A Novel Viewpoint on Andragogy: Enabling Moments of Community

A New Way of Comprehending Community, That Is, as Moments of Community

The notion of community as commonly used has many associations. In its broadest sense, community refers to “a group of people living in the same place or having a particular characteristic in common.” ³ A community may, for instance, be rural, ethnic, religious or scientific in nature. Because of its diversity, the term can also refer to a body of nations or states unified by a common interest.

Theoretically, two archetypes can be drawn to allow gaining a better grip on the term. There is a liberal-oriented perception on community, historically related to the French Revolution of 1789 and, counterpointing the latter, there is a perception originating in preromantic times and greatly influenced by the ideas of Burke, Herder, Fichte, and other contemporary thinkers. Subsequently, these ideas and their practices were first systematically developed into two analytical concepts, “Gemeinschaft” (community) and “Gesellschaft” (society; Tönnies, 1887) and then used as ideal types (Weber, 1968).

In the social sciences, the idea of community has been extensively reflected on, with its genesis being associated with different dimensions, including locality or place (Bernardo & Palma-Oliviera, 2016; Frankenberg, 1966). Others have emphasized the importance of traditional symbols and rituals (Back, 1996), pointed out its function as a means to resist change (Day, 2006) or highlighted the significance of systems of meaning as a collective property (Geertz, 1973). Moreover, there is a political dimension to community: the forming of communities of identity or interest—“peg communities” (Bauman, 2001). Another way to approach community development is to regard it as a process of creating or increasing agency—the capacity of a people – and solidarity (Bhattacharyya, 2004; Hustedde, 2009). While there are those whose sense of belonging will be restricted to one particular community, others may feel part of several communities simultaneously (Sen, 2006). In the social sciences, the term “social capital” (Bourdieu, 1986; Hanifan, 1916; Putnam, 1993) has a similar function, expressing that relations—no matter how diverse—are extremely valuable to both the individual and society.

As indicated, we will elaborate an additional understanding of community based on a view that developed at a time when the semantics of traditional concepts were changing and classic dichotomies and archetypes were surmounted (Lofland, 1988, p. 58). ⁴ Scholars argued that community should be thought of, not as a collective identity, but as a real social form, an interaction (Amit, 2002). Of particular interest in this regard is the observation by the anthropologist Ruth Soenen (2006) that people have experiences of community that in no way relate to “the making of a new group of likeminded people, a collective identity” (p. 7). Her aim is to gain a profound understanding of this phenomenon (Soenen & Verlot, 2002).

Drawing on micro-oriented research on connectedness and social relationship building, Soenen (2006) focuses on what it is that binds people in diversified neighborhoods. She is inspired by Granovetter’s distinction between weak and strong ties (Granovetter, 1973). Weak ties are potential relationships with different small groups that can be activated when necessary or desired, such as colleagues at work or acquaintances at children’s day care centers. Strong ties consist of deep relationships with homogenous groups. Soenen pays particular attention to a footnote in Granovetter’s work about “absent ties” (p. 1361). This footnote refers not only to the absence of any relationship but also to ties without substantial meaning, that is, where interactions are negligible. Contrary to Granovetter though, in her own research, Soenen is able to revalue these ties without substantial meaning by conceiving of such ties as ephemeral relations or moments of community.

Soenen’s research focuses in particular on the mobile reality of public transport. The space that users of public transport find themselves in, is subject to a number of unwritten rules, for example, the civil inattention rule (Lofland, 1988, p. 58). This implicit politeness rule is applied when people notice each other but turn their attention away to not offend their fellow citizens. Soenen, looking closely at these relations, observes that at times the civil inattention rule is broken, usually as a result of unexpected events. For instance, when a train or bus stops abruptly, the resulting imbalance may cause passengers to have eye contact or touch each other. Car accidents on a tram’s itinerary are known to start people sharing their views of the situation. And dogs and children in public transport are also often food for conversation. ⁵

It is interesting to the line of thinking set out in this article that Soenen (2006) distinguishes a number of elements in these ephemeral relations and that she regards such relations as providing moments of community. The author points to the politeness rule, and how it is suspended. Based on interviews, she asserts that during these small talks there is no longer “us” or “them.” Participants are transformed into something in between, less than the same and more than simply the other. At these particular moments, a previously imperceptible string of small talk and gestures surfaces, called “a relational web” (p. 7), also described as there being an “orientation towards the unknown other” (p. 6). These relations clearly are “salient as a means of affiliation” (p. 7), which is considered extremely valuable as it provides people with “a temporal experience of being “at home”” (p. 7). The sense of community is described in terms of “moments of community” (p. 7), endorsed as “emergent situations” (p. 10). Soenen (2006) asserts that the importance of these moments is not taken seriously enough.

The author is definitely right in emphasizing the pertinence of such experiences of being together, despite their ephemeral nature. Perhaps these interactions are not sufficiently valued precisely because their full impetus is not yet well enough known and recognized. Due awareness of their significance is also key to any attempt at pointing to their relevance for andragogy, so that further investigation is required. A philosophical point of view is favored since so far, to our knowledge, French continental philosophy has been the only source to reveal in a profound way how in these moments the co of community is revealed.

Suspension of the “Us–Them” Distinction

One of the constituent elements of the interaction at hand is that the distinction between us and them disappears. This is a peculiar phenomenon, because, as Heidegger (1927), Levinas (1969), and other philosophers have explained at length, people’s minds have the innate urge to imbue with meaning everything they sense as “world.” Also influenced by continental philosophy, Charles Taylor (1989) further demonstrates that a meaningful world cannot exist without distinctions. Zooming in on moral categories, he explains how people always distinguish between hyper goods and goods, making use of an array of nuances in between. So, in its most general and standard sense, it is by using distinctions—often as basic as cold–warm and them–us—that people appear to create a coherent world in which they can function. As inevitable as such distinctions are, though, Soenen (2006) points to the concrete possibility of their becoming disrupted. Her view is quite intriguing because she does not claim that, in the example given above, the other person in the tram—one of “them”—has become one of “us,” for in that case, she would have referred to a switch of categories. Instead, Soenen (2006) suggests that the person is transformed into something in between, belonging to neither category. This is the very reason why such situations may concern forms of community that have not been captured in traditional terms.

The aforementioned philosophers also refer to this dynamic of opposites, albeit in more abstract terms. Nancy (1997b) describes the interruption of distinctions as a suspension of thinking, for it is through thinking that distinctions arise. Considered from this perspective, at such moments, thinking takes a step and performs the impossible, distancing itself from a meaningful frame that it likewise creates.

This may appear utterly strange, for how can we stop thinking and making meaning? The matter is even more nuanced, however, and highly intricate: in the words of Nancy (2013), such an interruption is about “ . . . an interruption in communication. . . . Not an interruption of communication, but an interruption that is communicated in the midst of the uninterrupted flux of our communication” (p. 157). Applying this to our example, since we cannot live without distinctions, it is an interruption of the us–them distinction communicated in the mid of the uninterrupted flux of the categories us–them. They are interrupted, while paradoxically they continue.

Suspension of Innate Goal-Orientedness

Before continuing Soenen’s line of thought, in order to understand the deep implications of this interaction, we will introduce a nuanced Levinasian interpretation of the ego or subject. Levinas points to the ego’s conatus essendi or the effort of being: an ego has a perfectly healthy attachment to itself and uses its reason to become more and more itself. Its identity is a striving for identity, a making the world into its own world, with the sole goal of creating its proper ego. Its objective is the incessant attempt at becoming itself (Levinas, 1969). In more common language, a subject is a reasonable being striving for personal development, emancipation and improvement of its situation, a person that in an independent way fully develops its potentialities, goals, and dreams.

Next, Levinas (1969) introduces the possibility of this innate goal-orientation being interrupted, which is invariably provoked by the other. This interruption opens within the ego a response ability for the other.

Levinas’s observation about the ego’s innate goal-orientation being interrupted is not very familiar, not even in mainstream philosophy. Nancy (1996) following Levinas in this, rightly observes that in our current worldview interruption of the self is still predominantly judged as “pathological” (p. 6). ⁶ However, as will be discussed in further detail below, the idea of interruption offers interesting new insights, for it is only at moments of the ego’s interruption that the co of community can be sensed. In line with the above, this interruption is always an interruption of the ego in the midst of its uninterrupted continuation.

Above, referring to Nancy, it was claimed that at the moment of community, the thought process of making distinctions is interrupted. Next, we presented how such interruptions cause the ego’s attempts at creating its identity to be interrupted. These changes have repercussions on how the person experiencing the moment of community will understand the moment of co. The moment of co is neither understood by thought—thought has been interrupted—nor experienced with the senses, for according to Levinas and Nancy, the actual experience is a characteristic of the ego. That is why Nancy (1997a), in his very occasional use of the notion, refers to “a limit-experience” (p. 76). Sensing community is an experience—it is not a concept—but one we can hardly sense with the senses, because it remains at the limit. During the interaction as described by Soenen, people thus do not develop an idea of what community is all about, nor do they experience community in the proper sense of the term—like they experience swimming, for example; what is happening is a limit-experience, an experience that escapes the ego.

Last, from a philosophical viewpoint, the interaction is not part of chronos time and thus cannot be a “moment.” We will nevertheless use “moment of community” as a synonym for the interaction-as-interruption.

“Salient as a Means of Affiliation”

Soenen (2006) not only points out the particular nature of the encounter, she also emphasizes its genuine value. Empirical evidence gathered by way of interviews leads her to conclude that ephemeral contacts taking place in a narrow time and space slot appear to be “salient as a means of affiliation” (p. 7), providing people with “a temporal experience of being ‘at home’” (p. 7). To thoroughly understand the issue, we will have to focus on the co in community. Its etymology tells us that it concerns a move toward togetherness or, more specifically, a move from the ego experience toward a sense of togetherness where the ego’s goal-orientation and thinking have been suspended.

This means that we will have to explore and comprehend in greater depth the interaction between people: the action that brings about the inter, the co, which gives people a feeling of being “at home.” For this purpose, we will draw on Nancy’s attempts at providing a description of its conditions.

In one of his articles, Nancy (2014a) refers to a “decision [ . . . ] for the neither real nor possible” (p. 258). What we are concerned with here, is his use of the term “decision,” which we will need to deconstruct. While in everyday situations, a decision is taken to refer to an act performed by a fully responsible subject, Nancy’s use is more sophisticated. He first parses the term, pointing to the meaning of its constituent elements de and scission, namely an undoing of the act of “cutting” or “dividing.” In Soenen’s case, this would be an undoing of “us” and “them”; the scission between both is annihilated. Nancy then uses the same wordplay to reveal a second condition. While the term “decision” may be analyzed as de-scission, its semantical meaning—making a choice between two things—remains the same, in this case the choice for a yes or no to the interruption. Even so, a no is not within the range of possibilities. A person’s decision to say yes to the moment is not a deliberate act. Indeed, it is quite the contrary. With both goal-orientation and thinking having been suspended, the affirmative answer just happens, the moment being agreed to without the ego’s involvement. From a Levinasian viewpoint, in such situations of interaction, we are open to the other—or to reuse and deepen Soenen’s wording: we are oriented to the unknown other, despite our selves, that is, our egos. In the example about the person on the tram, the moment of community thus is something beyond their control.

Both Nancy and Levinas use such terms as “imperious” and “command” to highlight the uncontrollability of the act by a “subject.” However, to further zoom in on the etymological move toward a togetherness, and drawing on Derrida, we will tone down this wording and introduce the notion of gift.

This too is a notion requiring deconstruction. As a rule, a gift involves an act where the giver is fully aware of making the gift, in the hope of satisfying the receiver and thus implicitly expecting some sort of appreciation. In interactions as described by Soenen, the gift is recognized as such neither by the receiver—say, the “us”—nor by the giver—say, the “them.” Rather, the gift is something that happens in between “them” and” us,” experienced as the gift of being at home (with the other), without any direct obligation or claim ensuing between the two. It is an instance of involuntary affirming. The question then arises what it is that is being affirmed. According to Nancy, the answer is that it is no less and no more than a shared existence, coming about at the moment of co. When the ego is suspended—within its continuation—there is no longer any single subject but a becoming of sharedness. A sense (not an idea nor an experience) of co emerges, as in community, which Soenen refers to as the coming into being of a relational web between both. As such, the importance of the encounter can only be appreciated “in community and as community” (Nancy, 1992, p. 383).

Emphasizing the move toward togetherness, risks suggesting the idea of a unity, a merging of two or more subjects into a co. Although there is undoubtedly a bond, it is, as Levinas (1969) is keen to observe, “a bond that is established between same and other, without constituting a totality” (p. 40, italics added). There is also, and illogically, a distance toward the other, since, as already established above, the subject cannot get hold of the other through any form of classification, or as any kind of experience of the ego.

Theoretically, this illogical dynamic can be described as a simultaneity of proximity and distance. In the case of Soenen, the other (them) cannot be put into a category, which creates a distance, while at the same time there is, paradoxically, a move toward togetherness, which makes strangers feel at home with each other (proximity). In summary, there is an emergence of togetherness-in-distance, out of nothing, an ephemeral wink, lightly to be disregarded. Still the trace it leaves behind is not light, making us feel at home, making us sense that existence is first and foremost about just that: a move toward togetherness. These instances of co, which we ontologically are, are foundational to the individual and to each concept that helps shape community (Nancy, 1996).

Andragogical Relevance

At this stage, we can leave aside the philosophical reflections and go on to discuss the relevance of the above account to andragogy and its novel role. For, what has been laid bare is nothing less than the foundational point giving rise to orientation toward the other. Community happens when a step is taken from the linguistically constituted ego toward nonlinguistical togetherness, technically formulated as the paradox of merging (proximity) and yet remaining at a distance. It discloses the first and foremost human condition for commitment. Soenen thus (2006) rightly observed that these moments are not taken seriously enough. However, as Levinas strongly emphasizes, there is no straightforward relation between ontological affirmation - the experience of community - and actual engagement toward each other. Then why would this moment be so significant? The crux seems to lie in the reversal, in that, without such moments happening, any involvement would eventually cease to be. In other words, the interactions are imperative to keep involvement going by sparking a nonlinguistic understanding of its ultimate importance. Perhaps this is why Levinas (1969) at times uses the expression “experience par excellence” (p. 112).

In view of all this, the novel role for andragogy can be said to be challenging, if not steep. The first task to be completed would be to develop an ability, or rather, an alertness, to recognize moments of community. This is harder than it might seem, not only because of the illogical nature of the dynamic of the interaction, or the lack of general familiarity with the matter, but perhaps even more so because moments of community can come about in innumerable ways. In the field of anthropology, the constituent elements identified above—the interruption of distinctions, thought and goal-orientation, with the interaction being considered salient as a means of affiliation—are not always manifested in the same way. Some elements may prevail over others, and some may even be barely noticeable at all. ⁷ The constellations can differ considerably, as will be shown in a case study below.

In addition to developing the alertness to recognize a sense of community there is a second major task integrally interwoven with the first. To clarify what this entails, we will turn to the professional habitat of andragogy. Andragogical sciences, at least in its broad European comprehension, are expected to prepare their scholars to be employed in a wide variety of organizations and institutions, ranging from educational, social, cultural and artistical to organizations and institutions on a local, regional, national, or international level, of a formal or nonformal nature, and funded by public or private sources. Enabling moments of community in these highly diverse contexts, implies understanding any processes that might possibly prevent such moments from happening. Andragogues should therefore pay attention to both the recognition of these moments and hindering factors.

In the following section, we will briefly discuss how moments of community are to come about in such organizations, and then zoom in on one organization, the not-for-profit Local Exchange Trading System (LETS), as developed in a town in Belgium, to identify rigid visions or structures as the main impediments for moments of community. Last, it will be demonstrated what role andragogy can play to overcome this.

Recognizing Moments of Community

As indicated, moments of community may manifest themselves in multiple ways. The andragogical professional, working in organizations, will have to be aware of and attentive to this. Nevertheless, in organizations set up to strive for a better world, there is a particular manifestation that appears to be recurring.

When a not-for-profit organization is created, its members are usually eager to bring into practice their ideals. Aspiring to attain a common goal, colleagues form a collective, a “we.” They constitute a community in which a sharedness can be experienced. Although this sharedness should not be confounded with the moment of community, situations of shared ideals are propitious for moments of community to happen. Moments of community are bound to occur as uncontrollable intensifications of the we-as-towards-the ideal. A comparable situation is when people form a group, a “we,” to play music together. During their performances, at rehearsals or in concerts, they will go through moments beyond their control when they feel they are connected in a more intense way. This prompts an ontological yes to what has are already been undertaken with enthusiasm and considered valuable.

People are not likely to give expression to such limit experiences because there is no clear-cut vocabulary available to them. This lack of expressive means may prevent professionals in the field of andragogy from identifying such moments in their daily practice, even if, paradoxically, it is their task to enable them. The previously constructed network of concepts and insights may be helpful to recognize these moments and their utmost importance, to recall the interruption of the ego, the paradox of being close to the other (proximity) and yet at a distance, and the interruptions of distinctions. It should be noted that in the case of an organization, we point to an encounter, not between people but between people and their shared ideal.

As asserted above, it is only through the interruption of the ego that a co of community can come about. How is this element theoretically distinguishable? In organizations aiming to put into practice the idea of a better world, ideally, any orientation toward personal goals (e.g., trying to push through hidden agendas or subjective convictions) has already been left aside in favor of a common goal shared by all. If this is not the case, the co of community cannot occur. The genuine orientation toward a common goal can be regarded phenomenologically as an interruption of the ego’s self-interest, within its uninterrupted continuation.

As for the illogical dynamic of proximity and distance, the process of converting the organization’s ideal into concrete actions can bring about feelings of coming closer to achieving the ideal as a group, feelings that may be intensified during moments of community. In spite of these feelings, the members always remain at a distance from the ideal. Ideals are by definition something to be attained in an unspecified future. People can only strive toward ideals, but they can never reach them. There is a coming closer to something that inherently always recedes.

Interruptions of distinctions is the third important element and this is precisely the role to be played by andragogy in organizations. Above, we conjectured that if an ontological yes cannot be renewed, involvement will cease to be. Now, and this is essential, in the process of fleshing out and articulating their initially vague ideals, not-for-profit organizations run the risk of their ideals becoming rigid. As Nancy (2014b) puts it in a different context, there seems to be a natural tendency for “a solidification of meaning” (p. 15). This will negatively affect the organization’s enthusiasm for the shared ideals, and if enthusiasm disappears, the required condition for moments of community to happen, will also disappear.

In the following, some examples of this phenomenon will be provided through a case study on the LETS, highlighting the role andragogy can perform to open up rigid articulations of the ideal, namely by inducing flow. The case study serves to concretize the theoretical reasoning, not to prove the perspective scientifically.

A Case Study: The LETS: Meaning Rigidified

In 2013, a group of active citizens decided to start a LETS in their hometown. LETS is officially defined as a “local community-based mutual aid network in which people exchange all kinds of goods and services with one another, without the need for money.” ⁸ For the Co-ordinating Committee (COCO), the local LETS was to become much more than an a-political exchange platform, however. Aspiring to make the world a better place, the LETS was set up as a first initiative toward transition. Its main goal can be summarized in the following three phrases: “trust rather than distrust, being rather than having, co-operation rather than competition.” The two cases discussed below serve to illustrate how the network’s ideal was articulated, and how subsequently its articulations became rigid, affecting the participants’ enthusiasm and thus making it harder for moments of community to arise.

Practically Enabling Moments of Community

In outlining the role of practically enabling moments of community, it is presumed that the andragogue works within the system. In the case of the LETS, the relevant problems were identified and subsequently appropriate interventions were selected.

Most cases of rigid articulations were approached using communication techniques, particularly adapted versions of the Socratic dialogue. The main goal of a Socratic dialogue is to question strong beliefs. This method starts from the idea that even a seemingly very true conviction is no more than one of many potentially valuable perspectives. It makes deliberate use of two processes. The first is elenchus, an experience of shame caused by not knowing. It is derived from the Greek word elenkhein, to put to shame, refute. It is thought that this experience helps people listen to others. As long as people are convinced of their own truth, they will only try to persuade others. The second is the protreptic element, from Greek protreptikos, to urge on, to turn to. The idea is that, through this process, a person will open up to the other and adopt an attitude of constructive doubt and constant investigation (Van Rossem, 2018).

In the case of LETS, the dyadic structure of a Socratic dialogue runs parallel with the dynamic of interrupting (elenchus) and enabling a reconnecting to the ideal (protreptic). First, through the elenchus experience, it was possible to put into question the necessity to submit to self-imposed rules (Case 1), and the distinction between passive/active members (Case 2). Unlike the Socratic dialogue, in this case ideas were not targeted openly—that is, no shame about not knowing was provoked. Instead, a soft approach was chosen, the challenge being to make people realize for themselves that it is not about being right or wrong in absolute terms, by letting them experience that each situation can be viewed from different perspectives, some of which will be more appropriate in certain contexts than the others. The aim of this approach is to “interrupt” people’s strong convictions in an implicit way.

Second, there is the protreptic element or openness. In the case of the LETS, the technique, cautiously employed, helped increase the likelihood of participants reorienting toward the shared ideal. In Case 1, a collective yet implicit awareness of the possibility of rigidification emerged. This resulted in the participants abandoning their submission to rules and rearranging their foundational setup, more or less intuitively opting for a flexible structure. Concretely, the LETS switched from being a formal nonprofit organization to taking on a less constraining structure. The practice of flexibility was then transposed to other features of the LETS. For example, whereas before the change, COCO had opted for a balance between debit and credit, this rule was discarded in favor of the use of a virtual bottomless pit of credits.

Andragogues are free to use any other methods in addition to communication techniques, as long as they aim their interventions at opening rigid ways of thinking. For example, in the case of the LETS, what proved problematic in Case 2 was the change in perspective of a small subgroup, resulting in more generalized negativity during the meetings. After analyzing the situation to pinpoint the problem, the andragogue decided to use the monthly meeting of the COCO to suggest writing a New Year’s letter. She presented what such a letter could look like, and the initiative was welcomed and further elaborated by the group during the meeting. One major characteristic of the letter was its inviting rather than reproachful wording: it thanked the citizens for participating and thus for subscribing to the main ideals as expressed in the three sentences; it expressed gratitude to the members for their contributions to the exchanges, specifying that it did not matter whether they responded to only one or two exchanges a year, as long as they continued striving after the group’s ideals. Last, it invited the members to persuade others to join so that as many people as possible would adhere to the ideals and alleviate the tasks for all concerned. The letter thus emphasized the potentials of the LETS and, more importantly, merged the organization’s current practices in a renewed way with its ideals, retuning the minds to its ideals, and thus implicitly rectifying the prevailing discourse of perception of discontent. This effect of the letter was apparent not only at the level of the COCO but also at the level of participants, with some members expressing their renewed engagement.

More in general, a deliberate choice was made to intervene for pragmatic reasons only, opting for an approach that seemed to work best in that particular situation. Also, special attention was paid to whether relations would be blocked by such or such move. The primary focus was on reconnecting people or groups of people toward their ideals. Theoretical explanations about the viewpoint on moments of community were deliberately avoided. Not only because the issue is subtle and difficult to transmit but also because it could—and was bound to—become a new concern for the coordinators to live up to. In becoming a goal to achieve, its formulation would paradoxically lead to rigidity. In view of this, this aspect of the approach will have to remain within the nonspoken.