing struggle of the Thai civil service to resist political influence. Aside from Thailand, based on the survey data, most high-ranking civil servants respondents in the Philippines (76.7%) think that there is interference or pressure from politicians or other influential persons in hiring. The other higher countries are China (51.6%), and Malaysia (52.3%). The United States (23.4%) and South Korea (26.1%) have the smallest percentage of respondents who believe that there is interference.
As an illustration, these are the details on the Philippines. In the Philippines, powers are vested in the president for appointees, including secretaries and undersecretaries of the executive departments. Many have acknowledged that political patronage is a persistent problem in that nation’s civil service (Asian Development Bank, 2005; Domingo & Reyes, 2011). This problem is evident in both the Career Executive Service (CES) and the noncareer executive appointments. The Philippines inherited the CES from the United States since their colonial days. President Ferdinand Marcos created it in the 1970s initially to purge the civil service of unqualified personnel (Reyes, 2011, p. 348). Members of the CES in the Philippines are appointed and promoted on a track separate from normal civil servants. The Career Executive Service Board recommends and the President makes the final decision. The CES comprises of 1.2% of the civil service or 13,316 appointments (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011, p. 430). According to the Presidential Decree No. 1 issued by Marcos after he imposed authoritarianism in the country, the CES was “to form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.” (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011, p. 430). This shows how CES was originally used to strengthen political power of the ruling party rather than political neutrality of civil servants. While most CES officers, now, go through the examination process, a handful of career executive positions are still freely appointed by the President. In the United States, this is desirable because presidential control over the merit system is part of democratic politics (Ingraham, 1995). But in the Philippines, reformers are struggling to balance this power that has been abused frequently. Currently there are efforts to minimize this discretionary power by having all candidates pass selection exams (Domingo & Reyes, 2011, p. 414). Also there is an effort to provide political appointees with 3-year tenure and to prevent them from being transferred without their consent. This will actually provide legitimacy for political appointees to be in position longer than the political party that selected them.
Aside from CES officers, the noncareer executive officers are directly appointed by the President. The number of noncareer executive appointments is 1.2% or 13,329 (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011, p. 432). These officers may be transferred to another office without their consent and they resign when their political leaders step down from office. These are called “courtesy resignations.” These officials are mostly loyal to politicians rather than to the cause they are serving. This leads to unstable policy implementation, diminished institutional knowledge, and lack of career paths for the officials. Thus reducing politicization of both the CES and the noncareer executives is the key to the Philippines’ civil service merit reforms (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011, p. 450).
In sum, in countries such as China and Singapore, merit systems emerged from the need to find the best and brightest to serve the ruling party and be part of the elite class. The debate in the Philippines is centered on injecting a merit system to get rid of patronage and corruption. In Thailand, the merit system has been used to help ensure civil service independence from political control. Each country is at different levels of democratic development and do not necessarily view political affiliation and influence as undesirable. In places where it is seen as undesirable, it might be for very different reasons compared to merit system in the United States. The important point is that each country has differing objectives for using the merit system. Depending on the type and level of democracy, Asian countries are at different junctures in deciding the desired relationship between elected politicians, party leaders and civil servants.
Level of Centralization of Recruitment and Promotion Processes
Governments usually struggle to balance between a centralized public personnel system and a more decentralized-flexible process for selection and hiring. Most countries that have exams at the entry level would usually also have centralized examination processes, which mean there is a single agency to administer the exams. For example, Thailand’s general entry exam usually has approximately 600,000 applicants each year. OCSC sets up 17 examination centers in universities and colleges around the country. According to interviews, the capacity of the facilities places a major restriction on how many applicants can take the exam at any one time. Due to lack of resources, the exams are only offered once a year. Of the 600,000 who take the exam, about 20% will pass the exam and are listed. Many agencies have asked OCSC to conduct the exams more often because the list becomes outdated very rapidly. People do not wait when the process takes too long, which sometimes could be up to 1 year. People find other jobs and the list becomes invalid (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012). Clearly the OCSC cannot meet the demands for fast and efficient hires. This is one of the reasons the Thai public sector cannot compete with the private sector when recruiting talented individuals. One interviewee said, “The problem is we never get the cream of the crop. We do not target enough and we do not have a strategy to compete with the private sector for attracting talent” (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012).
Our data from the survey also demonstrate this point. In all the countries combined, we found a small negative correlation between the ability to hire candidates quickly and the requirement that candidates must pass the civil service exam (–0.121). Apparently there is some inherent trade-off between having a centralized examination and the ability of agencies to quickly hire.
One reason for this tension is the sheer number of applicants. The number of applicants in Thailand is very high partly because vocational degree holders, as well as bachelor degree holders, are allowed to take the exam. As mentioned in the previous section, in Thailand, it is considered nonmeritocratic to be too specific on educational qualifications. Bureaus are allowed to exempt applicants from central exams and administer interviews only for applicants who hold degrees that are hard to find, degrees that are lacking, degrees that normally do not look for public sector job, and degrees that are produced in limit numbers. This goes back to the argument about the definition of merit that Thailand is using.
To give more flexibility in recruitment, OCSC has begun to devolve its authority to line ministries’ human resources departments. However only a handful of large ministries have the capacity to administer exams and select the candidates. Most ministries still prefer to rely on OCSC’s accumulated expertise in recruitment (Interview with OCSC, April 2012). Another solution to ease the slowness in centralized systems is to make better use of information technology. In Thailand the exam is administered only once a year, the Philippines have computerized exams that are administered 3 days a week. There are early efforts to introduce computer-based exams in Thailand but the venue is still restricted to Bangkok (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012).
However, having said the above, when we unpack the small negative correlation number we find that whether a merit system is centralized or decentralized employees might feel that they still cannot hire as quickly as they would like. For example results from our survey show that in the United States only 42.1% felt that they were able to hire candidates quickly despite being in a seemingly flexible system with little reliance on exams. In contrast 53.7% China and Malaysia respondents felt they were able to quickly hire despite having centralized exams (see Table 3).
Examinations and Ability to Hire Quickly.
From the cases and survey data, it can be inferred that centralized personnel recruitment systems can also offer efficiency. The evidence to suggest that centralized systems will impede the ability to quickly hire is not strong. Decentralized-flexible systems can also be inefficient. There must be other factors at play that we have not observed. These could be various forms of red tape, which often leads to lack of efficiency. This warrants further research. Overall, we can infer that most governments do want to speed up the recruitment process, while maintaining the accepted norms of merit. By not doing so, the public sector will never be able to compete with the private sector for talent. But it must do so by clearly knowing the capacity of the central agency, capacity of the line ministries, and the demand from the public to take the exams, in addition to the definition of merit that the public agrees with. Only then can governments come up with the right balance between centralize and decentralized personnel systems.
Merit-Protection Regimes
The findings from our study show that merit systems are upheld and protected through a variety of channels. The combination of the various channels is referred to as merit-protection regimes, which constitutes institutions, rules, and norms. In some countries merit-protection regimes are well designed and are strong while in others are weak and fragmented. To have a good merit-protection regime, it is insufficient to only have entrance exams. And a case like the United States demonstrates that exams might not be necessary at all if there is a good merit-protection regime in place. Merit is protected in the United States by having qualification standards in job advertisements. About 83.8% of the respondents disagreed that there are no qualification standards in the United States, by far the highest percentage in all the countries (see table 4). On the other hand qualification standards are not included in job ads in China and South Korea. Partly this can be due to the effort to enhance fairness and equality by not specifying too rigidly the qualification standards for each position. But this allows for discretionary power for recruiters that might compromise the merit system.
Qualification Standards, Standards of Merit, Whistleblower Protection, Ethics Training.
The survey question is “Many positions do not have qualification standards” (7-point Likert-type scale, 1 = Strongly Agree—7 = Strongly Disagree). These are combined percentages of those who answered 4 to 7.
Aside from qualification standards in job advertisements, complaint channels and whistle-blower protection laws are important components to ensure that a merit system is protected. Compared to the United States most Asian countries are lagging behind in having these components. For example most lack whistleblower protection laws or most respondents think that there is no such law. Most U.S. respondents knew of whistle blower protection laws (72.0%). The Philippines has a merit system and promotion board at various levels. They address many concerns and receive complaints and grievances pertaining to merit selection. However only 13% of high-ranking officials we surveyed knew that there were such laws. This is the lowest among the seven countries surveyed. In China and Malaysia only 35.2% of the respondents said there were whistle blower protection laws. And in India there were 20.9% and in Taiwan 23.9% respondents who knew of their own whistle blower protection laws (see Table 4). Generally in Asia, there seems to be high discrepancy between the law and its actual enforcement.
Thailand’s Merit System Protection Commission (MSPC) is an example of an institution part of the merit-protection regime. Thailand adopted the MSPC model from the United States’s Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB is an independent, quasijudicial agency with responsibility for deciding Federal employee appeals from personnel actions taken against them, protecting the integrity of the civil service and other federal merit systems, and conducting studies of the civil service and other merit systems in the Executive Branch. In Thailand, the OCSC is the secretariat for the MSPC as well as the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Thailand’s MSPC is the agency that hears appeals involving unfair treatment within the public sector including unfair discharge from the service and disciplinary punishment. It is a place to file complaints against supervisors. MSPC can also ask agencies to change rules and guidelines that are not based on merit principles. In addition to MSPC, the mechanism to protect merit is enhanced through the judiciary—the administrative courts. Currently, it is very easy to file court cases against abuses of power. Civil servants are feeling that work is not as enjoyable as before because the public can easily file law suits against them (An official of OCSC, personal communication, March 29, 2012). Whether these new institutes will be able to protect merit in Thailand is to be seen. But these institutes are examples of how governments are beginning to compliment entrance exams with other channels to protect the merit system.
In addition to setting up independent commission bodies, performance-based management systems can also help to protect the merit system. For example, the Philippines has rolled out Performance Management System that links up individual performance (the Office Performance Evaluation System—OPES) with organizational performance (Organizational Performance Indication Framework—OPIF) and ultimately to the national plan or the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). This is in the hopes of developing a rating system that can assess individual performance for better decisions on tenure, promotion, or rewards (Domingo & Reyes, 2011, p. 414). Such efforts are common in other countries as well, such as Thailand, China, Singapore, and Malaysia.
Lastly we found that the understanding of merit depends on training, which many governments do not appear to be doing enough of. Whatever definition and methods governments choose to use for merit, what is important is continuous training to make sure employees understand the meaning of merit in their context. The United States had the highest number of respondents of 76.1% agreeing there is mandatory ethics training. An exception among Asian countries is South Korea where many agreed that there is training on ethics at 71.4% of the respondents. All the other countries had less than 50% of the respondents agreeing that there were ethics training. Very few U.S. respondents thought that the standards of merit and acceptable behavior were unclear (23.0%), whereas in Asia all had higher percentages (see Table 4). This survey result can mean either the standard of merit is unclear or the acceptable behavior is unclear or both. But the bottom-line is that more Asians think these standards are unclear. This shows that training on merit can also be an important activity to fill the gap between laws and its actual enforcement.
In sum, there are many ways to protect and uphold merit systems, such as having transparent job advertisements, setting up of merit-protection boards, involving the judiciary in merit-related cases, installing performance-based management schemes, and continuous training on merit for employees. These are all considered components of the merit-protection regime. This aspect, as compared to the other four aspects of the framework discussed above, reminds policy makers the importance of looking at meritocracy as a system that requires a comprehensive design rather than solely focusing on certain instruments such as examinations. The U.S. government seems to rely on merit-protection regimes rather than only exams. While many Asian civil servants in this survey do not know about whistle blower protection schemes in their systems and are not well-trained in merit, some governments are making progresses in setting up independent bodies to monitor and regulate merit principles. Overall, Asian governments are slowly developing their merit-protection regimes. This might well be the key to better merit systems in the region.
Conclusion
This study has described and analyzed the Asian merit system by drawing on qualitative data from Thailand and the Philippines and quantitative data from surveys of public officials in China, the United States, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. By using a framework of five aspects of the merit system, it has provided an analysis of the most prominent issues pertaining to meritocracy. The main messages can be summarized as follows. First, every country has its own concept and definition of merit and each uses differing policies and tools to operationalize the system. Most Asian countries in this study have chosen to use centrally administered examinations. This stems from traditional Imperial exams in China. Despite having central exams, many Asian countries still suffer from corruption and nepotism in hiring and selecting public employees. Many employees do not see their own systems as being meritocratic. This is due to various practices, including the need to be recommended by an internal person and the discretion that agencies may have to give preference to an internal candidate. Also some countries value recommendations over work experience and measurable competencies. Many countries in Asia have a long history of buying and selling public posts. Governments are pressured to use more diverse sets of recruitment criteria but not without resistance and debate that threaten to redefine what is considered meritocratic for the country.
Second most Asian governments aim to use the merit system to select the best into government to be part of the regime or the ruling party. The objective to build an elite class is more important, than to break up an existing one. Fairness and equal opportunity in the moral sense is of secondary concern. Politicians continue to have great control over civil servants especially in countries with a one dominant party system. Political intervention in recruitment and promotion is either already or becoming an accepted norm in many Asian countries. Interestingly in countries where democratization processes are more advanced, such as Thailand, the political leaders are winning an upper hand over the administration in controlling bureaucrats. In contrast to the United States, where democratic processes began and took root before the merit system, in Asia the merit systems began long before democratic processes filtered into political systems. In some countries democratic processes are still quite premature, while merit-based selection and recruitment has taken off. But mostly the systems have been launched unchecked and are under the control of political leaders—elected or not.
Third, civil service systems that are centralized in the name of being meritocratic can be inefficient but not always. Furthermore, there is an inherit trade-off between narrowing qualifications to attract only the best through an efficient selection process and the need to keep opportunities open for all to ensure equality. Also there is always tension between regulatory bodies such as civil service commissions that wish to protect meritocracy and ministries that wish to have autonomy in hiring and selection to stay competitive. These problems can be partially remedied by making better use of information technology. Most importantly having a holistic merit-protection regime can solve these problems. This can include the judiciary as well as appropriate training and transparent performance-based management schemes. Tools such as Freedom of Information and whistle-blower protection laws would also help to have a credible system of recruitment and promotion. It is within this context, as shown in this study, that there have been ongoing efforts in Asia to reform civil service systems to integrate the fundamental principles of meritocracy into the operations of local politico-administrative systems and bureaucracies taking into consideration the specific social, cultural, political, and administrative contexts.
Lastly, this study emphasizes that one should never accept their system as being meritocratic without asking the essential questions: What does it mean exactly, what tools are being used, who is benefitting from the system, what are the trade-offs, and has the system solved the problem it is meant to solve? Although this study provides an understanding of meritocracy in Asia, it only gives an overview of the issues with limited examples. We are also cognizant of the fact that Asia is not homogeneous with countries exhibiting diverse experiences. It is actually misleading to say that there is an Asian merit system. However, we do hope to generate debates regarding the general claims surrounding the issues of how merit is defined and operationalized in Asia. Future research should include detailed background information, including historical contexts, of all the countries in this survey. Each of the five aspects presented in the analytical framework should be investigated more extensively in each country by rigorously operationalizing the various dimensions of the merit system. Also this research should be expanded to other Asian countries, namely, South Asia, Central Asia, and other Southeast Asian countries. Robust theories on merit can be built subject to further improvement by more research. This is only the beginning of the conversation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Evan Berman and Kenneth Paul Tan for their valuable inputs to the article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author(s) received funding for this research from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.