Abstract
The author, an investigative journalist, reviewed eight examples of “quick fixes” in detail, closing with 34 pages of references for all of the books, authors, researchers, journalists, etc. that are quoted or mentioned. Describing the wild world of such research as “Primeworld,” Singal made this sober declaration: “When unskilled intuition collides with slickly advertised behavioral science, the problem isn’t just that institutions may end up spending money on approaches that don’t work; they may also end up neglecting approaches that do work” (p. 124).
The author graciously admitted that these “fixes” are not totally without merit. They simply do not deserve the widespread acceptance and application (including thousands, even millions, of dollars) they enjoy, even after the “man behind the curtain” has been exposed. Each of the eight interventions is treated in significant detail, including responses from both advocates and critics. At times the information offered reads like a graduate course in statistics, but the author's points are well taken.
Following are brief summaries of each of the “quick fixes.” However, each chapter deserves a full and careful reading to appreciate the substantial information and insights of this book.
The Selling of Self-Esteem—A democratic state senator in CA, John Vasconcellos (a big fan of Ayn Rand), was a powerful proponent for programs that were said to improve the self-esteem of students. Curricula designed on these principles purported to increase “a sense of security, identity, belonging, purpose, and personal competence” (p. 23). Eventually, research was conducted by the University of California that produced results that were severely limited in making this connection to the positive results offered. These results were carefully communicated to reduce this concern and not damage the integrity of the university. Years later, the importance of self-esteem (which, of course, does have some value) continues to be overemphasized.
The Superpredators Among Us—A young political scientist at Princeton, John D. Dilulio, predicted that demographic tides would result in a huge increase in adolescents, bringing “an army of amoral youths who were little more than walking killing machines” (p. 44). This simply did not happen. Dilulio later apologized in 2001, noting that he had been wrong but was unable to curb the responses from this concept, noting that he was “not responsible for teenagers going to prison” (p. 72).
Of Posing and Power—Along with others proposing the power of striking a “high power” pose before taking action, a TED Talk by Amy Cuddy in 2012 brought the concept to the public's conscience, resulting in its acceptance as scientific fact, to some degree because of Cuddy's charisma and the acceptance by popular media. However, the research did not hold up under careful scientific scrutiny and was even challenged by one of its co-authors Dana Carey, citing significant issues with the research. This reviewer was actually exposed to this “quick fix” as a graduate college professor when Cuddy's TED Talk was included in the curriculum for organizational leadership. After presenting this information to the department chair, it was removed from the program.
Positive Psychology Goes to War—This was one of the most challenging chapters for this reviewer to read as the work of Martin Seligman has been present in collaboration with individuals and students. The book that Seligman co-wrote with the late Christopher Peterson, Character Strengths and Virtues, is even cited in my doctoral dissertation. As Singal noted regarding these “fixes,” some value is present in focusing on the positive side of personality beyond the issues of dysfunction, but the impact that positive psychology has promised simply does not exist, nor is it supported in solid research. In addition, its application to the treatment of such issues as PTSD resulted in spending over a half billion dollars over the past decade. Singal wrote, “There may be no other single mental health intervention in the history of humanity that has cost this much, and the Army has almost nothing to show for it” (p. 132).
Who Has Grit?—Angela Duckworth, the inventor of this concept, and her chief evangelist sought to demonstrate that the presence of this combination of “passion and perseverance” (the description from her 2016 best-selling book) was a greater predictor of success than other measures such as IQ. She developed grit scales to measure this crucial trait, suggesting that performance may be improved by focusing on its development. Unfortunately, the research proved to be inconclusive. Interestingly, Duckworth had studied under Martin Seligman of Positive Psychology fame, and there is some research that correlates Conscientiousness from the Big Five Factor (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) with performance. However, the quality of the research she conducted was discovered to be faulty. Nonetheless, grit has been lauded by NPR, and a litany of books (Singal notes a number of them in his book) have been written supporting this concept.
The Bias Test—Starting with the story of the April 2018 firing of a manager in a Philadelphia Starbucks who called the police on two young black men waiting on a friend before ordering, the concept of implicit bias was introduced to the collective conscious. From this concern came the development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), championed by “Harvard University and a veritable army of well-credentialed social psychologists who study bias and discrimination” (p. 174). Not surprisingly, this topic is explosive. The bottom line, according to Singal, is that even if implicit bias exists, it is much more likely a systemic issue and cannot be measured individually by the IAT, nor can it be addressed by focusing solely on individual perceptions.
Non-replicable—This interesting chapter focused on the application of social priming, “the idea that subtle cues can exert large, unconscious influences on human behavior” (p. 211). The first example cited was the introduction of short, almost imperceptible flashes on the screen during the viewing of the 1957 movie Picnic to encourage the increased consumption of popcorn and Coke by the audience. Well, it worked, so the desire to apply this power to more pressing issues ensued. One interesting example was suggesting that female names for hurricanes caused people to be less prepared as they sounded less imposing, resulting in the adoption of “himmicanes” to increase public awareness of the danger of such storms. Singal waxed psychometrically in reviewing this concept, offering suggestions against the direct application of what he described as “one-off” studies. One insight he offered to address this issue is the Registered Reports process, designed by the Center for Open Science. This process follows the following sequence: develop idea, design study, stage 1 peer review, collect and analyze data, write report, stage 2 peer review, and finally publish report. According to a statement from COS, this design changes the incentive “from producing the most beautiful story to the most accurate one” (p. 243). Singal closed this fascinating chapter by hoping that “the psychological establishment is responding to the available evidence - weak, wobbly effects that can’t be replicated - and acting accordingly” (p. 247).
Nudging Ahead—This final “fix” addressed how easily the application of “choice architecture” can be used to influence human decision-making. An example was the redesign of the warrant form for New York City to reduce the number of failures to appear (FTAs) for court hearings. It worked, so why not use it for more significant issues? The problem is, although nudging may address what Singal called “low-hanging fruit,” its application to more pressing problems was less successful. Both the Obama administration and the U.K. government under David Cameron developed departments to address this resource (this department has been disbanded in the U.S. but still exists as a mostly private concern in the U.K.). An example of the ineffectual application of nudging was the Obama Administration's stimulus-cash nudge, where “those who received the nudge version of their stimulus dollars were less likely to spend them than those who received them in a lump sum” (p. 267). Singal ended this section with the statement “you can’t nudge your way out of a policy problem” (p. 276).
In his concluding chapter, Escape from Primeworld, the author mercifully suggested some “whys” for the success of these “quick fixes.” For example, simple answers are often easily accepted (Singal cited Occam's Razor in this consideration). In addition, he offered that these approaches may be most likely to pay off for the researchers (TED Talks, speaker's fees, consulting jobs, book deals, even minor celebrity status), and media outlets appear to be poised to embrace such exciting results. Singal wrote, “These dynamics can also elevate self-justification over scientific justification, keeping dubious ideas in circulation” (p. 279).
In summary, although the reader may take issue with some of Singal's statements regarding culture and politics, this book provides substantial information to warrant a careful consideration of the newest and most exciting research, particularly as such research is enthusiastically trumpeted by the media. Sadly, Singal noted that there is “the ongoing existence of myriad incentives nudging scientists to overclaim, university press offices to overhype, and exhausted journalists to accept and communicate clickbait-level ‘findings’ at face value” (p. 286).