Abstract
This study elaborates on how a disorienting dilemma, a life-event crisis, may trigger reflection. The study comprised an analysis of interviews with involuntarily childless women, who were in the process of negotiating emotionally chaotic experiences. The implications for Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning are explored. Compared with the more often discussed role of reflection in facilitated contexts, the analysis shows differences in the role of reflection in this nonfacilitated context, where it appears to enable meaning making in a chaotic situation that was not understandable from within existing meaning frameworks. Furthermore, disorienting dilemmas are manifested in various emotional experiences, indicating that one’s relation to these emotions—as opposed to the nature of the emotion—becomes essential with regard to triggering reflection. Last, the social dimension appears as a second-wave trigger of reflection, as one’s changed assumptions are found to collide with views of significant others.
This article elaborates on the possibilities of a disorienting dilemma, originating from a life-event crisis, triggering reflection. The study was carried out by applying Jack Mezirow’s (e.g., 1981, 1991, 2000, 2009) theory of transformative learning to analyze interviews with involuntarily childless women in the process of negotiating emotionally chaotic experiences.
In recent years, reflection has become well established in adult and higher education (see, e.g., Brookfield, 2000; Kreber, 2005; Procee, 2006). This is no surprise as the promises attached to the concept are multifaceted and profound: Reflection has been seen as an essential element in the development of expertise and higher order thinking skills for both professionals and university students (see, e.g., Berger, 2004; Bleakley, 1999; Boud & Walker, 1998; Brookfield, 2000, 2006; Cranton & Carusetta, 2004; Dewey, 1933/1989; Fisher, 2003; Hammersley-Fletcher & Orsmond, 2005; Kreber & Castleden, 2009; McAlpine, Weston, Beauchamp, Wiseman, & Beauchamp, 1999; Ottesen, 2007; Postareff, 2007; Schön, 1983; Tynjälä, Välimaa, & Sarja, 2003). More generally, reflection has been argued to be at the core of adult learning, transformation, autonomy, and empowerment (see, e.g., Illeris, 2007; Kolb, 1984; Mezirow, 1991, 2000, 2009; Moon, 2004).
Despite the plentiful discussion on reflection, often the trigger conditions for reflection have been left unexamined. In most theorizing concerning reflection, a discrepancy of some sort, a crisis, problematic instance, one’s assumptions becoming problematic or a cognitive conflict have been seen as triggers of reflection and learning (see, e.g., Brookfield, 1987, 1994; Boud & Walker, 1998; Cranton, 2006; Dewey, 1933/1989; Entwistle & Walker, 2000; Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 1998, 1991, 2000; Postareff, 2007; Rager, 2003). However, what is missing in these theorizations and empirical research is a more detailed exploration into how these discrepancies actually may launch reflection.
Mezirow’s theory was chosen as the starting point for this study, as it offers one of the most sophisticated conceptualizations of reflection within a larger frame of adult learning theory. The theory has been validated through numerous empirical studies and continues to provoke scholarly discussion internationally (see, e.g., Baumgartner, 2002; Cranton, 2006; Illeris, 2009; Malinen, 2000; Merriam, 2008; Sands & Tennant, 2010; Taylor, 1997, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, in Mezirow’s theory, the trigger conditions for reflection are explicated: Mezirow considers reflection to be triggered by a disorienting dilemma, a real-life crisis or more moderate growing sense of dissatisfaction with one’s old meaning structure. Although reflection is often being facilitated in many educational settings, this kind of disorienting dilemma may come about naturally in nonfacilitated settings when everyday living produces a disorienting dilemma one can no longer ignore (see also Sands & Tennant, 2010).
However, a more detailed understanding of the features of these contexts in relation to reflection is not offered within the theory, although the crisis may be seen as the most conspicuous manifestation of a disorienting dilemma. Furthermore, the role of reflection in crisis has not been examined in detail. Although this kind of incongruent experience has been accepted as a valid trigger of reflection within the discussions on transformative learning, based on Mezirow’s theory it remains unclear how a disorienting dilemma leads to reflection (see Taylor, 1998). In fact, this seems quite an unnatural conclusion, considering the crisis itself is an acute emotional strain, and reflection has been seen to be a challenging and painful process (see, e.g., Berger, 2004; Brookfield, 1987; Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 2000; Taylor, 2007, 2008).
This issue may be approached by posing the question to Mezirow’s (1991) basic proposition of making meaning: How do we make meaning if we are already in chaos? How is it possible for us to understand the situation if we are not able to conceive of it within the light of our previous assumptions? In a crisis, one is neither able to imagine one’s life ahead as based on one’s previous experiences nor able to have coherent anticipations of the future. Rather, one is, in a sense, in a vacuum of meanings: figuratively speaking, there are no ready-made labels or concepts to give meaning to one’s experiences (see also McWhinney & Markos, 2003). Furthermore, Mezirow (1991) considers the meaning perspective as socially constructed. Thus, an important question is “How is the social dimension manifested in the process of negotiating this emotional chaos that has questioned the meaning perspective?”
These questions illuminate the ways in which the conceptual link between a disorienting dilemma and reflection may be approached. At the same time, in examining these questions it would appear important to pay attention to the emotional and social dimensions alongside the cognitive dimension often most prominent in theorizations on reflection. In fact, considering these dimensions appears especially important as precisely the emotional and social dimensions have received less attention within Mezirow’s theory while the cognitive and rational aspects of transformation and reflection are emphasized (see Clark & Wilson, 1991; Cranton, 2006; Illeris, 2004, 2007; Merriam, 2008; Sands & Tennant, 2010; Taylor, 2000, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, various empirical studies have recently shown that besides emotions, the social dimension, for example, safe relationships are inextricable elements of transformation and reflection (see Baumgartner, 2002; Berger, 2004; Brookfield, 1994, 2006; Jokikokko, 2009; Merriam, 2008; Mezirow, 2000; Sands & Tennant, 2010; Snyder, 2008; Taylor, 2000, 2007, 2008).
Although there are some new interpretations of the transformative learning process focusing on the emotional dimension (see, e.g., Dirkx, 2001, 2008), theoretical elaborations and developments on Mezirow’s theory on these issues have been scarce (J. Mezirow, personal communication, December 1, 2007; see also Taylor, 2007, 2008). For example, the cognitive dimension explicated in Mezirow’s theory has not been brought together with the more recent examinations of the emotional dimension, to examine how these different dimensions relate to each other. To reach an understanding of the nature of reflection and the impact of transformative learning in both negative and positive ways, these viewpoints would be important (Taylor, 2000).
The aim of this study is to apply Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning to the context of involuntary childlessness, to explore the ways in which a disorienting dilemma may (or may not) launch reflection. More specifically, through theoretically oriented empirical analysis (see Layder, 1998), I will focus on the emotional and social dimensions of the relation between disorienting dilemma and reflection.
My motivation for this study stems from my earlier studies, which examined reflection from various viewpoints and with different methods. Namely, in my earlier study (Luoma, 2006), I examined reflection from interview data from the viewpoint of Mezirow’s theory. The data were the same as for this study, but my focus was on the variety of reflection manifested in the data. In another study, I focused on the relation between reflection and action, as well as the social and emotional dimensions of it, by examining interviews with university teachers (Mälkki & Lindblom-Ylänne, in press). In addition, I have examined reflection from a theoretical perspective, by analyzing Mezirow’s theory with philosophical methods to theorize the prerequisites and challenges to reflection (Mälkki, in press).
Theoretical Framework
Involuntary Childlessness as a Life-Event Crisis
Facing involuntary childlessness may be seen as one example of the kind of crisis circumstances (see Salzer, 1991) that Mezirow (1991, 2000) refers to as potential disorienting dilemmas triggering reflection and transformative learning. Involuntary childlessness implies that the original expectation and wish of having (biological) children have not come true. The previous emotionally charged expectations of bearing a child crash into a wall—figuratively speaking—when the impossibility of having a child becomes apparent. In addition to the grief and sorrow over one’s “lost” child, involuntary childlessness dashes one’s hopes related to having and loving a child and a family and of being a parent and may also challenge one’s values as well as one’s womanhood or manhood. An additional load is often experienced, as “other people” do not always understand the sorrow that the childless endure. The situation may also arouse feelings of guilt and shame. In addition, the beginning of the crisis is not definable as one has lost something that never existed, and the cycles of infertility treatments may repeatedly trigger the emotional reactions to the crisis. Overcoming the crisis does not, however, mean that childlessness is eventually experienced as justified. Rather, the meaning of it changes, and it no longer prevents one from enjoying other aspects of life (see Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Oinonen, 1998; Salzer, 1991).
Involuntary childlessness has been a focus of research within a variety of disciplines. Besides medical studies concerning infertility, there is research stemming from the fields of psychology, sociology, and women’s studies, among others. Each of these disciplines naturally approaches the theme from their own viewpoint—psychological studies focus on the emotional reactions and experiences (see Greil, 1997; Matsubayashi, Hosaka, Izumi, Suzuki, & Makino, 2001), whereas sociological research, for example, women’s studies (e.g., Letherby, 1999; Whiteford & Gonzalez, 1995), brings out the social dimensions of the experiences of involuntarily childless women, such as the experience of being stigmatized (Letherby, 1999).
Within these studies on involuntary childlessness, the issues concerning reflection and learning in crisis have not, however, been studied. This kind of educational viewpoint appears fruitful for considering the thought processes of negotiating through the crisis caused by involuntary childlessness, especially concerning how one may pull through the emotionally chaotic experiences. This kind of knowledge has also been called for by the involuntarily childless themselves (Luoma, 2006; Salzer, 1991).
Life-Event Crises as Disorienting Dilemmas
Within scholarly discussion based on Mezirow’s transformative learning theory, there are studies that consider transformative learning in association with life-event crises that may be seen as nonfacilitated context for transformative learning. For example, Baumgartner (2002), Courtenay, Merriam, and Reeves (1998), and Courtenay, Merriam, Reeves, and Baumgartner (2000) examined the transformational learning process of participants with an HIV/AIDS diagnosis. Based on their studies, they illuminated the kind of views that the participants arrived at while making meaning of their chronic illness. They suggest that there is stability in their transformed worldview and that social interaction was an important part of the transformation process (Baumgartner, 2002; Courtenay et al., 2000). Closest to the aims of this study comes Sands and Tennant’s (2010) recent study on transformative learning in the context of suicide bereavement. Sands and Tennant discuss the use of metaphors such as “trying on new shoes,” “walking in the shoes,” and “taking off the shoes,” to illustrate the differing phases of reconstruction of meaning in negotiating the loss. Sands and Tennant emphasize the relevance of affective dimension along with the cognitive focus of Mezirow’s theory. Furthermore, they mention that in the grieving process, the relationships are not only important as support, but they may also become transformed, modified, and recast as a result of transformative learning. Sands and Tennant also suggest that as a result of transformative process, the participants of the study were able to reach new, more emotionally satisfying ways of dealing with bereavement, while viewing the process as open ended.
As the above studies exemplify, Mezirow’s theory appears to offer conceptualization concerning the cognitive dimension of working through crisis, thus complementing the emotionally oriented views of psychology. Nevertheless, a crisis is an emotional chaos (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Salzer, 1991), and therefore the emotional dimension should not be ignored either in exploring the transformation of meaning structures. In fact, as noted above, there has been criticism concerning Mezirow’s theory in that it emphasizes the cognitive dimension at the expense of the emotional and social dimensions (see Clark & Wilson, 1991; Cranton, 2006; Illeris, 2004, 2007; Sands & Tennant, 2010; Taylor, 2000, 2007). My aim in this study is precisely to explore the emotional and social dimensions of the relation between disorienting dilemma and reflection, which in Mezirow’s theory has been conceptualized predominantly from the cognitive viewpoint. Therefore, I will also briefly discuss some perspectives that consider the emotional dimension. However, they, too, appear limited, as they do not consider the emotional and cognitive dimensions together in terms of reflection and transformative learning in general, nor specifically in terms of overcoming a crisis.
The process of going through the crisis is explicated in Kübler-Ross’s (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005) stages of grieving. According to Kübler-Ross and Kessler, the grief process progresses through the stages of denial, anger bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Each of these stages is seen to have its distinct role in dealing with grief and tragedy, in optimal cases leading one to reach the stage of acceptance. Nevertheless, the order and length of each stage is personal and cannot be defined in advance (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005). Similar stages are explicated also more specifically in terms of involuntary childlessness (see Salzer, 1991).
Furthermore, within discussions on adult learning, John Dirkx (e.g., 2001, 2008; Dirkx, Mezirow, & Cranton, 2006) has brought to view the emotional nature of adult learning. According to Dirkx, the prevailing view of learning is exaggeratedly rational and cognitive, whereas he emphasizes the emotional and imaginative nature of adult learning. In Dirkx’s view, becoming aware of the images behind emotions and feelings enables more conscious connection with oneself, while offering deeper understanding of experience as well as more satisfying relationships with one’s world (Dirkx, 2001, 2008, see also Dirkx, Mezirow, & Cranton, 2006). Although Dirkx explicitly differs from Mezirow’s view of adult learning in focusing on the role of emotions and imagination and Mezirow’s theory concentrates mainly on the cognitive and rational dimensions of learning, they both may be seen to emphasize the role of increasing one’s self-awareness as an essential feature in adult learning (see also Cranton, 2006).
Method
Data Collection
The data were collected by interviewing four involuntarily childless women, who were recruited through an advertisement published in a journal as well as on an Internet site dedicated to involuntary childlessness. The interviewees thus participated on a voluntary basis (see Holloway & Wheeler, 1995). In the advertisement, I suggested that one would participate only if enough time had passed after their most critical phases. Although all the participants were women, the advertisement had been neutral in terms of gender. In fact, six persons volunteered for interviews, one of whom was a man. However, he eventually cancelled his participation, because he and his wife managed to adopt a child. Together with this potential participant, we concluded that this joyous happening would have altered his viewpoint on his experiences as an involuntarily childless person. In addition, one woman opted out before the interview.
The interviewees were roughly between 20 and 40 years of age and came from different backgrounds in Finland geographically, professionally, and in terms of education. Each lived in a stable relationship. Because of the small population of Finland and, consequently, a relatively small number of involuntarily childless people, no further details of the participants are offered, to ensure their anonymity (see Holloway & Wheeler, 1995).
Despite the small number of participants, the amount of excerpts involving reflection entailed that the data provided a rich source from which to examine reflection in detail from a theoretical perspective. Namely, in the analysis, altogether 85 excerpts exhibiting reflection were identified from the 160 pages of double-spaced transcripts. Excerpts exhibiting reflection indicated an awareness of one’s earlier interpretations or assumptions, and assessing their validity (see Mezirow, 1991, 2000).
The interviews were unstructured but oriented to the topics related to involuntary childlessness. Each interview lasted 2 to 3 hours. A lifeline method (Silkelä, 1997) was used in the interviews: Interviewees were asked to draw a lifeline representing their subjective perception of their experiences. This served as an aid for communication that enabled the interviewer to better pinpoint the views of the interviewee, as it allowed the interviewee to set the timescale as well as the significant experiences that were used as the basis for the interview (Shank, 2006; Silkelä, 1997). Further topics covered in the interviews were, for example, the interviewees’ expectations on having a child; how the childlessness had come to light and the associated situations, experiences, and feelings; their experiences both during possible infertility treatments and concerning ending the treatments; adoption; overcoming the crisis; their relation to children, parenthood, and their relationships both before and after; their thoughts on their current life and the future. Furthermore, I asked the interviewees to consider what they would like to say to other involuntarily childless people, based on their own experience. I also asked how one may know that one has accepted the childlessness.
All the interviews were quite in-depth, open, and conversational in nature. Considering the intimacy of the topic, the interviewees were presumably oriented for deep and personal discussions already beforehand. From the viewpoint of the interviewees, my role and position as an interviewer—and at the time a young single woman—was that of an interested outsider. This may have led the interviewees to conceptualize their experiences further, as they could not rely on my understanding them automatically. On the other hand, they may have avoided some issues they did not feel comfortable discussing with someone who has not been through similar experiences. However, considering the openness and intimacy of the topics covered, and the authenticity of their way of expression, it may be assumed that the data were suitable for the purposes of the present study.
It may be argued that reflection expressed in an interview is rather artificially produced, so as to form a certain conception for the interviewer, instead of expressing the interviewee’s authentic personal reflections and meanings (see, e.g., Saarenheimo, 1997). However, regarding the topics and viewpoints covered in the interviews, it may be assumed that the interviewees felt comfortable enough to voice their impressions and experiences without excessive control and restraint. In fact, as the interviewees explicated their motivations for taking part in the interview, they indicated that they had been motivated to take part by my viewpoint expressed in the advertisement (“crisis as the seed for growth”). They felt that instead of merely dwelling on the negative aspects of involuntary childlessness, there is a need for knowledge and discussion on the overcoming process, as well as voicing the viewpoint of living as a childless person or couple. At the first sight, this may seem like creating an overly positive image of a more complex phenomenon. However, on the contrary, it seemed likely the interviewees felt comfortable talking also about the negative and unpleasant experiences, because they perceived the viewpoint of the research both before and after interviews as covering the phenomenon in a more comprehensive fashion, in contrast to the common stereotype that regards the involuntarily childless as merely pitiable (Letherby, 1999).
Furthermore, for each interviewee, a fair length of time had passed between their most critical phase and the interview. It is therefore possible that the interviewees ended up conceptualizing and elaborating on their experiences further within the interview than they had done before. In fact, within educational settings, biographical and topic-related discussions and interviews are seen as a tool for promoting reflection, along with learning diaries (see, e.g., Brookfield, 2006; Collin & Tynjälä, 2003; Mezirow, 1990). Supported by my specifying questions, the interview may have offered the interviewees a space to examine and clarify their perceptions and feelings in an accepting but relatively neutral atmosphere. I was not a professional capable of diagnosing (e.g., a medical doctor or psychologist), which might have oriented the interviewees into certain topics or viewpoints (see Vehviläinen & Lindfors, 2005).
On the other hand, in terms of their experiences during and after the interviews on such an intimate and painful issue, it was important that the interviewees knew my educational background, age, and relation to involuntary childlessness. They were therefore told that I was only a researcher with no further qualifications on issues related to involuntary childlessness or crisis. These are essential ethical questions, in addition to the above-mentioned issues, namely, that the interviewees participated on a voluntary basis, were informed of the viewpoint of the research, and that their anonymity was ensured (see Holloway & Wheeler, 1995).
Analysis
The data were analyzed by using as criteria Mezirow’s (1981, 1990, 1991, 2000) conceptualizations on reflection as follows. In the first phase of analysis, the data were separated into two parts, based on whether the excerpts involved reflection or not. At this early phase, I explicitly justified considering these excerpts as containing reflection by proportioning the ponderings to Mezirow’s (1981, 1990, 1991, 2000) definitions. In other words, I considered each excerpt separately and wrote out my interpretation on what kind of reflection I thought it manifested. I gave my reasons for this interpretation by examining the viewpoints the excerpt involved, in light of the conceptualizations and definitions offered in Mezirow’s theory. In the second phase, this material was further analyzed by constant comparative method (see Boeije, 2002) to capture all variation in expressions containing reflection. Regardless of the topics covered in the excerpt, I compared them in terms of the kind of reflection they involved and searched for similarities and differences between the excerpts. This way, I could get a more nuanced understanding of the excerpts, while grouping them according to their similarities (see also Boeije, 2002). The results of these theory-driven analyses were reported in detail in my previous study (Luoma, 2006).
After these theory-driven phases of analysis, I analyzed these excerpts further in a data-driven manner by orienting in particular toward the emotional and social aspects, while focusing on the relation between disorienting dilemma and reflection. In this third phase, I focused more on the context of the excerpts regarding four differing but interwoven dimensions that served as levels of analytic reading, namely, (a) the immediate context within the text where the excerpt was located, (b) the totality of that person’s experiences and accounts within the interview, (c) the variation in expressions containing reflection, formed during the previous phase of the analysis, and (d) the overall picture of the phenomenon of involuntary childlessness, formed as a result of reading all the interviews as well as the background literature. These levels were formed with a deeper analysis of the data, as they turned out important for grasping the meaning of each excerpt.
As mentioned in the beginning of this article, this study is closely related to my previous studies on reflection. My earlier examinations of reflection, using both the same and different empirical data, as well as with philosophical methods, made reaching a deeper understanding of the data 1 possible. Especially using previously analyzed data offered the benefit of long-term familiarity with the material (see Åkerström et al., 2007). While stepping away from the previous interpretations of the data took some time, in the end it enabled reaching an understanding of the data on a much deeper level (see Atkinson, 1992).
Finally, it is important to point out that the intention of the research was not to track the interviewees’ interpretations or opinions on certain issues as such (see, e.g., Baumgartner, 2002). Instead, it was aimed at elaborating on their way of pondering and considering issues within the context of their experiences related to involuntary childlessness. With the help of these considerations, the aim was to examine on a more theoretical level the relation between disorienting dilemma and reflection, and how cognitive, emotional, and social dimensions are manifested in this. Therefore, this analysis was neither data driven, in the sense that the data would play the lead, nor theory oriented, in the sense that Mezirow’s theory would be the ultimate lens through which to view the data. Rather, the analysis was a combination of both, in the sense that the data were used to explore, with theoretical interest, the issues less conceptualized within Mezirow’s theory. Thus, the analysis was not about involuntary childlessness as such, but rather aimed at theory development through empirical analysis (see Layder, 1998).
Findings
The findings of the study include four intertwined themes concerning the relation between disorienting dilemma and reflection. First, I will consider the role of reflection in crisis context that, based on the data, appeared distinct from the role of reflection in educational contexts. Second, I will discuss how the negative feelings associated with disorienting dilemma may contribute to the decrease of the significance of the earlier perspective, making it possible to open oneself up for new meanings. Third, I will consider the differing meanings of seeing through and living through the new meaning perspective (Mezirow, 2000), exposing how the role of reflection may vary according to the phases of negotiating an emotionally chaotic situation. Fourth, I will discuss the ways in which the social dimension of disorienting dilemma was manifested in the data, and introduce the idea of second-wave trigger for reflection.
The findings are explicated with few illustrative excerpts from the data. Despite the few illustrations, the findings were based on analyzing all the instances of reflection, while considering their broader context within the interview, as explicated above. Several instances from each interviewee illuminated each of these findings. The excerpts were translated from Finnish, and the names have been changed.
Role of Reflection in Crisis: Meaning Making After Crisis
Mezirow (2000) mentions that after perspective transformation, life is not only seen through but lived through the new perspective. This view is compatible with the emotion-centered views concerning crisis and the stages of grieving (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Salzer, 1991), that is, that one needs to live and work through the different phases of emotions in order to overcome the crisis and be able to accept one’s life after it. Both these perspectives appear to indicate that it is not merely a matter of new viewpoints or interpretations, but overcoming the crisis requires one to have worked emotionally with the issues, in order to be able to experience one’s life through the new perspective (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Salzer, 1991). In addition, Mezirow’s (1991, 2000) theory indicates that reflection may be seen as a way of working with crisis, and the result of a process of this kind may equate to transformative learning. Nevertheless, within the theory it is not explicated what kind of a role does reflection, in fact, have within the context of crisis.
Based on the analysis, it was evident in the data that the crisis certainly had provoked reflection. However, instead of the more common view of reflection as a tool for learning and development, for the involuntarily childless women reflection in this study appeared as a way of making meaning in a chaotic situation, in which there were no ready-made labels with which to conceptualize one’s experiences.
As the previous expectations did not yield understanding and coherence, or enable an understanding of one’s experience within the current context, meaning was realized by drawing on the sources available in circumstances of this kind.
First, one could make meaning by drawing on previous assumptions, that is, the previous meaning perspective questioned by the crisis, as well as from the context within which this previous perspective was formed. These ways of meaning making embody critical reflection, that is, critical analysis of one’s assumptions, becoming aware of one’s earlier meaning perspective, and pondering on the issues that have become questioned (see Mezirow, 1991) as one found out about the likelihood of remaining childless. To illustrate, in the following excerpt the interviewee explicates her previous expectations and their source, which she is now questioning, while realizing she had taken for granted the things she had learned as a child:
It’s like you can’t always plan your life as you thought when you were younger and things will go in their own order, and well, you can have kids also before you are married if they are to come. I was raised in a very traditional way and always thought things in correct order, for example I’ll go to work after studies, and then marry and then family and so on. But that script will not always hold and you cannot plan your life as much.
Second, one could sketch out meaning for one’s experience by drawing on other possible situations and experiences, and comparing one’s situation to these hypothetical situations. By sketching out these hypothetical situations, one maps the ground and produces conceptual landmarks or lighthouses with which to locate one’s self. These explications of hypothetical situations act as an effort to identify different, but related, possible experiences and situations, with which one compares one’s own case to form a path of meaning. This may be seen as a way of locating one’s experience on the map of possible experiences and using the knowledge of the social context to understand one’s experience. This is illustrated in the following excerpt:
And of course it was a terrible shock that [due to the cancer and surgery] the uterus was gone, but in some way it was also a big relief, in a way it ended the moving back and forth in uncertainty regarding whether we should try more or not, it kind of closed the door . . . It was not a totally catastrophic thing, maybe it was more a relief than it was, or I can’t really say which of the feelings was stronger, I mean relief or grief, but in any case we nevertheless were 2½ years in this treatment hassle, I mean that time was completely taxing. I don’t really understand how some people are like nine, ten, fifteen years in that treatment process. I couldn’t, like, I would get totally messed up for sure, so in that sense we got away with it quite easily.
This excerpt exemplifies the kind of effort to understand one’s experience abundant in the interview material. The situation itself was not expected or understandable based on previous life experience, as it involved closing the door on the hope of having a biological child. This excerpt can be seen as a conscious effort to conceptualize and make meaning of her experience. That she is not sure which feeling would best describe her experience implies she is not going with first impressions and interpreting her experience as unquestionably negative as her hopes appear unfulfillable. Instead, she brings different viewpoints into the examination, allowing herself to grasp different dimensions of her experience (see Mezirow, 2000). On a more basic level, this pondering already represents a new interpretation oriented by the realistic possibilities of the current context (see Mezirow, 2000). If it were grounded on a previous meaning perspective oriented toward the expectation of having a child, the whole situation would have been regarded merely as negative with no context-specific elaborated interpretations (see also Salzer, 1991). In terms of reflection, this indicates critical pondering on the issue from different perspectives, by becoming aware of and questioning the previous taken-for-granted perspective, the “first impressions” of the meaning of one’s experiences and the resulting feelings (see Mezirow, 1991, 2000).
These ponderings embody both becoming aware of one’s previous assumptions and their context, and negotiating the new meaning in relation to one’s current context. By drawing on these available sources of meaning, one could make meaning in the chaotic situation not understandable from within the existing meaning frameworks and one’s previous life experience. Paradoxically, this kind of “cognitive survival” effort is carried out through a process manifesting textbook examples of the reflection aimed at within adult and higher education (see, e.g., Boud & Walker, 1998; Brookfield, 2006; Cranton, 2006; Mezirow, 1991, 2000; Taylor, 2007). Furthermore, the same definitions of reflection Mezirow (1991, 2000) uses to illustrate the possibilities for validating meaning and aiming for more grounded, context-sensitive, and conscious viewpoints depict the thinking processes apparent in the effort to form meaning within the context of crisis.
According to Mezirow (1991, 2000), the disorienting dilemma or crisis may trigger reflection. Based on the data, it may be argued that reflection is, in fact, necessary to make meaning after crisis. This brings together two of Mezirow’s (2000) basic propositions: (a) the human need to understand one’s experience and (b) critical reflection as a way of validating meaning. In the context of crisis, critical reflection appears as a way to make meaning in the first place. Figuratively speaking, as one cannot move forward, one may search for another way through first stepping back.
The Emotional Dimension of Meaning Making/Reflection in Crisis
Although the above conceptualization is overly cognitive in nature, the other side of the coin is inherently emotional. As Mezirow (2000) states, we make meaning by bringing order to the experience and integrating it with what we know. This is necessary to avoid the threat of chaos and the anxiety we experience when unable to make meaning and understand our environment within the light of our previous experiences (Mezirow, 2000). In the case of crisis, one is already in a state of emotional chaos, and the emotional burden essentially distinguishes one’s experience from the “normal” context (see Mezirow, 1991; Saari, 2003; Salzer, 1991). This is evident both in the previous excerpt and in the following, in which the interviewee describes her feelings:
It caused me such a horrible symptoms, for two weeks I had to prick myself with a needle or I took a kind of nose spray every 6 or 8 hours, and I was like, I was totally messed up the whole time. It was a totally horrible time while I was on the treatment, like totally, then I swore I will never do this again, if it is so hard to get a child then I don’t need to have one . . . I really thought that I will never do this again, if it’s about losing my mental health then let’s leave it here, all the children will, on my behalf, I’ll give up.
The above excerpt is a typical example of the data concerning the interviewees’ experiences during the infertility treatment: The treatments were entered with an expectation of the possibility of having a child. However, as the treatment continued, various unexpected experiences arose, which had, perhaps, previously appeared insignificant. Among others, the uncertainty, waiting, pain, anxiety, and hormonal side effects resulted in the negative experiences and emotions coming to prevail. In this, as well as in many other excerpts within the data, the disorienting dilemma appears as a distinctly emotional state in the following ways.
First, the new context appears to have pushed itself into one’s experience, and as the feelings grew more unpleasant and more dominant, the weight of the previous viewpoint decreased. In terms of reflection, it therefore appears that as the effect of the preponderant feeling grew, it diminished the inhibition to perceive and access new viewpoints not committable to from one’s previous meaning perspective.
Second, the negative emotions moved one into a position where becoming aware of previously unquestioned assumptions and viewpoints appeared as partial relief, as it enabled conceptualizing and making meaning in the painful situation until then perceived as emotionally chaotic and without “labels” matching one’s experience. The prevailing negative feeling may be experienced as more painful than the pain of questioning one’s assumptions previously automatically overlooked.
Third, continuing to cling onto the previous perspective would have forced one to try to neglect these feelings, and artificially try to exclude them or to explain them away from awareness. Thus, by the act of accepting the feelings, one is paving the way for another viewpoint that would also frame these negative feelings.
It may therefore be assumed that, on one hand, this emotional distress orients an individual to seek alternative viewpoints, to give meaning to the experience not otherwise understandable (see also Brookfield, 1987). On the other hand, this can be seen as aiming to relieve the anxiety arising from the inability to understand (see Mezirow, 2000).
Furthermore, based on this I suggest that “assumptions becoming problematic” is not a trigger for reflection as such, but rather that disorienting dilemma is experienced through unpleasant feelings. Therefore, reflection on assumptions becomes possible only after these feelings are accepted as an indicator of the problematic assumptions. On the other hand, one may take up reflection also by questioning one’s attitude toward these feelings.
Seeing or Living Through the New Perspective
Outlining a new viewpoint or questioning the validity of an old assumption does not, however, necessarily imply a change in the way one actually experiences the situation. For example, the reflections expressed in the excerpt concerning an interviewee’s hysterectomy are not to be taken as an evaluation on how easy, difficult, or painful the experience was.
In fact, cognitively one may be able to sketch all manner of scenarios, but the significant issue is which perspective one actually lives by (see Mezirow, 2000; Sands & Tennant, 2010); in other words, whether the sketched new interpretations remain mere hypotheses or images one looks at, or do they represent the basic viewpoint through which one actually experiences one’s daily living. Within the discussions concerning transformation, the focus is often on whether the transformation has actually taken place and whether the new perspective defines how one actually feels and interprets new situations (see Taylor, 2000, 2007). However, based on the data, it appears that sketching out hypotheses may also be an important phase in forming possible paths of meaning, according to which one may be able to live later. Therefore, although it can be argued that transformation has only taken place if one is able to live through the new perspective, there is no reason to downgrade the meaning of playing with different perspectives; it may be important to sketch them out to take the concrete step later. On the other hand, of course, it is possible one never takes this concrete step, instead becoming attached to these hypotheses without actually processing the issue further.
In the end, accepting involuntary childlessness as part of one’s life is a long process of working with both one’s feelings and thoughts (Salzer, 1991; see also Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005), to enable living and experiencing through one’s new meaning perspectives. The expressions may sound the same as the expressions of a person who is only sketching out new meanings. The difference is precisely whether the ways in which one actually experiences the small everyday issues of life embody the old or the new perspective. Nevertheless, during this long process, the mere sketching out of new meanings and reflecting on issues without living through the new perspective may be an important phase.
Furthermore, as was previously suggested, letting go of the previous interpretation and opening oneself to new ways of thinking about issues may enable one to relieve the chaotic feeling and anxiety. This may also take an exaggerated form, in which one would, one way or another, aim to make oneself feel better, despite the validity of the interpretations. In my view, this comes close to Mezirow’s (2000) descriptions of thoughtlessly seizing explanations given by authority figures, or resorting to rationalization and projection, to create imaginary meanings.
However, the difference between this, and what was above described as sketching new meanings through reflection, resides in the extent to which the realistic context is taken into account. The interviewees themselves indicated that they had—through reflection—recognized a pronounced tendency “to ‘see’ only the thing that one is missing” and to ignore other aspects. This meant, for example, creating an overly positive image of the kind of life that one could not have. Hence, the significant issue is the anchoring of the interpretation to the realistic context—whether it be in terms of living through the new perspective or the preliminary phase of merely seeing through the new perspective. In the end, the question remains whether one actually uses the sketching as a way to process the crisis, or whether one creates of these interpretations a new, unquestioned ideology that serves to bring ostensible stability to one’s life.
The Social Dimension: Second-Wave Trigger for Reflection
Within the discussions on transformative learning, the social dimension of reflection is often referred to as offering the supportive relationships and comfort necessary for carrying out the challenging process of transformative learning and reflection (see Mezirow, 1991, 2000). Furthermore, rational discourse has been emphasized as a way of validating meaning (see Mezirow, 1991, 2009). These viewpoints came through from the data, as the interviewees in many instances described their significant relationships, which offered support and enabled them to clarify their thoughts.
In addition to these positive effects of social dimension, the data resonated with Brookfield’s (1994, 2006) notion of cultural suicide. With regard to this, I suggest that since meanings are socially constructed, they bring about balance in relation to the social dimension. Consequently, meanings becoming questioned or changed indicates a strain also in relation to the people and groups connected by shared assumptions (see also Brookfield, 1994; Sands & Tennant, 2010). In fact, based on the data, I suggest that experiencing an unexpected lack of shared meanings may be seen to form a disorienting dilemma within the social dimension, and to raise unpleasant feelings, possibly leading one to reflection.
As an example of this, in the following excerpt the interviewee thinks about the advice she would give, based on her experience, to other involuntarily childless people who have just learned about their situation:
It’s like other people have been disparaging, like what’s there to worry about. So maybe I would like to encourage [other involuntarily childless women or men] to feel you have the right to mourn, and it’s okay to spend time on it. . . . It annoys me that some people say, like, the grief may take a year or a whole lifetime, somehow I have felt that I’m no good if I haven’t accepted that [childlessness] within a year. So go on and spend your own time with it. It’s okay, if at some point in your life you can accept it, then it’s good. But yeah, that it’s okay to grieve. For sure it will be hard and you have the right to use as much time and energy as you need.
The above excerpt indicates her feeling of having exceeded the “proper” socially accepted timeline for grieving, which at first led her to feel “no good” for failing to fulfill these expectations. However, these uncomfortable feelings have then led her to ponder over the issue and to conceptualize her previously taken-for-granted assumptions, thus opening them up for review. Based on this, she has formed her own conceptions separate from the previous expectations. Second, after forming her own conceptions, the discrepancy within the social dimension appears on another level: Again, she finds herself at odds with other people’s comments, only now in a new way, as she is irritated by the comments that imply the taken-for-granted assumptions that used to govern also her thinking and feelings. Again she experiences unpleasant feelings signaling the disorienting dilemma within the social dimension. In terms of reflection, the excerpt indicates that the interviewee had examined her assumptions and formed her own conscious conceptions, first after feeling “bad” for her inability to accept her childlessness within the socially accepted timeline, and later after experiencing insulting or irritating comments by other people. In this, the consequences of deviating from the script of social expectations are literally experienced through the uncomfortable feelings (see also Brookfield, 2000; Sands & Tennant, 2010).
Another issue in terms of the social dimension repeatedly evident in the data involved reflecting on other people’s assumptions. There were plenty of instances in which the interviewees described unpleasant contradictions with other people, in association with reflecting on these other people’s assumptions. This is illustrated by the following excerpt:
Even quite unfamiliar people may come to ask “well do you not have kids” and then when I say that we don’t have then they go like “well you still can get one.” But you don’t bother to explain everyone that we can’t, you just don’t bother. And it is not like they’re pressuring you or anything, rather they are being kind, or people just do not realize what they are saying and what they are asking . . . It’s like you get those comments from people but they are not thinking about it at all. And they only look at it from their own perspective. These comments really aggravate me sometimes but I don’t bother to correct it and, well, let people talk what they want, but it is just the fact that their life has gone that way.
Different people had in several instances voiced tactless comments concerning the interviewee’s situation as a childless woman. In the end, the interviewees did not, however, interpret these comments as mere insults based on their immediate experience. Rather, they pondered on the perspective from which the commenter had spoken, and hypothesized that based on the commenter’s life experience it was possible simply to fail to understand what the comments would feel like from the perspective of someone involuntarily childless.
It appeared that the interviewees had reflected on their own assumptions, but as the contradiction remained, they ended up reflecting on other people’s assumptions, to understand why these contradictions and unpleasant situations keep arising. In a sense, they were dealing with the situation to accept the continuous contradictions and to understand their unpleasant feelings within these situations. With reflection, it was possible to form a larger frame for understanding the unpleasant situation within which the contradiction in views remain, although the contradiction in itself was not removed.
Altogether, the unpleasant feelings appeared again to be related to the need to ponder over the instance in the first place. In this, reflecting on other people’s assumptions appeared as a way of managing the continuing contradictions with other people not solvable by reflecting only on one’s own assumptions. In other words, as the disorienting dilemma took place on the social level, correspondingly reflection on the social level appeared necessary for forming a valid interpretation of the situation in which the individual was involved.
Although reflection is often portrayed in a positive light, as a tool for learning and as a means for clarifying one’s beliefs, assumptions, and feelings (see Mezirow, 1991, 2000), based on the above analysis, it may be suggested that the data brought to view another side of reflection. In many instances within the data, precisely the fact that one had reflected on one’s own assumptions led to a separation from the taken-for-granted social expectations (see Mezirow, 1991), which then appeared to cause contradictions within relationships (see Brookfield, 1994, 2006). These contradictions, as well as the accompanying unpleasant feelings, may be seen as a second-wave trigger for reflection, calling for “reflection-after-reflection.” In some instances, this second-wave reflection concerned one’s own assumptions behind the unpleasant feelings, whereas in others, it appeared to lead one to consider also other peoples’ assumptions, so as to understand and endure the conflicts within relationships not resolved by self-reflection.
Conclusions
This study explored how a disorienting dilemma, a life-event crisis, may trigger reflection. The findings of the study confirm several issues within Mezirow’s (1981, 1991, 2000, 2009) theory of transformative learning, while offering further examination into issues insufficiently considered within the theory.
First, the analysis shows that the role of reflection within the nonfacilitated context of life-event crisis differs from the more often discussed role of reflection in facilitated contexts. Namely, reflection appeared to enable meaning making in a chaotic situation not understandable from within existing meaning frameworks. At the same time, this may be seen as an effort to decrease the painfulness of the chaotic situation (see Mezirow, 2000; Sands & Tennant, 2010).
Second, disorienting dilemmas appeared to be inherently emotional experiences. This did not, however, downgrade the role of rational and critical pondering; instead, it appeared that reflection may well be used in working through these experiences. However, the reflective approach was not possible to take up merely with an intention to reflect. Rather, the important issue was one’s relation to the different emotions, whether one could be open to both pleasant and unpleasant feelings and regard them as experiences one may try to understand more deeply, instead of leaning on the first impressions of their cause. In fact, one’s relation to these feelings becomes the significant factor determining whether reflection is reached or not. Based on the above, I suggest that working through emotions is not only a stage in transformation, as Mezirow (1991) points out, but also a prerequisite for reaching the problematic assumptions in the first place.
Third, reflection does not only bring positive issues in its wake (see also Taylor, 2000). Echoing Brookfield’s (1994) notion of cultural suicide, views changed through reflection may also lead one into new kinds of misunderstandings and disagreements with significant others, as the previously shared views may also become changed. These differences in assumptions became evident through unpleasant feelings, which in turn may trigger further reflection in terms of these breaks in communication. This may be seen as a second-wave trigger for reflection, as the results of reflection bring about new disorienting dilemmas, triggering further reflection both on one’s own and other people’s assumptions, as well as on the relationship (see also Cranton & Carusetta, 2004; Sands & Tennant, 2010).
Furthermore, as a methodological issue concerning researching or facilitating reflection, it is important to note that not all critical pondering is indicative of the profound issues associated with reflection within the theoretical and practical discussions. In the end, the meaning of a given reflective act is only understandable in relation to that person’s unique meaning perspective. That is to say, the classifications of the levels of reflection do not in any straightforward manner indicate the meaning of a particular reflective act to that individual. In fact, what to an outsider may appear superficial may to the insider be a transformative opening to something entirely new. Correspondingly, what to an outsider may look like profound critical pondering may, in fact, be a repetition of an old pattern unquestioningly imitated from someone else for the individual in question.
In addition to the fact that the profoundness or transformative potential of given pondering may not be assessed from the outside, it is not adequate to assume that only the profound issues are the ones that matter. Often within the discussions on transformative learning, the transformation in itself is emphasized as an endpoint. In addition, it is often underlined that in transformation, one does not only see through the revised perspective but lives through it. This kind of emphasis may run the risk of lacking sensitivity to the variety of ways in which reflection may function, what kind of effects they may bring about and at what cost. Profound reflection may also have profoundly unpleasant consequences, and educators should be sensitive to and have tools to work with these issues. Furthermore, reflection that entails changes in one’s actions and changes the way one experiences issues is not the only kind of beneficial reflection. In fact, sketching out new perspectives and playing with new paths of meaning may be an important phase in gaining distance to one’s previous ways of thinking, and enabling later readiness to step on these paths.
Although these findings are based on examining interviews with involuntarily childless women within the nonfacilitated context of life-event crisis, the raised issues are of importance for any adult educator facilitating reflection. Whether the educator is working with people who are in crisis or with those who are not, it is essential to maintain sensitivity to both cognitive and emotional perspectives. Aiming to conceptualize different experiences and pleasant as well as unpleasant feelings, and to explore the assumptions they imply, is important for both groups of people. The time needed for committing to a certain perspective is never predetermined (Malinen, 2000). Therefore, it may be useful to view the significance of reflection in broader terms than whether or not one is able to actualize and live through the new perspective. The mere “trying on new shoes” (Sands & Tennant, 2010) or sketching new paths of meaning is also an important phase and may enable one to familiarize oneself with the new perspective. Nevertheless, the entry points (Lange, 2004) to these explorations may be seen to open up through sensitivity to both pleasant and unpleasant feelings. To avoid vicious circles where one only justifies previous assumptions and is unable to break through to broader perspectives, it may prove helpful to take up reflection by focusing on the feelings emerging spontaneously in everyday instances.
In terms of future research, the findings concerning the intertwined nature of the emotional, cognitive, and social dimensions suggest that further studies on reflection might benefit from considering this interplay. Another area in need of further consideration is the terrain between the crisis context and the facilitated educational context. That is to say, within scholarly discussions on transformation and reflection, there seems to be two lines of research and argumentation insufficiently linked with each other regarding the considerations of reflection. One conceptualizes reflection based on instances where reflection emerges more naturally, namely, the context of real-life crisis, change, and transitions. The other focuses on fostering reflection or aims to map the process by analyzing the different levels of reflection already taking place within educational contexts. What is left unchartered is the other side of the story, the nonexistence of reflection in educational settings as well as the obstacles and challenges associated with this. One study to stimulate such attempts is that of Berger (2004), by shedding light on the various experiences at the transformative edges of meaning. By remaining open to the similarities in experiences within different contexts, while being sensitive to the differences in them, it may be possible to perceive issues beyond our current perspectives on reflection and conceptualize more fully the continuum of human experience between the contexts of crisis and noncrisis.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: This research was funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation.
