Politics of Active Representation: The Trade-off Between Organizational Role and Active Representation

Abstract

The translation of passive into active representation assumes that bureaucrats are willing to serve the interest of their social group when developing and implementing policies. However, the assumption does not account for organizational socialization—the process of being taught what is important in an organization. In addition, there is a comparative paucity of theoretical and conceptual frameworks to explain why and how bureaucrats decide to become active representatives. In this study, I develop a framework for analyzing the decision to engage in active representation. The framework recognizes that active representation conflicts with organizational role and is based on the assumption of public choice theory that humans are utility maximizers. Bureaucrats are not totally devoted to active representation, but instead find an optimal point at which their self-interest is maximized in interrole conflict.

Keywords

active representation organizational socialization inter-role conflict self-interest maximization

Introduction

Since Mosher (1968) divided the concept of representation into passive and active forms, the link between them has been a central concern in public administration. Members of the same social group having similar demographic backgrounds undergo a similar socialization process and share core attitudes, values, and beliefs (Krislov, 1974), which generate social norms and cognitive reference points. Thus, when bureaucrats develop and implement policies in accordance with their own values and beliefs, they also serve the interest of their social group (Lim, 2006).

However, socialization has multiple sources: not just demographic backgrounds but also peer, community, and organization. Particularly, the previous literature has not fully taken into account organizational socialization, which is the process of being indoctrinated and taught what is important in an organization (Ellis, Bauer, & Erdogan, 2015; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Organizational socialization may conflict with the socialization one receives in a social group before entering the organization. Although some studies have recognized and explained organizational socialization as a barrier to the translation of passive into active representation (e.g., Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Wilkins & Williams, 2008), it is nevertheless an ongoing process after a member joins an organization (Oberfield, 2014; Wanous, 1992) and may conflict with active representation. Thus, the issue should be incorporated into representative bureaucracy theory rather than being presented as a potential reason for why passive representation does not translate into active representation.

In addition, most bureaucrats intend to represent their social group regardless of whether they are minority or majority. Thus, given that an organization has limited resources, minority and majority bureaucrats compete for use of these limited resources to represent their social groups’ interests. Finally, minority bureaucrats may not perceive their role as representatives of minority interests. It is a choice to take on active representation role.

In an effort to better understand a bureaucrat’s decision to serve as an active representative, I test an understudied theoretical framework that rests on the assumption of public choice theory that humans are egoistic and rational utility maximizers (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Bureaucrats pursue private interests at least to the same extent as other persons are allowed, so it can be expected that bureaucrats might promote self-interests while pursuing their own social groups’ interests. Furthermore, active representation is not a free lunch, but comes at the expense of private interests. Decision making about active representation can be understood under the assumption of utility maximization.

The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. I first discuss the theoretical background of representative bureaucracy, especially in terms of political support and policy discretion. The politics of active representation through conflict between informal and formal roles is examined, the establishment of a framework for understanding individual decision making about active representation. An exposition of testable hypotheses and a description of the data follow. In the final sections, I report the results of tests of the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the results for better understanding the politics of active representation. I conclude by describing the contributions and theoretical implications of the study as well as the limitations and issues that should be investigated in future research.

Theoretical Background

Representative Bureaucracy and Active Representation

The rise of bureaucratic power has led to the frequent assertion that public administration is a fourth branch of government (e.g., Long, 1952; Meier, 1979; Tummala, 2003) and at the same time causes concern about how to make bureaucrats accountable to the public and to legitimize their exercise of discretion in the policy process (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011; Cook, 2014; Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981). The theory of representative bureaucracy offers a potential solution (Kingsley, 1944; Long, 1952; Meier, 1979; Van Riper, 1958). The more demographically similar (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic traits) the public and a bureaucracy become, the more readily the actions and policies of the bureaucracy are accepted by the public. This is because the public generally evaluates the legitimacy of the exercise of power by bureaucrats on the basis of demographic similarity, that is, symbolic representation (Levitan, 1946; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Thielemann & Stewart, 1996). This proposition is based on the assumption that bureaucrats representing citizens do not misuse their positions for personal gain but act on behalf of citizens.

Mosher (1968) is most often cited for his elaboration of the concept of representation. He divides representation into passive and active forms. Passive representation is achieved when a bureaucracy demographically mirrors the public. This form has symbolic value that is significant for a democratic society, such as equality of opportunity or better access to public services (Pitkin, 1972; Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, 1977; Thielemann & Stewart, 1996). On the contrary, active representation denotes the situation in which bureaucrats make administrative decisions in favor of their social group. Active representatives produce policy outputs for their social group not only by themselves, but also by influencing the behavior and thoughts of colleagues from other social groups (Lim, 2006). For instance, Hindera and Young (1998) find in their study of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that if Black investigators constitute a prominent group (i.e., comprising the largest proportion, but not a majority of the staff) in an organization, then White investigators take complaints filed by Black citizens more seriously and more agency resources are allocated on their behalf. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) also support the indirect contribution of bureaucrats, noting that female police officers can sensitize their male colleagues to gender issues and cause them to pay more attention to women’s safety.

Political Support for Active Representation

Passive representation does not always foster active representation. Bureaucrats will continue to be willing to represent their social group if they obtain political support either within their organization or from the outside (Henderson, 1979; Meier, 1993). A major source of external political support is the presence of a leader who shares the same demographic background and sympathizes with active representation. For example, a minority leader may either explicitly or implicitly help minority bureaucrats become active representatives by freeing them from pressure to comply with organizational rules (Henderson, 1988) and supporting their policy proposals that benefit the social group (Winn, 1989).

Political support within an organization is obtained through interactions with other bureaucrats who support active representation efforts (Henderson, 1979; Meier, 1993; F. J. Thompson, 1976). Generally, the proportion of colleagues who share the same demographic background has been employed as a proxy for internal political support. A number of studies have found that minority bureaucrats must constitute a sufficient percentage of their organization’s total workforce (i.e., critical mass) to serve as active representatives (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Meier, 1993; F. J. Thompson, 1976). For instance, if a minority group in a public organization does not exceed a critical mass, then they cannot produce policy outputs benefiting the social group because their active representation is suppressed by a dominant group or by organizational norms. The size of the critical mass depends on the characteristics of an organization (Dahlerup, 1988; Kanter, 1977b; Meier, 1993).¹

Policy Discretion for Active Representation

In addition to political support, bureaucrats must have policy discretion to serve as active representatives. Having discretion means having an opportunity to transform passive into active representation (Meier & Stewart, 1992). Sowa and Selden (2003) measure minority supervisors’ perception of how much discretion they have through a mail survey and find that if members of a minority group perceive themselves as possessing significant discretion, they represent minority interests more by granting more resources to minority applicants.

Meier and Bohte (2001) focus on policy discretion at the street-level of public organizations. They indirectly measure the degree of policy discretion that a street-level bureaucrat has by using the span of control, defined as the number of subordinates a superior supervises. The authors assume that an organization with large spans of control has difficulty in keeping track of its employees and thus generally permits them to exercise more discretion. They find that discretion strengthens the translation of passive into active representation.²

Wilkins and Keiser (2006) investigate the effect of policy discretion by assuming that while bureaucrats in senior positions have discretion, others do not. Their main finding is that an increase in the number of female supervisors in a child support area office leads to greater child support enforcement for women, but an increase in the number of female caseworkers does not result in a significant increase. Smith and Fernandez (2010) also find supporting evidence that increased minority representation in senior executive positions in federal agencies is associated with an increased proportion of federal contracts awarded to small minority-owned firms.

Politics of Active Representation in Bureaucracy

The activity of representation as acting for others must be defined in terms of what the representative does, how he or she does it, or a combination of these two considerations (Pitkin, 1972). Previous literature on representative bureaucracy has mainly focused on the link between passive and active representation in terms of what bureaucrats do for their social group; no comparable effort has been put into understanding how they become active representatives (e.g., Selden, 1997). In this section, I argue that active representation is the result not only of an individual’s behavioral intention but also of bureaucratic politics.

Organizational Socialization

Active representation occurs within an organization. It is taken for granted that bureaucrats produce policy outputs for their social group by mobilizing organizational resources. Thus, active representation should be understood in terms of organizational decision making as well as individual intention.

Personnel vary in values and goals, so organizations generate numerous conflict-controlling and consensus-making mechanisms (Downs, 1967). One of these is organizational socialization, which is the process by which employees (especially newcomers) fit in, adjust, and conform themselves to the organization by acquiring the attitudes, behaviors, knowledge, and skills required to function effectively as a member of the organization (Ellis et al., 2015; Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Above all, it provides employees not only with an ordered view of the work life that precedes and guides experience, but also with the ground rules by which day-to-day activities are managed, regardless of employees’ previous socialization (Louis, 1980; Shibutani, 1962). In short, organizational socialization allows an organization to minimize the effects of employees’ personal values and attitudes on decision making and to ensure that they make decisions consistent with organizational goals and values (Oberfield, 2014; Simon, 1957).

Socialization in an organization often conflicts with socialization in a social group before becoming part of the organization, which is a crucial assumption for the translation of passive into active representation (Dolan, 2002; Meier, 1993; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Rehfuss, 1986; F. J. Thompson, 1976). In particular, organizational socialization is ongoing after a member joins an organization, and it is enforced through monitoring and motivational factors such as rewards and punishments. Wilkins and Williams (2008) present a notable and paradoxical finding that as the number of Black police officers increases in a department, the racial disparity in vehicle stops also increases. That is, Black officers have been exposed to organizational socialization that indoctrinates them to adapt to their departments and achieve organizational goals, so they represent their organizations, not their social group (i.e., Black drivers).³

Conflicts With Other Groups

The theory of representative bureaucracy understands an organization as a natural system, meaning that an organization consists of a coalition of groups with conflicting goals (Long, 1962). Within a formal organization, employees create informal groups that are based on personal characteristics and relations of the specific participants, and they act according to their own values and beliefs as well as organizational roles and norms (Barnard, 1938; Scott & Davis, 2007).

As the critical mass theory implies, active representation by minority bureaucrats can be hindered by majority bureaucrats. Kanter (1977a, 1977b) demonstrates that women’s status in an organization depends on their relative number. If very few women compared with men are in an organization, the women are significantly marginalized and even subordinated to the dominant group (i.e., men). Similarly, Meier (1993) finds a U-shaped relationship between passive and active representation, arguing that when minority bureaucrats do not constitute a critical mass, an increase in passive representation results in a decrease in active representation.

Even if bureaucrats achieve a critical mass in their organizations and are able to represent their social group’s interests in the policy process, conflicts with other informal groups cannot be avoided (Gest & Maranto, 2000). Organizations have limited resources, so pursuing the interests of a particular social group will generally be at the expense of another and inevitably cause conflicts. Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Mattioli (2015) show in their lab experiment that women’s increasing empowerment sometimes causes men’s resistance.⁴ The attempt of a minority group (e.g., women) to advocate their policy preferences is in conflict with and disturbed by a dominant group in decision making regardless of the proportion of minority members in an organization.

Commitment Dilemma: Conflict Between Informal and Formal Roles

Bureaucrats are motivated by their formal organizational and informal group roles (Selznick, 1948). Employees lower down in the hierarchy are under surveillance (or believe they are), resulting in timidity and caution (Downs, 1967; Perrow, 1979).⁵ Given that they fear criticism from superiors and colleagues and have a tendency toward self-protective behavior (Perrow, 1979), it would be a mistake to assume that bureaucrats propose advocating their social group’s interests as a policy agenda at the risk of exposing themselves to conflicts with their organization or other informal groups. As public choice theory suggests (e.g., Niskanen, 1971), a bureaucrat acts as a private person and pursues private utility at least to the same extent as other persons are allowed.

Socialization in a social group based on an individual’s socioeconomic traits (e.g., gender, race, region, and income) encodes and shapes skills, attitudes, and the very sense of self that individuals bring to social interaction, including peer interaction and creating an informal group in an organization (Selznick, 1948; Tyler, 1993). Furthermore, because power differences exist in an informal group (Blau, 1964; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975), members’ behaviors are rewarded or sanctioned by informal power based on interpersonal relationships (i.e., endorsed power), depending on the degree of their compliance with informal norms and orders (Scott & Davis, 2007). In addition to interpersonal rewards/punishment, an informal group creates social pressure to follow informal norms through mutual surveillance. That is, members in an informal group police one another’s behavior, keeping individual behavior in conformity with the informal norms (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2010; White, Laird, & Allen, 2014).

Because formal and informal role requirements are incompatible, bureaucrats face a commitment dilemma or an interrole conflict. Conforming to informal norms and pursuing a social group’s interests may conflict with organizational goals and cause backlash from other informal groups, which hurts the individual interests of bureaucrats themselves. If the intention to serve as an active representative is overwhelmed by these conflicts and requires significant personal sacrifice, passive representation may not translate into active representation. Consequently, to serve as active representatives, bureaucrats have to deal with conflicts within their organizations and minimize their personal losses.

Optimization of Self-Interest in Active Representation

Behavioral Conflict Resolutions for Active Representation

March and Simon (1958) suggest four behavioral mechanisms of conflict resolution: problem solving, persuasion, bargaining, and politics. Problem solving and persuasion assume that there are common goals, whereas bargaining and politics are valid for a situation in which there are persistent differences in interests. Active representation results from the behavioral norms of a social group, which are different from formal role. Thus, self-bargaining and politics can be suggested as methods of resolving behavioral conflicts to balance formal and informal role expectations and to minimize the loss of self-interest while serving as an active representative.

Optimization of Self-Interest and Active Representation

Similar to the way consumers spend money to buy goods, employees in an organization use commitment to receive rewards from the organization and/or their informal groups. Furthermore, just as individuals maximize utility by dividing their time between labor and leisure, the self-bargaining process for active representation is based on a compromise between formal and informal roles through swaps and concessions. For example, if an organization has overwhelming power vis-à-vis informal groups, bureaucrats are given one choice—total dedication to their formal roles (i.e., management ideology or inactive representation)—because the reward for active representation by informal groups never makes up for the personal loss resulting from punishment for deviance by the organization (Point A in Figure 1). On the contrary, if informal groups are not restrained by organizational control and enjoy absolute autonomy, their members indulge their informal roles and engage in rent-seeking at the expense of their organizational roles (Point B in Figure 1). Intrinsic rewards given by informal groups include information accessible only within the groups (Pescosolido, 2001), increased status (J. D. Thompson, 1967), and positive networking with group members (Riley & Cohn, 1958).

Figure 1.

Optimization of self-interest in active representation.

In most organizations, there may be inter-role conflict between formal and informal roles. Incompatibility between the two roles causes commitment constraint (Line AB). In addition, people tend to be loss- (or risk-) averse in decision making, overweighing losses with respect to comparable gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The marginal value of both gains and losses is a decreasing function of their magnitude—diminishing sensitivity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Because of loss-aversion and diminishing sensitivity, the value (or utility) function shows a convex indifference curve (IC in Figure 1), meaning a diminishing marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two kinds of rewards ( $R_{F}$ and $R_{I}$ ). Thus, an optimal allocation of commitment between organizational role and active representation is the point at which the IC is tangent with the commitment constraint line (i.e., Point C). An organization must provide more rewards than personal losses resulting from refusal of informal roles to motivate an employee who has the IC in Figure 1 with the reference Point C to be more dedicated to formal roles (i.e., $| Δ R_{F}^{A} | > | Δ R_{I}^{A} |$ ). Likewise, punishment (losses) for deviance from formal roles is overvalued compared with comparable gains for complying with informal roles (i.e., $| Δ R_{I}^{B} | > {| Δ R |}_{F}^{B}$ ). Proposition 1 summarizes this idea:

Proposition 1: There is a trade-off between active representation and organizational role.

The political process refers to the same situation as self-bargaining but posits that at least one group expands the arena of conflict so as to enlist the aid of outside forces (March & Simon, 1958). Bureaucrats are concerned about the cost of active representation in terms of the degree of personal loss that results from punishment (or reduced rewards) by the organization or other informal groups. If an informal group is able to reduce backlash from counterparts and also reduce the cost of active representation, its members will be more oriented to their informal roles. That is, the marginal rate of substituting active representation for formal role requirements (i.e., $\frac{{Δ R}_{I}^{B}}{{Δ R}_{F}^{B}}$ ) decreases, and the shape of the IC approaches ${IC}_{I}$ . To do that, an informal group seeks to mobilize the intervention of outsiders who can arbitrate or mediate conflicts with the organization or others in favor of the informal group. For instance, minorities at top leadership levels in government organizations can provide political power to help minority bureaucrats win the fight against organizational roles and other informal groups and reduce the cost of active representation (Henderson, 1988; Winn, 1989). Similarly, formal organizations can also mobilize external forces, such as law or culture, in favor of their interests, forcing employees to be more dedicated to their formal roles (e.g., ${IC}_{F}$ ). The effect of external political support on active representation is described in Proposition 2:

Proposition 2: External political support influences the level of active representation.

Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

Data: Female Representation in South Korea

To examine the politics of active representation, I focus on female representation in the South Korean bureaucracy. Gender is the first system of social differentiation, a salient template for making sense of all sorts of social situations, and a social standard to which one can be held accountable in social relations (Ridgeway, 2011). Female representation in the South Korean bureaucracy is a useful area of study for two reasons. First, South Korea is ethnically homogeneous, so gender is the most visible and pervasive part of social identity. Second, the Confucian tradition in South Korea creates obvious differences in socialization between men and women. In a Confucian society, women are still expected to be exclusively responsible for child care and household work and remain vulnerable to gender discrimination at work (Im, Campbell, & Cha, 2013; Song, 2018). Third, South Korea has experienced a rapid change in women’s social status compared with the past. For example, women’s participation in the labor force has sharply increased, from 26.8% in 1960 to 55.6% in 2013 by comparison with men’s slow increase from 73.5% to 77.6% during the same periods (Statistics Korea, 2013). In this context, the South Korean government has implemented affirmative action programs for women by which the ratio of women in the executive branch of the Korean government has steadily increased from 37.1% in 2001 to 48.1% in 2013. However, although passive representation seems to be almost achieved,⁶ women in government still suffer from gender-specific barriers for career progression, such as a lack of promotion to the higher civil service and limited access to positions in central organizations (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Proportion of women in the executive branch of the Korean government.

The Korean government has provided data on gender representation since 2002, and there was a great deal of government reorganization in 2008 when the leadership changed. Therefore, the data set in this study covers the period from 2002 to 2007. Although there were 40 organizations as of 2007, four of them were established or abolished during the period, creating 224 observations for analysis.

Active Representation: Women’s Support Fund (WSF)

The budget serves as a policy vehicle (Gosling, 2009), so the level of active representation by female bureaucrats is measured in this study through the amount of funds that their organizations allocate for meeting women’s needs. Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU), a coalition of Korean women’s interest groups,⁷ demanded that the Korean government allocate funds for eliminating social discrimination against women. KWAU also identified and reported how much the government allocates to female education and employment, childbirth and child care, and the protection of women from domestic violence, sexual crimes, and pay inequality; this allocation has been generally referred to as the WSF.

The WSF meets the three criteria of being a gendered policy area (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002): first, the fund directly benefits women as a class; second, the gender of a bureaucrat changes the client–bureaucrat relationship regarding the fund; and finally, allocating government resources to women’s programs is defined as a political issue in Korea. In addition, given that the policy preferences of budget participants typically reflect their values (Gosling, 2009), the amount of the WSF is a valid measure of the level of active representation by female bureaucrats.

A government budget must be appropriated by the legislature. In the appropriation process, a president’s budget request is amended according to the policy preferences of members of the legislature. That is, the WSF appropriated by the Korean National Assembly cannot be used to highlight fully active representation by female bureaucrats. Meanwhile, as seen in Figure 3, individual Korean ministries and agencies make and submit their own budget proposals (agency request) to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), which functions like the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The MOSF finally develops the president’s budget request by reviewing and modifying the budget proposals (Figure 3). Ministries and agencies try to participate in the development process to justify and protect their budget proposals and/or cut the budget of nonessential programs. That is, the policy preferences of ministries and agencies are revealed more clearly and accurately in a president’s budget request than in agency requests. Therefore, I use the amount of the WSF in a president’s budget request as the variable to measure the level of active representation by female bureaucrats. All budget variables are calculated in multiples of US$100,000.

Figure 3.

Budgeting process in the Korean government.

Passive Representation and Policy Discretion

Three types of measures of passive representation are used: (a) the percentage of women in the higher civil service, (b) the percentage of women in subordinate positions, and (c) the percentage of women in all positions. The grading system in the Korean civil service differs from the American system. The Korean general schedule is separated into nine grades, with Grade 1 being the highest level. Positions classified as Grade 5 or below are considered the higher civil service, and bureaucrats in these positions are generally in charge of developing or supervising policy (Kim, 1993). In policy-making organizations (such as central government departments and/or agencies), female bureaucrats in the higher positions have policy discretion (Rehfuss, 1986; Rourke, 1984), making resource allocation decisions in the process of drawing up a budget request based on their own values and preferences. To sum up, a position in the higher civil service is operationalized as having and exercising discretion in the policy process. On the contrary, positions at Grade 6 or above are categorized as subordinate, and those in these positions receive orders from higher officials and often change their behavior according to the orders. Therefore, the percentage of female subordinates is used as a reference variable to control the effect of not having policy discretion on active representation.

External Political Support

Leadership positions in ministries and agencies in the Korean central government are generally filled by political appointment. Many of them are external appointees, and female leaders in particular have been drawn from outside the civil service. Given that leaders make critical decisions on organizational structure and functions and play a central role in personnel management (Selznick, 1957), they are a major source of external political support. Thus, whether they have the same socialization experience or not is an exogenous variable to predict the level of active representation by bureaucrats. For example, a female leader may serve as an external political support for female active representation by facilitating the integration of female bureaucrats and/or by shielding female bureaucrats from the punishment inflicted by the organization or their male counterparts for performing informal gender roles (Kanter, 1977a). In addition, considering the patriarchal tradition and gender segregation in the higher civil service in Korea, the presence of a female leader is a rare and precious resource that a female group can try to mobilize to reinforce their active representation. Therefore, a female leader is operationalized as external political support for active representation by female bureaucrats.

Organizational Characteristics

This study controls three organizational characteristics: (a) the current budget, (b) the current WSF being implemented, and (c) organization type. The more resources an organization has, the more resources it can allocate to women’s programs because abundant resources alleviate competition among informal groups for obtaining resources. When there are plenty of resources, female bureaucrats can avoid serious conflict with counterparts in the budgeting process. In addition, as the total amount of budget increases, the proportion of the WSF decreases. So, active representation by female bureaucrats becomes less visible and receives less attention due to its small percentage. This study controls the current budget to examine the net effect of passive representation of women on the amount of the WSF.

Policy makers focus on the increments of change by adjusting their choices to the choices of prior actors (Lindblom, 1959). Likewise, budgeting is incremental and stable because budget makers accept past allocation decisions as the budgetary base (Wildavsky, 1964). That is, the largest determinant of this year’s budget is last year’s (Wildavsky, 1988). Thus, the amount of the WSF implemented in the current fiscal year is included as a control variable to capture the influence of budgetary incrementalism.

Finally, the data set in this study is comprised of 18 cabinet-level organizations and 22 affiliated agencies. Cabinet-level organizations are led by cabinet officers and have a broad range of administrative functions including policy making and planning, whereas affiliated agencies are controlled by noncabinet officers and deliver specific public services such as firefighting, police protection, and coast guard. Furthermore, affiliated agencies are responsible for reporting what and how well they perform to the prime minister or their superior organizations. Thus, I include a dummy for a cabinet-level organization to account for the differences in organizational type. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. WSF in a president’s budget request	204.88	1,315.10
2. WSF in the current budget	136.58	950.46	.96
3. Total current budget	26,702.81	58,691.46	−.02	−.02
4. Female leader	.065	.25	.52	.48	−.05
5. Cabinet-level organization	.47	.50	.16	.15	.29	.17
6. Women in the higher civil service (%)	9.56	10.64	.60	.53	−.04	.58	.13
7. Women in subordinate positions (%)	26.48	16.44	.31	.28	−.005	.27	.07	.69
8. Women in all positions (%)	21.51	15.11	.36	.32	−.008	.33	.03	.73	.97

Note. The correlation matrix is based on pairwise deletion. The budget variables are calculated in multiples of US$100,000. WSF = Women’s support fund.

Hypotheses

As argued in the previous section, bureaucrats do something for their social groups by compromising their formal and informal roles under the conditions that they optimize their self-interests in the trade-off with their social groups’ interests. Proposition 1 implies self-bargaining between active representation and self-interests, from which it is drawn that active representation requires the loss of organizational rewards. In the context of this study, female bureaucrats who exercised their policy discretion and increased the amount of the WSF in the previous year can be punished in terms of promotion. Proposition 2 implies that external political support reduces the loss of organizational rewards for active representation. That is, a female leader lessens punishment for active representation in terms of promotion. The following two hypotheses are formulated to examine the validity of Propositions 1 and 2:

Hypothesis 1 (self-bargaining): Growth of the WSF in the previous year is associated with a decrease in the percentage of women in the higher civil service in the present year.

Hypothesis 2 (politics): A female leader compensates (or overcompensates) for a decrease in the percentage of women in the higher civil service.

Meanwhile, as external political support is expected to do, internal political support (i.e., critical mass) is also expected to reduce the cost of active representation. In addition, the importance of internal political support in representative bureaucracy has already been proved as a necessary condition for the link between passive and active representation (see Meier, 1993; Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Selden, 1997). Thus, this study formulates and tests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (internal political support): An increase in the percentage of female bureaucrats in lower positions is associated with a decrease in the percentage of women in the higher civil service.

Analysis and Results

Female Representation in the Higher Civil Service

Before examining the politics of active representation, I first identify the mediating role of policy discretion on the relationship between passive and active representation. The comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 2 shows that ignoring the moderating role of policy discretion can lead to the misleading implication that recruiting more minority members fosters active representation, regardless of which positions they take. As the results of Model 2 show, an increase in female representation without regard to policy discretion has no significant impact on the WSF in a president’s budget request. Only increased passive representation in positions with decision-making authority leads to an increase in policy outputs for women.

Table 2.

Determinants of the WSF in a President’s Budget Request.

	Model 1		Model 2
	Coefficient	(SE)	Coefficient	(SE)
Passive representation
Women in all positions (%)	3.65**	(1.70)	8.06	(7.15)
Women in subordinate positions (%)	—		−10.33	(6.31)
Women in the higher civil service (%)	—		18.60***	(3.91)
Incremental budgeting
WSF in the current budget	1.26***	(0.03)	1.21***	(0.03)
Organizational characteristics
Female leader (yes = 1)	395.20***	(114.66)	102.12	(123.35)
Cabinet level (yes = 1)	27.72	(49.45)	25.11	(49.20)
Total amount of the current budget	−0.0001	(0.0004)	−0.0001	(0.0004)
Constant	−93.15	(72.09)	−61.93	(73.34)
N	220		220
F value	314.34		293.56
R²/adjusted R²	.94/.93		.94/.94

Note. Unstandardized coefficients are given. Dummy variables to control for serial correlation across time periods are included, but not shown in this table. WSF = Women’s support fund.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Self-Interest (Promotion) and Active Representation

In Models 3 to 5 in Table 3, the dependent variable is the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service. Bureaucrats are motivated to maximize their own gain, such as power, income, and prestige. Of the different types of organizational rewards, promotion is more valuable than others because the range of variation in power, income, and prestige among different levels in the hierarchy is much greater than the range available at any one level (Downs, 1967). Thus, the rewards (or punishments) given to female bureaucrats by the organization are operationalized as the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service.

Table 3.

The Effects of Active Representation and Political Support on Female Promotion.

	Model 3(whole sample)	Model 4^a (starting the WSF)	Model 5^b (increasing the WSF)
Active representation
Growth of the WSF_(t–1)	−0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.1851(0.8340)	−0.0014*** (0.0003)
External political support
Female leader (yes = 1)	2.0615*** (0.6490)	3.2610*** (0.9769)	1.0422(0.8904)
Internal political support
Women in subordinate positions	0.0978*** (0.0248)	0.0265(0.0439)	0.1383*** (0.0314)
Control variables
Women in the higher civil service_(t–1)	1.0102*** (0.0212)	0.9777*** (0.0345)	1.0608*** (0.0348)
Women in all positions_(t–1)	−0.1043*** (0.0283)	−0.0246(0.0394)	−0.1738*** (0.0405)
WSF in the current budget_(t–1)	0.0001(0.0002)	—	0.0000(0.0002)
Cabinet level (yes = 1)	−0.1647(0.2575)	−0.2029(0.3366)	0.2457(0.4495)
Total amount of the current budget	0.0000001(0.0000020)	0.0000006(0.0000026)	0.0000025(0.0000031)
Constant	−0.1751(0.3709)	0.2609(0.5116)	−0.4706(0.6145)
N	181	116	65
F value	674.22	121.15	595.46
R²/adjusted R²	.98/.98	.93/.92	.99/.99

Note. Unstandardized coefficients are given, with SEs in parentheses. Dummy variables to control for serial correlation across time periods are included, but not shown in this table. WSF = Women’s support fund.

Model 4 is run with the subsample of organizations that did not have WSF in the previous year.

Model 5 is conducted for organizations that had WSF in the previous year.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

The strength of active representation is gauged through Growth of the WSF_(t–1). This variable measures how much the WSF in a president’s budget request increases compared with that in the current budget.⁸ A higher value implies that female bureaucrats in the higher civil service act more aggressively for women when developing a budget request for the next fiscal year. The variable is lagged 1 year (t–1) because it takes time for the organization or other informal groups to recognize and punish female active representation and because last year’s performance is generally used as a baseline for managerial decision making including reward and punishment.

In Model 3, the coefficient of Growth of the WSF_(t–1) is negative and significant, meaning that if more funds were allocated to women’s programs in making a president’s budget request in the previous year (t–1), then the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service decreases in the present year. This result suggests that female bureaucrats are punished for their active representation through the loss of promotion opportunities by the organization, supporting Hypothesis 1. On the contrary, the coefficients of the political support variables are positive and significant at any level, meaning that political support reduces the cost of active representation. The presence of a female leader (External Political Support) is associated with an approximately 2.1% increase in female bureaucrats with discretionary power and makes up for the punishment for female active representation, which supports Hypothesis 2. Similarly, a 1% increase in the percentage of female bureaucrats in subordinate positions (Internal Political Support) leads to a 0.1% increase in the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service, supporting Hypothesis 3.

The coefficient of Women in All Positions_(t–1) in Model 3 is negative and significant. During the period of the data set (2002-2007), although female representation in the Korean central government increased by 7.2%, female bureaucrats in the higher civil service increased by only 4.6% (Figure 2). That is, the government largely employs women at the lower level of the hierarchy, so the negative coefficient implies that the increase at the higher level is not proportionate to the increase at the lower level as the United States did in the early 21st century (Hsieh & Winslow, 2006).

Discussion and Implications

Bureaucrats can base decisions on their personal values and attitudes when they occupy a higher position and have policy discretion. However, organizational socialization is against active representation. Bureaucrats continuously learn about the roles that the organization expects them to fulfill. If policy discretion is not given, not only does passive representation not correlate with active representation, but it can also hurt the interests of a social group (for details, see Meier, 1993).

The findings of this study indicate that female leaders who are external appointees and not (or less) influenced by organizational socialization are more committed to their formal roles at the expense of informal roles, that is, they engage less in active representation (see Model 2). Female appointees are strong supporters of the president’s policies and beliefs, so they have separate gender and leader identities and they are less likely to blend both, at least in Korea. As a result, they are exposed to fear of punishment and loss of self-interest for engaging in active representation, which cannot be offset by informal rewards for assuming gender roles. Regardless of demographic origins, greater managerial accountability forces female leaders to accept management ideology.

The main finding of this study is that informal roles to benefit a social group are incompatible with formal roles to accomplish organizational goals. As indicated in Model 3, active representation requires the loss of organizational rewards (promotion in this study). This result, taken together with the results of Model 2, implies that if female bureaucrats with policy discretion advocate women’s interests more actively, they have to bear the loss of promotion opportunities. However, the loss of organizational rewards can be mitigated by internal or external support. First, the positive coefficient of Internal Political Support implies that minority bureaucrats in subordinate positions protect their in-group colleagues who are serving as active representatives from the loss of organizational rewards. The importance of internal political support for the translation of passive into active representation has been well investigated and discussed through the critical mass theory. Second, the positive coefficient of External Political Support suggests that a minority leader can also reduce the loss of organizational rewards (i.e., promotion in the analysis) to active representatives. To sum up, minority leaders and minority bureaucrats without policy discretion cannot serve as active representatives, but they can encourage other minority colleagues who can.

The impacts of internal and external political support vary according to the context. Model 4 examines 116 organizations that did not have the WSF in the previous year. In this model, the coefficient of Growth of the WSF_(t–1) is no longer significant, meaning that the attempt to start women’s programs does not result in the loss of promotion opportunities. There are two explanations to account for this finding. First, in the social atmosphere which favored women’s rights and interests in Korea in the early 2000s,⁹ it is no wonder that women’s programs were developed and financed, especially for organizations without the WSF. Second, the average amount of funds allocated to new women’s programs is very low (about US$3,131, see Table 4), which does not cause a substantive reallocation of resources. To sum up, because the advocacy of women’s interests was socially supported and less intensive within an organization, female bureaucrats were able to produce policy outputs for women without the threat of punishment.

Table 4.

Growth of WSF and Female Bureaucrats With Discretionary Power.

	Average increase in the WSF in a president’s budget request	Average percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service
Organizations without the WSF in the previous year (Model 4)	US$3,131	8.14%
Organizations with the WSF in the previous year (Model 5)	US$22,134,000	13.96%

Note. The null hypothesis of no difference is rejected for all comparisons. WSF = Women’s support fund.

On the contrary, the coefficient of Growth of the WSF_(t–1) in Model 5 is negatively significant. Organizations in the model have the WSF in the previous year and increase the amount of the WSF on average by US$22.1 million in the process of making a president’s budget request (Table 4). Thus, unlike the symbolic act of starting new but small women’s programs, representing substantive interests of women is punished by decreasing the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service in the following year. Meanwhile, the coefficient of External Political Support loses its significance, meaning that a female leader does not serve as a source of political support for more active representation.

Conclusion

The theory of representative bureaucracy is a normative one that describes an ideal role of bureaucracy in the formation of a good state. As Edmund Randolph warned at the United States Constitutional Convention in 1787 (Argersinger, 1989), “If a fair representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Govt. shall shake to its foundation” (p. 59). Thus, passive representation in a bureaucracy itself is a way to obtain legitimacy of a government from the public. On the contrary, active representation is related to the reason why governments exist. Democratic governments have an obligation to satisfy the basic needs of their citizenry and must take into account the percentage of the population whose basic needs are not being met (Oppenheimer, 2012). Given that increasing the welfare of the poorest is a way to promote social welfare and justice (Rawls, 1971), active representation by bureaucrats who come from under-represented and discriminated-against groups is rationalized because they know best what their social groups want.

This study focuses on how bureaucrats become active representatives, considering that their organizations do not favor or even counteract the salience of informal roles and that bureaucrats are not always willing to serve their social groups. A framework is presented for modeling how decisions to serve as active representatives are made, grounded on the assumptions that bureaucrats are self-interested (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971) and that there is inter-role conflict between organizational (formal) and minority (informal) roles. Bureaucrats find an optimal point at which self-interest is maximized in the conflict. The framework appears to be plausible and illustrative through supporting results for the propositions: the trade-off between active representation and organizational role (Proposition 1) and the influence of external political support on the level of active representation (Proposition 2).

However, this study has some limitations. First, although a variety of concepts, such as informal groups, commitment dilemma, and conflict resolution, are deployed to describe the politics of active representation, most of them remain untested due to data constraints. Second, the framework considers active representation as an individual’s decision, but the empirical analysis has been carried out using organization-level data. Although the fallacy of division is not a statistical issue, it should be noted that individuals have different levels of reward motivation and socialization pressure for active representation and that the intensity of active representation varies according to individual factors as well as organizational characteristics.

Nevertheless, this study has contributed to the representative bureaucracy literature by suggesting a framework for how bureaucrats become active representatives. The framework indicates that majority bureaucrats can also become active representatives and that active representation is the result of self-interest maximization rather than a manifestation of empathy. I hope the framework will be useful for explaining decision making and behaviors of active representatives. However, the framework calls for additional research on whether and how it is relevant and appropriate to explain individual decision making for active representation. For example, in addition to the two propositions, the framework contains various propositions such as “informal groups compensate their members for performing informal roles.” My hope is that this study will provide “food for thought” to representative bureaucracy theorists and that the framework will be investigated further.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Changgeun Yun is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration at Ajou University, South Korea. He is also a research fellow at the Institute for the Government Capacity at Yonsei University. His research interests include innovation management in the public sector, representation, organization theory, and public policy theories.

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