The practice of envelope journalism in the Republic of the Congo

Abstract

This article provides insight into the “brown envelope journalism” in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Through in-depth interviews with journalists from four major Congolese news outlets, this research reveals how financial difficulties result in reporters justifying their violations of journalism ethics and standards. While two news outlets accept bribes to compensate for their precarious financial situation, two other news organizations pretend that they oppose envelope journalism although this research shows that their reporters also secretly accept bribes.

Keywords

journalism journalism practice journalism ethics bribery envelope journalism Congo

The widespread practice of giving bribes to African journalists to receive positive coverage—known as brown envelope journalism (BEJ)—has been a central question of researchers since 1990s. A series of scholarly articles appeared in several anglophone African universities, scrutinizing the “brown envelope syndrome” on a case-by-case basis. However, very little research has examined the practice in francophone African countries. Cameroon is one of the rare French-speaking countries with a consistent scholarly literature on the issue of the “brown envelope syndrome” (Ndangam, 2006, 2009; Nyamnjoh, 2001). No academic research has focused on it in Congo, while bribery is being entrenched in the country’s news media culture. Long-standing bribery in the Republic of the Congo is mostly practiced in newsrooms of major news outlets in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. During editorial conferences, senior editorial managers and staff assign reporters to cover major events in the city where the sources give them bribes, sometimes referred to as “la camora” (Frère, 2005, p. 14) and, if possible, they pay extra cash for special pages and special coverage.

Brief Overview of Congolese Media

The first free press could not be found in Congo until 1991, the year the single-party state ended and a national conference held to redesign government. According to Taman Yoba Mavoungou, one of the oldest Congolese journalists (now the director of Radio Liberté), Congo’s first radio station, which was created after the 1960 independence, was run by postcolonial groundbreakers. Following the postcolonial revolution in August 1963, more than half of the journalists of “La voix de la Revolution” (The voice of the Revolution) were soldiers, and the rest of the staff belonged to Parti Congolais du Travail (Congolese Labor Party) and other affiliated parties. Congolese news media then were totally partisan (Bibene, 2013). La Télévision Congolaise, the first television channel to broadcast in sub-Saharan Africa, was launched on November 28, 1962. The TV station has since served political interests of different ruling parties (Diamouangana, 2013). Following the national conference in 1991, the country became a democracy and the first constitution (ratified 1994) guaranteed freedom of the press for the first time (Minkala-Ntadi, 2012). The 1997 civil war saw a triumphant comeback to power of Denis Sassou Nguesso, who created Radio Liberté. The outlet became the first private media in the country. In 2000, the private TV channel Digital Radio Television (DRTV) was created by General Norbert Dabira. From 2000 onward, several other private news outlets were created. But, as Passi Bibene (2013) underlines, “the envy to exercise freedom of expression” bumped against financial difficulties, which gives the leading class the possibility to control the press and undermine its power.

According to the World Bank, Congo-Brazzaville’s national gross income (NGI) per capita “decreased to US$1640 in 2018” compared with more than US$2,500 in 2017, which makes local journalists’ financial situation more difficult (World Bank, 2019).

In Congo, news organizations receive subsidies from the Congolese government. Les Dépêches de Brazzaville sells about 10,000 copies per day (Diamouangana, 2013, p. 227), but the profit it makes is not sufficient to support journalists; therefore, they rely on subsidies and grants from the Congolese government and a couple of nonprofits. This might explain why they do not encourage their journalists to accept bribes.

Likewise, Radio Citoyenne des Jeunes (RCJ) is supported by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Congolese government. The radio station was started in 2017, thanks to the funding received from the Japanese government to support the youth in Congo.

In 2011, Brazzaville had about 20 newspapers, including one daily (Les Dépêches de Brazzaville), 14 weeklies, two biweekly publications and three other outlets published online (Diamouangana, 2013). The country has about 20 private TV channels, 20+ newspapers, 40+ radio channels and some online media (Reporters Sans Frontieres [Reporters Without Borders] [RSF], 2019). In 2011, there were about 40 TV channels (Lubabu, 2011), but due to financial difficulties, most of them have shut down; DRTV, Top TV, Vox TV and MNTV are the only ones that look financially comfortable. All these channels belong to or are directly supported by the presidential family (RSF, 2019). Another major TV channel in Congo is Africanews, the African division of Euro News. Africanews is based in Pointe-Noire but barely covers the Congolese local news.

In terms of freedom of the press, Congo-Brazzaville currently ranks number 118 (of 180 countries) on Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Index (RSF, 2020). According to Reporters Without Borders, Congo’s journalists are forced to self-censor, and the majority of private news outlets belong to “people close to the government.” Despite the constitutional protection that they are supposed to enjoy, Reporters Without Borders underlines that “many journalists have been threatened, forced to exile or kicked out of the country for having held the government accountable” or for inviting members of the opposition to speak on their platforms (RSF, 2019).

This study found that Télé-Congo and Radio Liberté are two channels where the practice of envelope journalism is clearly admitted in the newsroom. Radio Liberté is the first private medium in the country and Télé-Congo is the first public television. Radio Liberté has about 20 journalists, all unpaid workers! Respondents said almost all the station’s reporters rely on bribes (transport) as a source of income. Radio Liberté requires reporters to donate 10% of their kickbacks to the commercial service. The bottom line here is that Radio Liberté has made the practice of envelope journalism official within its newsroom, although there is no document that regulates it.

Télé-Congo is the largest news organization in the country. The outlet is directly funded by the government. Télé-Congo, which includes a radio station as well, has roughly 500 workers, about 300 to 400 of whom are full-time journalists, the latter directly paid by the state as civil servants.

Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (newspaper) and RCJ are the two news organizations that apparently do not allow their reporters to accept bribes although some journalists admit secretly accepting envelopes. These two organizations are far better funded than Radio Liberté but less than Télé-Congo. Although Les Dépêches de Brazzaville is considered a private organization, the newspaper is funded by members of the executive government and more other politicians. The newspaper was cofounded, and managed from 1998 through 2007, by Belinda Ayessa, the daughter of a Congolese politician who has been serving in the government of Congo-Brazzaville as the Deputy Prime Minister for Civil Service, State Reform, Labor and Social Security and a long-time associate of President Denis Sassou Nguesso. Given that the political regime has not changed since 1997, the newspaper is considered property of the ruling party because of its favorable reporting. The newspaper is edited by the ADIAC (Central African News Agency).

Likewise, RCJ is considered the property of the ruling party. The station was created in 2017 by Destinée Doukaga, youth minister and a fierce supporter of President Nguesso. Since its creation, RCJ has received significant support from the government via its founder, as well as from UNESCO.

Looking at the Other Side of the River: Coupage in DRC

Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are the two closest capitals in the world. Although Brazzaville journalists think that on the other side of the river, Kinshasa, the press is freer, it does not mean journalists are less corrupt. Like “la camora” in Congo-Brazzaville, the media world in Kinshasa is haunted by a corrupt practice known as “le coupage,” a generic term used to designate cash for coverage (Frère, 2008). Unlike “la camora” in Congo-Brazzaville where reporters wait for invitations to cover news briefings and other events for cash, in DRC, journalists pretty much practice the cult of personality to gain rewards from wealthy individuals. As Marie-Soleil Frère highlights, “poorly paid, journalists generate additional income through ‘coupage’ which consists in offering media visibility to an individual or to a demonstration against remuneration. ‘The pen and wave mercenary’ has become the norm” (Frère, 2008, p. 8). Although Congolese journalists from Brazzaville and Kinshasa are both involved in corrupt practices, the Congo-Brazzaville news media setting makes it easier for a source to hand envelopes to the majority of news outlets because they are so few. (Republic of the Congo has about 5.25 million people.) In Kinshasa, however, there are many outlets—more than 68 television channels, more than 216 radio stations of all sorts and about 65 newspapers (Barometre des Médias Africains, 2012). DRC has a population of at least 84 million. This makes the competition fiercer, and journalists seek to compensate their poor pay by accepting payment from individuals and organizations to write stories. This practice is in conflict with the country’s code of ethics in its Article 7, which recommends that journalists, “Not to accept any gift from information sources, any advantage or gift to stifle information, or any gratification due to the publication, distortion or deletion of information” (Haute Autorité des Médias, 2016). Although some news media in Kinshasa, such as Molière Tv, focus on community reporting, most others have normalized bribery, making the country no different from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Acheampong & Babangida, 2017; Adeyemi, 2013; Dirbaba, 2010; Helander, 2010; Kasoma, 2010; Mabweazara, 2010; Mare & Brand, 2010; Mpagaze & White, 2010; Ndangam, 2006; Skjerdal, 2010b).

This study examines the relationship between the practice of envelope journalism and agenda-setting news coverage in Congo. Although it has some methodological limits, this article gives an idea of how journalism is practiced in Congo; it also contributes generally to the understanding of the Congolese media environment.

Literature Review

Dozens of scholars from Africa have deeply researched the issue of brown envelope journalism. One of the most prolific researchers on African communication is Terje Skjerdal, a Swedish scholar whose interests in African journalism stem from his doctoral dissertation that “focuses on competing loyalties among journalists in the Ethiopian state media” (Skjerdal, 2013). Other scholars in West and East Africa have equally produced deep analyses of the so-called “brown envelope syndrome” from different angles (Adeyemi, 2013; Nwabueze, 2010; Okoro & Chinweobo-Onuoha, 2013). From Skjerdal (2010a) to Salihu (2017) to Kasoma (2010), the meaning of brown envelope journalism goes from literal “cash” to other advantages offered to journalists sometimes in exchange of good reporting. Skjerdal (2010b) defines “brown envelope journalism” as “journalistic activity which involves transfer of various types of rewards from sources to the reporter.” (p. 369). According to him, envelope journalism has three characteristics: “the practice on the personal level, confidentiality, and informal contract.” The practice at the personal level implies that the receiver of the little brown envelope uses it for himself, individually, as the money received is “not transferred on an institutional level as in various types of organizational corruption” (p. 370). However, in some news organizations, it is proven that bribery is actually institutional (as detailed above). Brown envelopes can be confidential because the contract between the giver and the receiver does not involve any written document, unless it is “described as transportation costs or other formally approved expenses” (Skjerdal, p. 370). Finally, the practice can be considered an informal contract because the source expects his story to be covered in the way that is good for him: “At the most basic level, the source expects coverage of an event or issue; but more importantly, the issue is expected to be covered in positive and uncritical manner” (p. 370). Kasoma (2010) highlights that brown envelope journalism is the “monetary incentives . . . handed out to journalists by event organizers for showing up to cover meetings, press conferences, workshops.” These “incentives” are, sometimes, mailed to the editors “in advance” by news sources (p. 460). To this extent, it is clear that the practice of envelope journalism is underhandedly encouraged by reporters, editors and news directors.

Regarding brown envelope journalism in the Ethiopian context, “the means of receiving bribery have expanded with journalists now receiving lands” (Dirbaba, 2010). Cited by Adeyemi (2013), Okoye (2011) defines brown envelope reporting as “a monetary bribe handed out to a [reporter] to pressure him or her to do what the bribe giver wants” (pp. 122–123). This definition might not be effective when we consider the fact that some reporters require news sources to give cash even though the latter are not willing to do so.

To this point, no scholar has been able to map the origin of the term or the practice of using brown envelopes, although some think that the term was first used in West Africa (Bamiro, 1997; Godfrey, 1970; Skjerdal, 2010a). Others attribute its origin to the United Kingdom about the 1990s, but attributing West African practices to earlier U.K. practices would require establishing both a causal connection and a probable timeline. (The use of brown envelopes in particular is not indicative, because most envelopes in the world are either brown or white—although Chinese journalists are bribed in red envelopes.). Skjerdal’s (2010b) article, “Research on Brown Envelope Journalism in the African Media,” concluded that the term and practice of brown envelope journalism was widespread in the African continent and even “existed in earlier eras in western [Africa] journalism practice.” Ndayo Hako, cited by Skjerdal (2010b), refers to the origin of “brown envelope syndrome” in Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979–1983), but it is unclear exactly when the term entered African journalists’ vocabulary.

Journalists have several euphemisms for corrupt practices that undermine journalistic ethics in Africa. As reported by Ndangam, Cameroon journalists refer to “brown envelope” as Gombo (okra), “a metaphor for various forms of kickbacks, freebies and rewards . . . provided by . . . news actors to journalists” (p. 179). The International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Studies (2016) revealed that Nigerian journalists use metaphors to talk about the bribes they receive regularly. Ghana journalists use the term “soli” about envelopes given after news coverage. Citing Berger (2006), and others, Skjerdal (2010b, p. 376) gives a summary of other words used in various African countries:

In Liberia, “gatu” is the term to use. It supposedly comes from “gratuity” . . . money given in recognition of services. French-speaking countries use for example “final communiqué,” “communiqué finale,” and “consultation,” which are found in Benin “frais de participation,” which is one of several expressions in Cameroon. Congo Brazzaville prefers “camora” [Any secret society that resembles one organized in Naples, Italy, c. 1820, which became notorious for terror, blackmail, and violence (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/camorra)]. A humorous touch is attached to the Zambian equivalent—“ndalama yamatako”—which literally means “money of the buttocks.”

All such terms are some evidence about how rampant bribery is in African news media. In 2010, African Communication Research published a series of articles focused on “bribery and corruption” in the African press. Comparing the policy governing ethics at three newspapers in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, Mare and Brand (2010) found that “only one of the newspapers—Kenya’s Business Daily” had “its own code of ethics which addresses pertinent business journalistic moral dilemmas” (p. 412). Weaknesses in journalistic codes of ethics, including poor enforcement, cause many immoral practices in the news industry, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Mabweazara, 2010; Mpagaze & White, 2010; Skjerdal, 2010b).

Conducting in-depth interviews with journalists in Zambia and Ghana, Kasoma (2010) found that the practice of BEJ was “commonplace” in both countries; the practice was “part of [their] media culture” blamed on low remuneration. After month-long qualitative interviews with Ethiopian journalists in some major newsrooms in Addis Ababa, Dirbaba (2010, p. 493) found that media “bribery is rampant,” and the practice goes from simply accepting envelope up to receiving “lands” and “other savory forms of remuneration” from news sources. In Nigeria, “poor salary” was the primary factor of journalists accepting different forms of bribes (Adeyemi, 2013; Okoro & Chinweobo-Onuoha, 2013; Salihu, 2017).

A study of BEJ’s impacts in Ghana (Acheampong & Babangida, 2017) reported, “153 journalists, representing 76.5 percent of respondents,” claimed that accepting bribes does not influence their reporting (p. 94). A study of Tanzanian journalists (Mpagaze & White, 2010) revealed consequences of journalists accepting bribes: When sources bribe reporters, the latter work under pressure, and should publish or broadcast the story as the source expects. Failure to do so results in interpersonal conflicts, so journalists lose their independence. Mpagaze and White (2010) also found that bribed journalists blame powerful institutions, including “government ministries . . . NGOs, financial institutions” and others.

But Burbidge (2012) wrote that he thinks the “real reason corruption in Africa is not exposed is that journalists themselves do not expose it,” and that when journalists are corrupt, the whole society becomes corrupt. Dirbaba (2010) wrote that “cultural traditions” also should be considered (and studied) an “important factor” in the corruption of African journalism: “[S]ociety’s ignorance about the principles of professional media operations” might be “related to the level of bribery among journalists” (p. 494). Helander (2010, p. 523) interviewed young Kenyan journalists in Nairobi, concluding that “the mass media are . . . being compromised by a number of different outside interests, including corruption that journalists seem not ready to challenge.”

Again, research done about BEJ mainly concerns anglophone, not francophone (or lusophone) Africa. Besides Ndangam (2006) study on Cameroon’s media and general research on BEJ conducted by Frère (2005), which mentions French-speaking central African countries, no consequential study has been completed about bribery and corruption in Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). Again, this article tries to show what Congolese journalists think about BEJ, and why some news outlets such as Les Dépêches de Brazzaville and RCJ do not allow their reporters to take envelopes.

Method

Interviews were conducted via telephone with 14 journalists from four different news outlets in Brazzaville, Congo. The city was chosen because of its high number of new organizations and, relatedly, it is the most populated city (home to one quarter of the country’s people). Brazzaville is home to about three fourths of all active journalists in the country; all national and international administrative institutions in the country; and the country’s only public university that offers a journalism program.

Fourteen journalists representing four major news outlets in the city were interviewed. The four news outlets include Télé-Congo public television, Radio Liberté privately owned radio, RCJ public radio and Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (privately owned newspaper). Three of these channels (Télé-Congo, Radio Liberté and Les Dépêches de Brazzaville) were selected because of their large sizes and because they are the country’s oldest news organizations that recruit only trained journalists. RCJ was chosen because it is the newest radio channel dedicated to young citizens (fresh out of college). For example, Télé-Congo has more than 500 journalists (full-time, part-time and interns), most of whom have been trained in Université Marien Ngouabi (the country’s sole public university). Radio Liberté, the country’s first privately owned media, has only journalism employees or volunteers with at least a BA in communication or 5 years of reporting experience. (Some have been trained in Congo, while others have their degrees from other African or European countries.)

Among the selected outlets, two (Télé-Congo and Radio Liberté) allow journalists to accept envelopes, whereas two others (Les Dépêches and RCJ) do not. The 14 journalists interviewed included two reporters and two editors from Télé-Congo; two reporters, one editor-in-chief and one news director from Radio Liberté; two reporters and one editor from Les Dépêches de Brazzaville; and three journalists from RCJ. Four interviewees have at least 15 years of industry experience; six are college graduates with at least 5 years of experience; three joined the industry in 2016; and two are volunteers. Eight are men, and six are women, ranging in age from 23 to 60 years. Four journalists from Radio Liberté, three from Télé-Congo and two from RCJ agreed to be identified, whereas all three from Les Dépêches de Brazzaville refused. But for the sake of confidentiality (Allen, 2017), this article does not identify any of them.

Interviews lasted between 7 and 20 min. Twelve questions (three yes/no; nine open-ended) were selected based on working research questions. The planned questions were as follows: (a) How many journalists work for your news outlet? (b) Are all of them full-time journalists? (c) How does your news outlet decide on what story to cover? (d) What is your opinion of “cash for news”? (e) Do journalists in your news outlets accept envelopes when they cover certain events? (f) Why do you accept or refuse envelopes? (g) Are envelopes given to reporters individually or collectively? (h) Why does your news organization allow/prevent reporters from taking envelopes? (i) How does your news outlet make it financially? (j) Are there any differences and similarities between your newspaper/radio/tv channel and other news outlets? (k) What are those differences and similarities? (l) Do you think the practice of giving and accepting envelops may change in the future—in your newsroom? Or in Congo? Anything you want to add?

Other basic questions asked about age, sex, education levels and years of experience. Follow-up questions were asked depending on the interviewees’ responses. All questions were translated into French, given that none of the journalists understand English. Interviewees’ responses were then translated into English, and were recorded, transcribed, coded by theme and analyzed (Gibbs, 2007).

Besides interviews, the researcher read daily publications of Les Dépêches de Brazzaville and three other outlets for 5 days (November 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30). Three stories each day were noted to compare what journalists said with the quality, tone and other characteristics of the content that their news outlets produce. It was also to determine whether all outlets have at least one of the same stories each day. On the last day of the research, some interviewed reporters were recontacted to ask them whether their colleagues received envelopes from sources for (or orchestrator of) one of the selected news stories.

Findings and Discussion

Journalists’ Perceptions of Bribery

All interviewed journalists said envelope journalism is common. Nine (of 14) said that accepting money from news sources subverts their dignity as journalists. Three said that accepting money from news sources does not affect the way they write or shape their narratives. Among the 14 interviewees, six from the news outlets that do not authorize reporters to accept bribes said some reporters do not obey the newsroom rules; one participant from Radio Citoyenne des Jeunes said that some “colleagues secretly accept incentives” and make sure to “keep it secret.” One interviewee from Les Dépêches de Brazzaville wondered why they should “refuse envelopes while every other reporter is accepting them.” Six interviewed reporters assumed that they receive money from news sources at least twice per week depending on the number of events (news briefings) in the city; four of the 14 said they have received an envelope at least once a month; four of the 14 said sometimes they accept sometimes they refuse; and two of the 14 said they have never accepted envelopes at all.

Editorial Policy and Bribery

One Radio Liberté editor, a reporter from Télé-Congo and another one form RCJ, said their respective outlets cover activities by “invitation,” which means, during editorial meetings, the editor-in-chief is expected to have received calls from different event organizers, hours or days before. Then he proceeds in making up teams to cover each event. Apart from in-town events, 10 respondents said that sometimes they write reflections and interview ordinary people about newsworthy issues. Some interviewed reporters reveal that the priority in three of the four selected newsrooms is set on events during which organizers “pay for special pages” and for coverage. Four Les Dépêches de Brazzaville journalists said they also cover activities on invitation but “nothing is expected from those who invite us,” said a news editor during the interview. “At Télé-Congo,” a respondent underlined, “[rookie] reporters feel embarrassed during editorial meetings” because everyone is “expected to recommend at least one activity and one topic for reflection per day; but new reporters don’t have any connection, so they feel frustrated.” Another interviewee who joined Télé-Congo only a year earlier said that other reporters “do not take [interns] seriously if [they] don’t propose activities that pay (cash).”

Every interviewed reporter said stories to cover are decided during editorial meetings, and topics range from events coverage—by invitation—or reflection on newsworthy issues. They also revealed that reporters who attend events without being invited are not given envelopes by press agents.

Based on all interviews for this study, it is evident that invitation-only events are privileged because reporters are used to being paid for coverage. One RCJ reporter said, “[story ideas] are submitted to discussion and journalists should decide whether or not the reflection is newsworthy to be assigned. [However], when it is an event, whether it seems newsworthy or not, reporters are dispatched anyway to cover it.”

A young Télé-Congo anchor said, “journalists have their personal contacts”; sometimes “they don’t have to attend editorial meetings at all,” they “just go out there” and come back with stories about “associations, assemblies, ceremonies, etc.” and make a deal (pay) with the Director of Programs (DP) to have their stories included in the news.

The Envelope Culture

A Radio Liberté participant said, a minimum of FCFA20,000 (about US$33) is given to each news outlet after covering a major event. “Each outlet,” he said, “is required to send four reporters”; newspapers and radios are usually given FCFA5,000 (about US$9) per reporter; television channels receive twice this amount. This might explain why Télé-Congo, Radio Liberté as well as Les Dépêches de Brazzaville produce more stories about nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government ministries, political parties, financial institutions and other major news actors.

The way news organizations decide on their daily coverage affects their contents and narratives in one way or another. As Dirbaba (2010) puts it, “private businesses and some NGOs are known to pay reasonable amounts to reporters whenever they have news events . . .” (pp. 181–182). In Tanzania, “the institutions most likely to offer bribes in order of likelihood are: (1) government ministries, (2) . . . Revenue Authority, (3) all NGOs, (4) financial institutions [. . .] business leaders, (4) news organizations, (5) political leaders” etc. (Mpagaze & White, 2010, pp. 553–554). In Congo, the envelope culture clearly has created conflicts among journalists who sometimes slam others who are too critical of the political system. Elie Smith, a Cameroonian journalist then working for a Congolese TV station, was attacked at his home in 2013 and later expelled from Congo for criticizing the country’s political leaders. No news media supported in Congo or Cameroon except Sadio Kante, a Congolese journalist originally from Mali. Kante was then deported from Congo, although she has almost never lived in Mali since her birth. (Other international media such as Jeune Afrique and VOA Afrique, and human rights organizations such as Reporters Without Borders and Observatoire Congolaise des Droits de l’Homme (OCDH), reported about the incident. Although news media reported that the five people who attacked Smith were arrested, why would the country expel the victim?) The aggression against, and expulsions of, Smith and Kante had a significant impact on the country’s ranking as per Reporters Without Borders’ freedom index reports. The country went from ranking number 76 in 2013 to 87 in 2014, 107 in 2015. In 2020, the country dropped down to 118th place and 117th place in 2019.

News Contents

This research tracked stories in/on Les Dépêches de Brazzaville, Télé-Congo, Radio Liberté and RCJ for 5 days (November 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30). The top three stories published by Les Dépêches de Brazzaville fell into at least one category mentioned by Mpagaze and White (2010), and Dirbaba, (2010): “NGOs, Financial institutions, business leaders, political leaders, government ministries.”

Although Les Dépêches de Brazzaville’s policy states that reporters do not accept bribes, the newspaper is likely to cover stories from entities known for giving bribes to reporters more than any other subject. The top three stories in Les Dépêches de Brazzaville were the same for Télé-Congo, Radio Liberté and RCJ. (No newspaper was published on November 28) The dates and stories were as follows:

November 25 Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (Number 3625): CEMAC wants to have a stable currency (financial institution); Unions raised against General Management (labor union); and Patrick Ntsiba and Noelly Oyambi Iwandza installed in their functions (government ministry).

November 26 Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (Number 3626): A financial control system against the money laundering system (financial institution); The President of the Republic on a working visit to Bouenza (government ministry); The Congo integrates the highest decision-making bodies of Unesco (government ministry).

November 27 Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (Number 3627): The Head of State inaugurates the Mfoati copper factory (presidency/government ministry); Improve the national system for funding protected areas (government ministry); Felbo builds schools in the plateaus (NGO).

November 29 Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (No. 3628): Festivities celebrated under the sign of peace (government ministry); Recovery plan for the Brazzaville University Hospital (government ministry); Domestic debt in process of being paid (financial institution).

November 30 (Saturday) Les Dépêches de Brazzaville (No. 055): Artists ready to celebrate BD (comic strip) in Brazzaville (NGO); Alain Kevin Andely: “Ba Sango” will allow publishers to become a little more autonomous (business leaders); The local “Fnac games” tournament is looming for December (business leaders).

Three of the news outlets—including one that does not accept bribes—had at least two stories in common every day, and they were “institutions most likely to offer bribes” (Mpagaze & White, 2010, p. 553; Dirbaba, 2010). In fact, most of the stories were considered the day’s biggest stories by Télé-Congo and Radio Liberté. Both broadcast the stories in the same order in their breaking news. Of course, most reporters who are sent to big events are considered elite reporters who therefore have control over story placement because in Congo, most of them are simultaneously reporters and editors. These stories, especially the ones about government ministries, economic institutions and business leaders, are considered major news stories in the country, although news outlets should receive invitations from the press person of each entity to attend and cover the stories.

RCJ did not broadcast many of the same stories. When asked why, one new director said he or she did not know about the “activities” because RCJ was not invited. An RCJ reporter said this apparently was because RCJ is a relatively newly established radio station and its staff has not yet developed strong relationships with press persons (attachés de presse) who select and contact news outlets for contact. The press persons take into account many aspects such as the outlet’s perceived popularity, and its connection with politicians (attachés de presse from government entities do not often contact outlets that give airtime to the opposition).

Were “Incentives” Received by Journalists?

The story about the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) happened in Cameroon and the Congo’s President Nguesso attended the meeting. Sources at a news station that accept bribes told this researcher that when the president travels, all reporters who travel with him receive FCFA500,000 (US$1,000) if the trip is inside the country and about FCFA1,000,000 (US$2,000) if the trip is outside the country. The so-called “mission” is run by the presidential press person (la prèsse présidentielle). Presidential press guys often impose reporters from other news outlets to report as dictated to them, and most of their video clips are provided by the presidential press staff because sometimes journalists are not allowed to personally film the president. For the CEMAC story, Télé-Congo and Les Dépêches de Brazzaville were allowed to join the presidential press team for the trip to Yaoundé, while Radio Liberté received the sound bites directly from a presidential press reporter asking them to broadcast the story (which they did, according to a source who also works as an anchor). However, some RCJ reporters told this researcher they received no sound bites.

All other stories categorized as “financial institution, business leaders, and government ministry” were covered in-person both by Télé-Congo and Radio Liberté. RCJ covered only three of them that week, some sources said.

Having worked as a volunteer reporter for a local news outlet for 3 years and later having been appointed as the head of the sports department and political reporter, it is no secret to this article’s author that every ministry, business institution and even the Parliament or Senate has a special budget allowed to every reporter who covers their events. As it was confirmed by one reporter interviewed for this study, government ministries routinely give FCFA10,000 (US$20) to every invited reporter. The Parliament’s lower house and small entities each offer FCFA5,000 (US$10) per reporter; while the Senate gives FCFA10,000 (US$20). Anyone else who wants his or her event covered should be able to give FCFA5,000, FCFA10,000 or more to each invited reporter depending on funds available. The budget for reporters is managed by a press person who will surely ensure the story was effectively broadcasted by the outlet that was invited. However, when asked whether the stories above involved “la camora,” only reporters from Radio Liberté and Télé-Congo admitted that, for some stories, reporters were given “transport” (kickbacks). Some interviewees from the newspaper denied having received any bribe. Those who admitted having received incentives said they did so without telling anyone in the newsroom because of the newspaper’s prohibition. Stories about ministries, financial institutions, NGOs and so on, are more likely to involve bribes, and the homogeneous coverage resulting from widespread bribery crowds out other stories, especially those involving ordinary citizens.

This research’s findings contradict Les Dépêches de Brazzaville staff who said during interviews that their newspaper does not allow journalists to accept bribes. As this research did not include press persons (attachés de presse) who bribe reporters, future research should seek to find whether incentives are sent directly to the news organization, which might help explain (other than ethics) why they do not allow their reporters to take “sweeteners.”

The Ethics Code

All interviewees said they learned in school or out of school about the ethics code set by the Congolese High Council for the Freedom of Communication (Conseil Supérieur de la Liberté de Communication [CSLC]). But only six of them (from Les Dépêches de Brazzaville and RCJ) said they apply it in their culture of news production. As provided by law nº8-2001 (passed on November 12, 2001), on the freedom of communication (Conseil National de Transition, 2001) and instituted by the Congo constitution’s Article 212 (October 25, 2016), the CSLC is an independent administrative authority in charge of regulating the freedom of communication. The Council ensures the proper exercise of freedom of information and communication (Yenga, 2007). As highlighted on its website (REFRAM, 2019), the CSLC’s role among others is to “monitor the media and ensure their protection against threats and obstacles in the exercise of their free and complete information function.” The general goal is for journalists to behave decently.

This ethics code is available at the Les Dépêches de Brazzaville offices and, as recommended by the CSLC, every reporter is expected to learn and respect it. However, only reporters from RCJ and the newspaper admitted that ethical and deontological standards are often discussed in their newsrooms. When asked why reporters accept bribes despite the deontological ethics standards, one respondent mentioned Article 8 of the November 12, 2001, law nº8-2001 of November 12, 2001, “Public and private information and communication companies can benefit from either direct or indirect assistance from the State.” However, as written in French, Article 8 does not authorize reporters to be given envelopes by any individual or organization, be it private or public during news briefings; the assistance mentioned in this article is supposed to be subsidies or grants. Article 9 of the same law stipulates, “no news outlet is allowed to receive financial aid in kind or in cash from a political party.” Nevertheless, the CSLC ignores regular bribery at political party press conferences, and the only outlets sanctioned and shut down are the opposition’s.

The Future of Envelope Journalism in Congo

All respondents, speaking for themselves or for others, said that as long as Congolese journalists continue to work in a financially precarious environment, the culture of bribery will prevail unabated. All interviewed journalists also think that the government should improve the working conditions of journalists to end bribery and corruption in reporting. It is true that financial issues have been cited by journalists as the main cause of bribery but, as Nwabueze (2010, p. 512) puts it, “beyond poor remuneration . . ., reporters in some government-owned media outlets who enjoy relatively good and regular pay still collect brown envelopes.”

Findings in this research are consistent with other research conducted by scholars in Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia. Scholars suggest a certain number of solutions about bribery in their respective countries. One scholar wrote the “basic solution to the brown envelope syndrome in journalism practice in Nigeria is improved and regular remuneration of journalists in media institutions” (Nwabueze, 2010, p. 514). But Mpagaze and White (2010, pp. 545–546) think that “leaders in the profession and institutions [should train] journalists try to improve ethical performance and the reputation of the journalistic occupation . . .” Regardless of financial difficulties, reporters need to be trained to be ethical journalists. Failure to do so undermines the power of the press and reduces journalists to ordinary storytellers rather than watchdogs.

Conclusion

This study has found that bribery of Congolese journalists is a major problem for the journalists and for the general public. In fact, no interviewee reported any ethical issues other than bribery! However, it is also clear that government control over the press, whether through bribery or other means, is also a problem in Congo.

Although the two settings (Africa and the United States) are different in terms of news culture, it is obvious that if African journalists seek to apply the American theory of public engagement in the news-making process (Wenzel et al., 2018), news media will make more of a public contribution; the financial obstacle might be overcome, and quality journalism will be produced. As Konieczna, citing the American journalism researcher Phil Meyer, eloquently puts it, “the only way to serve journalism is to develop a new model that finds profit in truth, vigilance and social responsibility” (Konieczna, 2018, pp. 39–40). However, some theorists suggest the normalization of brown envelope journalism by considering “Afriethics for African journalists, comprising an ethical system which is essentially communal-oriented in contrast to the supposedly individualistic-minded professional norms of the North” (Skjerdal, 2010b, p. 391). However, this researcher is among those who believe that so-called “Afriethics” is likely to kill, not improve, the watchdog role of African journalism.

One limitation of this research is that not all the studied outlets publish contents online. A second limitation, clearly, is that relying on a 5-day diary might be insufficient to draw a generalizable conclusion, no matter how obvious the pattern. Future research should consider personal observation of editorial meetings in newsrooms in both Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, two major cities in the country. Future research also would be helped if some regular event organizers are included in the research to define their relationships with reporters.

Nevertheless, this research is the first step toward the examination of how brown envelope journalism influences storytelling in the Republic of the Congo, or Congo-Brazzaville. Future research will include news sources and the audience. Including sources and the audience will help us understand whether “bribers” seek to offer envelopes to representatives of news organizations that claim they do not accept envelopes, and how the practice influences the relationship between news organizations and news consumers.

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