Abstract
In this article, I argue that the current views on the relation between fields and social networks are based on two false premises: first, that fields and social networks are mutually exclusive forms of relational structure, and second, that the objective form of relational structure is an a priori fact. The main point of this article is that fields—defined as sites of contest among their inhabitants known for using their symbolically charged capitals to define hierarchical relations among them—create historical conditions for social networks to emerge as the objective form of relational structure. Following this point, I argue that relational sociologists must reconstruct the notion of relational structure by focusing their epistemological lenses on the history of contests among the relevant field’s actors over the symbolic value of their field-specific capitals. I illustrate this insight on relational sociology using Bourdieu’s political field theory.
One of the most profound insights provided by the philosophy of natural sciences is that it is the relations among objects, rather than the essence of those objects, that shape the dynamics of the natural world (Cassirer [1923] 2003; Lewin 1951). Following this insight, the implementation of relational logic in sociology implies that sociological analysis should take as its primary object the relations among social actors rather than their essence (conceptualized as norms, values, beliefs, ideologies, and so on). When such analysis does focus on social actors’ essence, it should perceive such essence only as a temporal manifestation of the role these actors are playing during a particular instance of their exchange relations with each other (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:15–9; Emirbayer 1997; Powell and Dépelteau 2013; Wellman 1988).
Social network analysts and field theory scholars claim to rigorously follow the basic precepts of relational logic. However, despite their common adherence to relational logic, they have developed different conceptual apparatuses. More importantly, social network analysts and field theorists fundamentally differ in their respective conceptions of relational structure. While social network analysts assume social ties (with relatives, friends, competitors, patrons, etc.) to be the foundational element of relational structure (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Breiger 1974; Wellman 1988), field theorists argue that hierarchical relations created by the differential distribution of three symbolically charged capitals—cultural, economic, and social—constitute the fundamental form of relational structure (Bourdieu [1997] 2000:183; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:195–8).
The early commentaries on relational sociology assumed that the adherence to relational logic of both social network theory and field theory was sufficient to consider them to be similar methods of conducting relational sociology (cf. Emirbayer 1997:287 n. 8, 292, 304; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994:1414). Bourdieu, however, not only explicated differences between social networks and fields but also questioned the social network analysts’ belief that social ties constitute fundamental elements of relations. According to Bourdieu, The structure of a field, understood as a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital, is different from the more or less lasting networks through which it manifests itself. It is this structure that determines the possibility or the impossibility of observing the establishment of linkages that express and sustain the existence of networks. In network analysis, the study of these underlying structures has been sacrificed to the analysis of the particular linkages and flows through which they become visible. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:113–4)
To appreciate Bourdieu’s point of view on the relative relevance of fields and social networks for sociological analysis, we need to take into account his notion of objective relations. According to Bourdieu (1980, 1985, 1987, 1989), objective relations are external to and independent of social actors and can have a coercive effect on social actors digressing from their logic (cf. De Nooy 2003; Wacquant 2013). In the preceding quotation, Bourdieu argues that in a field, relations among field positions constitute the objective form of relational structure and shape the possibility of the presence or absence of social ties among field actors occupying various field positions. Hence, relations among field positions—structured by unequal distribution of symbolically charged capitals, not networks of social ties among field actors—should be the primary object of sociological analysis.
Bourdieu’s remark about social networks is highly polemical, as it attacks the core reason for believing in social network analysis: the idea that social ties shape the objective form of relational structure. However, it should be noted that this is the only explicit remark Bourdieu made on the relation between social networks and fields. The fact that Bourdieu never made a systematic comparison between the two is sufficient reason not to give undue weight to the above remark; despite this, however, it has become the point of departure for sociologists scrutinizing the relation between social networks and fields.
A large number of scholars accept Bourdieu’s contention but also believe that social network analysis is important for comprehending field dynamics. They envisage the relation between social network analysis and field theory in terms of division of labor: Field theory provides concepts, while social network analysis provides methodological tools for implementing those concepts (cf. Anheier, Gerhards, and Romo 1995; De Nooy 1991, 1999; Gerhards and Anheier 1989; Giuffre 1999, 2001).
Another group of scholars has challenged Bourdieu’s contention regarding social networks (cf. Bottero 2009; Bottero and Crossley 2011; Crossley 2013, 2010). Crossley proposes that social networks and fields are dialectically related to and thus shape each other. Bottero takes Crossley’s argument a step further: Asserting that intersubjective dimensions of interactions shape social actors’ practices, she not only argues that social networks are the objective form of relational structure but actually reverses Bourdieu’s contention by proposing that social networks create conditions for the emergence of fields. More recently, Mohr (2013) has developed a similar argument; while his criticism focuses on field analysis methods, he also argues for the importance of taking into account microlevel interactions among relevant social actors when examining the formation of field relational structures.
In this article, I argue that the current debate on the relation between social networks and fields suffers from two weak assumptions: first, that social networks and fields are mutually exclusive forms of relational structure, and second, that the objective relational structure (whether in the form of social networks or fields) is an a priori fact. These two weaknesses are the result of the participating scholars’ lack of engagement with Bourdieu’s insights on the role of history in shaping the relational structure of a field.
In this article, I argue that Bourdieu’s generic definition of social capital (Bourdieu 2002:286), unlike Coleman’s (1988) and Putnam’s (1993), is compatible with social network analysts’ view of social ties among actors. However, unlike social network analysts, Bourdieu does not make the a priori assumption that social ties among actors constitute objective relations; instead, he argues that field dynamics are driven by the historically shaped contests among field actors over the question of which field-specific capital—social, cultural, or economic capital—defines the relational structure of their field. Those field actors who succeed in establishing their capital as the symbolic capital of their field play the pivotal role in defining the dominant form of the field’s relational structure, which in turn appears to the field actors as the objective form of their field’s relational structure. In other words, field theory proposes that objective relations are determined a posteriori, not a priori; thus, they can be discovered only by investigating the history of contests among field actors over the symbolic capital of their field.
Hence, even though Bourdieu once questioned the status of social ties as a form of objective relations, his field theory allows us to accept the possibility that under certain historical circumstances, social networks can define the relational structure of a field. This possibility appears in a field when field actors known for claiming their social capital as the symbolic capital of their field emerge triumphant from their historically shaped contest with field actors known for capitals other than social capital. In contrast, in those historical periods when field actors known for claiming either cultural or economic capital as the symbolic capital of their field emerge triumphant, processes leading to the formation of social networks and the meaning of intersubjective ties at their root are mediated by their symbolic capital.
In the fields empirically examined by Bourdieu, field actors were competing over the symbolic value of their field-specific cultural and economic capital. Thus, depending upon the state of their contests, one of these two capitals had the status of symbolic capital and hence defined the relational structure in that field. Perhaps for this reason, Bourdieu has often been criticized for neglecting the notion of social capital, despite its inclusion in field theory (Erickson 1996; Warde and Tampubolon 2002). In contrast to the fields he empirically examined, Bourdieu envisaged the field of politics as a site of contesting actors claiming that their respective politics-specific form of social capital (social ties among political actors) or cultural capital (personal popularity among the masses) is the symbolic capital of the field. Thus, studying political field history should prove to be a particularly fruitful exercise for systematically developing a theory of the relation between social networks and fields that is sensitive to the importance of history in defining field relational structure.
The body of this article is divided into five parts. In the first part, I briefly introduce the conceptualization of relations in social network analysis and field theory. In the second part, I discuss available theories on the relation between social networks and fields. In the third part, I argue that these theories are based on the assumptions that social networks and fields are mutually exclusive and that their status as the form of objective relations is an a priori fact. In the fourth part, I propose that Bourdieu’s political field theory can illustrate the significance of taking into account the history of conflict among field actors in shaping the relational structure of their field. In the fifth part, I explicate the history of the Indian political field to develop new insights on the dynamics of the relation between social networks and fields. Finally, in the conclusion, I explore the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological implications of the arguments developed in the article.
Forms of Relational Structure
Social Networks
According to Wellman (1988), the intellectual lineage of social network analysis begins in post–World War II British anthropology, when structural functionalists began to distance themselves from then-prevalent explanations of groups or societies based on their members’ norms and beliefs. A few among them, notably Radcliffe-Brown, began using networks of social ties as a metaphorical representation of the social structure. Nadel and Barnes expanded this use of social networks and began to systematically use them as a tool for analyzing the structure of a society.
These developments were quickly absorbed by a small group of American sociologists who were also unsatisfied with prevalent normative theories in their field. They further cultivated social network analysis by developing formal techniques for mapping social networks, largely inspired by Simmel’s notion of formal structure (cf. Erikson 2013; Mützel 2009). A large body of such social network research is based on the belief that social ties among actors, or nodes, act as a pipe for the flow of various material and nonmaterial resources within a social system (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Wellman 1983).
Social network analysts typically adopt one of three research strategies to study variations in ties and their impact on nodes (Emirbayer 1997). First, cluster analysts focus on how the pattern of direct and indirect social ties among nodes creates unique social network positions that can provide actors located within them advantages over other nodes (cf. Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Second, positional analysts study nodes that are structurally equivalent, despite belonging to different social networks, because of their similar social ties with the members of their respective networks (cf. Padgett and Ansell 1993; White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). Third, ego-centered network analysts examine social network structures from the point of view of network actors and illustrate how differences in network actors’ points of view create asymmetries in the network structure that differentially affect other nodes (cf. Feld 1991; Wellman 1988).
Some social network analysts have been critical of the pipe model, arguing that ties are not merely conduits for the flow of resources but rather have a meaning structure with cultural, subjective, and intersubjective components (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Fuhse 2009; Fuhse and Mützel 2011). White (1992, 2008) advanced this vision of social networks by showing that network actors actively participate in developing, maintaining, or transforming the narratives of their social ties, which are shaped by their uniquely shared memories, stories, symbols, and vocabulary of communication (cf. Somers 1994). In fact, it is the polysemy in the meaning structure of social ties, created by the complex amalgam of past narratives and possible future narratives of social ties anticipated from the current position, that creates the prospect of “order at the edge of chaos” in the social world (Fontdevila, Opazo, and White 2011).
Erickson (2013) recently argued that the differences between social network analysts who view social ties as pipes (i.e., formalists) and those who view them as saturated with meaning (i.e., relationalists) are not coincidental; rather, these differences are a result of the differences in their respective metatheoretical foundations. Formal social network analysis is deeply influenced by Simmel’s notion of formalism. Applying Kant’s insights into the role of a priori principles for investigating the natural world, Simmel argued that the knowledge of the social world can be derived from a priori forms that must be discovered by sociologists. Hence, formalists do not take culture and actors into account in their study of social network structures, as the network forms are viewed as independent of the substance of networks.
Relationalists, in contrast, derive their notion of social networks from the philosophical work of pragmatists (Dewey, Pierce, and Mead), according to whom social actors actively interpret the world around them, including their social relations. Furthermore, because these interpretations are based on the intersubjective meaning of social ties that temporally unfolds during their interactions with each other, they are also pregnant with uncertainty that leads to the possibilities for the transformation of meanings. Thus, culture, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity are basic constituents of social ties for a relationalist.
From this reasoning, we can see that the disagreements between formalists and relationalists are a result of their metatheoretical background rooted within the philosophical debate between Kant and the pragmatists. However, despite these differences, both formalists and relationalists adhere to the common principle of social network analysis: The structure of social relations is the relational web in and by which social actors’ practices are shaped (Erickson 2013; Fuhse and Mützel 2011; Mützel 2009).
Field
Bourdieu implements relational logic in his field theory by using three conceptual apparatuses: capital, field structure, and habitus. He defines capital as the material and embodied form of accumulated labor (Bourdieu [1983] 1986:241). There are three generic forms of capital—economic, cultural, and social. Economic capital refers to wealth in the form of money or property rights; cultural capital refers to an actor’s knowledge of necessary skills required to be a member of a field; and social capital refers to the number and kind of people one knows in a particular field and whose resources one can mobilize when required (Bourdieu [1983] 1986:243, 248; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:119).
Each of these three generic forms of capital acquires a specific form in a particular field. Although multiple capitals exist in a field, not every capital has equal value in that field. From the point of view of particular actors located in a particular position in a particular field, some capitals in the field have higher value than others. Bourdieu defines the value of a capital as its symbolic value (Bourdieu [1983] 1986:255 n. 3; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:119).
A position in a field is a depository of a particular volume and proportion of the specific form of each of the three generic capitals mentioned above, whose values have been adjusted according to their respective symbolic values in the field. There are multiple positions in a field, each of which, according to Bourdieu, can be conceived of as a vector of force. However, these vectors of force are not randomly arranged. Rather, Bourdieu perceives them to be arranged as either dominated or dominant in relation to each other. A conglomeration of such nonidentical and hierarchically arranged vectors of force, or positions, constitutes the relational structure of a field.
The habitus of a field actor allows that actor to generate field-specific practices and to appreciate them in relation to those of other field actors. Here it is important to note that habitus generates systematic strategies only in relation to a specific field. Within a field, the habitus of a social actor generates specific practices in relation to the practices of other actors located in different positions in that field. Such a relation between habitus and a field is possible because habitus, which structures social actors’ practices, is structured by the structures of the field. The structuration of habitus takes place as a result of a social actor’s experiences of the symbolically charged relational structure from that actor’s current position as well as his or her experiences of the trajectory taken through different positions to reach his or her current position in the field (Bourdieu [1997] 2000:150–9; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:115–40).
Bourdieu uses the metaphor of a battle to illustrate the dynamism of a field (cf. Martin 2003). Depending on their current position in the structure of a field, social actors aim to either preserve or change the current configuration of the distribution of capitals in a field. They do so by strategizing to increase the symbolic value of their capital in relation to others. Thus, a field is always in a state of conflict between social forces that are interested in preserving the existing structures of the field to sustain the existent norms of domination and social forces bent upon changing them. By challenging the value of other actors’ capital in a field, field actors aim not only to improve their positions but also to create a high potential for the transformation of the very structure of the field.
The Relation between Social Networks and Fields
From the above discussion, we can see that the common feature of both social network analysis and field theory is that they concede primacy to relations among social actors rather than to social actors’ internal properties. However, they differ in their respective conceptualizations of relational structures. Specifically, social network analysts believe that relational structures are shaped by social ties, whereas field theorists believe that the hierarchically arranged field positions constitute the relational structure.
Bourdieu’s controversial remark claiming that field relational structures are more objective than social networks has emerged as the point of departure for scholars investigating the relation between social networks and fields. The three different visions of the relation between social networks and fields discussed in the following pages are based on three different assessments of social networks and fields as the objective form of relational structure—respectively, these suggest that social networks are less objective than field structures, that social networks are as objective as field structures, and that social networks are more objective than field structures.
Social Networks Are Less Objective than Field Structures
De Nooy’s (2003) “Fields and Networks” is the earliest and most influential attempt at conceptualizing the relation between the two forms of relational structure. The ideas presented in De Nooy’s article are based on his empirical studies of the field of literature and other similar studies (cf. Anheier et al. 1995; De Nooy 1991, 1999; Gerhards and Anheier 1989; Giuffre 1999, 2001). Voicing the main theoretical themes emanating from these studies, De Nooy argues that while Bourdieu’s contention regarding social networks is correct, network analysis tools are indispensable for conducting field theory research. De Nooy begins to develop his vision of the relation between social network analysis and field theory by pointing out the gap between Bourdieu’s theoretical points on relational structure and Bourdieu’s chosen methodological tool for investigating relational structure—namely, correspondence analysis.
According to De Nooy, one of the most important insights provided by Bourdieu’s field theory regards the relation between social actors’ practices and field structure. He argues that it is during interactions among social actors that field structures are reproduced and the potential for field structure transformation is generated. Thus, comprehending the interaction among social actors is as important as comprehending their structural positions. However, while correspondence analysis can be used to illustrate the position of field actors in a field’s relational structure, it does not provide direct evidence of how the field and the actors’ practices affect each other. At this point, social network analysis becomes important, as it offers well-developed analytical tools for examining the interactive practices of social actors.
Following Bourdieu’s argument that interactions are shaped by field position, De Nooy argues that one can examine the effect of field structure by examining social actors’ interactions. For example, one can illustrate the effect of a symbolically charged relational structure by examining the prestige of social actors involved in interactions within that structure. Social network analysis provides well-developed tools for examining prestige during interactions among social actors. These tools are based on the assumption that prestige-based relations are asymmetrical (i.e., that resources of deference are unequally exchanged). For example, social actors with high prestige are likely to receive more calls for relations than they reciprocate. By examining asymmetries of exchange relations among field actors located in particular field positions, we can infer which actors among them have higher prestige than others.
Thus, De Nooy argues that one can use social network analysis tools to study field effects and, by doing so, gain insights into how field structure is reproduced and how the potential for field transformation is developed during interactions. De Nooy also hints at the role of social networks in shaping the field. Thus, even though his view on the relation between social networks and fields is based on the belief that field structures are more objective then social networks, he comes very close to arguing that social networks are as objective as field structures, as social network analysis suggests that the former can transform the later. This point is explored to its fullest extent by Nick Crossley (2010, 2013).
Social Networks and Field Structures Are Equally Objective
Nick Crossley (2010, 2013) challenges Bourdieu’s remark on social networks. According to Crossley, while Bourdieu is correct in arguing that field structures create conditions for the formation of social networks, once social networks are formed they develop their own internal dynamics and can shape field structures. Crossley develops his argument by comparing the explanations of taste formation offered by Bourdieu and by social network analysts.
According to Bourdieu, social actors’ distance from the socioeconomic necessities of everyday life plays the central role in their taste formation. For this reason, there is a difference in the pattern of taste formation among members of the working class and those of the upper class. The taste formation of members of the working class is deeply influenced by their investments in the immediate socioeconomic necessities of their everyday lives. For this reason, members of the working class emphasize the importance of sameness in the development of taste in cultural objects. However, the most distinguishing feature of the everyday life of the upper classes is their detachment from the immediate socioeconomic necessities of their lives. For this reason, members of the upper classes tend to emphasize developing a distinct personal appreciation of taste for cultural objects.
According to Crossley, however, the social network analysis–based study of taste formation within the working class disproves the above argument. Referring to ethnographic studies by scholars from the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Culture Studies, Crossley argues that working-class youths do not necessarily have aspirations for developing similar tastes. On the contrary, despite being subjected to similar socioeconomic conditions, they tend to develop highly heterogeneous subcultures (e.g., teds, mods, skins, and punks). The reason for this heterogeneity is that working-class youth are embedded in multiple social networks that shape their comprehension of the social world, thus leading them to develop different tastes in cultural objects. In other words, contrary to Bourdieu’s claim, working-class culture is “not conditioned by necessity or resigned to a no frills life style” (quoted in Crossley 2013:138); instead, it is a result of working-class social networks.
At the same time, Crossley argues that interactions and the development of social ties among working-class actors, as well as the formation of the social networks within which their particular kind of subculture matures, depend on their socioeconomic conditions. After all, it is their socioeconomic conditions that bring them to the same neighborhoods, the same schools, and the same recreational activities. Thus, he believes that field theory’s insights into the role of socioeconomic conditions in taste formation are as important as those provided by social network analysts. Furthermore, Crossley argues that the simultaneous presence of relational forces, in the form of social networks and field structures, also provides an explanation of taste formation among the members of the upper classes that is superior to Bourdieu’s explanation.
Following these arguments, Crossley envisages a relation between social networks and fields that differs from that conceptualized by De Nooy. Unlike De Nooy, Crossley does not view field theory as a supplier of conceptual apparatuses and social network analysis as a supplier of methodological tools for studying relational structures. Instead, he strongly argues that social networks and fields must be viewed as two separate, yet equally objective, forms of relational structure that mutually influence and shape each other and thus are best viewed as sharing a form of dialectical relation.
Social Networks Are More Objective than Field Structures
Bottero (2009) takes the debate on the dominant form of relational structure to the other extreme. Her main argument is that social networks are a more objective form of relational structure than are fields. She develops her argument by asserting that intersubjective dimensions of interactions are the basis of social actors’ practices. She gathers evidence in support of her argument by referring to the social movement literature on group formation.
According to Bottero, the social movement literature provides substantial evidence that patterns of interaction and the resultant social networks, and not the socioeconomic conditions of the interacting actors, are central to the group formation process. Thus, structural homophily—that is, the conditions within which social actors generate practices according to collective expectations—are created by social networks. She argues that since field actors’ interaction practices are central to the processes leading to the formation, reproduction, and transformation of habitus and field structure, social network–driven interactions create conditions for the formation of the field.
Interestingly, Bottero shows that Bourdieu’s early ethnographic study on honor among the Kabyle people of Algeria was focused on the intersubjective dimension of the Kabyle people’s interactions with each other. However, in later studies, Bourdieu shifted his attention to field positions—defined by the volume and proportions of different kinds of capitals in a particular field position—rather than field actors’ interactions, to explain their practices. This shift in Bourdieu’s focus—from immediate interaction among field actors to the relation among field positions—made him vulnerable to criticisms suggesting that he depicted social actors as overly determined by their structural positions while discounting the importance of their agency (cf. Alexander 1995; Barnes 2000; Bohman 1999; Jenkins 1982; King 2000). Bottero argues that these criticisms of field theory can be overcome by reshifting the focus from the field positions to immediate interactions among actors in field analysis.
Recently, Mohr (2013) has developed similar arguments. According to him, while Bourdieu’s field theory is based on relational logic, field analysis is based on a linear understanding of the social reality. Mohr blames correspondence analysis for this discrepancy between the claims and practice of field theory. According to Mohr, even though correspondence analysis examines relations among field positions, field positions are developed with respect to linear dimensions. Furthermore, he argues that these dimensions are based on the elite’s categories of perception. Hence, they impose the elite’s point of view on field actors who are socially so distant from the elite’s field positions that they might not even be aware of the latter’s point of view.
Mohr argues that maps of relational structure generated by social network analysis do not have these limitations. The positions of network actors on such maps are based entirely on their social relations with each other. Hence, network maps do not have the typical X and Y linear dimensions. At the same time, Mohr criticizes social network analysts for being too concerned with a network of social ties. According to him, conventional social network analysis has remained focused only on the objective reality of social networks, thereby losing focus regarding the subjectivity of the network actors. Mohr insists that taking into account the subjectivity of network actors is as important as taking into account the objective structural conditions of their relational environment in order to explain their activities.
Mohr uses his own hermeneutics-inspired research on early nineteenth-century social welfare organizations to illustrate how one can avoid the problem of linearity in field analysis as well as the structure-meaning duality in social network analysis. First, he examined the self-perceptions of social welfare organization actors in terms of 20 technology, status, and social problem (TSP) criteria. Second, he quantified these data and developed a matrix relating each organization with its self-perception along the 20 TSP criteria. Finally, he used multidimensional scaling (MDS) to illustrate the Euclidean distances among the social welfare organizations. The organizations with similar points of view on the TSP scale were clustered closer to each other, while those with different points of view were located farther apart from each other. According to Mohr, this map illustrated the relational structure of the nineteenth-century social welfare organization field.
Mohr claims that his method, unlike that of social network analysts, can capture this meaning-structure duality. Furthermore, his method reveals conflicts at the local levels, which otherwise cannot be captured through correspondence analysis. Thus, his method overcomes the prominent weaknesses of both social network analysis and field theory.
False Start
One of the most conspicuous features of the debate on the relation between social networks and fields is that the current scholarship treats them as two separate entities. However, Bourdieu’s definition of social capital belies that impression. It simultaneously demonstrates the link between field theory and social network analysis and the significance of social networks as a form of force in fields. According to Bourdieu, Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. (Bourdieu 2002:286)
Bourdieu’s recognition of the durable social networks of field actors in shaping their social capital is similar to social network analysts’ views of the significance of social ties for network structures; however, his emphasis on social networks as resources makes him appear closer to the social capital scholarship led by Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) than to the social network analysts. This apparent closeness between Bourdieu and mainstream social capital literature has been challenged by Portes (1998, 2000), who argues that while the mainstream literature views social capital as a property of a group, Bourdieu characterizes it as a property of an individual’s social ties. 1 Thus, even though it may seem that Bourdieu’s notion of social capital is similar to Coleman’s and Putnam’s, it is safe to reason that Bourdieu’s emphasis on the individual’s social ties in his definition of social capital places him closer to the social network analysts than to the mainstream literature on social capital. Incidentally, social capital scholars now emphasize treating social capital more as a property of individual social ties than as the aggregate source of a collectivity (cf. Lin 1999).
Indeed, scholars engaged with debates on the relation between social networks and fields are aware of the closeness between Bourdieu’s notion of social capital and social network analysis. However, most of them neither explicitly examine it nor bring it to the debate. Bottero (2009) is an exception to this oversight. She accepts that the notion of social capital is integral to field theory; however, she criticizes Bourdieu for focusing only on the field dimensions of cultural and economic capital. Bourdieu did not examine variations in social ties, resultant network positions, and overall social network in any of his empirical studies on field. Thus, Bottero argues that even though the notion of social capital includes the basic element for conducting social network analysis—social ties among actors—it fails to appreciate its significance for shaping the field’s relational structure.
While Bottero’s contention is correct, it is also misplaced. Bourdieu’s field research is based on the premise that the logic of practice in a particular field can be explained by examining the objective dimension of that field’s relational structure. Furthermore, he did not view the objective form of the field dimensions as a given ahistorical fact. According to him, the most intense conflicts within the various fields of the modern social world are those among actors regarding the question of which dimension should be viewed as the objective dimension of the field. Hence, the question of the objective dimension of relational structure is left open in field theory and can be answered only through the empirical investigation of the field.
Bourdieu empirically investigated the fields of social space (1984, 1985), academics (1990), culture (1993), art (1996), and state nobility (1998). These particular historically specific fields were characterized by the intense competition of collectivities claiming that either cultural or economic capital was the objective dimension of their field. For this reason, Bourdieu was interested in measuring the distribution of only these two kinds of capital (and not social capital). Thus, Bottero correctly identifies the lack of elaboration of social capital within field theory despite Bourdieu’s acknowledgement of it as one of the three dimensions of the field. However, she fails to recognize that this lack of elaboration was due to the particular fields Bourdieu studied and not his lack of appreciation for networks.
This insight into the relation between field theory and social capital also explains what Bottero identified as inconsistency between Bourdieu’s early work on the Kabyle people (in which he focused on intersubjective ties) and his later study of fields (in which he focused on field positions). In his later work, Bourdieu typically studied fields in which, unlike in the Kabyle society, social capital was not one of the main contestants for shaping the objective dimension of the field; hence, in these studies, he focused on field actors’ concerns regarding the reproduction of cultural and economic capitals in their respective position during their interactions with each other. In fact, Bourdieu’s open-minded approach toward the importance of social capital is quite evident in his conceptual discussion of the importance of social capital in shaping the relational structure of the social space in the former East Germany, in contrast to the role of cultural capital in shaping the relational structure of social space in France (Bourdieu [1994] 1998:14–8).
This feature of field theory—that is, the open-ended exploration of the objective dimension of field relational structure—can be comprehended by examining one of the least-studied concepts of field theory: symbolic capital. The value of each capital in a field is determined not only by its volume but also, and more important, by its legitimacy from the point of view of the field actors. This legitimate value is known as the capital’s symbolic value. The capital with the highest symbolic value in a field is identified as the symbolic capital of that field, and it becomes the reference for evaluation of all other capitals. Those field actors who have symbolic capital gain symbolic dominance over others in their field, and thus their point of view acquires greater legitimacy in the field than that of symbolically dominated actors. In other words, the point of view of the symbolically dominant actors in a field plays the pivotal role in structuring the objective dimension of that field’s relational structure.
Among the scholars examining the relation between social networks and fields, only De Nooy (2003) mentions symbolic capital. In fact, he uses this concept to expand Bourdieu’s critique of social network analysis. According to De Nooy, social network analysts assume that network actors are unrestrained in interpreting the symbolic value of resources exchanged among them. Bourdieu, however, shows that the symbolic values of social resources are not ascertained by individuals but instead are collectively recognized. Such collective recognition of symbolic value passes from generation to generation and, through the socialization process, shapes social actors’ categories of perception. Thus, social network analysts focusing only on the present state of resource exchange fail to appreciate the significance of history in shaping the current dynamics of interactions.
However, De Nooy does not recognize that while symbolic value is collectively reproduced, there is also an ongoing contest among various collectivities in a field over the question of what is the “true” symbolic capital of their field. The collectivity emerging as the winner defines not only the symbolic capital but also the objective dimension of the field. Thus, it is possible that in different historical epochs, any one of the three forms of capital—social, cultural, or economic—can be the objective dimension of the field relational structure.
In those historical moments of a field when social capital is established as the objective dimension, social networks define the relational structure of the field. Under such circumstances, the logic of network dynamics plays the pivotal role in shaping network actors’ immediate comprehension of the symbolic values of the objects exchanged. In other words, De Nooy does not recognize that field actors’ practices not only reproduce the objective dimension of the field relational structure but also create the potential for changing the very identity of that dimension.
Bourdieu ([1997] 2000) has argued that the potency of the objective field dimension lies not in its coercive power over field actors but rather in the fact that it acquires the status of the commonsensical understanding of that field. Thus, it is with respect to that field dimension that field actors interpret their immediate field experiences. Correspondence analysis maps illustrate the state of a field when a particular elite’s unique point of view has acquired the form of such a commonsensical perception. Thus, such maps require dual reading, because they simultaneously depict the relational structure of the field from the point of view of the elite and from the commonsensical perception at a given time.
Mohr (2013) does not acknowledge this dual reading of the correspondence analysis maps. Instead, he remains focused on only the elite interpretation of the field structure. As a corrective to correspondence analysis–generated field maps, Mohr insists on the significance of localized conflicts for the formation of the macrostructure of the field. He acknowledges the importance of the commonsensical perception of the actors involved in these conflicts, as this perception makes it possible for them to comprehend each other and the reasons for their conflicts. However, his solution veers toward the untenable assumption that actors’ common sense is completely insulated from the influence of the wider field structures.
While it might be true that the conflicting nonelite actors’ common sense is not aware of the dominant elite’s point of view, this does not necessarily mean that their common sense is insulated from the influence of the dominant elite. After all, they are a part of the field’s relational structure, which is deeply—even if indirectly—influenced by the dominant elite’s point of view. Thus, if the dominant elite view the objects being exchanged as more important than the social ties within which those objects are exchanged in the elite sector of the field, then the nonelite’s commonsensical perception is likely to be shaped by locally experienced forces, which, in turn, are shaped by the relative difference in the symbolic value of objects in the elite sector of the field. In contrast, the logic of elite networks will create the domain within which nonelite actors’ commonsensical perception is conditioned in cases in which the dominant collectivity within the elite sector of the field depends on their social ties rather than on objects exchanged in the field.
The point of the above discussion is that the interpretation of field theory by scholars interested in examining the relation between social networks and fields does not take into account Bourdieu’s notion of social capital and his insights into the role of history in shaping a field’s relational structure. These two oversights lead these scholars to believe that social networks and fields are two separate forms of relational structure. Hence, they make a false start in theorizing the relation between the two by assuming that one is more or less objective than the other or that the two are equally objective. I argue that instead of examining how social networks and fields are related to each other, scholars should focus on the question of under what circumstances social networks become the objective dimension of field relational structure. As discussed in the following section, the field of politics is a unique case of field theory in which these views on the relation between social networks and fields can be examined without assuming that the two are separate forms of relational structure or that their status as the objective form of relational structure is an a priori fact.
The Political Field
Bourdieu ([1991] 1999:194–6) describes the political field as a space of contest among political actors to gain control over state offices by using two kinds of politics-specific capital: the capital of social ties among politicians (social capital) and the capital of popularity among the masses (cultural capital). Typically, a political actor relies on the widespread recognition of his or her party among the masses in order to mobilize them in his or her favor during general elections. However, to use party apparatuses, it is important for a political actor to first be nominated by party leaders as the party’s candidate in an election. Thus, a leader dependent on the popularity of the party symbol needs to be well embedded within the social networks of his or her colleagues in order to further his or her political career. In contrast to such typical politicians, a few leaders possess personal fame that surpasses their party’s popularity among the masses. Such personal fame could be a result of fame attained in another field (e.g., law, movies, medicine, etc.) or personal charisma.
A leader relying on his or her social ties in politics in order to mobilize the masses will appreciate political practices that contribute to increasing his or her social ties among the party leaders and strengthening the party organization. In contrast, since political actors relying on their personal fame are relatively independent of their social ties among the party leaders, their point of view on political practices is not shaped by whether those practices contribute to their social ties in politics. In fact, if necessary, they can ignore the desires of the party leaders and the requirements of the party organization, because their main concern is their popularity among the masses.
Because of these differences in political actors’ points of view on favorable practices, contests among them over the symbolic value of these two politics-specific capitals (i.e., ties among politicians and popularity among the masses) become inevitable. These kinds of inter- and intraparty contests among the political elite play the decisive role in establishing the symbolic value of their politics-specific capitals. The elite’s claims of the relatively higher symbolic value of their respective politics-specific capitals are authenticated through general elections, in which the true efficacy of their capitals in mobilizing the masses is tested.
A member of the elite uses his or her politics-specific capital to lead the party’s nominees in legislative elections. If a large number of the party’s nominees win legislative seats, that member of the elite can claim that the winners’ success was a result of his or her politics-specific capital, thus establishing his or her capital as the symbolic capital of the political field. Therefore, the political practices of those leaders with a relatively higher volume of symbolic capital will have higher legitimacy in the political field. Furthermore, their appreciation and depreciation of others’ political practices will have relatively higher acceptance among the political field members. In other words, the point of view of leaders with a high volume of symbolic capital gives meaning to the term objective in the concept of objective relational structure.
If a section of the elite establish their social ties in politics as the symbolic capital of the political field, then their social networks in politics define the relational structure of the political field. Having gained access to state resources, the dominant elite are likely to exploit state resources in order to both expand and deepen their existing networks. Such political field authority reproduction strategies of the dominant elite not only reproduce the objective dimension of political field relational structure but also deeply affect the workings of the state institutions.
This political field scenario has been extensively explored by political scientists and sociologists interested in the role of elite networks in stabilizing institutions of democracy. A series of studies by Higley and colleagues since the 1970s have demonstrated that the circle of informal network ties that facilitate the elite’s access to state resources is the foundation of stable democracy (Field and Higley, 1973, 1980, 1985; Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 2006; Higley et al. 1991). Meanwhile, consociational theorists reason that democracy is stabilized by institutional arrangements for the distribution of state power among communal elite (Lehmbruch 1993; Lijphart 1977, 1984, 1996; Mair 1994). Unlike the elite circle theorists, consociational theorists are more interested in the role of formal than informal social networks among the elite (Higley et al. 1991). Nevertheless, like elite circle theorists, consociational theorists acknowledge the importance of elite networks in shaping the fate of democracy in a country.
However, if the elite known for their popularity among the masses establish their capital as the symbolic capital of the political field, then social networks in politics cease to be the defining feature of the political field’s relational structure. Classic studies on populism present strong evidence that populist leaders are more interested in exploiting state apparatuses to improve their popularity among the masses than in maintaining their social ties among political actors (Di Tella 1965; Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Skidmore 1979). Hence, a typical strategy used by a populist leader is to either deepen the state’s interference in the market economy or, if it is already deep, to use it to distribute various resources among his or her constituents.
The appearance of dominant political elites known for their popularity among the masses does not mean that social networks among political actors located in different field positions disappear. Political actors, including the dominant elite, are still embedded within various social networks in politics; however, their political practices are now determined by their position along the dimension of cultural capital in politics (i.e., mass popularity capital) rather than by the internal logic of their social networks in politics. Thus, while one can analyze the flow of various resources through social networks in politics, one cannot explain the practices of political actors solely on the basis of their position within those networks.
Here it is important to note that these well-known studies on the political foundations of democracy do not view politics as a field (i.e., as a site of contest among political actors over the meaning of politics). Hence, they cannot recognize the historical specificity of their unique notions of political structure. Thus, while these studies are sufficient to bolster field theory’s claim that social networks are integral to fields and can define the latter’s relational structure, they are not sufficient to examine the flow of history within which the relation between fields and social networks alters.
To critically appreciate the available theories on the relation between fields and social networks (cf. Bottero 2009; Crossley 2010, 2013; De Nooy 2003; Mohr 2013) and gain new insights, we need to examine the history of a political field in which social or cultural capital defined the relational structure at different points of time. In the following section, I present my field theory analysis of three periods of postcolonial Indian politics—the Nehruvian (1947–1964), Syndicate (1964–1969), and Gandhian (1971–1984) periods—during which changes in the symbolic value of social and cultural capital changed the relational structure of politics, with dramatic consequences for the unique case of Indian democracy (Singh 2012, 2015, 2016).
Theoretical Insights from the Indian Case
The Nehruvian Period (1947–1964): Evidence Favoring Mohr’s Ground-up Thesis
As an exception to the socioeconomic theories (cf. Lipset 1959; Moore [1966] 1993), India has served as a testing ground for illustrating the role of elite networks in shaping democracy consolidation processes, especially during the Nehruvian period (cf. Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 2006; Lijphart 1996). Such studies imply that elite political networks defined the entire political relational structure. However, available accounts show that Nehruvian-period politics were driven by two different political logics.
The Nehru-led elite controlled the dynamics of national politics and hence deeply influenced state policies and the ruling party’s political rhetoric. Nehru was well known for his mass popularity as well as his distaste for nepotism, the ruling leaders’ core strategy to sustain their political networks. However, regional leaders’ sway in local politics remained largely unchallenged. Most of them belonged to the landed castes, and their political success was driven by their social ties with their regions’ caste leaders. They firmly controlled local party office dynamics and were pivotal in legislative nominations, even when Nehru disliked their choices. Thus, while Nehru’s cultural capital in politics shaped the relational structure of national politics, the regional leaders’ social ties defined the relational structure of local politics.
This appears to confirm Mohr’s (2013) ground-up relational method, which suggests that grassroots-level dynamics are insulated from the elite sector’s influence in a given field. Hence, in order to study relational structure, one must examine interactions among grassroots-level actors. However, the unique configuration of the relational structure of the Nehruvian-period political field was a result of Nehru’s unique strategy for transforming his dominated colonial-period position within the elite sector of the postcolonial political field.
During the late colonial period, Nehru gained immense popularity among the rural masses, bringing him into conflict with the Congress party leaders whose political strength was in their social networks among the party and the landed caste groups. Because the colonial state had enfranchised only the dominant social groups for participation in elections, the landed caste groups were primarily responsible for the electoral victories of the Congress party leaders. Thus, a typical colonial-period Congress party leader recognized social ties in politics as the symbolic capital of the field. The adoption of democracy in postcolonial India enfranchised the rural masses, and Nehru ensured that their participation in elections was unhindered by any form of coercion by the incumbent elite. Nehru led the Congress party leaders to victory in the first three general elections, conclusively demonstrating the superiority of his cultural-capital–based mass-mobilization strategy in the eyes of the Congress party leaders.
In other words, Nehru dexterously exploited the well-known foundational political institutions of democracy—free and fair elections, universal franchise, and civil and political liberties (cf. Schumpeter 1942)—to transform the symbolic order of the Indian political field in favor of his cultural capital in politics. Thus, field theory shows that in contrast to the claims of elite network scholars, it was not strong elite networks but rather Nehru’s effort to weaken the symbolic power of leaders known for their networks that led to the institutionalization of Indian democracy. However, having seen the significance of the party leaders’ networking in the colonial period, Nehru prudently kept peace with the regional leaders by granting them sufficient autonomy to manage local politics on their own terms. Thus, the Nehruvian-period political field poses a serious challenge to Mohr’s assumption that local interactions remain insulated from the elite sectors of a field.
The Syndicate Period (1964–1969): Scrutinizing Bottero’s Vision of Social Networks Structuring the Field
During the early post-Nehruvian period, elite-sector dynamics began shifting in favor of a clique of powerful regional leaders called the Syndicate. Their triumph in appointing Shastri as Nehru’s successor after his death in 1964 demonstrated the newly acquired significance of their networks in national politics. However, while the strength of the Syndicate’s networks appears to validate Bottero’s argument that social networks define the relational structure of a field, the fact that the Syndicate’s regime began and ended at specific moments also reveals the main weakness of Bottero’s argument: her a priori assumption that the social ties constitute an ahistorical form of objective relations.
Having established their social capital as the symbolic capital of the field, the Syndicate appointed Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, as the successor to Shastri (who died within a year of taking office), expecting her to consult with their network members before deciding on any important policy issue. Gandhi, however, believed that she had inherited Nehru’s cultural capital of personal fame and the resultant political authority and, hence, could decide such matters on her own. Feeling insulted by Gandhi, the Syndicate soon started publicly criticizing her government’s policies; in retaliation, she accused them of acting like party bosses, only interested in wealth and power.
While the conflict between the Syndicate and Gandhi could be viewed as a conflict over control of state offices, it really concerned whether their relation was defined by the Syndicate’s networks or Gandhi’s personal fame. This conflict illuminates another important weakness of Bottero’s theory: her assumption that network members share the same point of view on the meaning of their intersubjective ties. In 1969, the conflict between the Syndicate and Gandhi over the meaning of their relation with each other split the party into Congress (R), led by Gandhi, and Congress (O), led by the Syndicate. In the 1971 elections, Gandhi defeated Congress (O) using her populist slogan of garibi hatao (“remove poverty”), establishing her cultural capital as the symbolic capital of Indian politics and thereafter dramatically diminishing the political significance of the national and regional inter- and intraparty elite networks.
The Gandhian Period (1971–1984): Testing De Nooy’s Thesis on Fields as the Foundation of Social Networks
The Gandhian period appears to confirm De Nooy’s thesis that field relational structure shapes networks in a field. Gandhi’s political network members, who shared her populist political ideology and associated cultural capital, were relatively unknown and hence had less social capital than the Syndicate’s network members. However, De Nooy’s theory suffers from the assumption that field relational structures are historically transcendent. The dynamics of the Gandhian-period political field were a result of the historically unique condition of Indian politics, characterized by the relatively higher symbolic value of cultural capital than social capital.
Symbolic order creates not only the possibility of creating social networks but also the meaning of intersubjective ties at their foundation. The Syndicate’s intersubjective ties were defined by clientelism; they were dependent on members of their clientelistic networks, who expected access to state resources in exchange for their support, and such political calculations were considered to be appropriate when the Syndicate’s social capital was the symbolic capital of the political field. When Gandhi established her cultural capital of mass popularity as the symbolic capital, the intersubjective meaning of her political ties was defined by loyalty; she believed that only she could provide resources to her network members and thus expected their unconditional deference.
This situation led to the culture of sycophancy in the ruling party toward Gandhi and her family members that, in the late 1970s, almost derailed Indian democracy. Because Gandhi’s network members were not known for or interested in developing their social capital in politics, they emaciated the elite networks that were vital for the stability of local politics. In response to the resultant political commotion, which posed an unprecedented challenge to her authority, Gandhi suspended Indian democracy by declaring a state of emergency (1975–1977).
Indian Political Field and Crossley’s Thesis about the Dialectical Relation between Fields and Social Networks
The field–social network relation theories scrutinized so far make a priori assumptions about fields and social networks as the foundation of objective relations. Crossley avoids this pitfall by claiming that both field and social networks are equally objective forms of relational structure and hence are dialectically related to each other; however, Crossley’s argument confuses the scholastic ideal of giving equal importance to all points of view in academic research with the harsh reality of the hierarchically related positions of field actors.
India’s postcolonial political history shows that the dynamics of relational structure were driven by contests among the elite over the symbolic value of their respective politics-specific capitals. However, such contests took place on an uneven plane shaped by previous similar struggles. Hence, depending upon whether their politics-specific capital currently defined the field’s relational structure, some political actors always had an advantage over others.
The Nehruvian period shows that cultural and social capital can share the status of the dominant dimension of political field relational structure, seemingly in line with Crossley’s claims; however, this status was valid in different sectors of the field—cultural capital in national politics and social capital in local politics. Thus, the Nehruvian period relational structure does not reflect Crossley’s belief about the dialectical relation between fields and networks.
At the beginning of the Syndicate period, both the national and regional politics were defined by the Syndicate’s networks. However, near the end of the Syndicate period, both the Syndicate and Gandhi vociferously claimed that their respective politics-specific capital was the symbolic capital of the field. This fluidity in the symbolic order did not congeal until the Syndicate’s electoral losses and Gandhi’s success established cultural capital as the symbolic capital at both the national and regional level.
Thus, the closest the Indian political field came to resembling Crossley’s thesis was during its transition from the Syndicate period to the Gandhian period. This transition period shows that such apparent evenness in the political field generates a high degree of uncertainty that is only resolved when one of the actors successfully claims the symbolic capital. Once the political field stabilizes, the transition period similarity in the capacities of social and cultural capital to shape the political field relational structure ceases to exist.
Summary: Main Lessons from the Indian Case
The study of the Indian political field shows that the current theories on the relation between fields and social networks are not invalid. However, since these theories are based on assumptions about fields and social networks as objective forms of relational structure, and because conflict among actors over the symbolic capital of the field changes the objective dimension of the relational structure, they are valid only at a historically specific juncture of a field’s evolution. Thus, only in particular historical circumstances can one use social network analysis as a tool of field theory (De Nooy 2003), study the dialectical relation between social networks and fields (Crossley 2010, 2013), or accept social networks as the foundation of the field (Bottero 2009; Mohr 2013).
At a more general level, this study shows that fields, defined as the site of contests over the form and substance of relational structure, shape the fate of social networks as the defining form of relational structure and the meaning of intersubjective ties among the network members. The Syndicate period shows that social networks define relational structure when the dominant actors’ primary capital is their social capital, while the Gandhian period shows that cultural capital defines relational structure when the dominant actors’ primary capital is their cultural capital. Finally, the Nehruvian period shows that the status of social networks as the defining form of relational structure in different field sectors depends on whether the dominant actors in the elite sector of the field view the existence of social networks as vital to their field reproduction strategy.
The Syndicate and Gandhian periods show that the members of a social network need not necessarily assign the same meaning to their intersubjective ties with each other. Furthermore, the differences in the meaning of intersubjective ties are not resolved by the contingencies of interactions among network actors. The symbolically dominant actors can impose their point of view regarding the meaning of intersubjective ties on the symbolically dominated actors interacting with them. Thus, to comprehend the meaning of intersubjective ties among interacting actors, it is imperative to take into account the symbolic order in the field.
Conclusion
Perhaps Bourdieu’s polemical remark on social networks is largely to be blamed for misleading the debate on the relation between social networks and fields. His challenge to the social network analysts’ belief that social ties are the objective form of relational structure triggered the logic of dialecticism within the debate among scholars interested in examining the relation between social networks and fields. As a result, some scholars developed their view by accepting Bourdieu’s remark, while others developed their position on the topic by challenging Bourdieu.
However, once we bracket Bourdieu’s brief remark on social networks and view it in the context of his wider concerns on the relation between the history and field relational structure, we can clearly see that there is no need to develop a synthetic conception of relational structure; such a conception already exists, as a social network analysis–driven notion of social capital is integral to field theory concepts. However, field theory does not assume that social capital is the a priori objective dimension of field relational structure. In fact, Bourdieu has insisted that the objective dimension of field relational structure can be known only as an a posteriori fact. Hence, the focus of the debate within relational sociology should be on the historical conditions within which one of the three dimensions of a field—cultural, social, or economic—becomes the objective dimension of field relational structure.
The political field is an important research site for relational sociologists, not only because it demonstrates the historical specificity of the field relational structure but also because—unlike other fields explored by Bourdieu, in which actors compete to establish economic or cultural capital as the symbolic capital—the contest in the political field is to establish either politics-specific social capital (social ties in politics) or cultural capital (personal fame) as the symbolic capital of the field. Thus, political field theory provides a unique opportunity to study the relation between field and social networks.
Comparative field analysis of Indian politics shows that relational sociologists must reconstruct the notion of relational structure by focusing their epistemological lenses on the history of contests among the relevant actors over field-specific goals, such as offices, awards, grants, titles, and so on. The study of conflicts among field actors illustrates various kinds of resources, or capitals, that they use to compete with their rivals. The success or failure of their practices simultaneously reveals the symbolic worth of their resources, the symbolic order of the field, and the objective dimension of field relational structure.
This epistemological insight does not entail a rigid choice of research method; either correspondence analysis or social network analysis, or a combination of the two, or even a different method, may be used to identify the relational structure of the field. These points about methodology are evident in available studies examining the relation between social networks and fields. De Nooy (2003) used both correspondence analysis and social network analysis, while Crossley (2010, 2013) and Bottero (2009) used both qualitative and quantitative social network analysis techniques. Mohr (2013) used neither correspondence analysis nor social network analysis; instead, he developed a unique, hermeneutic-driven MDS method to reveal the relational structure. The only limitation of these authors’ methodological strategies is that they assumed that their studies revealed a universal and ahistorical form of relational structure. However, if we view their studies through field theory insight, we will note that these studies revealed the relational structure of a particular field sector at a particular moment of contest among actors within it over the symbolic value of their respective field-specific capitals.
To conclude, I argue that the epistemological focus on the historical state of conflict among field actors over symbolic capital is important not only because it allows sociologists to correctly identify the shape and components of relational structure but also because it helps to prevent sociologists from unwittingly becoming complicit in field actors’ efforts to reproduce the existent, or to establish a new, politically charged ontology of their field’s relational structure. This mistake is evident in elite network studies examining institutions of democracy, as they assume that all forms of democratization flow from networks in politics to the masses, giving the impression that networks represent an ahistorical and universal form of political structure (Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 2006)—an impression that the leaders dependent on such networks for their political fortunes like to make.
As a consequence, such scholarship fails to accept that contests over the definition of politics constitute the seminal part of political field dynamics and, hence, ends up depicting populist leaders as the villains in the story of democracy in a country (cf. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Such a depiction of populist leaders does not allow for a balanced appreciation of leaders like Gandhi, who, while correctly criticized for temporarily suspending Indian democracy (1975–1977), must also be appreciated for transforming the meaning of Indian democracy by allowing the masses to access state offices, rather than restricting such access to the dominant classes of the country (cf. Hewitt 2007).
Awareness of the difference between dominant and dominated actors’ points of view on relational structure does not entail emphasizing the potency of the latter’s points of view. Rather, such awareness brings to light the fact that what appears to be the dominant principal of a field’s relational structure is nothing more than the misrecognition of the dominant actors’ particular point of view as the universal, or commonsensical, point of view. In fact, challenges posed to the dominant actors by the dominated actors, no matter how muted, keep the field tilted toward the possibility of radical change. Thus, even though one must remain skeptical of the dominated actors’ claims that their point of view shapes the relational structure of their domain, it is important to acknowledge their claims. Otherwise, sociologists might give the impression that social spaces are more like what Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:102–4) identified as an apparatus—a pathological state of social space in which domination is absolute and, hence, history is dead—than fields that contain a perpetual struggle to redefine the relational structure and that are thus alive with history.