Public Housing Matters: Public Housing Policy in Sweden,the United States,and Israel

Abstract

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Chinese

During the past decade, many countries have returned to public housing to meet the demand for affordable housing. Using the Esping-Anderson typology, this study examines how differences in a country’s political economic regime influence the implementation and outcomes of public housing policies over time and the extent to which and how the differences change over time. The analysis focuses on Sweden, the United States, and Israel, representing three different regime types. In light of the renewed worldwide recognition of the importance of public housing, such an analysis can help shape more effective public housing policies.

Keywords

liberalism public housing Sweden United States Israel welfare state

Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, and especially after World War II, public housing was built in many countries, including several European countries, the United States, and Israel. However, the primary goals and rationales for public housing policies varied in important ways, as did their implementation. Such differences have affected the definition of the target population, project size, location, form of subsidies, and the level and method of maintenance (Hananel 2017; Houard 2011; Scanlon, Whitehead, and Arrigiota 2014; Schwartz 2014; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007).

In most places, public housing consisted mainly of large housing estates in unattractive locations and created homogeneous communities that became concentrations of poverty, making public housing policies controversial. Whereas some see these policies as supplying much-needed affordable housing for various populations, others viewed them as worsening the living conditions of disadvantaged people (Bratt 1986; Fuerst 2000; Goetz 2005; Marcuse 1995; Von Hoffman 2012).

The debate over public housing intensified in recent years, stimulated in large part by the global financial crisis that began in 2007–2008, and was intertwined with a housing crisis and an increased need for affordable housing. In response, many countries have acted to increase their supply of affordable housing (Calavita and Mallach 2010; Gurran 2008; Hananel 2014).

Public housing, one of the oldest and best known responses to a housing crisis, has become popular again in the past decade. France built 131,500 new public housing units in 2010, the United Kingdom expanded its construction of public housing in 2007–2009 (Housing Europe Review 2012), and the Netherlands added 160,000 units to its public housing stock between 2006 and 2011 (Elsinga and Wassenberg 2014).

Interest in public housing spread across the globe, even to Hong Kong, which has¹ one of the world’s most neoliberal economies (Chiu 2010; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). Whereas renewed or new interest in public housing has been evident in many countries in the past decade, the policies pursued have differed in important ways, shaped by specific political, social, legal, and economic factors (Hananel 2017).

Public housing, then, still matters, and public housing policies in different countries should be examined and compared. This paper examines how differences in the political economic regime influence the implementation and outcomes of public housing policies. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of public housing policies in different places and over time makes it possible to examine whether the definitions of the welfare state regime types of the mid-twentieth century are relevant to the new millennium, whether the substantial differences in the past still exist, and whether these differences have grown or shrunk, and if so, to what extent and in what manner. In light of the renewed worldwide recognition of the importance of public housing, such an analysis can help create more effective and sensitive public housing policies.

To answer these questions, we use the Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b) seminal typology of three welfare state regimes: social democratic, corporatist, and liberal. We focus on Sweden and the United States because each of these countries represents a classic model of a different type of welfare state regime: social democracy and liberal, respectively. We chose Israel because of the exceptionally interesting trajectory of its public housing policy. First, the Israeli policy has components that are related to the three welfare state regime types—starting with a combination of social democratic and corporatist regimes and later displaying a combination of liberal and corporatist regimes. Second, the changes in Israel’s public housing policy over time are extreme, even in comparison with the changes in other countries (Hananel 2017).

We focus on differences in (1) primary goals and rationales, (2) quantity and location of the housing built, (3) its quality and maintenance, and (4) eligibility and characteristics of its occupants. We also discuss current debates and developments.

In the next section, we present background on public housing. Then, we discuss the relations between public housing and the welfare state and present the methodology used in our research. The following sections present our case studies of public housing policies in the three countries. We then compare the policy outcomes and conclude by drawing inferences that could be used to create more effective policies in these countries and in others.

Public Housing: Background, Definitions, and Global Trends

Public housing is one of the oldest policy tools for increasing the affordable housing supply. Public housing generally refers to government-owned housing, usually low-cost rental apartments, for lower income people who cannot afford private-market rental or ownership prices (Hananel 2017).

World War I and the 1930s economic crisis stimulated public housing in some European countries and the United States. However, public housing spread globally only after World War II (Scanlon, Whitehead, and Arrigiota 2014). Since the 1980s, in most countries the percentage of the housing stock allocated for public housing has declined substantially. In England, it declined from 31 percent in 1979 to only 18 percent in 2011 (Whitehead 2014), in the Netherlands from 43 percent in 1975 to 32 percent in 2011 (Elsinga and Wassenberg 2014), and in Germany public housing units constituted almost a quarter of the housing stock in the 1970s, while they are now only 5 percent (Droste and Knorr-Siedow 2014). In many countries, this resulted from a combination of privatization, allowing the sale of apartments to their tenants and a slowdown in public housing construction. Nevertheless, most societies have maintained some level of public housing construction (Hananel 2017).

During the past three decades, especially in Western Europe, new public housing initiatives have appeared. Many were influenced by neoliberal trends dominant in advanced economy countries. Consequently, instead of national subsidies providing most funds and local authorities or housing companies building the units, public/private partnerships are being created, and more and more private developers are building and operating public housing and urban renewal projects (Clapham 1995; Kemeny and Lowe 1998; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007; Scanlon, Whitehead, and Arrigiota 2014).

Public Housing and the Welfare State

The literature refers to housing in general and public housing in particular as one of the pillars of the welfare state, ranking in significance with social security and health and education (Fahey and Norris 2011; Kemeny 2001). In some (mainly European) countries, public housing is in fact called social housing (Houard 2011; Scanlon, Whitehead, and Arrigiota 2014; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). However, some scholars contend that a state decision to intervene in the housing market can be driven by interest in achieving economic or national-territorial goals rather than social welfare (Kallus and Yone 2002; Marcuse 1978). Economic goals can be served when public housing is used to create jobs and improve the economy. National-territorial goals can be at work when public housing is used to populate and establish control over a geographical area (Kallus and Yone 2002).

There is no single formal definition of public housing (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). Definitions may include such variables as ownership type, who constructs the dwellings, whether rents are below market level, the relevant funding, and/or subsidy stream. Most important is the primary goal of the housing, whether formally available to all, as in Austria and Sweden, or reserved for those who cannot meet their own housing needs, as in England, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Methodology

In this study, we seek to find out to what extent characteristics of public housing are influenced by the existing political economy regime and may change as a result of major changes in that regime. To answer this question, we use the Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b) seminal typology of three welfare state regimes: liberal, corporatist, and social democratic. According to Esping-Andersen, essential criteria for defining the type of a given welfare state relate to the quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market, and family. Thus, public housing policy could be affected significantly by the type of welfare state regime and the changes it has undergone. The use of Esping-Anderson’s typology enables us to compare the public housing policies of the three countries and analyze changes that have occurred in each of them over time.

We shall present briefly the most important characteristics of Esping-Andersen’s (1990a, 1990b) three regime types.

A liberal welfare state regime is characterized by little state interference and a strong market orientation. Private companies are responsible for most welfare services. The state helps only a limited group having really low incomes (as a safety net). Those eligible for welfare services are in general low income, usually working-class state dependents. Entitlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma. Benefits are typically modest. The state encourages the market, either passively, by guaranteeing only a minimum, or actively, by subsidizing private welfare schemes. As a result, the society is dualistic. There is equality (but also poverty) among state welfare recipients, with variations in income in the rest of the society (Hoekstra 2003). According to Esping-Andersen (1990a), the archetypical examples of this model are the United States, Canada, and Australia.

In corporatist welfare state regimes, the state is fairly active in providing welfare services. Here the liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification was never preeminent and, hence, Esping-Andersen (1990a) explains, granting social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. However, welfare provision is segmented, and different groups are entitled to different services. In this regime type, the state is definitely not the only provider of welfare services, and the family and private nonprofit organizations like churches and trade unions also play an important part. Austria, Germany, Italy, and Belgium are representative corporatist welfare state regimes (Hoekstra 2003). As previously mentioned, we chose to include Israel because its public housing policy has major corporatist components and because from the policy’s inception, it was designated only for the absorption of new Jewish immigrants (Doron 2003; Sleifer 1979), an issue we will discuss in broad terms.

In social democratic welfare state regimes, the provision of welfare services is dominated by the state, and the principles of universalism and de-commodifying social rights are extended to the new middle class. Esping-Anderson (1990a:122) calls it a social democratic regime type “because in these nations, social democracy clearly was the dominant force behind social reforms.” In contrast to other welfare state regimes, which provide equally only for minimal needs of distinct populations, the social democratic regime type promotes an equality of the highest standards of universal welfare services to much of the population. Given the redistributing effects of the welfare state, income differences are relatively low (Hoekstra 2003). According to Esping-Andersen (1990a), Sweden and Norway are classic examples of a social democratic welfare state type regime, as are Denmark and Finland.

Prima facie, in the 1950s and 1960s, each of the selected countries represented a different type of welfare state regime. Sweden is the social democratic type regime, the United States is a liberal type regime, and Israel, as this study will show, is a hybrid production of corporatist and social democratic regime types as presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Welfare state regime type of the three selected countries 1950s–1960s.

This paper examines how differences in the general political economic regime influence the implementation and outcomes of public housing policies. We also examine whether the definitions of the welfare state regime types are still relevant today.

To apply Esping-Andersen’s typology to housing, we chose to focus on four aspects fundamental to housing studies generally and to public housing specifically. The four aspects are:

The primary policy goal: What was the primary policy goal and the main problems it aimed to solve? Did the policy aim to achieve social goals as part of the social democratic regime type, market-biased economic goals typical of liberal type regimes, or other goals?

Quantity and location: Public housing, like any welfare service, can be provided by the state, the market, or the family (Hoekstra 2003). Hence, we ask how many public housing units were produced and by whom, what proportion of each country’s housing stock do they comprise, and what quantity changes have occurred over time. Esping-Andersen’s typology does not refer directly to the spatial dimension of location. However, any analysis of spatial policy, especially of public housing policy, necessarily involves locations. Thus, we also ask about public housing units’ geographic distribution: Are they located mainly in cities or suburbs, the center, or peripheral areas (Archer, Gatzlaff, and Ling 1996; Barret 1976; Chen and Rutherford 2012).

Quality and maintenance: According to the Esping-Anderson typology, the welfare regime type affects the quality of public services citizens receive. While liberal regime type provides minimal services at minimal and sometimes even subminimal standards, social democratic regimes provide high standards of universal welfare services such as public housing. Corporatist type regimes may produce public housing units at different levels for different populations. We shall ask about the quality of public housing, who sets the maintenance level, who is responsible, and who pays for maintenance over the years: the state, local authorities, public companies, or nonprofit associations.

Eligibility and characteristics of occupants: The Esping-Andersen typology refers directly to these aspects. We ask if all households are eligible. as in social democracy. or if there are strict criteria like means tests and/or other requirements often associated with stigma in liberal or corporatist type regimes.

This study shows significant differences in each of these aspects between Sweden, the United States, and Israel. However, changes in public housing policy have taken place in all three countries. Thus, over the years, the major differences in the 1950s, shown in Figure 1, have shrunk.

Methodological Constraints and Challenges

Cross-national comparisons of a public policy are challenging and require one to identify and consider important political, social, and economic differences between the countries. One must also be mindful of structures and/or conditions unique to those countries that limit possible generalizations. In the case studies that follow, we point out the most important general and specific features of each country. Another limitation of cross-national research is that the empirical data available in each country are not always defined or gathered in exactly the same way or the same years. Hence, in our study, some comparisons of outcomes are not based on identical operational measures.

On the theoretical level, one notes that Esping-Andersen’s typology has been criticized from various standpoints (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Powell 2015). Some think this typology is problematic and difficult to implement in reality (Scruggs and Allan 2008). However, we believe that using it as a theoretical framework helps shed light on the difference between public housing policies shaped in the three selected countries, implementation of the policies, and the economic and social changes these countries and many others underwent over the years.

Lastly, we are not suggesting that these three countries’ public housing policies are the only models or that one can generalize from them to public housing in all other countries. We do, however, believe that important lessons can be learned from these case studies and applied to produce positive outcomes elsewhere.

Public Housing Policy in Sweden

Throughout Europe, Sweden is viewed as the model of a democratic welfare state (Magnusson and Turner 2008; Skocpol 1986), and it is the classic example of a social democratic welfare state in Esping-Andersen’s (1990a, 1990b) seminal typology. From the 1930s until 2006, Sweden was governed primarily by the Swedish Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SAP), the originator of the Swedish welfare state, and public housing was one of the government’s chief concerns. Some erosion of the welfare state is thought to have occurred under the central-rightist government that came into power in 2006. Because local authorities play a prominent role in housing matters, policies vary to some extent from one community to another, depending on which political party is in power there (Lind 2014).

Original Rationales, Justifications, and Goals

The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) started intervening directly in the housing market in the early 1900s, primarily as a way of dealing with a temporary crisis. After World War II, major construction of public housing began in Sweden, after the Social Democratic government introduced a housing policy that gave municipal housing corporations (MHCs) subsidized loans.²

The declared goal was to end overcrowding in the cities and the housing shortage following the war by stimulating the production of good housing at a reasonable price for everyone.³ This policy, according to Borelius and Wennerström (2009), meant that “housing was no longer a private matter but a social right.” Evidence of the social goal of Swedish public housing policy is found in its name, allmännyttig, which in Swedish means “public utility” or “for the benefit of everybody” (Housing Europe Review 2012).

The number of MHCs grew quickly after the new housing policy was instituted. By law, they were responsible for finding housing of a reasonable standard for all residents. The policy was based on a social commitment and the belief that good housing contributes to the positive development of society and would help prevent problems like alcoholism and delinquency (Bengtsson 2004; Lindbergh, Larsson, and Wilson 2006; Magnusson and Turner 2008). Clearly, “social democracy” was the dominant force behind this policy, which is what an Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b) social democratic welfare state regime requires.

Quantity and Locations

In 1965, to meet the increased demand for housing, the government, led by the SAP, began implementing the Million Program (Miljonprogrammet), whose goal was to build a million new dwellings in ten years (1965–1974).

The Million Program produced about 1,006,000 new apartments, resulting in the creation of new suburbs (Andersson, Bråmå, and Holmqvist 2010) and an oversupply of public housing. Consequently, public housing companies had to compete for tenants and encountered economic difficulties, especially in districts that were not near metropolitan centers (Andersson et al. 2010; Borelius and Wennerström 2009). This also fits the social democratic type regime, which provides welfare services (public housing) to much of the population.

However, over time, and especially in the 1980s, the government began cutting support for new construction, depriving municipal companies of their advantage over private firms. Subsidies for public housing declined between 1996 and 2011 from SKR 60 billion to SKR 10 billion. At the same time, taxes on real estate went up from SKR 25 billion to almost SKR 30 billion (Holmqvist and Magnusson Turner 2014). In the 1990s, government tax increases further burdened municipal companies, especially those in poorer districts experiencing problems because of immigration (Sheridan et al. 2002).

Since 1990, the proportion of public housing in the total housing stock has decreased from 22 percent to 16.5 percent in 2013, for several reasons. First, until the 1990s, government subsidies could make building public housing profitable, but when these subsidies shrank, the number of public housing units decreased significantly, particularly in places of high demand. Second, privatization was embraced by some center right municipal governments, such as Stockholm’s, which granted private ownership to tenants of public housing and stopped building more units (Magnusson and Turner 2008; Öst, Söderberg, and Wilhelmsson 2014; Sheridan et al. 2002).

These changes point to some shifting from the left end of the axis of a social democratic welfare state type to the right (a liberal welfare state type) (see Figure 1).

Sweden currently has more than 300 MHCs responsible for 729,000 public housing units.⁴ More than 1.5 million people, about 17 percent of the population, live in these units, which account for almost 20 percent of the country’s residential real estate market and almost 50 percent of all rentals.

With regard to geographic dispersion, public housing in Sweden comprises 28 percent of all urban housing. Many apartments are in the most attractive areas of the main cities. Only 13 percent of public housing is in rural districts, where real estate prices are low and there is less need for public housing (Magnusson and Turner 2008). About 40 percent of municipal councils are short of funds for housing, and 20 percent of them have a housing shortage. However, 1.7 percent of the public housing stock is vacant due to low demand in areas far from urban centers (Blid, Gerdner, and Bergmark 2008; Dol and Haffner 2010).

Quality and Maintenance

The high quality of public housing in Sweden is a source of pride for policymakers, who point out that the goal of providing affordable, quality homes for the general population has been achieved (Atterhög 2005; Borelius and Wennerström 2009). A 2004 survey of the public’s image of public housing in Sweden found that most people did not associate negative characteristics with the tenants (Magnusson and Turner 2008). The high standard of public housing is another prominent indicator that Sweden’s public housing policy is a classic case study of the social democratic type welfare state regime, according to Esping-Andersen’s typology.

The MHCs derive income solely from rent, which covers maintenance costs. In addition, low-interest government loans enable local authorities to decide where and when to invest in new housing. Sweden also gives housing allowances to families with low incomes, and the cost of a reasonable rent is fully covered for families on income support (Atterhög 2005).

Eligibility Criteria and Characteristics of the Occupants

In Sweden, unlike most other countries, “The social democratic party maintained social housing as a universalistic form of housing provision, not a residual form targeted for the poor” (Harloe 1995:540). In other words, every citizen is entitled to public housing. There are no eligibility criteria and no means tests (Housing Europe Review 2012), which follows Esping-Andersen’s (1990a, 1990b) definition of the social democratic welfare state regime.

In assigning housing units, MHCs apply criteria that favor people from weaker social strata. They divide the population into three categories: the elderly, young people (18–30), and all others. Each local company determines eligibility on the basis of demand and criteria such as distance from work, family composition, and age. The main consideration is the length of time since the initial enrollment, which favors people who signed up at the age of 18. Once people have been assigned an apartment, they may live in it for as long as they choose, but when they die, the unit returns to the system.

Paradoxically, the policy that provides housing for all, with controls that reduce prices significantly in high demand areas, creates advantages for higher income people because even those who can afford to buy or rent in the private market can get a less expensive public housing unit (Andersson and Söderberg 2012).⁵ The long wait for an apartment (5–8 years) in a desirable city has created a black market in which people buy illegal rental contracts directly from tenants at inflated prices (Öst et al. 2014). It has also created problems such as overcrowding in immigrant neighborhoods. Most longtime residents of public housing in the city centers want to remain in their apartments. Consequently, vacant units are mostly found in remote neighborhoods less attractive to younger Swedes but attractive to immigrants, and the poverty, unemployment, and violence rates are notably higher than the national average (Andersson et al. 2010; Magnusson and Turner 2008; Ỏst et al. 2014).

Current Debates and Recent Trends

Sweden has seen conflicting trends in public housing in recent years. On the one hand, in September 2014, after a decade of rule by the conservative-liberal Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet), the Social Democratic Party returned to power in a coalition with the Green Party. However, this new coalition has only 138 seats in Parliament, whereas the opposition has 211 seats.

On the other hand, growing anti-immigrant sentiment and the increase of non-European immigrants in public housing heightened opposition to public housing and other social welfare policies, especially from the far right, anti-immigrant party, the Swedish Democrats who won almost 13 percent of the votes in 2014.

Before the election, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party promised to invest heavily in the “million apartment” housing stock⁶ if they gained control of the government. Although they are in the minority in Parliament, the new government succeeded in passing a budget for 2015–2016 that included a SKR 11.1 billion investment in public housing. It allowed for new construction, renovation of all public apartments to make them energy efficient, investment in new rental apartments, and housing for students and the elderly.⁷

Thus, the analysis of Sweden’s public housing policy indicates some political and economic changes that have influenced that policy and created a slight move toward the right—toward a liberal (or neoliberal) welfare state. However, even today, Sweden is a social democratic welfare state closer to the left of the axis (see Figure 1).

Public Housing Policy in the United States

Understanding public housing policy in the United States requires recognition of two distinctive characteristics of the American political system. First, the federal government was established with a political economy that was based on support for free enterprise and limited intervention in private markets (Weinberg 2003). Second, the government has a federalist structure; authority is divided among the national (federal) government, the fifty state governments, and nearly 90,000 local governments.⁸

Public housing policy is made by the national government, and the housing units are constructed and managed by local housing authorities whose authority comes from their state government, which oversees them jointly with their local government (Buckley and Schwartz 2011). According to Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b), the United States has the typical liberal type of welfare state regime, expressed tangibly in its public housing policy regarding the four aspects presented in the following.

The national government created the first public housing in 1933 as part of the Public Works Program initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democrat) in response to the crisis of the Great Depression (Von Hoffman 2000).⁹ Congress passed the first direct Housing Act in 1937 and a much larger, landmark Housing Act in 1949 (Bloom, Umbach, and Vale 2015).

Original Rationales, Justifications, and Goals

Most of the federal government’s housing policies in the 1930s addressed severe unemployment and problems in the financial and real estate sectors, especially the failure of thousands of banks and massive foreclosures on home mortgages. The Housing Act of 1937 encountered strong opposition from real estate and construction organizations and conservative politicians who viewed it as “creeping socialism” (Heathcott 2012), though its stated purpose was to improve the housing conditions of low-income families and reduce unemployment. In fact, many members of Congress viewed providing construction jobs to strengthen the economy as the primary goal of the Act and housing as a secondary goal (Vale and Freemark 2012). To ensure that public housing would not compete with private market housing, the Act placed relatively low ceilings on construction expenditures (Landis and McClure 2010) and set low income limits for eligibility. This description fits the liberal type of welfare regime.

After World War II, millions of returning veterans faced a severe housing shortage, and federal programs were created to help them buy homes (Vale and Freemark 2012). New public housing was also built to address veterans’ needs for affordable rental housing and those of the many low-income people from rural areas, particularly African Americans from the South, who had moved to cities in the Northeast and Midwest in search of jobs (Von Hoffman 2000). In 1949, after several years of political battles, Congress approved the landmark Housing Act whose goal was “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family” and authorized building 810,000 public housing units over the next six years (Orlebeke 2000:493). Thus, in the late 1940s, US public housing policy had some characteristics of social democratic and corporatists regime types, while from that point, on its features fit the liberal regime type.

Quantity and Locations

In the mid-1990s, public housing in the United States peaked at slightly more than 1.4 million units and is currently roughly 1.1 million units (Housing and Urban Development Department [HUD] 2016). This decrease resulted partly from the unlivable condition of some units and the demolition of more than 150,000 units that were part of the HOPE VI housing program (HUD 2004). The goal of that program, which began in 1993 and ended in 2010, was to replace “the oldest and least viable public housing projects with new, mixed-income, mixed-use, lower-density projects” (Landis and McClure 2010:323).

Since the late 1960s, critics of public housing have convinced the federal government to rely increasingly on the private sector to supply housing for lower income people by providing subsidies for its construction and tenants’ rents (Deng and Xiaodi 2013). According to Esping-Andersen’s typology (1990a, 1990b), such criticism of public housing policy typifies liberal type regimes.

Project-based subsidies to private developers who agree to charge lower than market rents for new or rehabilitated housing were introduced, followed by housing vouchers, which pay a portion of the rent for a private market apartment. Currently, roughly 2.1 million low-income households receive housing vouchers, and about 1.6 million live in project-based subsidized housing. In addition, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, created in 1986, has helped fund more than 2 million housing units built mostly by nongovernmental actors (Vale and Freemark 2012).¹⁰

Since the program started, the federal government has provided most of the funds for public housing construction, but state and local governments play key roles in its implementation. Local governments that want public housing ask their state government to grant them authority to create a local Public Housing Authority (PHA). The PHA determines where the housing is built and manages the buildings after they are occupied (Buckley and Schwartz 2011).

About two-thirds of all public housing units are in cities, less than 20 percent are in rural areas, and a small number are in suburbs. About 30 percent of the total public housing stock is in high-rise, high-density buildings in low-income areas (Schwartz 2014). Some large public housing projects were built in remote, isolated locations where land was cheaper and there were few neighbors to view such construction as a Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) activity and oppose it (Talen and Koschinsky 2014).

Quality and Maintenance

The federal government did not provide standards for public housing; it only set per-room costs, and these were low. The result was often shoddy construction, including, for example, closets without doors (Schwartz 2014). Furthermore, public housing projects were often built to look austere so they would not compete with private market housing (Nenno 1996).

Poor maintenance and complaints about unresponsive management, widespread in public housing projects, resulted from the federal government’s financing only the long-term debt of construction costs; PHAs had to pay maintenance and management costs from tenants’ rents. When rapid inflation led to significant increases in operating costs in the 1960s (Landis and McClure 2010), many PHAs increased rents and/or did little or no maintenance. In 1969, an amendment to the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 capped rents at 25 percent of tenants’ income (the current cap is 30 percent). This amendment also authorized an increase in federal funds for operating subsidies to help cover the gap between rent and maintenance expenses, but these funds were appropriated only a few years later (Goetz 2013).

In 1981, the federal government began offering PHAs partial operating subsidies, but in 2003 and for six consecutive years, the subsidies were underfunded (Sard and Fischer 2008). This contributed to growing deficits in many PHAs’ budgets, often resulting in less maintenance and repairs. The bad physical and social conditions of many projects created a negative image and convinced many that public housing was doomed to fail (Bloom, Umbach, and Vale 2015; Bratt 1986; Dreier 1997). The previous description fits to a large extent a liberal type of welfare state regime, which provides minimal social services in minimal conditions.

Eligibility Criteria and Characteristics of the Occupants

Low-income families and individuals, the elderly, and people with disabilities are eligible for public housing. HUD sets the maximum income as 80 percent of the median income in the housing’s location (AMI). However, most tenants have extremely low incomes, below 30 percent of the AMI (HUD 2016). Housing assistance in the United States is not an entitlement program, and only about a quarter of households eligible for public housing or any other form of rental assistance receive it (Congressional Budget Office Report 2015).

Currently, the annual average income of households in public housing is $14,455 (HUD 2016), significantly lower than the $24,300 the federal government defines as the poverty level for a family of four.¹¹ The eligibility criteria and the characteristics of the public housing tenants clearly fit the liberal type regime: It had strict entitlement rules involving income tests and is associated with stigma.

About 45 percent of all public housing tenants in the United States are black/African American, 32 percent are white, 21 percent are Hispanic or Latino, and 2 percent are Asian. Thirty-seven percent are under eighteen and 13 percent under six. A substantial number of elderly households also live in public housing: 32 percent are sixty-two or older, and 21 percent of all tenants have disabilities. Thirty-five percent of all public housing households are headed by single females (HUD 2016).¹²

Current Debates and Recent Trends

Although many people believe that public housing in the United States has failed, some affordable housing activists and influential policymakers see a continuing need for it and argue that there are ways to improve its quality as well as its neighborhood conditions In 2010, President Barack Obama’s (Democrat) administration launched the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CN) program, which draws on the positive impacts of the HOPE VI program and seeks to improve aspects that had disappointing results (Salsich 2011).

Taking a comprehensive approach to housing and neighborhood redevelopment, the CN program aims to transform neighborhoods with distressed public housing by replacing it with high-quality, well-managed, mixed-income housing; improved public school and health services; and better socioeconomic opportunities in the neighborhood. Planning grants are available to applicants who show that the planning will be collaborative and involve local residents, representatives from the public and private sectors, and nonprofit and philanthropic organizations.¹³ The CN program is still in its early stages; around 100 planning and implementation grants have been awarded since 2011, and its outcomes cannot yet be assessed.¹⁴

Following the global economic crisis of 2007–2008, there was increased attention to the need for more government assistance to help provide housing for low- and moderate-income households. The Obama administration proposed and secured budget increases for HUD that included improving the public housing stock, indicating a shift away from the right end of the axis. However, debates about the US government’s role in producing affordable rental housing are likely to continue (Tach 2014), and the results of the November 2016 presidential election will likely have significant impact on public housing. HUD’s budget has already been cut, and more emphasis on supporting private developers has been signaled.

Public Housing Policy in Israel

Israel was established in 1948 as a socialist state with a progressive welfare policy. Its government was headed by the Labor Party from 1948 until 1977. As a welfare state, Israel recognized its responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and improving their quality of life. In practice, Israel fulfills this responsibility in three principal ways: widespread social legislation, state funding of social services like public education and public housing, and an organizational infrastructure of social services across the country, such as the National Insurance Institute, public schools, and government hospitals. Some elements were inherited from the British Mandate; others were developed after the establishment of the Israeli state (Doron 2003; Doron and Kramer 1992; Gal 2004).

Immediately after the state’s establishment, a massive wave of immigration began, doubling the Jewish population within three years—from 650,000 to more than 1.5 million (Sleifer 1979)—and creating a pressing need for housing. Public housing was introduced to address this need and populate uninhabited areas. Thus, since its establishment, Israel has been a hybrid of a social democratic and a corporatist type regime, with public housing designated mainly for new Jewish immigrants and not for everyone, as clearly indicated in its primary goals and justifications, as described in the following. Despite the fact that new Jewish immigrants were certainly not “everyone,” they were a significant part of the population (and of the needy population) at that point and were logical candidates for shelter support.

Original Rationales, Justifications, and Goals

Israel’s first public housing was built in 1949, immediately after the War of Independence. Because of national security considerations—that is, to prevent the Arab population from taking over land— public housing for Jewish immigrants was built primarily in peripheral areas that were relatively isolated physically, socially, and culturally (Kallus and Yone 2002; Sleifer 1979).

The national settlement and national security roles of the public housing policy were stated explicitly in Israel’s first strategic plan in 1952.¹⁵ During the 1950s, dozens of new municipalities, called development towns, were created in peripheral areas. Most of the immigrants who arrived during that time, mainly from North Africa and Asia, were sent to development towns (Hananel 2009; Tzfadia 2006), where most public housing units were built.

Quantity and Locations

During the 1950s and 1960s, public housing comprised more than half of the housing construction in Israel (Fibish 2006). The large amount of public housing built during these years is typical of a social democratic regime. However, it decreased significantly over time.

In the 1970s, when immigration declined substantially, public housing construction decreased to an estimated 30 percent of all building starts. In that decade, the government’s housing policy changed from supporting the construction of housing units (supply side) to mainly providing financial assistance for housing ownership through subsidized mortgages (demand side) (Fibish 2006).

During the 1980s, Israel’s dominant political ideology changed from that of a social democratic welfare state with a collectivist and centralized structure to that of a globalized capitalist state dominated by neoliberal rationales, institutions, and practices (Nitzan and Bichler 2002; Ram 2008; Schipper 2015). In the mid-1980s, the privatization of public housing began as part of the neoliberal waves, and the government encouraged public housing tenants to purchase their units at a substantial discount (Hananel 2018).

An exception to this trend came in the early 1990s when the mass immigration of nearly one million people from the former Soviet Union created an urgent need for housing. This led the government to resume construction of public housing¹⁶ while continuing the sale of public housing units to tenants.

The privatization trends sparked opposition by social organizations and public housing tenants and led to the Public Housing Act of 1998, which allowed the sale of the apartments to tenants at significant discounts (up to 85 percent). To maintain the supply of public housing, the law stipulated (Clause 10) that all sales proceeds would go for the construction of new public housing (Hananel 2017, 2018). However, the law was suspended immediately for two years and again every two years thereafter. Under various programs, some 37,500 apartments were sold between 1999 and August 2011 (total revenue, NIS 2.75 billion), but no new public housing units have been built since the late 1990s (Fibish 2006; Fiedelman 2011).

Public housing units currently constitute less than 2.5 percent of Israel’s total housing stock, and approximately 2.5 percent of the population (200,000 people) lives in public housing.¹⁷ In January 2014, fifteen years after the Public Housing Act was enacted, the government decided to implement it—but with an amendment that allowed the use of sales proceeds for rental assistance and repair of existing housing. Consequently, in 2015, the public housing stock reached a historic low of 58,879 units.¹⁸

A significant shift in Israel’s welfare state type, according to the Esping-Andersen typology, has clearly taken place. While in the 1950s and 1960s, it was a unique combination of social democratic and corporatist type regimes, during the 1980s, and especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has been more like the liberal type regime of welfare state.

As for location, 70.1 percent of all public housing units are in peripheral districts—north (25 percent), south (34.5 percent), and Haifa (10.6 percent)—and more than half (54 percent) the stock is in development towns (Hananel 2018).

Quality and Maintenance

In an attempt to meet the housing needs of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, the housing companies built most of the units quickly and to a very low standard (Sleifer 1979). Nevertheless, they were not necessarily cheaper to build than private housing; in many cases, units built in distant peripheral areas were actually more expensive due to the high costs of transporting materials and skilled workers and the need to create new infrastructure. Hence, disadvantaged immigrants in peripheral areas, whose average wage was about half that of workers in the center of the country, paid higher rents for poorer quality apartments (Darin-Drabkin 1959). This led some critics to argue that public housing projects created and reproduced the class structure and increased the ethnic and economic gaps between groups in Israeli society (Yiftachel and Meir 1998)—gaps that remain today.

A combination of political, social, and economic factors led to severe neglect of maintenance in most public housing units. Decreased pressure from the waves of immigration and the political weakness of its residents resulted in public housing receiving a constantly decreasing slice of the national pie. The state neglected maintenance, and because it was rental housing and not owner-occupied, residents had no economic interest in investing in maintenance or improvements. Wear and tear and weather damage took their toll, and thus the social and economic gaps between the living conditions of the public housing tenants and others widened (Elmeleh and Lewin-Epstein 1998).

In 1998, the Knesset passed the Public Housing Tenants Rights Law, which for the first time placed responsibility for the maintenance of the public housing units on the state and the housing companies. Nevertheless, the State Comptroller’s annual reports repeatedly documented the poor condition of most such housing. In May 2010, the report stated that 65 percent of 865 randomly selected apartments were below standard in life-threatening ways (Fiedelman 2012). These minimal and even subminimal building standards and severely neglected maintenance closely fit the liberal type of welfare state described by Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b).

Eligibility Criteria and Characteristics of the Occupants

Public housing eligibility and the tenants’ characteristics have changed over the years. In the 1950s and 1960s, most public housing was allocated to new immigrants on arrival without any specific criteria. During the 1990s, following the wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union, new criteria gave priority to immigrants, the disabled, the elderly, and single-parent families. These characteristics fit Israel’s unique attitude toward public housing, a combination of social democratic type (relevant to most of the population without specific criteria) and corporatist type (mainly for Jews) of a welfare state regime. Notably, this classification changed dramatically over time.

Today public housing is allocated mainly (70 percent) to disadvantaged populations, with clearly defined criteria that include family size (three or more children), income tests, and health status (those with disabilities). Eligibility is checked continually and limited to people without a home whose income is below a certain level.¹⁹ Tenants aged 65 and over account for 30 percent of public housing residents, though they constitute only 10 percent of the population. By contrast, the percentage of families with young children in public housing in Israel is half that in the general population (24 percent compared with 57.7 percent) (Hananel 2017).

Over the years, in response to the rising demand for public housing units, decision makers raised the eligibility criteria (Hananel 2017, 2018). This enabled the government to keep waiting lists stable for years despite rising demand (Fiedelman 2011). Consequently, the government saw no need to update its public housing policy.

According to Construction and Housing Ministry data, the maximum monthly household income for eligibility in 2011 was NIS 5,914 (approximately USD 1,516), less than half the average income of Israeli households at that time. In fact, the eligible households had incomes in the lowest three deciles of all households (Hananel 2017).

The changes that occurred in public housing eligibility criteria clearly indicate a shift toward the liberal, or rather neoliberal, type of welfare state regime. As we have seen, public housing is generally allocated to the most disadvantaged Jewish population, with very strict entitlement rules often associated with stigma. Moreover, as Hananel (2017) shows, public housing tenants are perceived as the most disadvantaged population, but even though national minorities are in fact the most disadvantaged population, they rarely get to be housed in public housing units. Currently, only 1.5 percent of the public housing stock (about 1,000 of 60,000 housing units) are allocated to national minorities (Bedouins, Arabs, Druze, and Circassians), and most of these units are in cities inhabited by both Jews and Arabs such as Lod, Ramle, and Acre.²⁰ However, the very fact that the government has allocated public housing units, albeit a negligible number, to national minorities may indicate a weakening of the corporatist component of Israel’s public housing policy.

Current Debates and Recent Trends

Since the 1980s, public housing in Israel, as elsewhere, has been controversial. Some contend that the construction of public housing is no longer necessary, whereas others, mainly social change movement leaders and activists, argue that more such housing is needed.

The past decade has seen significant developments with respect to housing policy in general and public housing in particular. First, the sharp increase in housing costs in Israel and the ensuing housing affordability crisis have resulted in a 23 percent increase in the waiting lists for public housing (from 2,150 in 2007 to 2,788 in 2015).²¹ Second, in summer 2011, Israel experienced the greatest social protests in its history. They were sparked largely by the high cost of living, especially by the lack of affordable housing, and brought housing issues to the forefront of the public and political agenda (Hananel 2017; Schipper 2015). This showed the government and the housing companies that change was necessary.

In 2015, upon taking office, the new construction and housing minister, Yoav Galant (of the new centrist party Kulanu), declared a five-point plan for resolving the public housing crisis that would increase the total amount of public housing, introduce flexible eligibility criteria, encourage urban renewal projects by Amidar and Amigur for those entitled, and substantially increase the renovation of existing units.²² It is too soon to evaluate the results of this plan.

We may conclude that in practice, these significant changes indicate the increased importance that decision makers attach to public housing. On the theoretical level, there is a mixed trend. First and foremost, the changes are clearly biased toward the market economy and therefore reflect a gradual but clear move toward a liberal type of social welfare regime, according to the Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b) typology. However, the current study indicates a slight weakening of the corporatist component, although the number of housing units allocated to members of national minorities is still marginal, and it is unlikely that this trend will increase in the near future.

Conclusions, Discussion, and Lessons

This paper has examined how differences in a country’s political economic regime influence the implementation and outcomes of public housing policies. We used the Esping-Andersen (1990a, 1990b) seminal typology of three welfare state regimes—social democratic, corporatist, and liberal—to examine public housing policy in three countries that represent different regime types: Sweden, as the classic example of the social democratic type; the United States, as the classic example of a liberal type; and Israel, as an interesting example of a mixed regime type that has changed fundamentally over time from a social democratic and corporatist one to a liberal and corporatist one. We focused on four fundamental aspects of housing policy: (1) primary goals and rationales, (2) quantity and location of the housing built, (3) its quality and maintenance, and (4) eligibility and characteristics of its occupants. We also discussed recent and likely developments with regard to each country.

The summary of our findings in Table 1 clearly shows that differences in the welfare state type regime have had significant effects on public housing policy design and implementation in all four aspects. Moreover, as noted, changes over time in the dominant political economy of the state significantly influenced the implementation and the outcomes of public housing policies.

Table 1.

Comparison of Public Housing Policies in the Selected Countries and Esping-Andersen’s Welfare-State-Type Regime.

	Sweden	United States	Israel
Primary goal and rationale	Typical of a social democratic type regime: to provide a decent home at a reasonable price for the entire Swedish population.	Typical of a liberal type regime: to house people who are temporarily unable to afford private market housing.	A combination of social democratic and corporatist type regime: to absorb Jewish immigrants and disperse the Jewish population in the new state.
Quantity	Until the mid-1960s, typical of a social democratic type model: more than 1 million units. Currently, moving toward a liberal type regime: Public housing is 16.5% of the total housing stock, housing some 1.5 million people (17% of the population). Most units are in cities.	Typical of a liberal type regime: Public housing is less than 1% of the total housing stock.	Until the 1960s, starts as a combination of a social democratic and corporatist types of regime: public housing comprised more than 50% of all housing. Since the 1980s, a liberal type regime: Public housing is now ~2.5% of the total housing stock.
Location^a	Probably typical of a social democratic type regime: Most public housing units are in cities. Many units are in the most attractive areas of the main cities. Only 13% of public housing is in rural districts.	Probably typical of a liberal type regime: two-thirds of all public housing units are in cities, less than 20% are in rural areas, and a small number are in suburbs. Approximately 30% are in urban high-rise, high-density buildings in low-income areas.	Probably typical of a liberal type regime: 70% of the public housing units are in development towns in peripheral areas (for disadvantaged populations).
Quality and maintenance	Typical of a social democratic type regime: High-quality housing was built and has generally been maintained well.	Typical of a liberal type regime: Much of the housing was of poor quality. Maintenance was often minimal, mainly due to lack of funds.	Typical of a liberal type regime: Most units are of poor quality. Many suffer from severely neglected maintenance.
Eligibility criteria	Typical of a social democratic type regime: There is no income limit; anyone who does not own real estate is entitled.	Typical of a liberal type regime: Incomes must be below 80% of the area’s median income (AMI).	Typical of a liberal type regime: The most disadvantaged families and individuals are eligible.
Characteristics of occupants	Moving toward a liberal type regime: Tenants’ characteristics vary, but disadvantaged people, like non-European immigrants, currently receive priority.	Typical of a liberal type regime: More than two-thirds of the tenants have incomes less than 30% of the AMI; ~70% are black, Hispanic, or Latino.	A combination of corporatist and liberal type regimes: Tenants, mainly Jewish, have incomes in the lowest 30% of all households in Israel.

Esping-Andersen’s (1990a, 1990b) model does not refer to a specific location or spatial dimension. Nevertheless, it suggests a connection between attractive urban locations and a social democratic type regime and remote peripheral areas for disadvantaged populations and a liberal type regime.

Despite significant differences in public housing policies and outcomes in these three countries, our analysis has shown that over time and especially since the 1990s, differences have shrunk because of major global economic and political trends common to all the countries. Three recent decreases in these differences are of special importance.

First, in all three countries, the total quantity of public housing units has decreased significantly over the years. The most significant change occurred in Israel (from 50 percent of all housing starts in the 1950s to less than 3 percent today). However, a substantial reduction also occurred in Sweden (from 22 percent in 1990 to 16.5 percent in 2013) and the United States (from 1.4 million units in 1994 to 1.1 million units in 2013). In the three countries, public housing construction has decreased significantly over the years, concurrently with growing privatization. This trend is also seen elsewhere, especially in European countries with a high amount of public housing, such as Germany, England, and the Netherlands (Scanlon, Whitehead, and Arrigiota 2014; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007).

Second, in all three countries, there have been significant changes in the composition of public housing tenants over the years. As we have seen, in the 1950s and 1960s, in Sweden and the United States, public housing projects were designed for young families and soldiers returning from World War II, and in Israel, such projects were the main national tool for Jewish immigrant absorption, that is, for most of the population. Today, however, partly because of the decline in the number of units, the population living in public housing is becoming more and more homogeneous, with overrepresentation of national minorities and immigrants. Thus, public housing tenants are mainly the most disadvantaged population in the country. This trend has occurred in Sweden, where disadvantaged groups, mainly immigrants from non-European countries, are overrepresented in public housing units outside the big cities. It has also happened in US public housing projects, which, especially in the cities, have had high concentrations of racial minorities for many years. And it has also occurred in Israel, where public housing tenants are in the population’s third lowest decile. However, in Israel, because the primary goals of public housing were nation-building and Jewish immigrant absorption, national minorities are rarely accommodated in public housing (Hananel 2017).

Third, and perhaps most important, is that in the three countries, there have been significant changes in the attitude of the central government toward public housing and its residents. As we have seen, although the basic justifications (primary goals and rationales) for public housing were essentially different in the three countries, in the 1950s to 1960s in all three countries, the public housing policy served a national goal to some extent. In Sweden, it was the national social vision of providing a decent home at a reasonable price for every Swede. In the United States, there was an economic consideration, namely, to stimulate the economy after World War II and provide homes and employment to the returning soldiers. And in Israel, there were national-territorial considerations for the policy, which was aimed mainly at absorbing Jewish immigrants and dispersing Jews throughout the new state.

Nevertheless, our analysis shows that today public housing policy is not a national goal in any country—on the social, economic, or territorial level. This finding is evident in the central governments’ involvement in public housing. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s public housing was mainly built or financed by the central government, in recent decades, even in places where there is public housing construction, it is based mainly on incentives given to private entrepreneurs and developers. This policy has intensified in the United States over the years and has also begun to seep into Sweden and Israel.

How can these findings regarding the decrease in significant differences between the three counties be explained? One possible explanation, which is connected to the theoretical findings and the Esping-Anderson typology, is the global move toward a neoliberal economy and also the recent rise of more right-wing governments in all three countries.

The findings show that the Esping-Anderson typology is dynamic and that changes in the political composition and political economy of all three countries over the years have affected the welfare state regime type of each country, as Figure 2 illustrates.

Figure 2.

Welfare state regime type of the three selected countries at present.

The findings indicate that the relevant axis for examining changes in public housing policy is the scale of social democratic policy versus liberal (or neoliberal) policy. On this axis, in general, the distance between the welfare state regime types of the three countries has narrowed over the years.

The analysis reveals a move toward the middle from both extremes of the scale. The United States, on the liberal right, has begun in recent years to discover new initiatives for increasing public housing. In contrast, Sweden, on the social democratic left, has encountered increased opposition to new public housing construction. The most significant change has taken place in Israel, which has changed its welfare state regime type. Whereas during the 1950s and 1960s Israel had a social democratic type regime, today the regime is much closer to the liberal pole. In Israel, we have also seen slight changes in the corporatist route, reflected in the fact that today about 1.5 percent of all public housing units are inhabited by members of national minorities.

Moreover, as part of the global tendencies toward privatization and neoliberalism, this entire axis has moved to the right, toward the liberal end. Thus, even initiatives to expand public housing and ease eligibility conditions (in Israel and the United States) are based largely on the private market and are closer to the liberal side. It would be interesting to examine whether this change has occurred only with regard to housing or whether it applies to other areas too, but that is beyond the scope of the current study.

As we have seen, the differences between the three countries have significantly decreased over the years, affecting primarily the disadvantaged population groups, those living in public housing, and especially those on the waiting lists. However, our findings also indicate that in all three countries, in recent years, society has indeed become cognizant of the need for public housing, and perhaps we have reached the very lowest point from which one can only go up. Thus, despite criticism of past public housing policies, given the current shortage of affordable housing in all three countries examined, and in many others, efforts are being made to redesign public housing policy to maximize its ability to provide decent affordable housing for disadvantaged households. In Sweden, despite increased anti-immigrant sentiments and acts, in 2014 the government coalition of the Social Democratic and the Green Party parties invested SKR 11.1 billion in public housing. In Israel, after three decades without any public housing construction, in 2015 the current government developed a strategic plan to increase the public housing stock. And in the United States, in 2010 President Obama’s administration developed the Choice Neighborhood program to improve public housing in distressed neighborhoods and offer services and opportunities to improve the lives of the residents.

These current developments indicate that public housing still matters. As already mentioned, in response to the housing crisis in recent years, public housing has again become popular in many countries. Consequently, they are reshaping and/or updating their public housing policies. As this study shows, this has already happened in Sweden, Israel, and the United States. Therefore, today more than ever, it is important not to repeat past mistakes but instead to design more sensitive and just public housing policies.

To do so, first and foremost, countries must recognize the importance of increasing the public housing stock. Public housing tenants are the most disadvantaged populations almost everywhere. The demand for public housing among these populations is growing, while the supply is shrinking—because of privatization, sales of apartments to tenants, or urban renewal projects. It is important to design a policy that addresses both the supply side and the demand side (through various subsidies) and increases the supply of public housing units. This conclusion also holds for subsidies. Many countries have adapted their public housing policies to neoliberal trends. Consequently, instead of national subsidies providing most of the funding and local authorities or housing companies building the units, public/private partnerships are being explored, and more and more private developers are becoming involved in building and operating public housing and urban renewal projects (Elsinga and Wassenberg 2014; Hananel 2017; Whitehead 2014; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). Our findings show that there is a need for greater involvement of the state in public housing and that this policy cannot be based solely on benefits granted to entrepreneurs in the free market. Government intervention and responsibility with regard to public housing will make possible better control not only of the number of housing units but also the location, type, and size of apartments built and the quality of construction. As this study shows, these aspects are important and influence the characteristics of the public housing tenants.

During the twentieth century, the majority of public housing units were built in large urban projects that eventually became slums and areas of concentrated poverty (Schwartz 2014; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). In this respect, as this study has shown, Sweden is the exception: Most of its public housing was built in attractive urban areas. It is important to locate public housing in attractive areas, too, and ensure a population that is mixed in terms of income, age, and ethnicity to avoid creating areas where all the residents are poor. Drawing on the lessons of the past, some new initiatives are taking an urban diversity approach and highlighting the need for a social mix (in terms of income levels, ethnicity, and age) and land uses (Fainstein 2005, 2010; Talen 2012). This approach is perhaps most developed across Europe, but it is of increasing interest also in the United States and elsewhere (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007).

Lastly, the most important lesson is the need to ensure that the policy’s primary goal is to achieve egalitarian results. Using public housing to achieve other goals is likely to produce an inadequate supply of decent housing. For many years in Israel and the United States, public housing policies were judged by their ability to produce decent housing for disadvantaged people and improve their quality of life, though these were not the policies’ primary goals when they were first instituted during the 1950s.

In conclusion, our case studies show that the welfare state type regime and the changes that occurred within it have significantly influenced various aspects of the public housing policy in all three countries. They have influenced the primary goals of the policy; the quantity, location, and quality of the public housing; and also the eligibility characteristics of the tenants and their demographic characteristics, such as their income levels, ethnicity, and age. The lessons we have learned are unlikely to be acted on unless policymakers have the political will to provide decent affordable housing for the most disadvantaged and the necessary political support to develop and implement a policy with this as its primary goal.

As many countries worldwide experience a severe shortage of affordable housing, the research findings show that public housing still matters and that it is the oldest and perhaps most effective policy tool for ensuring decent housing for those who need it most.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank the editors, Clinton Andrews and Frank Popper, and the anonymous reviewers for their useful and challenging comments, which have strengthened the paper. We deeply thank Gosta Esping-Andersen for his helpful and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks also to Gila Menachem, Naomi Carmon, Itai Sened, Oren Yiftachel, Joseph Berechman, Efrat Tolkovsky, and Amos Zehavi for their comments. We thank Harel Nachmany and Erela Ganan for their assistance in obtaining data and Yael Fraenkel for the graphic assistance.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research benefited from a grant from the Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya.

Notes

Author Biographies

Ravit Hananel is a professor of public policy at Tel-Aviv University. Her research expertise focuses on land policy, land use (planning) policy, and housing policy, especially for disadvantaged population.

Sharon Perlman Krefetz is an emerita professor of political science at Clark University. Her research focuses on efforts to increase the supply of affordable housing and reduce racial segregation in US cities and suburbs.

Ami Vatury is a professor of European history at Haifa University. He is the founding father and the current co-general secretary of “Koach La Ovdim,” the third largest general trade union in Israel.

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